Liu Yong

# The Dutch East India Company's Tea Trade with China, 1757-1781

TANAP MONOGRAPHS ON THE HISTORY OF ASIAN-EUROPEAN INTERACTION

BRILL

# THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TEA TRADE WITH CHINA
1757 - 1781

# TANAP Monographs on the History of the Asian-European Interaction

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AND

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VOLUME 6

# THE DUTCH EAST INDIA COMPANY'S TEA TRADE WITH CHINA
# 1757 - 1781

BY

YONG LIU

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*Dedicated to the memory of*
*my maternal grandmother Liu Hehua*
*and paternal grandfather Liu Daoman*

# SERIES EDITOR'S FOREWORD

Probably nowhere in the world have such profound changes in historiography been occurring as in the nation states of Monsoon Asia that gained independence after the conclusion of the Pacific War in 1945. These traditionally outward-looking countries on the rims of the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Seas have been interacting with each other through maritime transport and trade for more than two millennia, but the exigencies of modern nation-building have tended to produce state-centred historical narratives that emphasize a distinctive heritage and foster cultural pride and identity on the basis of such heroic themes as anti-colonial resistance. No one will deny the need for and utility of such "nation-building" agendas, but an inward-directed national historiography does not necessarily prepare one's citizens for our present age of regional co-operation and globalization.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the coastal societies of Monsoon Asia witnessed the entry of European traders, the emergence of global maritime trading networks, and the laying of the foundations of colonial empires that reached their apogees in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The difficulties of studying this pre-colonial and early colonial past should not be underestimated. Local sources are often rare because of wars and the frequent changes of both indigenous and colonial regimes. The hot and humid tropical climate is also unkind to the preservation of manuscripts. The mass of western-language data preserved in the archives of the former East India companies and those of the Spanish and Portuguese empires in Asia often have an undeniably Europe-centred character and bias. Thus we face not only a highly imbalanced supply of source material, but also the very complex problem of how to decode the hidden agendas that often colour these primary materials.

Over the past fifty years there has been a pronounced effort in academic circles in North America, Australia and the former European colonial nations to "decolonize" historical writing on Asian-European interaction, albeit for reasons totally different from those in their Asian counterparts. Increasingly doubt has been cast on such longstanding paradigms as the superiority of the dynamic West over static Asian societies. Historians of international trade such as the late Holden Furber, whose description of this period as "The Age of Partnership" inspired the name of the TANAP programme, have taken an interest in the various ways and means by which Asian-European interaction began in various kinds of competition, rivalry, collaboration, diplomacy, and military confrontation. This

approach has forced historians to return to the archival sources and the places where these events unfolded with the result that new frontiers of research have opened in which close partnerships between Asian and European historians, with their specific cultural tool kits and linguistic backgrounds, is now starting to reap fruit.

In anticipation of the four hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the Dutch East India Company in 1602, members of the history department of Leiden University proposed the establishment of an international research programme aimed at training a new generation of Asian historians of Asian-European interaction in the early modern period. It was taken for granted that any such drive towards international educational co-operation should be carried out in carefully planned collaboration with the National Archives in the Hague, the Arsip Nasional of the Republic of Indonesia in Jakarta and the archives of Cape Town (South Africa), Colombo (Sri Lanka) and Chennai (India), which together hold several kilometres of archival data from the former *Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. The TANAP – Towards a New Age of Partnership – educational and archival preservation programme was started in 2000 thanks to generous grants from the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO), the Netherlands UNESCO commission, and Leiden University. Twelve universities in Asia sent some thirty young lecturers to Leiden during 2001-2003. Under the auspices of the Research Institute for Asian-African and Amerindian Studies (CNWS), these historians participated in an advanced master's programme that included intensive courses on historiography, palaeography and the old Dutch written language.

With additional funding from several Asian foundations, in 2002 seventeen of the TANAP graduates from Sri Lanka, India, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Africa and the Netherlands began working towards a PhD degree at Leiden. Three others went on to pursue their doctorates at universities elsewhere in the world. The *TANAP Monographs on Asian-European Interaction*, which includes two studies on early modern South African society, are the offspring of their doctoral theses defended at Leiden.

Leonard Blussé, University of Leiden

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First of all, I want to pay my greatest respects and express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Professor J.L. Blussé and Professor Zhuang Guotu, who have been "hand-in-hand comrades" since the 1980s. Professor Zhuang wholeheartedly inducted me into the study of the history of Chinese-Dutch relations, and Professor Blussé benevolently guided me and spurred me on to improve myself step by step throughout the course of my research. Without their constant encouragement and support, I would never have been able to carry out this research. I sincerely hope I have proved worthy of their belief in me.

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Chen Menghong, my *Chinese zus* in Holland, enthusiastically helped me to deal with my daily life in Leiden. Her stimulation and assistance from time to time made my stay in the Netherlands easier, and enabled me to concentrate more on my research. Also, I was very happy to sail with the Blussé family along the Dutch coast and in the Netherlands during several summers. Sailing on the *Mediene* offered me the colourful experience of a boatswain's life on board a Dutch *tjalk*.

This book is based on archival research in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. I am deeply grateful for all the facilities provided by the kind staff at the National Archives and the British Library in London, the Municipal Archives in Amsterdam and Utrecht, and especially the *Nationaal Archief* in The Hague where I enjoyed over three years of research. I also appreciate the courtesies of the *Rijksmuseum* in Amsterdam, the Historical Museum of Rotterdam, the National Museum of

Ceramics in Leeuwarden, the Municipal Museum of Schiedam, and the Leiden University Library. Special thanks go to Marion de Vries-Jacobs, the owner of the tea and coffee shop "The Cloverleaf" – the oldest-existing tea and coffee shop in the Netherlands – in Leiden, for kindly offering her private collection of photographs and written information about this shop.

This research has been supported by the TANAP Project (Towards a New Age of Partnership: A Dutch-Asian-South African Historical Research Project), the Kong Koan Project (Research Project of the Kong Koan Archives of the Chinese Council in Batavia/Jakarta), the CNWS (Research School of Asian, African, and Amerindian Studies), NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research), and the Universities of Leiden and Xiamen. I especially thank the co-ordinator, Henk Niemeijer, and the secretary, Marijke van Wissen-van Staden, of the TANAP Project for facilitating the institutional needs during these years.

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The unwavering support of my parents and younger sister was an important source of strength during this research. I most sincerely thank them for their patience, understanding, and endless encouragement.

# ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| BGB | Archives of the Bookkeeper-General in Batavia (*Archieven van de Boekhouder-Generaal te Batavia*), NA |
| BHIC | Brabant Historical Information Centrum *(Brabants Historisch Informatie Centrum)*, 's-Hertogenbosch |
| *BKI* | *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* |
| BL | British Library, London |
| CAS | Collection Atlas van Stolk *(collectie Atlas van Stolk)*, HMR |
| *CMD* | *Canton-Macao Dagregister* |
| DAC | Danish Asiatic Company |
| dl. | volume *(deel)* |
| EIC | English East India Company |
| ed. | editor or edited |
| eds | editors |
| GAA | Municipal Archives Amsterdam *(Gemeentearchief Amsterdam)* |
| GAU | Municipal Archives Utrecht *(Gemeentearchief Utrecht)* |
| HMR | Historical Museum Rotterdam *(Historisch Museum Rotterdam)* |
| IOR | India Office Records, British Library, London |
| KITLV | Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies *(Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde)*, Leiden |
| *KPAC* | Royal Prussian Asiatic Company in Emden to Canton and China *(Königlich Preussischen Asiatischen Compagnie in Emden nach Canton und China)* |
| N. (or N) | number |
| NA | National Archives of the Netherlands *(Nationaal Archief)*, The Hague |
| NA (UK) | The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London |
| NFC | Archive of the Dutch Factory in Canton *(Archief van de Nederlandse factorij te Canton, 1742-1826)*, NA |
| PRO | Public Record Office, NA (UK)) |
| VOC | Dutch East India Company *(Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie)*; Archives of the Dutch East India Company *(Archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (1602-1795))*, NA |
| Vol., Vols (or vols) | volume, volumes |

# NOTES ON SPELLING

The *pinyin* system of romanization is applied throughout the text. However, titles of publications and proper names, normally written in other forms of romanization, have not been uniformly changed to the *pinyin* system. Other exceptions are made in regard to some historical names of places, such as Peking (rather than Beijing), Canton, Macao, Amoy, and Limpo, and the names of teas such as Bohea (rather than Wuyi), Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Songlo, Hyson, and so on. The titles of some Chinese officials such as Tsongtu, Fooyuern, and Hoppo are transliterations from Dutch. To maintain consistency, however, these have been altered to the *pinyin* system and put within brackets.

# GLOSSARY

| | |
|---|---|
| *ad valorem* | Latin, meaning "according to the value". *Ad valorem* tax is a tax based on the estimated value of the goods or transaction concerned. |
| agar-agar | a gelatinous substance obtained from certain red seaweeds and used as a biological culture media and as a thickener in foods. |
| aloe | bitter juice from a succulent plant with a rosette of thick tapering leaves and bell-shaped or tubular flowers on long stems, used as a strong laxative. |
| arrack | Arabic *araq*, the strong spirits distilled mainly in South and South-east Asia from fermented fruits, grains, sugarcane, or the sap of coconuts or other palm trees. |
| *bankzaal* | the Bengali *bankasala* derived from Sanskrit, meaning "trade hall". A large storage shed which European companies paid to be built on the sandbank at Whampoa. |
| Barra Fort | the southern fortification of Macao 澳门, of strategic importance in defending Macao's inner harbour. |
| Batavia Committee (*Bataviase commissie*) | the committee of the Dutch supercargoes for the China trade under the leadership of Batavia between 1735 and 1756, dealing with the Company's business in Canton 广州. |
| Bay of Praia Grande | a bay south of the Macao Peninsula. |
| blue dye | a kind of well-known dyestuff of which a principal element is cobalt dioxide in the form of fine blue powder, used to colour something blue. |
| Bocca Tigris | a narrows, also known as the Bogue, meaning "Tiger's Mouth" 虎门, thirty miles below Whampoa, at the estuary of the Pearl River 珠江. |
| calico | all-cotton fabric woven in plain or tabby weave and printed with simple designs in one or more colours. Indian calicoes had originated in Calicut by the 11th century, if not earlier, and in the 17th and 18th centuries were an important commodity traded between India and Europe (and China). |
| camphor | a white volatile crystalline substance with an aromatic smell and bitter taste, occurring in certain essential oils distilled from *Camphora officinarum*. Baros camphor, of a very high quality, originates from Baros on West Sumatra. |
| carat | a unit of weight. 24 carats of pure gold valued c. 373 guilders in the Netherlands Indies in the period under study. |
| Casa Branca | a large white fortress on top of the hill at Qianshan 前山 where the military garrison was stationed. |
| catechu | a vegetable extract containing tannin, especially one obtained from the heartwood of an Indian *Acacia catechu*, used for tanning and dyeing. Also called gambier. |
| Channel Islands | a group of British-dependent islands off the coast of Normandy, France, in the English Channel. |
| chickpea | an edible leguminous plant, *Cicer arietinum*, bearing pea-like seeds. It can be eaten in salads, cooked in stews, ground into a flour called gram flour, and also can be used as a green vegetable. |
| China root (Radix China) | the dried root of the *Smilax* China, used for medicinal purposes. The root is astringent and slightly tonic; the parched and powdered leaves have been used as a dressing on burns and scalds. |

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| *chinoiserie* | refers to an artistic European style which reflected Chinese influence and is characterized by the use of elaborate decoration and intricate patterns. Its popularity peaked around the middle of the eighteenth century. |
| chop | Hindi *chhäp*, an official stamp or permit, by extension any official document bearing a seal-impression or stamp; a trademark, or mark of quality in East Asia. |
| clove oil | an aromatic oil obtained from the buds, stems, or leaves of the clove tree, used in flavouring and perfumery. |
| Co-hong | the guild of Chinese merchants authorized by the Chinese authorities to trade with an exclusive privilege with Western merchants at Canton prior to the First Opium War (1839-1842). Such firms often were called "foreign trade firms" (or (*Yang-hang* 洋行) and the merchants who directed them were known as "Hong merchants". |
| comprador | a native-born agent in Canton employed by European traders to serve as a provisions purveyor in the Canton trade. |
| cubit | an ancient unit of linear measure. See the Explanation of the Units of Measurements. |
| ducat | gold coin. |
| Dutch Republic | also called the United Provinces. The Dutch confederation of seven provinces, which had their own independent provincial governments and were governed directly by the States-General between 1581 and 1795. |
| East Indies House (*Oost-Indisch huis*) | the logistic headquarters of the VOC in Amsterdam where the board meetings took place, the administration was kept, the wages were disbursed, goods were sold, profits were calculated, and dividends were paid. |
| ell | a European measure of length, used in the Asian trade as a cloth measure. See the Explanation of the Units of Measurements. |
| *en route* | on the way. |
| *Estado da India* | the Portuguese State of India that exercised the jurisdiction over Portugal's Indian colonies. |
| *Fooyuern* (抚员 or 巡抚) | Governor or Inspector, the subordinate colleague of the Viceroy in matters at the provincial level. |
| galingale (*galinga*) | Arabic *khalanjär*, an aromatic rhizome of the ginger family; probably a distortion of Chinese "mild (or excellent?) ginger", widely used in herbal medicine and cookery. |
| gamboge (*gommegutte*) | a brownish or orange resin obtained from several trees of the genus *Garcinia*, used as a pigment (yielding a golden-yellow colour) or medicinally as a purgative. |
| *grijnen* | camlet, fabric made of a mixture of wool and camel or goat's hair or pure wool. |
| *guanxi* | Chinese social "connections" and "relationships", describing the basic dynamic in personalized networks of influence. |
| Guia Castle | the castle built approximately in 1637 on the hill of Guia, the highest hill in Macao. |
| Hague Affairs *(Haags Besogne)* | preparatory committee of the VOC directors, which met in The Hague. |
| Hanover | a kingdom and province in north-western Germany which was an electorate of the Holy Roman Empire from 1692 to 1805. |
| High Commissioner (钦差大臣) | namely the "Imperial Envoy" dispatched from Peking. He was delegated directly by the Emperor to put the latter's will into effect should the Viceroy or Governor hesitate or be unable to carry out the Imperial Orders. |

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| *Hoppo* of Canton (粤海关监督) | the Imperial Commissioner of the Customs, with headquarters in Canton. |
| *Hoppo* of Macao (澳门关部行台旗员防御) | customs officer at Macao, sent by the *Hoppo* of Canton to levy dues on all in- and outgoing Chinese junks and Portuguese ships. |
| *imperialen* | a sort of high quality textile. |
| *ipso jure* | Latin, meaning "by the law itself" or "by operation of law", used as an adverb. |
| *Jan Compagnie* | a servant of the Dutch East India Company. |
| kapok | a fine, silky fibre obtained from the fruit of the silk-cotton tree, used as padding in pillows, mattresses, cushions, etc. |
| *koban* (小判) | also called as *cobang*, *coubang*, *coupan*. Small 6.5x3.2 cm shaped gold coin in Japan, weighing 18 grams. |
| *Koxinga* (国姓爷) | the popular name of Zheng Chenggong 郑成功 (1624-1662), a prominent leader of the anti-Qing movement and a general who recovered Taiwan from Dutch colonial rule in 1662. |
| *laken* | woollen cloth, the major commodity of the Netherlands imported by the Dutch in Canton. |
| *Mexicanen* | Mexican silver coins. See the Explanation of the units of measurements. |
| mother-of-cloves | ripe clove fruit, containing one seed or rarely two seeds. The ovary and sepals constitute the specific part marketed as cloves. |
| musk | a substance with a strong, penetrating odour obtained from a small sac under the skin of the abdomen of the male musk deer, used in perfume and medicinally. |
| myrrh | a fragrant gum resin obtained from certain trees, used in perfume, medicine, and incense. |
| *nachoda* | from Persian *na-khuda*. Captain of an Asian vessel, especially Chinese junk. Also called *anachoda* or *annakhoda*. |
| Nanhai Court (南海县) | the Justice Court, which was called "Yamen" 衙门 in Chinese, of Nanhai County 南海县. |
| Nanking linen | a kind of finely woven, shiny linen. |
| old tea | tea left over from the past trading season, called "old tea" by the Dutch, was called "Yadong Cha" (压冬茶) in Chinese, and "winter tea" in English. |
| *olibanum* | an aromatic resin, yellowish in colour, obtained from trees of genus *Boswellia sacra* or *Boswellia carterii*, used in incense and perfume. |
| *op recognitie* | on recognition. The VOC received commission for the auction of teas on recognition. |
| *op vracht* | at freight. The VOC received commission for the auction of teas at freight. |
| *patria* | Fatherland or home country. |
| pearl dust (*stampparel*) | pearls of the smallest size, sometimes ground into dust and used as a cardiacum, a medicine for weak hearts. |
| *perpetuaan* | perpetuana (everlasting), a durable woollen fabric, imported by the Dutch in Canton. |
| *piaster* | silver coin. |
| pig | an oblong ingot of lead from a smelting furnace. The term was sometimes used for other metals such as iron and copper. |
| Poelo Bavi | Wuzhuzhou Island 乌猪洲 east of the Shangchuan Island and c. 20 miles west of Macao. |
| *polemieten* | durable, smooth woollen cloth. |
| principal shareholders (*hoofdparticipanten*) | Those who owned or held the principal shares of the VOC stock. Their representatives could be present at important meetings of the VOC management. |
| putchuck | Hindustani *pachak*, dried, fragrant, spicy root of *Saussurea costus*, a species of thistle, used for burning as incense or in medicine as |

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| | a stomach tonic, diuretic, and expectorant. |
| *ras de Marocco* | twilled woollen cloth from Maroc, very glossily woven and shorn so that the hair cannot be seen. |
| rattan | Malay *rütan*, canes obtained from the long stems of the *Calamus* climbing palm throughout South-east Asia. More pliable than bamboo, they could be split and twisted to make thick ropes and hawsers for ships and woven into sails for junks, as well as a whole variety of building and domestic uses similar to bamboo. |
| red ochre | a red earth pigment containing ferric oxide, typically with clay. Ochres vary widely in transparency; some are quite opaque, while others are valued for their use as glazes. |
| *régulateur de la politique anglaise* | regulator of the English policy. |
| rhubarb (*rhabarber*) | the dried, bitter-tasting rhizome and roots of *Rheum* grown in China, used medicinally as a purgative and laxative. |
| Sadras | a fortress town 70 km south of Chennai in Tamil Nadu state. "Sadras" is the anglicized form of the ancient town of Chadhuranga Pattinam. |
| sago | Malay *sügü*, the flour-like foodstuff produced from the stems of the palm genus *Mebroxylan*, found throughout South-east Asia. It formed a bulk commodity for the Dutch and in its round pellet form was often shot straight into the hold of a ship to fill all the spaces between other cargoes. |
| sampan | a small boat or skiff, possibly from Chinese *sanpan*, "three boards". |
| sandalwood | the fragrant red wood of the *Pterocarpus santalina*, native to South India, used for carvings, cosmetics, and incense. |
| *sang-froid* | self-confidence or self-assurance. |
| sapanwood | the red dye-wood of the *Caesalpina sappan*, found in South-east Asia, used for medicine and for dying cotton products. |
| *schuitje* | ingots with the shape of a small boat. Silver, copper, gold, and tin cast in the shape of a boat for trade. |
| security merchant | Baoshang 保商 in Chinese. The merchant who was held responsible by Chinese authorities for the foreign ships, the crews, and the duties that were owed. |
| Senate of Macao (*Senado da Camara de Macao*) | the municipal council of Macao, the voting members of which comprised three councilmen (*vereadores*), two judges (*juizes ordinarios*), and a procurator (*procurador*). |
| Spanish rial | Spanish silver coin. See the Explanation of the Units of measurements. |
| spelter (*spiauter* or *spiaulter*) | zinc alloyed with small amounts of copper, lead and a few other metals, usually found in the form of ingots, slabs, or plates. |
| St Jan | Shangchuan Island 上川岛, west of Macao. |
| star anise | also called Bajiao 八角 in Chinese. A small star-shaped fruit with one seed in each arm from the *Illicium verum*. It has an aniseed flavour and is used unripe in cookery. |
| States of Holland and West Friesland *Staten van Holland en West-Friesland* | the representation of the three estates: Nobility, Clergy and Commons to the court of the Count of Holland. After the United Provinces were formed they continued to function as the government of the Province of Holland (1572-1795). |
| States-General (*Staten-Generaal*) | the supreme authority of the Seven United Provinces established in 1593 and seated in The Hague. It consisted of representatives of each sovereign provincial estate for the general government of the United Provinces. The VOC was under its general supervision. |
| storax | a rare fragrant gum resin obtained from an eastern Mediterranean tree, used in medicine, perfumery, and incense. Liquid storax is a liquid balsam obtained from the Asian liquidambar tree. |

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| Taipa (氹仔) | island south of the Macao Peninsula. |
| tare | the deduction from the gross weight of commodities to allow for containers, wrapping, packing, etc; or to determine or indicate the tare of commodities. |
| tea *van particulieren* | tea owned by private individuals. |
| test-needle (*toetsnaald*) | also called "touch-needle". A small bar of gold and silver, either pure or alloyed in some known proportion with copper, for trying the purity of articles of gold or silver by comparison of the streaks made by the article and the bar on a touchstone. |
| Tiger Island | the island situated at the entrance to Bocca Tigris, commanding the entrance of the Pearl River. |
| touch | both gold and silver were rated according to their alloy content, or "touch", as it was known. |
| trepang | a large sea cucumber (*Holothuria edulis*) from the southern Pacific and Indian Ocean which is eaten as an ingredient in soup especially in China. Also called *bêche-de-mer*. |
| *Tsongtu* (总督) | styled Viceroy (Governor-General), the highest civil official over the province. |
| turmeric (*kurkuma*) | a widely cultivated plant of China (*Curcuma longa*), having yellow flowers and an aromatic, somewhat fleshly rhizome. The powder and fresh root of this plant is used as a condiment and a yellow dye. |
| Whampoa (黄埔) | the outer port of Canton, in the Pearl River, c. 15 km south-east of Canton. |
| Zoet-Zoet-Ham | an anchorage downriver from Canton and just above Bocca Tigris. |

# EXPLANATION OF THE UNITS OF MEASUREMENTS

*Weights*

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|---|---|
| 1 Chinese picul | = 100 catties = 1600 taels |
| | ≈ 1 "Company" picul = 122½ pounds* |

*Lengths*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Dutch ell | ≈ 69 centimeters |
| 1 Indian cubit | ≈ 70 centimeters |

*Currencies*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1 Chinese tael | = 10 maces = 100 candareens = 1000 catties |
| | = 88 stivers = 4.4 guilders |
| 1 guilder (*gulden*) | = 20 stivers (*stuivers*) = 320 pennies (*penningen*) |
| 1 Zeeuws pound (*pond*) | = 20 shillings (*schellingen*) = 240 pennies (*groten*) |
| | ≈ 6.05 guilders |
| 1 Spanish rial | ≈ 2.5 guilders |
| 1 mark *Mexicanen* | = 9.13 Spanish rials |
| | ≈ 6.75 Chinese taels |
| | ≈ 23 guilders |
| 1 mark piaster | ≈ 1 mark *Mexicanen* |
| 1 rix-dollar | ≈ 2.4 guilders |
| 1 Dutch Indies rupee | = 1.5 guilders |
| 1 Dutch gold ducat | ≈ 5.25 guilders |

* "pound" used in this book is Dutch pound, unless otherwise indicated.

Sources: NA 1.04.02, VOC 4543-4547; M. Kooijmans & J.E. Oosterling, *VOC-Glossarium. Verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000); K. Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*; H. Enno van Gelder, *De Nederlandse Munten* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2002); *Het Woordenboek der Nederlandsche Taal* (AND Electronic Publishing B.V., 1999).

# INTRODUCTION

In the years 1792-1793, the British King George III sent George Macartney as his envoy to the Manchu court in Peking. The main purpose of this appointment was to establish trade and diplomatic intercourse on the basis of equality with the Empire of Qing China. Some historians argue the Macartney mission failed because of the clash between the Chinese and the English attitudes toward the Chinese court etiquette, which required all visitors to kowtow before the Qianlong Emperor. This argument may be acceptable from the cultural point of view, but the deeper reason behind the Emperor's refusal to accede to the English requests was his persistently dismissive attitude about foreign trade, which was undoubtedly representative of the basic policy of the Empire. This was clearly expressed in his reply to the British King: "The productions of Our Empire are manifold, and in great abundance; nor do We stand in the least need of the produce of other countries" and "China in particular affords tea, and fine earthen ware, silk and other materials. All these are in great request, both in your own and the other Kingdoms of Europe."[1]

The tone may have sounded arrogant and the "We need nothing" formula is a standard phrase in imperial rhetoric, but the facts the Emperor stated were simply true at one level. The two sentences more or less summarize the commercial situation between Europe and China in the eighteenth century. There was an imbalance in the European trade with China. The Manchu government considered the permitting of European trade in Canton a beneficent indulgence towards European countries. It did not particularly value the European trade, although its contribution to the imperial treasury was not to be sneezed at.[2] China was not to purchase enough foreign commodities to balance the trade until the import of opium mushroomed in the early nineteenth century.[3] For their part, the European countries needed the China trade dearly. After their infatuation with spices and Indian calicoes in the seventeenth century, the Europeans turned their gaze to China in the eighteenth century.[4] The "China craze" showed itself in a passion for Chinese silk, porcelain, and tea, but it was tea which took pride of place. In Europe, the widespread vogue for *chinoiserie* and the concomitant development of the porcelain industry, and later in the nineteenth century the design of the fast tea- and opium-clippers were all linked to the craze for tea. It takes no great stretch of the imagination to realize that tea indeed gave shape to the course of the European-China trade.[5]

The influence of this rise in consciousness was especially significant to the China trade of the Dutch United East India Company (*Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, hereafter the VOC) from 1729, when the VOC initiated its direct trade with China, until 1794 when the directorate of the Company was dissolved. Notwithstanding the fact that the VOC traded with China for tea, porcelain, raw silk and silk textiles, China root and galingale, rhubarb, star anis, spelter and so on, the tea trade exclusively occupied by far the most important proportion of the VOC China trade. The growing perception of the importance of its tea trade by the VOC administration stimulated the Gentlemen Seventeen (*Heren Zeventien*), the central administrative board of the VOC, to carry out no less than three times a drastic change of policy towards the trade route to China.

Before the present study, little attention has been paid to the importance and the relative value of tea as a commodity within the VOC trade or to the management of the tea trade itself. The more meticulous the research into the records of the China trade of the VOC, the more indelibly the idea takes root that tea was indeed the cornerstone of the China trade. This affirmation makes a case study of the VOC management of its tea trade with China a worthwhile proposition.

### *Outline of the VOC tea trade with China*

On 20 March 1602, in order to reorganize the burgeoning Dutch overseas trade with Asia, the States-General (*Staten-Generaal*) of the Republic of the Seven United Provinces of the Netherlands (*Republiek der Zeven Verenigde Provinciën*, hereafter the Dutch Republic or the Republic) issued an exclusive charter for the foundation of the VOC, in which all the existing East India Companies of six different cities in the coastal provinces of Holland and Zeeland were merged into one company.[6] Not many years passed before the China trade emerged as an important component of the Dutch trade with Asia.[7]

The Dutch were the first to take tea from Japan and China to Europe at the beginning of the seventeenth century,[8] but during most of the seventeenth century the China trade of the VOC was focusing on the trade in silk, gold, and porcelain. From the beginning of the eighteenth century onwards, as European consumers familiarized themselves with tea-drinking and tea entrenched itself as an indispensable article in European daily life, the significance of tea as an important article of trade began to dawn on the Company directors. In the meantime, the VOC tea trade with Japan dwindled, and China became the only source of supply. Initially tea was a luxury article reserved for the wealthy, but it was not long before it became a popular drink among the general public. Well


aware of the European infatuation with tea, the VOC saw itself obliged to reorganize its trade relations with China.

Until the second decade of the eighteenth century, the VOC used to purchase tea in Batavia to where it had been brought by Chinese junks from such Chinese ports as Canton 广州, Amoy 厦门, and Limpo 宁波.[9] In the face of the mounting demand for tea, which went hand-in-hand with a growing perception of the quality of the product, the shortcomings of this tea trade based on Chinese shipping to Batavia was thrust under the nose of the Company directors. They were acutely conscious of their rivals, having to contend with fierce competition from the Ostend merchants in the Austrian Netherlands, whose ships first appeared in Canton in 1715,[10] and from the English East India Company (hereafter the EIC), which managed to establish a regular tea trade between Canton and Europe in the 1710s.[11]


The circuitous Chinese tea trade via Batavia suffered from various shortcomings. The worst impediment was that it took a considerable amount of time to deliver tea to the European market because the Dutch merchants had to await the arrival of Chinese junks in Batavia. The tea they brought from China had to be discharged, purchased, and finally transferred to the homeward-bound Company ships. The second drawback was that the supply of tea to Batavia was neither consistent nor dependable, causing the purchase price of tea to fluctuate. Cogently, the purchase price of tea in Batavia was often much higher than it would have been in China. Another impediment was the impossibility to guarantee a constantly high quality of tea because the Dutch could not select this article themselves in China in the same way as their competitors did. The combination of all the above factors forced the VOC management to reconsider its commercial policy towards the tea trade with China. Therefore, after giving the matter due consideration, the Gentlemen Seventeen decided to reorganize their purchasing policy and in 1729 they established a direct trade link with China.[12]

The ensuing period of the tea trade with China which lasted sixty-five years can be divided into three quite distinct phases (see Map 1): the direct trade between the Dutch Republic and Canton managed by the Gentlemen Seventeen themselves in a short trial period between 1729 and 1734; the trade directed by the Governor-General and Council of the Indies in Batavia (*Gouverneur-Generaal en Raad van Indië*, or the *Hoge Regering te Batavia*, hereafter the High Government) for the following twenty or so years (1735-1756); and finally the direct trade conducted by the so-called China Committee (*Chinasche Commissie*, or *Commissie voor de vaart naar China*) from 1757 to 1794.[13] During this sixty-five-year period, tea became the lifeblood of the China trade, since it made up on average 70 per cent of the total purchases on the Canton market.[14]


*Map 1 Sailing routes of the China ships between the Dutch Republic and China, 1729-1794*




Phase One: 1729-1734




Phase Two: 1735-1756




Phase Three: 1757-1794

The High Government stubbornly refused to fit out ships for the purchase of fresh, high quality tea for the European market in Canton. It preferred to acquire all Chinese goods via the Chinese junks in Batavia, whose shipping profited the economy of this town enormously. In answer to this defiant attitude the Gentlemen Seventeen decided in 1727 to organize the China trade themselves and dispatched ships directly to Canton from the Dutch Republic, bypassing the Asian headquarters. In this early phase, it transpired that the China trade was unsuccessful because, with the exception of precious metals (mainly silver), sheet lead, and textiles from the Republic, the VOC ships carried none of the tropical products from the East Indies region which were in demand in China. Furthermore, the trade suffered on account of smuggling by the crews, who should have been supervised more strictly. In order to restore the imbalance in the trade, it was decided that from 1734 two ships would be sent annually from Batavia to Canton where the Company delegates were to purchase fresh tea and other such Chinese goods as porcelain and raw silk. When the transactions had been satisfactorily completed, one ship would sail directly back to the Republic without calling at Batavia again but the other would return to the Asian headquarters, where her cargo should be regulated.[15] In order to sustain the advantageous Chinese junk trade with Batavia, permission was granted to continue the purchase of lower quality tea from the Chinese junkmen, which was then shipped to the Republic. The management of the China trade by the High Government protracted the swift transport of tea to Europe; consequently these teas were less fresh upon arrival than those varieties imported directly from Canton. The last change was made in 1757 when the China Committee, an independently functioning department directly under the supervision of the Gentlemen Seventeen, dispatched ships to Canton from the Republic, putting in at Batavia outward-bound to load the sought-after goods from the East Indies. On their return voyage, these ships had to sail back to the Republic from Canton without putting in at Batavia again to ensure the swift transport of the tea. In comparison with the first two phases, the tea trade in the last phase was indisputably more stable and successful, owing to the more flexible and satisfactory management of this trade at home.

## *Previous research*

Although there are several excellent, detailed studies on the VOC trade with China in the eighteenth century, these studies do not really reveal the significant proportion assumed by the tea trade in the overall commercial activities of the Company in Asia. In the past decades more atten-

tion was paid to the problematic Dutch-Chinese tea trade as it was run until the 1750s, rather than to the flourishing trade during the last four decades of the existence of the VOC.

As the pioneer in research on the history of the Dutch-China trade Johannes de Hullu demonstrated in a 1917 article, the existing source materials from the VOC factory in Canton can be applied not only to the study of the transport of Chinese tea to Europe, but they are also highly informative about the circumstances under which tea was purchased in China. De Hullu was initially interested in the debates which were pursued on the board of the Company directors concerning the profit maximization of the China trade during the first thirty years of the eighteenth century.[16] In 1923, in another article he focused on the debates which were waged about the reorganization of the direct China trade and the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the China Committee in the second half of the 1750s.[17] He understood how important the China Committee's intervention was to the more successful direction taken by the China trade from the 1750s and therefore devoted his full attention to the study of the preparations leading up to the reorganization of this trade. The purpose of the present study is to follow up the discussion started by De Hullu almost a hundred years ago and to show how the direct China trade of the VOC, after having been subjected to several reorganizations, was successfully managed in the second half of the eighteenth century.

After De Hullu, the China trade of the VOC has been touched upon by a number of other scholars who each have contributed to a better understanding of how the China trade was organized.

In his pioneering study of the Dutch trade with Asia, Kristof Glamann analysed the commerce in a number of representative commodities. In dealing with the Chinese tea trade, he compared the composition of Dutch and English cargoes of tea, the Dutch and English purchase prices of Bohea tea in Canton, and the sales of tea in the Dutch Republic and Britain at the auctions organized by the respective East India Companies.[18] Comparing the tea trade of the EIC with that of the VOC, he demonstrated how important the Chinese tea trade became to the VOC. Nevertheless, his focus is restricted to the period 1720-1740 which, as I mentioned above, is not illustrative at all of conditions prevailing in the heyday of the VOC tea trade with China. Quite apart from his limited time frame, the statistical material Glamann adduces for this period is far from complete and is merely illustrative of his argument.

Christiaan J.A. Jörg is the first to have compiled a clear chronicle of the China trade of the VOC. Since his dissertation focused on the export of porcelain, he did not spill much ink on a discussion of the Company's tea trade with Canton, although he recognized the fact that the tea trade was

the most important component of the Company's trade with China.[19] He acknowledges this by pointing out that the tea trade not only had a big influence on the Company's porcelain trade but it was actually directly connected with it. The main value of his work to the present study is that he has clearly shown that tea actually dominated the Dutch Company's trade with China, since it comprised on average 70 per cent of the total purchase in value from China, as shown in Appendix 8 of his book. In this respect, it may be said that Jörg's dissertation constitutes an open invitation to engage in a detailed case study on tea, the principal commodity the VOC exported from China.

Very recently Els M. Jacobs drew her conclusions on the rise and decline of the VOC Chinese tea trade in a brief description of the tea trade within the larger context of her masterly survey of the Dutch intra-Asian trade during the eighteenth century. As she mentions, the traditional viewpoint is that, owing to its late entry in the Canton trade, the VOC could not catch up and compete with the other European companies, and consequently the English had stolen a march on the Dutch after 1750. Jacobs, however, concluded that the results of the Chinese tea trade of the Dutch Company in no little measure depended on the performance of its rivals. She points out that although the VOC kept a large share of the tea market, its main trade was in the cheaper sorts of tea on which it could realize relatively little profit.[20] Jacobs maintains that the Dutch had to take a step backwards in the second half of the eighteenth century because their standard trade practices were by then successfully being duplicated by their competitors. Nevertheless, she does not show in detail how she reaches this conclusion. Incontrovertibly, the VOC was outpaced by the EIC in the Chinese tea trade in the second half of the eighteenth century, but in comparison to the volume of trade in the earlier period the Dutch trade in Chinese tea did, in fact, increase considerably.

It is also impossible to overlook three other works touching on the VOC tea trade with China. In his pioneering work on the English China trade, Hosea Balou Morse also devoted attention to the Chinese tea trade of the VOC on the basis of the English source materials derived from the EIC archives.[21] Louis Dermigny has made use of the data in his *magnum opus* about the European Canton trade, but the VOC trade occupies only a small part of this scholarly narrative about the export of and contraband trafficking in tea from Canton.[22] The third contribution is an interesting article by Frank Broeze on the end of the Dutch trade in Chinese tea, focusing on what happened after trade relations were restored in 1813.[23] Curiously enough, in order to present a retrospective to his study, he relied heavily on the data which Morse derived from the EIC archives but does not refer to the copious archival records of the VOC.

Apart from the above-mentioned research on the Dutch trade in

Chinese tea, Hoh-cheung Mui and H. Lorna Mui's study of the conduct of the EIC tea trade with China in the years 1784-1833 must be mentioned for it has been the main source of inspiration for the present study. This very well-researched work highlights the ins-and-outs of the management of the EIC monopoly on the Chinese tea trade, by counterbalancing the English and Chinese sides of the tea trade through an analysis of such aspects as the total quantities, average bid-up prices, and the assortment of tea sold by the EIC, the put-up prices of tea at the EIC auctions, the deliveries of tea from the EIC warehouses, the EIC accounts of profit and loss with estimates of interest on investment and insurance on cargoes, prime cost and freight charges of tea sold by the EIC, the standard purchase prices of several kinds of teas in Canton and so on.[24] Their highly refined research placed alongside Morse's overall survey of the English Company's tea trade in many respects holds up a perfect mirror revealing various possibilities of how the VOC tea trade with China should be studied.

Since the present study focuses not only on the way the VOC conducted the tea trade with China but also deals with the production, transport, and delivery in China, and the distribution in the Dutch Republic, some other publications on the tea-cultivating areas in the uplands and the transport of tea from there to Canton, the business life in the port of Canton, and the distribution of the tea, plus the taxes imposed on this commodity, and the consumption of tea in the Dutch Republic have been consulted.

In 1976 Robert Paul Gardella defended his thesis on the tea industry of Fujian Province 福建 and trade in both Qing China and the Republic of China. In his thesis, some chapters deal with the tea production in Fujian Province and some other areas of China. He locates the Fujian tea industry and trade in the context of the Canton System (1760-1842) and the relations between the European tea trade and the Canton System.[25] His research probably is the first specific case study on the Fujian tea-growing areas and their relationship with the Canton trade,[26] and sets the present study a good example for examining the other tea-growing areas from where the VOC procured teas: the south-eastern part of Anhui Province 安徽.

In 1989, Ch'en Kuo-tung presented a paper at a conference on the transaction practices in the export tea trade of China in 1760-1833. In this article, which is restricted to the transaction of the teas for the EIC, he discusses the structure of the transaction system. He investigates the practicability of that system – namely the routes and means of transportation used to bring the "EIC teas" from the areas of cultivation to Canton as well as the mode of transacting business pertaining to teas among the various business parties involved in this trade. This leads him to an assess-

ment of the profitability and the possible stimuli for making changes in the existing system.[27] Since there was no big difference between the VOC and EIC in the routes and means of transportation of teas from the areas of cultivation to Canton, and the mode of transaction among the parties for the "EIC teas" offers a good comparison with the "VOC teas", Ch'en's work is a fine point of reference for the present study on the "VOC teas", the "VOC tea"-supplying agents, and the procurement of tea by the VOC trade representatives in Canton.

Concentrating on the local organization of the port city of Canton and the Pearl River Delta,[28] Paul A. Van Dyke has recently published a monograph on the Canton trade, specifically the day-to-day operations in the port, during the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries. His book provides a fresh look at the successes and failures of the trade by focusing on the practices and procedures rather than on the official policies and protocols. In his book, the daily lives of all the players in the trade, covering such diverse groups as sampan operators, pilots, compradors, and interpreters, to country traders, supercargoes, Hong merchants, and customs officials, are meticulously unravelled. This research shows that, contrary to popular opinion, the Canton trade was stable, predictable, and secure, and the huge expansion of trade was actually one of the factors which contributed to its collapse as the increase in revenues blinded the Chinese authorities to the long-term deterioration in competence of the lower administrative officials. In the end, the Canton System was indeed overthrown but the principal reason for this was that it had already defeated itself.[29] Basing his research on an extraordinarily wide variety of European and Chinese sources, Van Dyke has enriched our knowledge of the daily business affairs in China's gateway to the outside world, Canton. The detailed narratives in his descriptions of supercargoes, Hong merchants, and customs officials have facilitated the research for the present study in its discussion of the negotiations between the VOC trade representatives and their tea-supplying agents.[30] Importantly, the main argument of Van Dyke's book – that the Canton trade was stable, predictable, and secure in the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century – was an inspiration to the author of the present study to check how the Dutch Company's China trade, which of course was but one part of the Canton trade, was conducted in the second half of the eighteenth century.

Up to the present time, publications on tea in the Dutch Republic are still scarce. The only one which can be mentioned is J.R. ter Molen's 1978 museum catalogue for a special exhibition on the history of tea-drinking in the Netherlands.[31] This catalogue touches on almost every aspect concerning tea in the Republic. For example, it covers the import of tea into the Netherlands, the use of tea as a medicine and a stimulant, tea in the

decorative arts, tea services, tea shops, taxes on tea and other aspects, but there is still plenty of room for further research. Some topics which can certainly yield interesting information are tea shops, taxation on tea, and the auctions of tea by the VOC Chambers. Information gathered from the source materials pinpoints the lacunae in Ter Molen's publication.

### *Subject and framework*

If one looks carefully into the extant archival records of the VOC concerning the Company's tea trade with China, there can be no possible doubt that, after the direct China trade had been completely reorganized at the end of the 1750s, the second half of the eighteenth century emerged as the heyday of the VOC tea trade with China. An even closer look tells us that during the period from the end of the 1750s to the beginning of the 1780s the tea trade reached its zenith because the quantities of tea the VOC exported from Canton each year were comparatively large and stable, yielding much higher annual profits for the Company than they had done in former days.

This conspicuous change raises the question of what was the reason behind this. Or, in other words, how did the Company which had tried for so many years to develop its trade with China, finally manage to make its Chinese tea trade flourish, ushering in a "Golden Age" after nearly a century of striving? How did the VOC conduct this trading link in the phase 1757-1781 – the longest and most profitable phase in the VOC trade with China – and how did this successful trade quite suddenly come to an end in the 1780s? In my study, I hope to provide satisfactory answers to these questions. My aim is not to focus solely on the development of the VOC Chinese tea trade itself, but also to examine the VOC response to the external factors which had a decisive influence on the development of the European-China trade in the second half of the eighteenth century. This leads neatly to an explanation of the period chosen: 1757-1781, that is between the official commencement of the management of the China trade by the China Committee and the outbreak of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784).

This study commences with the preparations of the Gentlemen Seventeen to reorganize the direct China trade and the establishment of the China Committee. This will be followed by a discussion of the instructions issued by the China Committee to the Company servants on the China ships and in China and those sent to the High Government; the selection of trade goods and the gathering of funds to be sent from the Dutch Republic; and finally the China Committee's demands specifying the "VOC teas".

The next subject is Batavia, as it is essential to investigate the little understood role of the High Government in the direct China trade. This examination will bifurcate, looking first at the contributions of the High Government to the direct trade under the management of the China Committee and then underlining the benefits the former derived from this trade.

With this organizational background in mind, the focus changes to the transaction of the tea trade between the VOC trade representatives and the tea-supplying agents in Canton. Attention will be paid to the variety of the "VOC teas", the component of the "VOC tea"-supplying agents, and the process of tea procurements by the VOC trade representatives.

The often confusing relationship between the European merchants, the bureaucratic apparatus of the Qing regime, and the Macao Government is the following subject. It will deal with the vagaries of daily business life in the Pearl River Delta by highlighting three representative events which occurred in the period under study, namely the protest against the establishment of the Co-hong in 1760; the purchase of the *Herstelder* in 1772; and the recapture of the *Goede Hoop* in 1781.

Having looked at the dynamic interaction in Canton, the attention shifts to the sales of the "VOC teas" in Europe: beginning with the setting of auction dates; the selling prices; the quantities as well as the value of the "VOC teas" which were auctioned off by the chambers. Subsequently, the distribution of the "VOC teas", after the Company auctions, from the tea-dealers to the shopkeepers and eventually to the consumers will be studied; finally, the re-export of the "VOC teas" by Dutch traders to other European countries will be discussed.

Finally an attempt will be made to draw up the balance sheet of the "Golden Age" of the VOC tea trade, by comparing the internal and external factors which initially turned the China trade into a great success and finally led to its abrupt end.

## *Source materials*

Since the present study is principally based on a research into primary source materials, it is necessary to give a brief explanation of the main source materials which were consulted.

There are several sets of archival data available in the VOC archives as preserved at the National Archives in The Hague.[32] These sources are remarkably well organized and hence lend themselves well to the present study. I have classified them as follows.

*Record Type A* – The records of the China Committee (NA 1.04.02, VOC 4542-4582).

These documents are comparatively independent of the larger corpus of the VOC archives and deal with the VOC China trade in the second half of the eighteenth century. Two sources have been of great importance to the present study: the "Report of the China Committee to the Gentlemen Seventeen, 1756" (NA VOC 4543, *Rapporten van de Chinasche Commissie aan de Heren Zeventien, 1756*) and the "General and Particular Instructions of the China Committee" (NA VOC 4543-4559, *Generale en particuliere instructies van de Chinasche Commissie*).

The records of the China Committee provide information concerning all aspects of the Chinese tea trade outside Canton. Among the data they provide are the instructions which the China Committee issued each season to the authorities on the China-bound ships, to the trade representatives serving in Canton, and to the High Government in Batavia. This is a marvellous way to discover all sorts of commercial data, such as information about the capital sent on the China-bound ships, the detailed orders for the purchase of tea in Canton, the sales of the tea cargoes in the Dutch Republic and other such basic information.

*Record Type B* – The collected records of the "Resolutions of the Gentlemen Seventeen" (NA VOC 172, *Resoluties van de Heren Zeventien*) on the China trade; the "Reflection by Jacob Mossel" (NA VOC 172, *Bedenking van Jacob Mossel*) on the China trade; the "Answer of the Gentlemen Seventeen to Jacob Mossel's Reflection" (NA VOC 172, *Rescriptie van de Heren Zeventien op Mossel's bedenking*); the "Letter from the Gentlemen Seventeen to the High Government" (NA VOC 333, *Brief van de Heren Zeventien aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden*).

These records deal with the preparation for an improved management of the China trade and the establishment of the China Committee in the 1750s.

*Record Type C* – The "Annual Statements of the Goods Sold by all the VOC Chambers, 1731-1790" (NA VOC 4584-4597, *Jaarlijkse staten van de verhandelde goederen bij de VOC ter alle kamers, 1731-1790*).

These records give a survey of the bookkeeping of each chamber relating to sold and unsold goods; outstanding debts; published obligations; advances given to the VOC to buy products; and inventories of the warehouses of the chambers recording the equipage, armament, and provisions. In these records, data can be found on the tea auctions, namely the quantities and value of the teas traded at the Company auctions of all chambers each year.

*Record Type D* – The "Lists of the Deliveries, with the Names of the Buyers and Prices Paid at the Sale by the Zeeland Chamber, 1724-1776" (NA VOC 13377, *Lijsten van de leveranties, met namen van de kopers en betaalde prijzen op de verkoping van de kamer Zeeland, 1724-1776*).

Over the period 1758-1776, the auction dates, the origins of the teas,

the names of the tea-buyers, the quantities of teas purchased by various tea-buyers, and the auction prices fetched by teas as well as the total amounts paid by the tea-buyers at the auctions organized by the Zeeland Chamber are clearly recorded in the lists.

*Record Type E* – The "Letters and Documents sent from China concerning the factory in Canton to the Gentlemen Seventeen, the Amsterdam Chamber, and the China Committee 1729-1794" (NA VOC 4381-4447, *Overgekomen brieven en papieren uit China betreffende de factorij in Canton aan de Heeren XVII, de kamer Amsterdam en de Chinase commissie, 1729-1794*).

This record complements the information of *Record Type F* about the trade representatives' activities in China and the communication between the Dutch factory in Canton and the Company administration in the homeland.

Besides the VOC archives, there are some other sets of impottant archival data relating to the VOC China trade in tea at the National Archives in The Hague.

*Record Type F* – The records of the Dutch factory in Canton (NA 1.04.20, *Nederlandse Factorij te Canton* (NFC) 1-388).[33]

The documents from the trading factory in Canton contain various kinds of official resolutions and daily records, documents and papers on financial and other special affairs, registers of notarial documents, accounting records of the Dutch factory, and official and private correspondence between the servants of the Canton factory, Batavia, and the Dutch Republic.

These records chiefly give information about the tea purchases, showing how the VOC trade representatives contracted for and purchased the "VOC teas"; how they interacted with their Chinese trading partners, the Chinese local authorities, and the other European traders in Canton to solve the business problems in the Pearl River Delta; how they tackled the competition from other companies; and how they corresponded with the High Government. Besides these highly pertinent data, the records also offer information about business dealings such as the selection of trade goods in both the Dutch Republic and Batavia for the Canton market.

*Record Type G* – The "Prices of Teas, 1670-1695 and 1777-1782" (NA 1.11.01.01, *Collectie Aanwinsten 1820-1992* (Aanwinsten 541), *Prijzen van de Theen, 1670-1695 en 1777-1782*).[34]

In the section relating to the years 1777-1780, the records yield information about the assortments of imported teas; the variations in selling prices at auction; the names of the China ships which carried these teas; and the auction dates set by various chambers.

*Record Type H* – The "General Journal" (*Generaal journaal*) in the "Archive of the Bookkeeper-General in Batavia" (NA 1.04.18.02, *Archief*

*van de Boekhouder-Generaal te Batavia, 1700-1801* (hereafter BGB) 10767-10800).[35]

In the "General Journal", data can be found regarding the transportation of tea between Batavia and the Dutch Republic between 1730 and 1790 and the quantities and value of teas sent to the VOC Chambers in the Republic from Batavia.

*Record Type I* – The "Hope Collection 1602-1784" (NA 1.10.46, *Collectie Hope 1602-1784*).[36]

This archive, assisting *Records Types A* and *B*, enriches our understanding of how the VOC administration reorganized the China trade in the middle of the eighteenth century.

In a less obvious place to search for relevant Dutch data, the *Brabants Historisch Informatie Centrum* (Brabant Historical Information Centrum) in 's-Hertogenbosch, the records of the "Plakkaten" (BHIC, *Plakkaten* 1607, 2157, and 2237) were found. These explain in detail the excise that was levied on tea in the Dutch Republic at different moments in the eighteenth century. In the *Gemeentearchief Utrecht* (GAU, Municipal Archives Utrecht), municipal records (Inventory II, N 354 (5 vols) and N 355 (2 vols)) contain such useful material on the sale and consumption of tea in the Republic as the registers of acts of permission concerning the sale of tea as well as the registers of the wholesalers and licensed victuallers of tea in Utrecht and its surrounding areas in 1752-1811. The *Gemeentearchief Amsterdam* (GAA, Municipal Archives Amsterdam) also contains records pertaining to the tea business in this city (Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, N 40.03.012.24, and N 61.01.016.33), including instructions on how the tea-dealers and the shopkeepers should run their business. The *Collectie Atlas van Stolk* (CAS, Collection Atlas van Stolk 3873) in the *Historisch Museum Rotterdam* (HMR, Historical Museum Rotterdam) possesses printed tax imposts on tea in the Dutch Republic dating from the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century.

In addition to the research in the Dutch archives in the Netherlands, I also consulted the archival records of the English East India Company in the British Library (India Office Records (IOR)) and in the National Archives of the United Kingdom (Public Record Office (PRO)) in London.

The diaries and consultations of the EIC trade representatives in Canton (BL IOR-G/12 and R/10) were perused to glean information about conflicts between the English and Dutch Company servants. Many private letters between the EIC and VOC servants were discovered which revealed that there was, as only to be expected, intense rivalry, but also sometimes unexpectedly close co-operation whenever this was necessary. The PRO archives yield information about the British response to the smuggling of the Continental, particularly Dutch, teas to Britain in the late eighteenth century.

Finally, the contribution of the Chinese sources available to the present study is to offer general information about the administration of the foreign trade by the Qing Imperial Government, the local legislation affecting international traders and the activities of the domestic merchants by the Canton authorities, and the various ways in which the Chinese administration kept contact with the Western merchants in that port: see for instance the *Shiliao xunkan* 史料旬刊 and the *Yue haiguan zhi* 粤海关志.[37]

Unfortunately, detailed Chinese source material pertaining to the Chinese-European daily business activities in Canton is scarce. This is attributable to quite distinct political and cultural factors. During the past century, a series of revolts and considerable political unrest have thrown Canton into turmoil. From a cultural point of view, it has never been the custom of Chinese commercial firms to preserve their archives for posterity at all.

CHAPTER ONE

# THE CHINA COMMITTEE AND ITS MANAGEMENT OF THE CHINA TRADE

## *Introduction*

In order to achieve a more flexible and efficient management of the trade with China, after several years of reasoning, the Gentlemen Seventeen decided in 1755 to regain control of the China trade, taking it out of the hands of the High Government of Batavia.[1] One year later, they appointed an exclusive committee, which was known as the China Committee, authorizing it henceforth to make decisions on the China trade and to supervise all affairs connected to the setting up of a new shipping route linking the Dutch ports with Canton. The China Committee held its first meeting in November 1756, and dispatched the first China ship from the Dutch Republic at the end of the same year. After this ship arrived in Batavia in June 1757, the High Government effectively relinquished its management of the China trade. From then on, the direction of the VOC trade with China assumed a very different hue to that which it had had previously.

Right from the start, the China Committee began to issue various annual written instructions to the Company servants who were serving on the China ships or were working at the Company's establishment in Canton, plus a set specifically for the High Government in Batavia. The instructions destined for the officers on the China ships and the trade representatives in China were of a general nature. Those sent to the High Government and the Dutch chief,[2] the leader of the trade representatives in China, respectively were very specific.

The China Committee fixed the number of the China-bound ships and their crew members, the sorts and amounts of trade goods, and the amounts of funds to be sent from the Dutch Republic on these ships to China each year, and also briefly listed the goods from the East Indies which should be supplied by the High Government.

## *Preparations for the improved management of the China trade*

In the Spring meeting of 1755, the Gentlemen Seventeen discussed the current state of the Company's China trade and its future. Because the

directors were clearly displeased with the management of this trade by the High Government, they decided to take the bull by the horns and regain direct control of it.

This decision was not made on the spur-of-the-moment but was the outcome of a discussion which had rumbled on over the past few years. As early as November 1752, in his "Reflection on the Intrinsic State of the VOC" the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, Jacob Mossel, confessed his anxiety about the critical state of the Company business in Asia to the Gentlemen Seventeen.[3] In this document he analysed the possible causes of the decline of the Company trade in Asia in detail. He reported he believed that one excellent remedy to revive its ailing commerce should be to stimulate the China trade. He had noted that many other European nations were sending ships directly to Canton where great profits could be made. None of these nations, however, enjoyed such an advantageous position as the Dutch Company, Mossel wrote, since the High Government was in a position to dispatch considerable quantities of tin, pepper, cotton, wax, spices and other goods to Canton from the East Indies. The ships of other nations which sailed directly from Europe to Canton had to rely on cargoes of bullion to pay for Chinese commodities. Weighing up the situation, he suggested that four ships per year should always be reserved for the Dutch-China trade, since the profits from this trade were so great. Appraising the aggregate profits on the sale of tropical goods sent to China from Batavia and the Chinese merchandise shipped to the Dutch Republic, he estimated the total at about 500,000 guilders (5 tons) per year.[4]

After due consideration, in March 1754 the Gentlemen Seventeen sent their comments on Mossel's proposals.[5] In reaching their conclusion, they had first scrutinized the causes of the precarious situation of the Company in the East Indies. They were convinced that one of the principal causes for the troubles of the Company in Asia was the heavy expenses incurred by the High Government. Although Batavia, as the Company headquarters in Asia, was absolutely essential to the survival of the Company and its business in the East Indies, the Gentlemen Seventeen condemned the expenses incurred in sustaining the general rendezvous, which they deemed outrageously high and therefore no longer to be tolerated. Many reasons were cited for the costly upkeep of Batavia. Among these were the defence of the Moluccas whenever trouble brewed there. At times of rebellions and uprisings, sea and land forces stationed in Batavia were to be dispatched to help quell the turmoil and restore peace in those remote islands. Because it obviously cost the High Government a fortune to offer military assistance over such a large distance, it was suggested that these forces should be stationed locally on Ambon and in Banda. With such assistance ready at hand, the neighbour-

ing establishments in Makassar and Ternate would then also be in a better position to defend the islands and the Company trade.

The Gentlemen Seventeen was also censorious about the Company trade with Sumatra. The High Government had delegated the running of this commerce to a commercial society in Padang because the expenses incurred by the annual dispatch of a Company ship to Sumatra from Batavia were too high.[6] They pointed out that to the west of Malacca other European competitors were involved in much bigger business than the VOC, without the burden of the upkeep of such expensive headquarters. Assessing this situation, the Gentlemen Seventeen wondered what the use of Batavia to the Company really was and whether it served the Company's Asian trade optimally.

Turning their attention to the management of the trade in Bengal, the Gentlemen Seventeen uttered the suspicion that the trade directors there had for many years not served the Company well but had dealt with the possessions and interests of the Company as if these were their own property. They contended that *Jan Compagnie* in Bengal arbitrarily forced up the purchase price of goods there and that its representatives broke the rules drawn up by the Gentlemen Seventeen concerning the purchase of linen and other articles at random.

Having criticized Bengal so scathingly, the Company directors (*bewindhebbers*) set their sights on the management of the China trade by the High Government. The Gentlemen Seventeen remarked that, in comparison with the profitable sales of the import goods enjoyed by other European companies in China, the Dutch Company could not even make a 40 or 50 per cent profit on the selling price. Caustically, the Gentlemen Seventeen doubted whether they should leave the management and the execution of the trading activities at the Company's subordinate establishments in the Asian trade in the hands of servants whose performance was so disappointing. In their opinion, the European rivals of the Company surpassed the VOC in its navigation and trade in all the "Western settlements of the East Indies".[7]

Having reached the understanding that the current trading practices of the VOC were lagging behind, the Gentlemen Seventeen wondered whether they should bring the management over all these subordinate settlements in the East Indies under their own direct control, so that these could be managed by more obedient, honest, and able servants. All other European companies had headquarters in the areas to the west of Malacca which were self-governing and they also engaged able servants, whose behaviour, administration, and responsibility could be closely monitored for the direct trade between Europe and India.[8]

After their scorching appraisal of those matters, the Gentlemen Seventeen finally focused on the China trade. They had entrusted the

conduct of the China trade to the High Government because of the frequent claims made by the authorities in Batavia that the VOC had achieved a widely acclaimed superiority over its competitors in this trade. They had attributed this felicitous circumstance to the fact that the Company's China ships could find plentiful cargoes in Batavia while the ships of other companies had nothing else to offer on the Canton market but payments in bullion. To ascertain the truth of this claim, the directors took a closer look at the China trade to discover whether there was indeed some evidence of this superiority in the China trade via Batavia. They questioned whether the High Government's management really was so effective and wished to be informed why, if this were the case, the Dutch Company still had to pay higher prices in China and reached only 40 or 50 per cent of the profits made by its competitors at the sales. The unreliable purchase price in China and the low returns in Europe could only be explained by the fact that the trade representatives in Canton had to sell goods which were not highly sought-after, such as cinnamon. They cut a sorry picture compared to their competitors who brought precious metals from Europe which, as could be easily seen, were well received in China. Having weighed up the pros and cons, the Gentlemen Seventeen urged the High Government to acquiesce in their decision to bring the direct China trade under their own administration.

In July 1754, the "Hague Affairs" (*Haags Besogne*)[9] of the VOC directors took an equally dim view of the management of the China trade by the High Government. The authorized principal shareholders (*hoofdparticipanten*) who attended the "Hague Affairs" meeting, as this meeting reported to the Gentlemen Seventeen, "[...] recognized that several salutary corrections should be made in this particular branch of trade by the High Government, if the Company desires to continue the trade on the present basis."[10] They also believed that a thorough investigation should be launched into which goods and effects, other than precious metals, would prove beneficial to the China trade, so that the highest profits could be reaped on the sales in Canton, and many sorts of Chinese goods of the highest quality could be acquired at the lowest price. It was lamented that it often happened that the Company gained 10 per cent on the sale of an article but lost 20 per cent when purchasing the return cargoes.

In order to make this point clear, the principal shareholders referred to several cargoes on ships which had recently been sent to China by the High Government.[11] The cargoes consisted of articles from the homeland or elsewhere in Europe (hereafter the "Home goods") as well as from the East Indies (hereafter the "Batavia goods"). The "Home goods", such as miscellaneous English and other foreign draperies, lead, cochineal and precious metals, besides a number of Dutch woollen fabrics and *ras de Marocco*, were more expensive than those of the competitors because they

were sent first to Batavia and stored in its pernicious climate, and then traded and surcharged again with all the extra expenses accrued in Batavia. These operations had cost the Company 15,081.9.8 guilders. These "Home goods" sent to Canton via Batavia obviously were less profitable than those sent directly from Europe.

It was noted that the China-bound "Batavia goods" had consisted of 20,707 pounds of cloves, 9,060 pounds of nutmeg, 2,000 pounds of wild cinnamon, 2,350,000 pounds of pepper, 777,676 pounds of tin, 23,215 pounds of copper, 60,000 pounds of sapanwood, and 612½ pounds of camphor and rattan per year.

The fly in the ointment was that the spices sent to China had fetched the same price in Canton as in Batavia. When only 40 piculs of nutmeg and 40 piculs of cloves were sent to Canton annually, this supply had already exceeded Chinese demand, so that the trade representatives in Canton were forced to exchange the surplus with Chinese merchants for tea, porcelain or silk. Wild cinnamon from Ceylon, the highest quality cinnamon, turned out to be unsaleable in China because the Chinese could obtain fine cinnamon in their own country where it was valued at only three stivers per pound.

The principal shareholders agreed with the current import of 2,350,000 to 3,000,000 pounds of pepper to Canton. According to the "yields" (*rendementen*) over the past years presented by Batavia, pepper had assured the Company 120 to 160 per cent profits. Unconvinced, the principal shareholders questioned the veracity of these statements and asserted that the profits were not nearly as large as they had been claimed to be. Time and again in its calculations, the High Government had raised the value of the tael in China to 88 stivers whereas it was effectively valued only at 71 or 72 stivers. In order to solve the conundrum of whether it was more profitable to sell pepper in Canton than in the Dutch Republic, the principal shareholders launched an investigation into how it had been valued in Dutch currency in China since 1734. The results of this inquiry demonstrated to the Gentlemen Seventeen that the intrinsic value of the tael in China had never been more than 72 stivers. Their case was that pepper had been sent to China from Batavia in place of silver, because the High Government argued silver was then in weak demand. The inevitable conclusion would seem to be that the High Government had obviously preferred to sell pepper in China at a loss rather than nothing at all, so that the homeward-bound ships could at least return with Chinese tea (instead of with ballast), although this tea was of a poorer quality and more expensive than that of other companies.

The principal shareholders placed a big question mark after the so-called importance of copper to the China trade, for the simple reason that the Chinese received a much larger share of the Japanese copper trade

than did the VOC. Even though the Dutch Company succeeded in buying 10,000 chests of copper every year in Nagasaki, the Chinese secured at least 16,000 chests only part of which they could use in China so that they hawked the remainder elsewhere wherever they could find a buyer. The upshot was that China required no copper from the VOC. As a matter of fact, on various occasions in the past the Gentlemen Seventeen had even proposed that Japanese copper should be purchased from China rather than the present rigmarole of it being sent to China from Batavia. Even if copper were a popular and profitable item in China, a sale of only 20,000 or 30,000 pounds in a full year was not a justifiable reason to call at Batavia with four or five ships and to sojourn there for several months, since the incidental costs of each ship lying in the Batavia roads devoured double the value of such a small amount of copper.

Tin was deemed to be a proper commodity for the trade with China. The High Government had already been engaged in selling this article to Chinese junks which sailed to and from Batavia. In the opinion of the High Government, selling tin to the Chinese junks in Batavia reaped a safe profit and did no harm to other branches of the Company's Asian trade. The directors of the "Hague Affairs" begged to differ on this matter and thought it would certainly be better to transport and sell tin on the Company's account in China, since the sales price of tin in China was much higher than in Batavia. They were not sure how much tin could be sold in China, but it should be more than the 700,000-1,000,000 or 1,500,000 pounds which had changed hands there in the past. Cannily, the principal shareholders felt that although the export of tin was advantageous to the China trade, they might be deceiving themselves if they believed that the last sale of 1,447,549 pounds of tin in China had actually realized 703,161.8.8 guilders, considering that the sales price amounted to 48 guilders per 100 pounds. If the ducat was valued at 78 stivers instead of 88 stivers, the sales price would actually have amounted to barely 39 guilders. Their deliberations were also swayed by the fact that tin fetched a high price in the Dutch Republic, making it an attractive proposition to use it as ballast for the return ships, a move that would avoid the shipment of such useless cargoes as sugar and Persian red ochre to the Republic.

In the final analysis, the "Hague Affairs" therefore insisted that the China trade should be managed from Europe and that the ships should return directly to the Low Countries from Canton, as they had done earlier during a brief trial period between 1729 and 1734. Because the principal shareholders agreed that the trade with China should not be engaged in from Europe and Batavia at the same time, the "Hague Affairs" advised the termination of the management of the China trade by the High Government in 1756, citing the reorganization of this trade as its reason.

At the same time, it proposed to appoint a separate committee to run this branch at the next meeting of the Gentlemen Seventeen, in view of the great importance of this matter: "[…] the aims of the Company should be promoted and executed in the best possible way".[12]

### *Establishment of the China Committee*

In the Spring meeting of 11 April 1755, the Gentlemen Seventeen decided that the China trade should again be managed at home. They agreed to hand the management of the direct trade over to a separate committee the members of which they would nominate at their next gathering; in the meantime, they resolved to inform the High Government of their decision and of its further implications for Batavia.[13] On 14 October, the so-called China Committee was established to comply with the resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen. Three Amsterdam directors – Jan Calkoen, Reijnier Bouwens, and David de Wilhem, the Company's advocate Cornelis van der Hoop, and two Zeeland directors – Samuel Radermacher and Johan Constantin Matthias were designated to form the China Committee in January 1756.[14] In consideration of the commercial interests of the Company, all these arrangements were kept secret.[15]

The China Committee had the power to request as many ships, crew members, and funds from the chambers as it judged necessary to pursue its task; furthermore, it was qualified to assign to the ships those persons whom it deemed suitable to conduct the trade in Canton. Finally, the Committee should provide the ships with all the goods which could be sold advantageously on the China market. Of course, all the goods, personnel, and funds were sent on board at the behest of the chambers themselves, which acted on the recommendation of the China Committee. The committee members were further authorized to give instructions concerning the forthcoming journey and the conduct of trade to the ship's officers and the trade representatives in Canton. Rather heaping insult upon injury, the Gentlemen Seventeen informed the High Government that it should honour the instructions of the China Committee.

In order to avoid further delays in this important business, the delegates of the Presiding Chamber[16] in conjunction with the principal shareholders and the advocate of the Company asked the China Committee to draft as quickly as possible a practicable plan, by which the trade from the Dutch Republic to China could be undertaken and conducted. Once the plan was ready and approved, the China Committee would appoint a gentleman to effectuate it. Shortly afterwards, the eminent Amsterdam banker, Thomas Hope, who had attended the meeting of the "Hague

Affairs" in July 1754 as principal shareholder and had written the report of the "Hague Affairs", was also added to the members of the China Committee on account of his extensive commercial experience and because he was, after all, the person who had prompted the reorganization of the China trade.[17] All these decisions, which ran directly counter to the continual effort of Batavia to steer the Company's China trade via its roadstead, were recapitulated in a letter to the High Government.[18]

On the advice of the China Committee, in 1757 the Gentlemen Seventeen voted unanimously to restart the direct trade from the Dutch Republic to China. To avoid a situation in which ships would be sent to China from both Europe and Batavia at the same time, the Committee ordered the High Government to desist in dispatching ships to China after 1756. The Gentlemen Seventeen wrote to the High Government that: "[…] since you [the High Government] usually plan ahead in February and March and the Batavian ships are wont to leave for China in June and July, we have preferred to err on the safe side and also, secondly, to give you an opportunity to show and prove to us that you are truly disposed to co-operate with us in the reforms needful in the administration and management of the East Indies. You will have enough time left after the receipt of this to make such arrangements that we shall find in these, your last return shipments of the year 1756 that the short weights in the Company's returns, which are lamentable in contrast to those of the Company's competitors, and about which we have complained for many years to no avail, have been corrected and improved. If we find that no such correction has been made, after we have given you such serious warnings, we shall be forced to decide that we should not expect that you will contribute anything to save the Company. But should this not be the case, as we are willing to believe for the time being, you can give us proof of your good intentions at this last opportunity and with this, your last shipment to China."[19]

Presumably the warning was not heeded. In a letter sent to the High Government some one and a half years later, the tone was far from effusive: considering the complaints lodged by the trade director and supercargoes castigating the bad shape and inferior quality of goods which were sent to them from time to time from Batavia, and considering that the trade representatives had paid little heed to the choice and care of the goods which they had sent home, in spite of the Gentlemen Seventeen's earnest and frequent admonitions and notwithstanding the promises made by them to seek improvement, the Gentlemen Seventeen were once again displeased with the inferior quality tea brought home in 1754. The tea bore little resemblance to the samples sent from there; likewise, the porcelain had also been packed so haphazardly that much of it had been damaged. Having given these shortcomings due consideration, the

Gentlemen Seventeen felt strengthened in their resolve to take the sailings to and trade with China under their own supervision and administration, beginning in 1757.[20] Obviously, the Company management could hardly expect a "provisionally respectful answer" from Batavia to this bluntly worded letter. As was to have been expected, the High Government tried to defend itself against the accusation in a more "disrespectful" tone than it had adopted in the previous letters. When this "disrespectful" answer reached the Dutch Republic by the homeward-bound ships in the summer of 1756, the China Committee still had not settled all the arrangements for the direct China trade. Such steps could only be taken after it had received the requisite information about how much money the rival European companies planned to invest in their sailings to China for the coming year. Not until the end of 1756 had the picture become clear enough to commence concrete preparation.

At its first meeting in Amsterdam on 9 November 1756, the China Committee discussed how many ships and of what charter (size) should be fitted out for the direct trade to China from the Dutch Republic.[21] It concluded that the prospects for expanding the China trade did not seem very favourable. According to the latest intelligence the Swedish, Danish, and Emden[22] Companies were to send fewer ships and the French no ship at all to China in 1756 because of the Anglo-French War (1755-1763); and, even if the price of tea recently had declined considerably there was still a large amount in store. The latest news from Asia was that at least four Dutch ships were on their way to the Republic from Canton. Their cargo would certainly increase the stock of Chinese merchandise and keep prices down. Therefore, the China Committee suggested to the Gentlemen Seventeen that the Company should exercise all possible thrift, in view of its weak financial position, and use its financial resources principally for the trade with which it could gain the most profits.

Under these conditions the China Committee judged it proper to send only two ships of the 150 feet charter to China, namely the *Slooten* and the *Spaarzaamheid*, which were declared ready to sail by the Amsterdam Chamber. Both ships were manned by 100 able-bodied sailors and one drummer. The Committee gave orders that the trade in Canton should be negotiated by the trade director Michiel Graa and five supercargoes, Johannes Dionijs van der Burgh, Martin Wilhelm Hulle, Egbertus Genits, Jan Hendrik Knibbe, and Nanning Wijnberg, who would sail to China on board the ships. They would be duly recompensed. The trade director was offered 2 per cent of the yield of the return cargo of one ship and 1 per cent of that of the other ship, as well as a premium of 4,000 guilders; the supercargoes Johannes Dionijs van der Burgh, Martin Wilhelm Hulle, and Egbertus Genits each received a salary of 150 guilders per month; and Jan Hendrik Knibbe and Nanning Wijnberg

each 80 guilders per month. Over and above this, the five supercargoes were jointly offered 1 per cent of the yield of all the return cargo, of which the first three supercargoes would each receive one quarter and the last two one-eighth each. Over and above these provisions, the supercargoes, assistants as well as the other servants were permitted to transport some baggage or chests with Chinese goods such as tea or porcelain on board the return ship for the use of themselves or their friends in the home country. This privilege was however very restricted.

The Committee fixed the capital for the ships at 1,200,000 guilders of silver plus a certain amount of lead which was also used as ballast. Besides this, 400,000 pounds of tin, 5,000 pounds of nutmeg, 5,000 pounds of cloves, and 100,000 pounds of sapanwood were required to be supplemented by the High Government. The Committee ordered that the return cargoes from China should consist of tea, raw silk, silk textiles, porcelain, China root and galingale, rhubarb, turmeric, sago, star anise, camphor, aloe, gamboges, and spelter.[23]


As the *Spaarzaamheid* was not ready for departure because of the unexpected descent of a dense fog,[24] the *Slooten* finally sailed alone. On 8 December 1756, she left the roadstead of Texel with a cargo of silver and goods, as well as the missives, instructions, and orders of the China Committee to the High Government. The *Slooten* arrived in Batavia on 6 June 1757. The personnel and goods destined for that port disembarked and at the same time the ship was supplied with the specified amounts of tin, spices, and sapanwood. The voyage to Canton was continued on 22 June, and one month later, on 31 July, the *Slooten* anchored in the roadstead of Whampoa. There she remained at anchor for six months until 21 January 1758, when she set out on her return voyage to the Dutch Republic. The *Slooten* returned home on 6 September 1758 with a cargo of 713,459 pounds of tea, 4936 pieces of silk textiles, 2,000 pieces of Nanking linen, 6,366 pounds of raw silk, 10,163 pounds of China root, 5,079 pounds of galingale, 3,137 pounds of rhubarb, 10,072 pounds of turmeric, 1,451 pounds of sago, 2,553 pounds of gamboge, 61,751 pounds of spelter, and a considerable quantity of porcelain. This first voyage set the pattern for all the subsequent sailings of China ships.[25]

### *Instructions of the China Committee*

From 1756 onwards, the China Committee maintained total control of the Canton trade until the dissolution of the directorate of the VOC in 1794. During those years, the members of the Committee held a meeting every year in which all the general and particular instructions were drawn up for the officers on the China ships pertaining to their China-bound

and homeward-bound sailings; for the Company personnel in Canton regarding the sale and purchase of goods; and for the High Government setting out the supply of provisions. The Committee gave the Company servants who participated in this special business more or less the same kind of instructions from one year to the next during the last four decades of the eighteenth century.

*Figure 1 Organizational structure of the VOC China Trade, 1757-1794*




To comply with the instructions of the China Committee, several councils were established on the China ships and in the trade factory in Canton. These councils acted in several ways: as the Company's administrative deputies on board seeing to it that the daily rules were enforced and that all matters about the ship and crew were settled; as the Company's commercial deputy dealing with all the Company business of selling and purchasing merchandise in Canton; and acting as the Company's general administrative deputy for all matters concerning the Company servants both on the China ships and in China. If necessary, these councils could also call upon the High Government to offer all kinds of assistance. All persons involved in this trade had to behave themselves strictly according to the instructions laid down by the China Committee, which generally referred to earlier regulations for VOC servants confirmed by the States-General in 1742.[26]

1. *To the Company servants on the China ships and in China*

Before 1759, the China Committee instructed the Council of Naval Officers (*Scheepsraad*), the Full Council of Naval Officers (*Volle scheepsraad*), and the Broad Council (*Brede raad*) to be established for both the ships' officers and the trade representatives, and it retained the Batavia Committee (*Bataviase commissie*)[27] manned by the trade representatives of the Company business in China previously in accordance with the instructions of the High Government.

On the voyage, the regulations applied to the trade director, the captain, the supercargoes, the first and second mates, the other officers and the sailors on board of each ship. The supervision of the daily rules on board was commonly the duty of the captain and his deputy. Whenever a disagreement about these daily rules flared up, it was submitted to the Council of Naval Officers, which was normally composed of the captain, the most junior supercargo,[28] the first mate, the second mate, and the boatswain. The most junior supercargo serving as the clerk drew up a true and proper written version of the resolution of the Council of Naval Officers. As a rule, the captain acted as the president of the Council, but all the judgements had to be passed by a majority of votes.[29]

During the voyage at sea or during the sojourn in China, except for matters concerning the ordinary rules on board, extraordinary matters might crop up with regard to the equipage, the passengers, the distribution of the daily rations, an unforeseen call at some port in the case of distress or an emergency, and problems with the supply of victuals during the sojourn in China. If under these conditions the Broad Council, which will be discussed later, could not be summoned, the trade director, or the captain of the fleet, was charged with the duty of convening the Full Council of Naval Officers.

The Full Council of Naval Officers consisted of the trade director, the captain, the supercargoes, the first and second mates, and the boatswain. The trade director presided over the Full Council of Naval Officers on the ship on which he sailed, and on other ships it fell to the captain to preside. The Full Council of Naval Officers settled all civil and criminal matters by a majority of votes, taking account of the ship's articles and of the common law, and in the future it would ask the Broad Council whether it had done so properly or not. Also in this case the most junior supercargo served as clerk, and should some capital crime or other criminal act be committed, the junior supercargo ranked directly above the clerk assumed the function of public prosecutor, so that all the resolutions by the Full Council of Naval Officers could be enacted and executed immediately in order to assure good order on board.[30]

When at least two ships were together during the voyage at sea or dur-

ing the sojourn in China, the place of the Full Council of Naval Officers was taken by the Broad Council, and the latter would settle all the reported matters mentioned before. The Broad Council consisted of higher-ranking persons such as the trade director, the captains, the supercargoes, the first mates, the second mates and the boatswains of all ships. The trade director presided over the Broad Council, or a captain would replace him in the event of illness or death. If one or several members died, a person of the same rank was to be admitted to the Broad Council and replace the one who was indisposed or had passed away. Should some of the members not attend the Broad Council because of illness or other legitimate reasons and the remainder could not make up the required quorum of nine persons, as many of the ships' officers of rank as necessary on all the ships were summoned to take part in the Broad Council. To defuse a situation in which disputes about the precedence of ships' officers might be raised, the China Committee ordered that the officers of the flag ship always ranked above those of equal rank on the other ships. The majority vote and the supercargoes' services as clerk and public prosecutor in the Full Council of Naval Officers were repeated in the Broad Council.[31]

The Broad Council, or the Full Council of Naval Officers in the absence of the former, was in charge of seeing that the articles and special regulations of the Gentlemen Seventeen as well as the general and particular instructions of the China Committee were strictly adhered to. All the placards, orders, and regulations were shown to the respective servants. Before the arrival of the China ships in the roadstead of Batavia, on each ship particular care was taken to post up the placards forbidding the carrying out of private business and the regulations on the baggage of the China-bound and homebound people. Before the ships weighed anchor at Canton, the Broad Council was convoked by the trade director and he would read out all the instructions, placards, and regulations laid down by the China Committee to remind the crews once again of their duties; the placards and regulations were published once again by being posted up on the mainsails, and left there until the ships were on the high seas.[32] Disagreements might arise about the scheduled departure of the ships from China if, during the commercial dealings in Canton, some Company servants were plunged into debt, sold or purchased some goods privately, or engaged in selling and buying with the local dealers, shopkeepers, and smugglers who turned out to be impecunious on the receipt or the delivery of the goods, which meant that dues were not paid on time. It was the task of the Broad Council to keep its personnel out of such troubles. Notices were posted both on the ships and in the factory, warning Chinese and other European merchants that the Dutch Company would not be responsible for the credits or the debts of its servants. Simultaneously, the trade representatives were informed that they should

pay all the tolls and other duties exacted on exports and imports punctiliously to take heed of the interests of the Company.[33]

In accordance with the instructions of the China Committee, on the China-bound voyage the China ships did not call at ports other than the Cape of Good Hope and Batavia; on the homeward voyage, they did not anchor at ports other than the Cape of Good Hope, unless the High Government especially ordered them to call in to deliver gold purchased in China on the account of the High Government. The instructions even recommended the China-bound ships sail straight to Batavia without stopping at the Cape of Good Hope so that they could shorten the length of the journey and arrive in Canton sooner.[34] The homeward-bound ships were allowed to call at other places should trouble or a disaster at sea strike,[35] and were also allowed to skip a visit to the Cape of Good Hope if they were not carrying goods for that colony.[36]

On each ship, the captain or an officer of equal rank was responsible for the cargo and capital until delivered into the hands of the trade representatives in China. After business was concluded in Canton, the readily prepared Chinese products that had already been marked with branding irons in the factory were brought on board after the weight had been ascertained and entrusted to the care of the ship's officers. Some more goods might be unmarked if so allowed by the regulations. Two identical receipts for every delivery were made for the goods bought, clearly stating the date, the year, the quantity, and quality of such commodities with the designation of the same trademarks, names and so on. The captains who received the goods and the person who delivered them on behalf of the trade representatives should sign the receipts and take charge of them respectively. The captains were expected to deliver the receipts, plus the bills of lading upon their arrival home.[37]

In 1759, a revolution was effected in the above-mentioned organizational structures. The Council of Naval Officers and the Full Council of Naval Officers were replaced by the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers (*Ordinaire scheepsraad*) and the Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers (*Extraordinaire scheepsraad*) respectively, and the Broad Council was frequently called the Full Council (*Volle raad*).

All the ordinary matters on board each ship were settled by the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers, and the main functions of the previous Broad Council, or the Full Council of Naval Officers in the absence of the former, during the ocean voyage were assumed by the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers over which the captain presided. The trade representatives, namely the supercargoes, assistants, or bookkeepers who sailed on the China ships, were no longer included in the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers, by the instruction of the China Committee. Should the trade representatives decide to take up some extraordinary

matters, the captain of the fleet who presided over the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers had a duty to summon the Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers to deal with all such matters. This Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers consisted of the members of the Council of Naval Officers plus the trade representatives. The captain presided over the Extraordinary Council of Naval Officers, and the trade representative serving as the clerk drew up a proper written record of the resolutions of the Council. After the arrival of the China ship(s) in China, the place of the Ordinary Council of Naval Officers was taken over by the Full Council, and all civil and criminal matters as well as the other affairs outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary administration of the ship or the conducting of the trade would be settled by the Full Council presided over by the Dutch chief.[38]

In the same year the China Committee ordered the trade representatives to set up a new council, known as the Trade Council (*Commercie Raad*), in place of the former Batavia Committee, in Canton as the deliberative organ to make the resolutions germane to the Company business there.[39]

The Trade Council consisted of several supercargoes and their assistants. Each supercargo had one conclusive vote, while the assistants had an advisory vote. Should one or more supercargoes be absent from the meeting of the Council for whatever reason, the assistant next in rank might be selected to cast a conclusive vote.[40]

All the business concerning the sale and purchase of goods in Canton fell under the control of this council. Contracts were made or approved in the presence of all its voting members, unless some of them were not able to attend because of sickness or some other unavoidable reason. The Trade Council was ordered to resolve all sale and purchase contracts and the acceptance of the goods properly, and whenever the Council members took a particular decision the reason should also be clearly stated. Not all the trade representatives in Canton could attend the Trade Council, but according to the instructions of the China Committee they were given definite assignments by the Council.[41]

The Trade Council took decisions about the disbursement of funds and deliveries of goods after the process of the sale and purchase, taking due care each time to explain why such a decision had been taken. If not all the members present agreed, a decision could be taken by a majority of votes. In that case, the reasons for taking this decision had to be noted down, including the particular reasons brought forward by the dissenting members in support of their own sentiments. In the event of the votes of the two opposing sides being equally divided, the Dutch chief, who presided over the Council, always had a double vote to ensure a definitive conclusion. The Dutch chief therefore had a special position in the Trade

Council: in the deliberations and in the management of all other business, he was authorized to take the lead and nothing could be undertaken without his foreknowledge.

In consideration of the Company's commercial interests, all the members of the Trade Council present swore a solemn oath that they would discuss the Company business with nobody except those who had indisputable acquaintance with it. The Council members should fully disclose the state of affairs and report directly or indirectly, before deliberating on or resolving the sale and purchase of goods, the disbursements, the making of contracts with Chinese merchants and so on.

When the supercargoes engaged in negotiations with the Chinese suppliers or other persons in Canton, they were often urged by the Chinese to accept some presents. The Trade Council decreed that, according to the instructions of the China Committee, none of its members might accept these presents from the Chinese merchants. They should refuse such prohibited articles, although they were allowed to give presents to the Chinese. Should it really prove impossible to refuse such gifts without prejudicing the Company business, the members might accept them and would then be obliged to explain the reasons for their action. Such gifts should be delivered with the Company goods, to be placed at the disposal of the China Committee upon their arrival home. Come hell and high water, every Company servant should be assiduous in their care of the interests of the Company.[42]

In the factory, the members of the Trade Council paid close attention to the storage of the Company stocks during their sojourn in Canton. Normally, when the ships were in China, the supercargoes asked the ship's officers to dispatch one efficient petty officer with one drummer and as many crew as possible ashore and that these be provided with any arms which the Council deemed necessary for the safe-guarding of the factory and the stocks inside it. The Council could require that more personnel be placed at its disposal according to the conditions prevailing in the current business climate. Another very specific point was the ready money in the factory. The China Committee made a special arrangement that each chest containing ready money should be furnished with four different locks and keys and the Dutch chief and three other subordinate supercargoes in descending rank kept a different key under his own charge, so that any money had to be taken out in the presence of the said supercargoes.

During the sojourn in Canton, the supercargoes and the assistants were ordered by the Trade Council to keep a note of the commerce as well as of the housekeeping by means of a daily record. In particular and with great accuracy, the daily record noted the arrival of any foreign ships, their names, who the supercargoes and captains were, from where they had

sailed, in what business they were engaging, and what merchandise they took on for the return voyage. All this information could be useful to the instructions the China Committee would issue with relation to the sale of European, Indian, and Chinese goods which had been brought to Canton.[43]

The general trade books, which include the ledgers, journals, and cashbooks were also kept in Canton by one person who was ordered to append his signature after balancing these books. All the information contained in these books would be of help to trade representatives fulfilling the same function in later years. It would aid them to understand how their predecessors had fared, what the conditions at the lodge were, and if some debt had to be paid back on the Company's account, where and in whose hands the contracts had been signed and so on.

The bookkeeping was likewise strictly controlled. It was decreed that the books should be kept not only in the Chinese species of tael, mace, candareen, catty and the like but also in the Chinese weight units of picul, catty, tael and so forth, in which the supercargoes negotiated and settled with their Chinese trade partners. To comply with the orders of the China Committee without too much ado, the Trade Council was instructed to take the piece of eight[44] in the trade books as follows: 100 marks *Mexicanen* were equal to 913 pieces of eight and 74 Chinese candareens to one piece of eight, as these were generally taken in the trade. Besides this, the Trade Council was ordered to convert the Chinese weights to the Dutch pound when dealing with Chinese merchants on the sale and purchase of goods, at the ratio of one picul to 122½ Dutch pounds in an ordinary season.[45]

Every year, the Trade Council also ordered that, upon finishing their business in Canton, the supercargoes draw up an ample memorandum replete with the necessary instructions to enlighten those who would leave for China the following year. In this memorandum, the state of the factory with an inventory of the furniture and so on could be found. Above all, they had to note meticulously the principal things that had happened to them, with which merchants they had transacted business, what goods and at what price they had sold and purchased these, and what they thought about the business in Canton and other such commercial matters. The memorandum was also useful to later successors in continuing their business successfully.[46]

In the instructions to the trade representatives in China, the China Committee likewise added several particular orders to the supercargoes, assistants, bookkeepers and other individuals. The first rule was that none of the supercargoes and assistants, who were repatriating to Europe and who, of course, received their monthly pay as well as the premium from the return goods which would be sold in the home country, might bring

along more chests or baggage than was stipulated for the storage on board. These persons should behave themselves decorously and with the strictest propriety, as offenders would inexorably be punished according to the general articles issued against the transportation of forbidden items. The second rule covered correspondence. Should some private letters be sent home by the Company servants in China on board the ships of other nations, in these letters the Company servants should not mention anything in relation to the state of the Company business in China, which might prove detrimental to the VOC; as an additional guarantee of the delivery of the letters, the sender was to inform the Gentlemen Seventeen under cover with which ship the letters had been sent and to request them to dispatch the enclosed letters to the China Committee.

Finally, upon their arrival home with the return ships, the repatriated trade representatives from China were ordered to remain on board until one member of the Gentlemen Seventeen had come on board and given them permission to go ashore; upon their disembarkation, they should not take along anything other than the clothes they stood up in, and their other belongings and baggage were to be taken to the East Indies House for examination, whereupon they would be either returned or confiscated.[47]

### 2. *To the High Government in Batavia*

After the Gentlemen Seventeen resumed control of the China trade, the High Government became subsidiary to the China Committee in this trade. In antithesis to the instructions to the authorities on the China ships and the trade representatives in China, those issued to the High Government grew simpler each season, since this government was no longer a direct operator in the trade.

In its annual instruction, the China Committee usually commenced by informing the High Government about the ships it proposed to send to China. According to the instructions of the China Committee, it was the duty of the High Government to ensure that an equal number of ships would be ready to continue the voyage to China as a stand-by, should any of the China ships run into trouble when they arrived in Batavia or were delayed *en route*, by replacing those disabled with ships of the High Government. In the initial years, the China Committee also ordered that, if the business in China could not be concluded in time, the ships might sail back to Batavia where all the ship's officers and sailors, together with the ships and their cargoes, should be put under the orders and at the disposition of the High Government.[48] This was a more precautionary measure and such an occasion never arose, since the trade representatives

began to make it a custom to remain in Macao during the off-season from the beginning of the 1760s.

The most important part in the instruction to the High Government was the demand for the goods of East Indies origin. First of all, the China Committee set down how much capital in precious metals (see Appendix 1) and what "Home goods" would be sent from the Dutch Republic on the China ships, and then gave a brief list of the "Batavia goods" which should be supplied by the High Government. The assortment and amount of the goods required might usually be given, but were not as precise as the "Assessments of the merchandise" (*Bevinding der goederen* or *koopmanschappen*) on the China ships drawn up by the trade representatives in China upon delivery (see Appendix 2). During the two-week sojourn of the China-bound ships in Batavia, the High Government was expected to load the ships as quickly as possible.[49] Should there not be enough tin available, the High Government would be obliged to make up the deficiency with silver coins to ensure that there would be enough "general funds" for the purchase of return cargoes in Canton.[50] In the period under study, such an occasion never arose and it is interesting that the High Government, in fact, quite often made use of tin or pepper to supplement the general funds allotted to the direct China trade.[51]

The China Committee also instructed the High Government to load the China-bound ships with the provisions and other necessities which were required to supply the factory in Canton. Usually the Committee was uncertain about what the factory needed exactly, so it asked the High Government to inquire of the officers on the China ships about the requirements upon their arrival in Batavia. The High Government itself was supposed to have received this information from the correspondence sent to Batavia from Canton on the homeward-bound China ships, Chinese junks, or other European private vessels.

As early as 1759, the China Committee issued a special instruction concerning the private China trade conducted from Batavia.[52] The Committee declared that all private trade should be forbidden absolutely, since the Company had a sufficient amount of export and import goods to send on the ships it proposed to dispatch to China. Any private trade would be disadvantageous to the Company's China trade if it were allowed to be pursued simultaneously. If the goods concerned were not those in which the Company dealt itself, it would not hurt the Company's China trade were a trade by a few Dutch private individuals in Batavia to be permitted. Yet it was remarked that as long as the trade in these kinds of private goods could be pursued to some advantage, the Chinese junks plying between Batavia and China would definitely already be trading in them. Since the founding of Batavia, the sailing of Chinese junks to and from the city had been very advantageous to this colony, therefore the

Chinese junk traffic should be promoted by all proper means and no Dutch private trade by Batavia should be permitted over and above this. If the High Government judged that the Dutch private trade could be carried out without hurting the direct China trade of the Company and at a profit for this colony, the High Government should offer an explanation of what kind of private trade this might be, what profits the Company or this colony might enjoy, under which constraints it would be permitted and which precautions could be taken to ensure those constraints were observed.

On 3 September 1762, at the request of the High Government the China Committee informed this government about its decision to lift the prohibition on the private trade under certain conditions. In June 1763, the High Government thereupon resolved to allow trade between Batavia and Canton by the private residents in Batavia on two vessels annually. Intending to keep a firm grip on such trade, the High Government issued very strict regulations, complying with the instructions of the China Committee. Hence, such vessels should not call elsewhere; spices, tin, and pepper[53] might not be exported on these vessels; no foreign nations might have any portion in the loading of the ships, to which the crews of the vessels should make a declaration under oath before their departure, under penalty that the ships and their cargoes could be confiscated *ipso jure*. The trade representatives in Canton were ordered to keep an eye out for possible infringements committed by the private traders. If there was any evidence of illicit commerce, the offending vessels should be sent back to Batavia under convoy with a Company ship.[54] According to the source materials studied, no vessels were even sent directly to Canton from Batavia by Dutch private merchants, but a number of Chinese junks, and in some years ever Portuguese ships, were employed for this purpose by Dutch residents in Batavia.[55]

### *Trade goods and funds sent from the Dutch Republic*

As mentioned earlier, the China Committee requested the chambers to furnish the China-bound ships with sufficient trade goods and funds for them to undertake the voyage. All these goods and funds were sent on board by the chambers themselves in compliance with the instructions of the Committee.

At Texel, the "Home goods", which ordinarily consisted of lead (sometimes referred to as "Dutch lead"), *laken*, printed *laken*, *polemieten*, printed carpets and so on were loaded onto the China-bound ships together with the bullion. Lead, *laken*, and *polemieten* were the most frequently recurring export items. The quantities of the "Home goods" were laid

down by the China Committee not only in its instructions to the High Government, but also in those issued to the trade representatives, and in the particular instruction to the Dutch chief in Canton.[56] It should be pointed out that the amounts of the "Home goods" supplied may also be found in the records of the "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships (see Appendix 2) in which their end-result in Canton was also mentioned in the usual meticulous detail.[57]

On the China-bound ships lead served more as ballast than as merchandise, and in Canton a big portion of it was exchanged with the Chinese merchants for a cheaper return ballast of spelter.[58] On the Chinese side, lead could be used not only to alloy spelter, but also to alloy tin to make the "tea lead". This was used to line the tea chests to preserve the aroma and taste of tea more effectively and keep the wooden tea chests dry during the transportation of tea.[59]

Dutch *laken* was not highly sought after in Canton, and only the best grades and finest types of smooth, napless, and closely-woven textiles were marketable there for a few years in the 1760s and 1770s, but this picked up a little in the 1780s and 1790s. *Laken* with a printed pattern could be sold only in small quantities in the 1760s and in 1789, 1790, 1791, and 1793. The *polemieten*, which had a Turkish cotton warp and were therefore stronger than the English product with a woollen warp, were quite saleable so that they were brought by the China ships nearly every year in the periods 1763-1780 and 1783-1793, with the exceptions of the years 1766, 1771, and 1772.

In the contemporary textile industry in the Dutch Republic, Leiden was a very important place. In 1742, the Amsterdam Chamber resolved to purchase half of all the cloth it needed from Leiden drapers, and later in 1776 the Company directors signed a contract with them agreeing to order all the cloth the Company needed for Asia in Leiden.[60] In 1787, the manufacture of *polemieten* for China became the most important source of income for some Leiden factories.[61]

According to the "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships, however, the total amount of *laken*, printed *laken*, and *polemieten* imported into Canton by the VOC was by no means large in the period 1758-1793. The reason for this should probably be sought in the fact that Canton was the only place where the VOC, as well as other European companies, could sell European-made textiles in China during the second half of the eighteenth century. The upshot was that the market there for the European cloth was quite limited. Given that Canton is a sub-tropical city it was not exactly the right place to market European coarse cloth, in particular woollen fabrics. Potential Chinese customers also had the choice of buying various types of coarse fabrics made in other areas of China such as Nanking linen, which was even regularly exported to

Europe in the eighteenth century. The VOC imports of cloth to Canton also had to compete strenuously with other European companies, especially the EIC which offered the Canton market any amount it might demand at lower prices.[62]

From the late 1750s to the early 1790s, precious metals, the so-called "general funds" for China, formed the most important import commodity and was brought regularly as clockwork each season on the Company ships from the Dutch Republic (see Appendix 1). Among the precious metals silver bullion usually preponderated. Over the thirty-seven years from 1758 to 1795, the silver bullion brought to Canton was definitely in the form of *Mexicanen* in twenty-two years, as piaster in four years, as Spanish rial in three years, and partly as piaster and partly gold ducat in two years. It is curious that in the years of 1764-1781 and again in 1783, a fair amount of silver bullion from the previous trading season remained unsold (see Appendix 1). This is very interesting because during almost the same period, the trade representatives spent enormous sums of money on the return shipments every year.[63] Therefore, other than might have been expected at first glance the annual excess of silver bullion did not signify the failure of the Company business in Canton; on the contrary, it meant instead that the trade representatives had profited greatly from the goods imported into Canton by the VOC.

### *The China Committee's demands for the "VOC teas"*

In its annual instructions to the Company personnel in Canton, the China Committee devoted several pages to a detailed explanation of the various return goods it desired from Canton, such as tea, porcelain, unbleached Nanking linen and silk, rhubarb, star anis, China root, lacquer ware, and spelter, but among these the explanation about the "VOC teas" of course took pride of place. For each kind of tea in demand, except Bohea, the desired amount was noted down, with further specifications about the various grades of tea.

The quantities of various "VOC teas" required by the China Committee are listed in Appendix 4. These data show that, with the exception of Bohea, the total amounts of the "VOC teas" bought in Canton basically matched the demand from the Dutch Republic, allowing for some discrepancies between the demand and supply of each sort. Such irregular discrepancies appear nearly all the time in the period concerned.

The China Committee clearly stated that each kind of tea, Bohea excepted, should be divided into good (*puik goede*) or ordinary grade, better (*fijner* & *beter*) or second grade, and best (*super fijne*) or first grade. In accordance with differentiation in quality, the quantity of each sort

decreased from ordinary to best. Occasionally, the Committee just ordered one grade or perhaps two of a particular sort of tea. This occurred mostly in the demands for the low-quality black tea.

Only with the very best Bohea did the China Committee never give the exact amount required, for it always let the trade representatives in China decide how much should be purchased, depending on the situation on the Canton market in the coming trading season. To lighten the burden of the personnel in Canton, the Committee always sent some information about the market situation of tea in the Dutch Republic, stating the sales price, the tea-buyers' demands for the various grades and even their complaints about the low quality they had received. It was hoped that this manoeuvre would improve the trade representatives' purchases in Canton.

There were years in which the trade representatives in Canton did not buy some of the sorts of tea which the China Committee required;[64] in others the situation was reversed. It also occasionally happened that the trade representatives bought more quantities of tea than the China Committee had required (see Appendix 4). It is believed that this was a fairly common occurrence because it was virtually impossible to predict the fluctuation of the price and the supply of tea on the Canton market with any accuracy.

## *Conclusion*

From the end of the seventeenth century, when trade and shipping increased tremendously between Europe and Asia, the VOC had gradually lost its unique position in the Asian trade,[65] and the profits the Company earned from it had been insufficient.[66] This became more obvious towards the 1750s. One of the reasons of the weakening share of the VOC in this trade was that other companies which were better managed entered the field, another was the enormous expenditure the High Government was put to in internal Asian affairs, and a further reason was that control was too centralized in Batavia. The High Government often acted in internal Asian affairs as if it were all powerful. It sometimes behaved as if it was beyond the authority of the VOC directors in the home country, and concentrated more on its own interest in Asia. As a result, the scale of opportunities for intra-Asian trade managed by Batavia and private corrupt dealings from the management and administration in the various settlements increased. All this encroached on the interest of the Company, diminished the Company's core concentration on the European-Asian trade, and hindered some branches of the European-Asian trade to magnify their value to the fullest extent, for example, the essentially lucrative trade with China, Surat, and Bengal. In order

to recover the Company, these trades were proposed to be expanded.

Dissatisfaction with the manner in which the High Government conducted the China trade paved the way for the Gentlemen Seventeen's decision to regain control of and revamp this important trade, by henceforth sending ships directly from the Dutch Republic to China. The Gentlemen Seventeen suspected that the High Government delayed the ships unnecessarily at Batavia, and saddled them with some unmarketable "Batavia goods" for Canton. The upshot of its procrastination was that the VOC paid higher prices in China and received lower returns in Europe than did its competitors.

As something had to be done, the China Committee was established to reorganize the trade with China to tailor it more closely to the wishes of the Gentlemen Seventeen. Although disappointed by this decision, the High Government had no option but to obey it. After the direct trade between the Dutch Republic and China was inaugurated, the trade with China no longer benefited Batavia as it had done in the past but primarily served the interests of the Company at home. As a conciliatory gesture, the China Committee did not completely ignore the profits Batavia made from the China trade but allowed some involvement on condition that the fundamental interests of the Company be guaranteed.

Almost thirty years earlier, in 1727, the Gentlemen Seventeen had also tried to inaugurate a direct shipping link between the Low Countries and China. Within a few years, corruption and mismanagement had brought that experiment to an ignominious end and Batavia retrieved its controlling position. With this disaster still rankling, when it began to organize the direct China trade, the China Committee issued various stern and highly detailed instructions to the ship's officers, the trade representatives in China, and the High Government. The boundaries of every participant's functions and powers were clearly circumscribed, ensuring all the participants would be able to co-operate with each other under the leadership of the China Committee. Once everything had been arranged, the regulations remained basically the same from its beginning to the end of the trade. This implies how well controlled and stable the direct China trade became under the management of the China Committee. With regard to the selection and purchase of the return cargoes, especially the "VOC teas", the instructions left the trade representatives in Canton enough room to manoeuvre to decide themselves upon the quantities, value, and prices of the goods bought for the home market.

The China Committee made sure that marketable trade goods were sent to Canton on the China-bound ships. More attractive commodities did indeed give a fillip for the trade representatives' negotiations in Canton, but the most tradable item for the Canton market remained the precious metals sent from the Dutch Republic.

All things considered, the China Committee was a unique type of institution within the structure of the VOC for it focused exclusively on the trade in one single commodity with one single region for nearly half a century.[67] Close study of the China Committee's management of the VOC China trade shows that in an age of the decline of the Company as a whole, the reorganization of the VOC China trade was a smashing success for the stockholders.

CHAPTER TWO

# BATAVIA'S ROLE IN THE DIRECT CHINA TRADE

## *Introduction*

Since the Gentlemen Seventeen brought the management of the China trade back under their own control by installing the China Committee, entitling it to take full charge of the China trade in the late 1750s, the High Government was relieved of direct control of the trade. Nevertheless, despite the catalogue of incompetence cited as the reasons for the Gentlemen Seventeen to have taken this step, the China Committee still could not ignore the crucial importance of Batavia to this trade, for without the participation of the High Government it would have been impossible to obtain better results than in the previous years.

First and foremost, the goods which the China Committee could send from the Dutch Republic to Canton were precious metals (see Appendix 1), the only commodity really attractive to the Chinese merchants, supplemented by a quantity of lead and some textiles in limited varieties. Most of the consumer goods which were in demand on the Canton market were available only in the East Indies and therefore had to be supplied by the High Government. Then, when the China-bound ships arrived in Batavia for a short sojourn after their seven-month-long voyage, Batavia was on hand to offer all kinds of aid to refit these ships and ensure their seaworthiness before they set course to China. Finally, on behalf of the China Committee, the High Government could also supply the Company servants in China with additional information which might be useful for them.

The situation was also advantageous to the High Government as it was permitted by the China Committee to order the trade representatives in China to buy goods for Batavia on its behalf. The High Government could actually ask the Company's China ships to transport the goods from China to Java, but in that case it had to send ships to transfer the goods out at sea so that the homeward-bound ships would not be delayed on the way. Although the opportunity was there, in most cases, it was easier for the High Government to entrust this kind of transport to Chinese junks or the vessels of other nations. As in previous times the High Government was also allowed to continue its trade in Chinese gold, but this activity was soon discontinued because it was no longer profitable.

*Batavia's contributions to the direct China trade*

Batavia, the general VOC rendezvous in Asia, was in a privileged position to collect all kinds of merchandise from the East Indies that were in demand on the Canton market. Moreover, in those years that the China Committee might find itself short of funds for the direct China trade, there always was the possibility that the High Government could make up the deficiency. Nor did the services stop there. The China Committee could also rely on the assistance of Batavia in other areas, such as the supply of personnel, provisions, and equipment for the China-bound ships and for the factory in Canton.[1] Another important aspect was that Batavia was in a position to send advice on the spur of the moment to the Company servants in China should any problem arise there for which the instructions of the China Committee did not give a clear-cut answer. Considering the two-year lapse in communication between China and the Dutch Republic, this "short cut" in decision making was indeed a useful service.

1. *Supply of trade goods*

After arrival at Batavia, the China-bound ships took on their cargoes of such East Indies commodities as tin, pepper, and, if required, sapanwood, rattan and other products as quickly as possible. This operation would usually be completed in twelve to fourteen days so that the ships could be dispatched without a protracted delay for the next leg of their voyage to Canton. When taking delivery of these goods, the ships' officers were required to adhere to the general regulations concerning the sales placards warning against underweight and insufficient goods which were issued by the High Government in 1752.[2]

Among the East Indies commodities supplied by the High Government, tin took pride of place, comprising one-half to two-thirds of the total value of the "Batavia goods". Tin was classified as Bangka (or Palembang) tin or Malacca tin.[3] Since the middle of the seventeenth century, the High Government had tried to gain monopoly rights to the tin from Perak, the oldest known producer of tin. Perak had supplied the metal as tribute to the Sultan of Malacca as early as the fifteenth century, but the High Government was not able to sign a contract with the Sultan of Perak until 1746. On the other side of the Straits of Malacca, the Sultan of Palembang had already granted the VOC the sole rights to the purchase of all the tin from Bangka in 1722. The VOC procured more than 80 per cent of its tin from South Sumatra, and perhaps about three-quarters of this was exported to China.[4] Neither treaty, however, was


faithfully observed by these Malay rulers when they found out that others were willing to pay higher prices than the VOC. In this respect, Sinnappah Arasaratnam has spoken of "the hopelessness of relying on contracts and pretended allies".[5]

Generally speaking, the supply of tin for the direct China trade of the VOC was relatively stable in the second half of the eighteenth century, although in some years the purchase of tin by the Company was threatened by the contraband trade pursued by Chinese junks – those which sailed not only from China but also from Tonkin, Siam or other parts of South-east Asia – and European country traders in Johore and elsewhere. An increasing number of Chinese junks, their masters seeing a lucrative profit in it, engaged in the contraband trade of tin. These vessels sailed straight to the tin deposits of the Malay world (see Map 2), and so did private Portuguese and English traders who passed through this region on their way to Canton. The High Government could enforce a limitation on how much tin and pepper Chinese junks carried to Canton from Batavia and Palembang,[6] but when it had to clamp down on the Malay tin-producing areas, which were actually not wholly under Dutch control, the only means to which the High Government had recourse was to send cruisers to the Straits of Malacca to blockade the transport of tin from this region to Chinese junks and the vessels of other nations. The penalty for any transgression was confiscation. Such blockades, in operation from the 1760s until 1780, were to say the least not very effective.[7] A Dutch report of 1777 estimated that the English "[…] took over 500,000 pounds of tin from the Malacca Straits which was about 78,000 pounds more than the Dutch brought in that year".[8] As a result of the afore-mentioned situation, it needs no stretch of the imagination to understand why in the second half of the eighteenth century nearly 85-90 per cent of tin brought on the Dutch China ships for Canton was Bangka tin. Especially during the years 1790-1793, all the tin the High Government offered was Bangka tin (see Appendix 2).

The VOC fixed the price of tin from Palembang at 10 Spanish rials per "Company" picul in the 1720s but by around 1780 the price hovered between 11 and 15 rials.[9] In Canton, the selling price gradually rose from the 1760s to 1781. In 1764, the Dutch trade representatives sold tin at 11.1 taels of silver per (Chinese) picul of 122½ pounds with a profit of about 111 3/16 per cent. In 1774, the Chinese merchants paid 12 taels per picul, despite other European companies selling at a price of 11.4 taels. Two years later, the Dutch price jumped to 12.3 taels and one year later to 13.4 taels. In 1779, the Dutch price hovered around 14.6 to 15.5 taels, and in 1780 it was set at 14.8 to 15 taels.[10]

Tin was a readily saleable commodity in Canton. Upon its arrival part of the tin sold remained in Canton and the rest was transported to the

*Map 2 Tin and pepper supplying areas of the VOC China trade*




Source: Reinout Vos, *Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince*, ix.

inland provinces. In China, tin was used for various purposes. Its most popular employment was as foil from which to make devotional offerings, known as sacred paper. This paper was pasted on to a backing of very finely beaten tin foil and burnt every morning and evening.[11] But in the busy commercial centre of Canton, apart from being used to back the sacred paper, tin also had another important use in the European tea trade. In the eighteenth century, a large quantity of the imported tin was beaten into foil for use as the lining of tea chests.[12] Before the teas for the European market were packed in airtight wooden chests, the chests had previously been lined with the "tea lead", an alloy of tin and lead, on the inside to preserve the aroma and consequently taste better, besides this it also kept the damp out.[13]

It should also be noted that, as can be seen in Appendix 2, in many trading seasons the imported Company goods were not handed over completely to the Chinese merchants. Of course, the bulk of the commodities were delivered to the Company's trading partners. Yet, some quantities were either transferred to the warehouse at the factory, most likely for the next trading season, or remained on board the homeward-bound ships as ballast. This happened regularly in the case of tin and rattan. From 1765, all rattan remained on the homeward-bound ships each year for use on board (see Appendix 2).

Pepper was the other principal article in the trade. As was the case with tin, the High Government controlled most of the pepper sources of supply, as it had the monopoly on the purchase of pepper from Palembang and Banten (see Map 2). In 1642, the VOC concluded a contract with the Sultan of Palembang, and from that year the VOC enjoyed the monopoly on the export of pepper from this Sultanate. For Palembang pepper, the VOC fixed the purchase price at 3.75 Spanish rials per "Company" picul[14] in its contract with the Sultan. As a general rule, the Sultan of Palembang sent the pepper to Batavia, but when there was a surplus the VOC sent extra vessels to Palembang to collect the pepper.[15] In 1680, the VOC concluded a contract with the Sultan of Banten stipulating that all Banten pepper should be delivered to the VOC at about 4.73 Spanish rials per picul. From the 1760s and thereafter, these two kinds of pepper were sold on the Canton market by the VOC. Again this commodity was subject to a great deal of leakage and considerable quantities of the pepper production were sold to the rivals of the VOC.[16]

It is intriguing to note that in the "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships, there is a great difference in the VOC shipments of pepper to Canton between the periods before and after the year of 1778. During the earlier period, the VOC shipped no pepper to Canton in 1759, 1767-1769, and 1773; in 1763 and 1772 only Banten pepper was sent, and in 1777 and 1778 only Palembang pepper; in 1764, the share

of Banten pepper was 71.05 per cent and that of Palembang pepper 28.95 per cent; in 1765, the share of Palembang pepper was 70 per cent and that of Banten pepper 30 per cent; in 1766, Banten pepper's share increased to 71.3 per cent and that of Palembang dropped to 28.7 per cent; in 1774 and 1775, the kind of pepper is not specified.[17] After 1778 until 1793, it is not possible to make these distinctions for the assortments of pepper sent to Canton each year relying on the "Assessments of the merchandise", since only the general term "pepper" was used. Why there should have been such fluctuation in the choice of pepper-producing areas has to remain a mystery for the present. The most likely reason was the variations in the annual yield.[18]

On taking delivery of the cargoes of pepper, the Dutch trade representatives in Canton sometimes complained about the quality. It was befouled with dust and stones which were probably mixed inadvertently with the pepper either when it was originally sold to Batavia by the Malay Sultans or during the loading in Batavia and the unloading in Canton. In 1764, for example, the supercargoes were loud in their criticism that the pepper they received was of the worst possible quality, full of stones and seedless corns, although in the following year, in its reply the High Government insisted that the pepper had been packed with only 1 per cent of dust.[19] Despite such lapses in quality, the profits on pepper were still 200 per cent on average.[20]

Apart from tin and pepper, relatively small quantities of other spices were in real demand in China such as nutmeg, cloves, and mother-of-cloves, which yielded astronomical profits of even up to 1,000 per cent.[21] Other merchandise such as camphor, sapanwood, sandalwood, blue dye, arrack, clove oil, rice, pearl dust, bird's nests, Surat cotton, catechu, and putchuck also frequently found a ready sale (see Appendix 2). Although these other commodities were not in the same league as tin and pepper, they were also not negligible commodities which could be exchanged for the desired tea, porcelain, and others Chinese goods.

The China-bound ships also transported the imported Japanese copper from Batavia to Canton, where it was sold at a profitable price to the Company's trading partners.[22] But this happened only in the years 1765-1766, 1783-1784, and 1787. On the eve of the establishment of the China Committee, when the principal shareholders discussed what trade goods would be useful to the future direct China trade, they had no appreciation whatsoever of the importance of copper to this trade. Their reasoning was that the Chinese themselves had a much larger share in the Japanese copper trade than did the VOC. There was another important reason why China declined its desire for Japanese copper: China very much increased its domestic copper production in the eighteenth century. From 1738 to 1810, copper mines in the south-western

province of Yunnan 云南 produced an average of 6,000 tons of copper annually.[23]

In the records of "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships, it is very easy indeed to obtain basic information about the persons to whom the "Batavia goods" and to whom the "Home goods" were sold. The bulk of the Company goods were delivered to the Hong merchants, in particular the Company's security merchants, who, as we know, were also the chief tea-supplying agents for the VOC. These trading partners of the Company dominated the reception of the principal import commodities of tin, pepper, and lead.

### 2. *Supplementing trade funds*

As discussed earlier, throughout the second half of the eighteenth century the China-bound ships carried trade funds to cover each season's trade. As luck would have it, in some years the trade funds proved insufficient and the High Government had to supplement the amount needed. The High Government made up the deficiency in two ways.

Initially, the High Government often instructed the supercargoes in Canton to use the remainder of the funds left from the Batavia-Canton gold trade to supplement the general funds for the direct China trade. As will be discussed in detail later, the High Government sent separate funds for the purchase of gold on its own account. Depending on the market, these funds could not always be actually dispensed by the trade representatives. Since 1763 it had often happened that the High Government told the supercargoes to keep the funds in China either for the gold trade of the next season or to supplement the general funds.

This scheme appealed to both the High Government in Batavia and the trade representatives in Canton, because it provided the latter with the opportunity to plug the holes in the payment of export tea and porcelain. Simultaneously, the High Government neatly avoided the double risk of having the funds for the gold trade shipped back and forth. Despite its advantage, this scheme was short lived because an end was put to the gold trade in 1765.

Subsequently, the High Government supplemented the deficit in Batavia. In 1777, it was informed that, although the China Committee had in the previous year increased the general funds to 36,800 marks *Mexicanen*, which converted to 248,628.1.6 taels of silver, this money was not enough to cover the trading season. This meant that the High Government had to supplement a sum of 337,500 Spanish rials, or 249,750 taels, of silver. It could happen that cash supplements were not readily to hand. In such cases the High Government would resort to tin and/or pepper to meet the requirements. When some extra funds were

requested for the direct China trade in 1778 and fortuitously the price of pepper in China stood high at 13.5 taels per picul, the next year the High Government decided to send a larger quantity of that article to Canton. In 1780, because of the high selling price of tin, the High Government made the rational decision to use tin to supplement the funds, which meant that the general funds for the off-season amounted to 200,898.1.4.9 taels.[24]

Although such a practical system was in place, the transfer of ready money to Canton from Batavia did not always go to plan. In 1778, according to the instructions of the High Government to the supercargoes in Canton, the former sent 223,824 rupees to Canton, at the express request of the Trade Council in Canton. The next year, the Trade Council reported to the High Government that a loss of 3,304.4.5 taels had been made on the sale of these rupees. Having been hit in its pocket, the High Government felt extremely disgruntled by such an exorbitant loss and indignantly asked the Trade Council to give a more detailed elucidation. Smarting from the set-back, henceforth it decided to send no currency other than Spanish rials to Canton.[25] In the report of the Trade Council in 1780, the amount of 3,304.4.5 was reduced to 1,744.0.5, which somewhat appeased the discomfiture of the High Government. When the Trade Council requested the High Government to send a quantity of ducats to supplement a short fall in funds,[26] the High Government replied, although the amount demanded was not great, it was not able to satisfy this requirement, because it had no supplies of that particular coin at that moment. The High Government therefore suggested that, should the Trade Council judge that the ducats really would be useful in future, it should address itself to the China Committee on this matter.[27]

### 3. *Complement of equipment and personnel*

Throughout the whole of the eighteenth century, the voyage from the Dutch Republic to Batavia took the VOC ships 245 days on average.[28] Small wonder that after such a long voyage, during which illness on board, bad weather, faulty navigation, or structural defects often plagued the VOC ships, many problems with the equipment and crew of the ships were bound to appear upon arrival in Batavia. All these matters had to be straightened out on the spot, if this were humanly possible, during the two-week sojourn of the China ships in Batavia, so that they would be able to continue the voyage to Canton in fresh heart.

Although most ships were still structurally sound, they often required some repairs to the rigging and damaged equipment always needed to be replaced. The High Government would provide all kinds of assistance by supplying carpenters to assist in the repairs or in making new equipment

on the island of Onrust in the roadstead of Batavia (see Illustration 1), where most of the "Batavia goods" for the China trade were also stored in the warehouses.[29] Whenever it was obvious that a China-bound ship would not arrive in Batavia on time, or when a ship was very unseaworthy on arrival, according to the instructions of the China Committee the High Government had to replace these ships with ships of its own, in order to make up the required number of the China-bound ships and hereby avoid the Company suffering a loss on the trade. From the 1760s to 1794, incidents of this kind occurred at least ten times, the years 1771-1775 being particularly bad.[30]


After the China-bound ships anchored in Batavia, an assessment of the situation often revealed that a number of ship's officers and crew had died during the voyage, or that some of them were seriously ill, either suffering ill health because of rigours of the voyage or stricken upon arrival by some of the tropical diseases rife in Batavia,[31] rendering them unfit for duty. In order to man the ships properly for the rest of the voyage, the positions of these people would be taken over by men recruited in Batavia by the High Government. Sometimes the China Committee asked the High Government to complement the crew with extra carpenters and sailors. When this happened it was probably prompted by a dearth of recruits in the Dutch Republic.[32] Such requests for complementary personnel could also come from the Dutch factory in Canton. Instances of this kind were not frequent, but a few references can still be found in the NFC records. In 1765, for example, the Trade Council in Canton requested the High Government to send ten soldiers for the factory, a request with which the High Government complied.[33]

### 4. *Assistance with instructions*

Theoretically, the trade representatives in China fell under the authority of the China Committee in the Dutch Republic and they carried on the Company business each trading season in compliance with the instructions which the China Committee had laid down drawing on the experience of the past Company business with China. In practice, however, circumstances in China had often changed from the time at which the China Committee had drawn up the instructions to the moment at which they were handed to the Trade Council almost a year later.

Given the enormous distance and the time lapse in communication, it is understandable that the instructions of the China Committee could never cover all aspects of the problems which the trade representatives came across each season. Such matters could touch upon the Company business but their daily life in China also raised a number of perplexing situations. Some common problems could best be dealt with by the

*Illustration 1 View of the Island of Onrust, near Batavia, from at sea in 1779*



Etching by Mattheus de Sallieth in 1779, with ships in the forefront, the shipyard on the left and the walls of a fort on the right, 328x418 mm.
Source: Rijksmuseum Amsterdam, inventory number RP-P-1911-293.

supercargoes on their own authority, but other complications could not be solved without further instructions from their directors. If and when such tricky situations presented themselves, the High Government was obviously the nearest authority which the supercargoes in China could consult.

Before 1760, the Chinese authorities forced the trade representatives of the European companies to leave China after the trading season. This proved very inconvenient for the servants of these companies if they had been unable to finish their business in time. The solution hit upon by the China Committee originally was to instruct the trade representatives to sail back to Batavia, as they had done in the past. Should this be the case, all the ship's officers and crew in Batavia would fall under the command of the High Government. The regulation extended to the ships and their cargoes. This meant in effect that the supercargoes and their assistants should adjust themselves to the regulations of Batavia and write their business report to the High Government.[34] As it so happened, this eventuality never materialized, because shortly after 1759 the Chinese authorities granted the European supercargoes permission to stay in Macao during the off-season.[35] As a result, after 1760 the Dutch trade representatives in China changed their custom of writing a business report yearly to the High Government to writing an annual missive.[36] The responses of the High Government to the supercargoes' missive were communicated via what was known as an "instruction", which supplemented the instructions of the China Committee to the Trade Council in China.[37]

Usually, the supercargoes' missives and the instructions of the High Government were considered regular business correspondence carried on between the two places, and the contents covered such matters as the prices for which the goods sent by the High Government were sold in Canton, how much tin or pepper the High Government should send for next season and so on. In case of an emergency, the supercargoes in China would send a report to Batavia and await the instructions of the High Government. These reports were transported either on the homeward-bound China ships, Chinese junks, or other European private vessels. Most often, the replies of the High Government were sent on Chinese junks or Portuguese private ships.

In 1776, for instance, the supercargoes in Canton reported that, at the behest of the *Estado da India* in Goa, the Senate of Macao planned to expel the Dutch supercargoes from their rented accommodation in that city in the following off-season. The Dutch Trade Council, therefore, requested the High Government to intervene and solicit the Government of Goa not to carry out its design. The High Government resolved not to take this step but instructed the supercargoes to submit a memorial to the Macao Government. Simultaneously, the High Government gave an ulti-

matum to the captains of the Portuguese ships from Macao, lying at anchor in Batavia. It declared that should the Macao Government treat the Dutch trade representatives badly during their annual stay in Macao, it would no longer allow the Macao ships to trade at Batavia in future. The High Government also wrote to the trade representatives in China suggesting they should make their representations to the Macao Government in "a modest and fitting manner", intimating that the High Government favoured the Portuguese traders from Macao in Batavia, especially those trading with Timor who stopped over at Batavia, with facilities and conveniences, above all other Europeans. Batavia therefore also expected the same favours would be extended to its Company servants in Macao.[38] This had the desired effect. Had it not, the High Government would not have sent a letter to the Trade Council in 1779 informing the latter that it had continued to deal benevolently with the supplying and transporting of the crew of the wrecked Portuguese ship the *Estrela de Aurora*.[39]

In 1779, the Trade Council informed the High Government that an affray had occurred between English and Dutch sailors at Whampoa on 29 November 1778. The Dutch spoke of "a big national dispute", while the English considered it just an insignificant quarrel between "a pack of drunken seamen".[40] The conflict arose after the sale of arrack to English sailors by Dutch sailors at what was known as the *bankzaal*[41] on the Danes Island in the roadstead of Whampoa near Canton. The drunken English sailors chopped down the Dutch flagstaff and towed it on board one of the English ships. The Dutch supercargoes took this as a national affront and insisted that the flagstaff should be replaced and the flag should be hoisted by an English officer, otherwise they would report the affair to the authorities in Batavia as well as those in the Dutch Republic. The English supercargoes agreed to compensate for a new flag and staff, but since, in their opinion, the Dutch were the aggressors, they refused to make any further "honourable reparation".[42] Having read the supercargoes' account, the High Government, probably considering it as an affront as well, referred this affair to the Gentlemen Seventeen and ordered the supercargoes not to offer people on the incoming ships any arrack in future and to ban the sale of arrack at the Dutch *bankzaal*.[43]

No later than July 1780, the High Government had heard rumours about an imminent war between the Dutch Republic and Britain. In July, the High Government instructed the Trade Council that should the supercargoes receive confirmation that indeed a war had broken out before the departure of the four Dutch China ships, they should let all four ships sail from Whampoa in convoy at the end of December; if the departure of the ships was a number of days earlier or later, the vessels should anchor together with the ships of those nations with which the

Dutch Republic was at peace. But if the supercargoes received no further news of any war before the ships were due to sail, these ships should depart at the usual time and the ship's officers should proceed very carefully along their customary route, flying no flags or pennants until they found themselves in the vicinity of the islands off Malacca, where the High Government would send cruisers to meet them.[44] In July 1781, upon having received confirmation of the outbreak of the war, the High Government at once informed the supercargoes in China that the English had already launched hostilities in the Indian Ocean as well as the South China Sea, and instructed them to do their utmost to protect the Company servants and goods in China. Mindful of its responsibilities, the High Government looked for opportunities to send provisions and other necessities for the Canton factory on the Portuguese ships from Macao.[45] This was deemed essential because no China ships were expected from the Dutch Republic and Chinese junks also ran the risk of being attacked by English ships as the English captains knew that Chinese junks often shipped goods on the account of the VOC.[46] In the following years, it transpired even the Macao ships were not safe from English attacks.[47]

### *Benefits to Batavia from the direct China trade*

In return for the substantial contribution by Batavia to the direct China trade, the China Committee permitted the High Government to direct the trade representatives in China to purchase the Chinese merchandise ordered for this colony. These goods were essential not only to the daily supplies in Batavia itself and local use, but were also highly necessary to the intra-Asian trade. The most sought-after commodity was Chinese gold which was crucial to the Indian textile trade. Payment for these goods by the High Government was delivered in two kinds: silver bullion and goods. The bulk of the silver bullion was taken from the general capital which was sent out to the East Indies from the Dutch Republic every season. The goods which were collected in Batavia by the High Government could include exceedingly pricey articles for which there was a ready market in China such as trepang, agar-agar, shark-fin, and bird's nests from the East Indies, pearl dust from Ceylon, or blue dye and textiles from India.

#### 1. *Commodities for use in Batavia*

The commodities which the High Government desired to receive included medicinal materials, porcelain,[48] Nanking linen, spelter and other minor articles.[49] All these commodities generally served for the use of the

High Government itself but could be resold to such local shops in Batavia as the apothecaries, small china shops as well as grocery shops.[50]

The medicinal materials were rhubarb, musk, China root, and galingale. In the eighteenth century, rhubarb was used as a laxative. The best quality was harvested at the end of winter and was purported to possess numerous curative properties. Because it was grown in northern China, its price in Canton tended to be quite high.[51]

Musk is used as the basis of numerous perfumes. Good musk is a dark purplish colour, dry, smooth, and unctuous to the touch, and bitter in taste. It dissolves in boiling water to the extent of about one-half; alcohol takes up one-third of the substance, and ether and chloroform dissolve still less. The musk imported from China was most valued.[52]

China root was used by apothecaries in the seventeenth century and was already regarded as an outstanding remedy for all sorts of health problems caused by colds, such as gout, headaches, a weak stomach, the shivers, and so on. It was also supposed to possess the inestimable quality of conferring immunity from smallpox. The essential oils extracted from galingale were used in the making of liqueurs and the brewing of beer.[53]

The medicinal materials were in high demand in Batavia, because it was a large town whose population was crammed together in a relatively small space. It was also a bustling port which attracted numerous overseas visitors. Adding to its unhealthy living conditions was the fact that it was located in a low, swamp area, which had an oppressively humid climate, and after 1733 the fishponds built by the Batavian residents on the silted up coastal strip in front of the town formed the ideal breeding ground for the malaria mosquito.[54] It had earned a dubious reputation as the "graveyard of the East".[55] The Chinese medicinal materials were very efficacious in helping to treat the tropical diseases which plagued the East Indies and were in popular use in contagion-ridden Batavia.

Compared to other textiles, Nanking linen was a much cheaper and lighter cloth and was therefore also attractive to the Chinese in South-east Asia. During the 1760s and prior to 1775, Nanking linen was ordered by the High Government a couple of times in its natural colour, but from 1775 to 1781 it was shipped almost every year and the buff or yellow-coloured textile constituted the major part of the purchases. Most probably the population increase around Batavia in the 1770s had a bearing on this soaring demand for this cloth.[56] The reason for the yellow colour is an interesting topic for speculation.

Spelter is also called tutenague. The crude spelter was extracted in China by open-cast mining. Later it was smelted down with the other metals just mentioned in Canton and cast into ingots in the form of "pigs", which weighed about 60 pounds.[57] One of the main uses of spelter was to cast coins, but it was also essential to the making of brass for

the manufacture of all sorts of utensils. Spelter also proved useful as ballast.

After the China Committee had taken charge of the direct trade with China, the High Government was instructed to organize its own transport of the goods destined for Batavia. There was no direct prohibition on using the Company's China ships for transport, but the China Committee probably considered that the transfer of goods for Batavia from Company ships onto cruisers sent from Batavia might slow down the homeward-bound China ships as they passed through the Sunda Strait. Because time was an essential factor, it encouraged the High Government to employ Chinese junks for this transport, as the shipping traffic of Chinese junks between Batavia and China was a time-honoured, satisfactory custom, which was very advantageous to this colony.[58]

Obviously, when it came to dealing with actual conditions, the High Government did not put all its eggs in one basket but made use of the various means of transport at its disposal. During a couple of seasons in the first half of the 1760s, only Chinese junks were employed to transport the goods from Canton to Batavia. In January 1764, for example, two Chinese junks, named the *Sam-con(g)-hing* and the *Sweehing*, left Canton bound for Batavia with porcelain, rhubarb, musk, China root, and galingale, Nanking linen and other minor articles.[59] And in January and February 1765, the junks the *Eckthaaij*[60] and the *Sweehing* each carried similar goods and general letters from the Dutch supercargoes plus their reflections on the business in Canton to the High Government.[61] In 1767, the Company ships the *Vrouwe Margaretha Maria* and the *Geijnwensch* were used to transport the goods for Batavia on their return voyage.[62]

After 1768, the High Government started to make use of both the Company's China ships and of Chinese junks or Portuguese vessels to transport the goods demanded. In September 1768, the Company ships the *Willem de Vijfde* and the *Paauw* carried China root and galingale, musk and rhubarb;[63] and in February 1769, the Chinese junks the *Eckthaaij* and the *Honka*[64] brought the same articles, supplemented by porcelain and spelter, to Batavia.[65] Late in the same year, the Company ship the *Oostcapelle* and the Portuguese ships the *St Catharina* and the *St Louis*, which sailed between Macao and South-east Asia, in particular Batavia and Timor, were used to transport the "Batavia" goods.[66] Afterwards, the Portuguese vessels were frequently used in 1772 and 1777-1781,[67] and English private ships also did their stint to transport the goods for Batavia in 1773, 1774, and 1776.[68]

When Chinese junks were engaged to undertake the transportation, as a rule the *nachoda* was requested by the Dutch supercargoes to sign a contract pertaining to the shipment and delivery of goods. In the contract,

the assortments and quantities of the goods were listed in order, and the *nachoda* then declared that he promised to hand over all the goods listed dry and in good condition in Batavia on the completion of a safe journey. Should the goods be found in any way deficient on arrival at Batavia, the *nachoda* would be obliged to make up for the loss. Two identical contracts were drawn up and should the one be fulfilled, the other would automatically become void. After delivery of the goods, the *nachoda* would receive the freight fare in Batavia.[69] And, in the contract signed between the supercargoes and the captains of the Company ships, the captains declared that, on their safe arrival in the vicinity of the Northern Islands near the Sunda Strait, they would transfer the goods to the waiting cruisers, which would be dispatched from Batavia.[70]

As early as 1763, the High Government sent a regulation to the Trade Council in Canton stipulating that, in order to relieve the traffic between Batavia and Canton all the more, it banned the export of trepang, bird's nests and agar-agar by all foreign Europeans, as well as the import of all sorts of Chinese goods claimed by other foreign Europeans into Batavia, under penalty of confiscation. There was an extra warning to the *nachodas* of the Chinese junks sailing from Batavia that they were forbidden to carry any goods at freight for other European nations on their return to Batavia. Should they be in breach of the regulation, their junks and their cargoes would be impounded by the High Government.[71]

Fourteen years later, in 1777, such a violation was discovered. When the High Government took delivery of the goods which it had ordered from the English private ship the *Nancy*, the authorities discovered many packages, cases, chests, and bales on board this ship, which had been brought on the account of the private residents in Batavia. The High Government took immediate action and announced that it would not tolerate any such trade between foreign Europeans and the Dutch citizens in Batavia.[72] It banned the import of all sorts of Chinese goods which were claimed by the foreign Europeans either for themselves or for others, at freight or on order, under penalty of confiscation. The trade representatives in Canton were also strictly instructed that no company or private goods which were the property of foreign Europeans should be sent to Batavia and that those goods for Batavia should either be transported on the Company's China ships, or on the Chinese junks or Macao vessels which headed to Batavia annually for trade.[73]

The demands for the commodities for use in Batavia were generally fulfilled by the trade representatives in Canton, but in some years the smooth running of the system was hampered by problems with the transportation of the goods. As they were subject to the vicissitudes of winds and weather conditions and to the whims of nature, some vessels were either delayed on arrival or captured by inimical ships. In the early spring

of 1770, the High Government received the goods demanded, consisting of 255,658 pounds of spelter and twelve chests of porcelain, from the junk the *Honka*. But the other expected junk, the *Eckthaaij*, which also left Canton in 1769 with the demanded 244,341 pounds of spelter and fourteen chests of porcelain, did not arrive in Batavia on time. The same fate had befallen the *Wonchan* (or *Wongsong*),[74] which had already left in 1768 with forty-two chests of porcelain.[75] On 27 April 1782, Daniel Diederick van Haak, Chief Clerk of the General Secretary,[76] reported to the High Government that the Cantonese junk the *Thaij-an*, bound for Batavia, had been captured by captain John McClary of the English privateer the *Dadoloy* in the Bangka Strait, and all its cargo had been seized as prize under the pretext that these goods belonged to the VOC.[77] In 1784, the supercargoes in Canton were informed that the Macao ship the *St Antonio* with the goods demanded for Batavia had been plundered by the same captain on 27 February of the previous year.[78]

## 2. *Gold for the intra-Asian trade*

Gold played an important role in the intra-Asian trade of the VOC. Optimizing its position in the intra-Asian trade, the VOC purchased and sold gold in several regions in Asia. It is impossible to extrapolate a complete picture of the movement of gold from the general trade ledger of Batavia,[79] but generally speaking, as far as its sources of gold were concerned, the High Government procured this metal in three ways – by sending Company ships to Japan; by purchasing it in Batavia from Chinese junks from South China; and by exploiting its own gold-mines in Sumatra. Naturally, the next question is what became of this gold but the answer is not as straightforward as it would seem at first sight. It is no secret that the High Government sent the gold to India (the Coromandel Coast) to pay its way in the textile trade.

Of all the gold suppliers of the VOC, Japan was the prime source in the seventeenth century. Initially there had been more interest in silver, but in 1668 the Tokugawa government issued a decree banning the export of silver. Relying on a fund of precious metal to finance its Asian trade, the VOC then turned to the Japanese gold coins, the so-called *koban*, which could also be used profitably on the Coromandel Coast. Up to that time the VOC had mainly purchased gold coins by trading with the Chinese via Formosa, but *Koxinga*'s conquest of this important commercial centre in 1662 had put a stop to this trade.[80]

Towards the end of the 1660s, discoveries of large deposits of gold were made in Japan, and the VOC acquired great quantities of gold at low prices. An export boom in gold developed in the years around 1670. But all good things come to an end: the Japanese raised the price of *koban*

from 56 to 58 maces in 1670 and from 58 to 68 maces in 1672. This price hike slowed down the VOC export and a marked decrease in the quota of gold in the export figures can be traced in the years which followed. The next hurdle which presented itself was a temporary ban on the export of gold in the years 1685-1686. This measure was taken because the Japanese feared that the large amount exported would cause a shortage of their currency. Despite such hindrances, it should be noted that the VOC export of gold from Japan never dried up completely, even though during the following decades, it mainly set its sights on the third coining metal in which Japan was rich, copper.[81]

The Japanese debased their gold coins from 85.69 to 56.41 touch[82] in 1696, without any reduction in its silver price.[83] The new gold *koban* contained a lower percentage of gold than had the old coins, but was kept at the same weight. The Company had no option but to accept them at the same price as before. This meant that the *koban*, which had previously been sold at a profit on the Coromandel Coast, now made a loss of about 15 per cent. A further debasement of the gold coin in 1720 caused this figure to rise to 37 or 38 per cent. In spite of the loss, the Company still continued the export of *koban* from Japan right down to 1752, albeit with an interruption from 1739 to 1742. Although at first sight this did not make good economic sense, the Company seldom made such a decision without good reason. In this instance the consideration was that the coins provided a steady supply of money for the trade with the Coromandel Coast, and the course was partly adopted because, apart from copper, the Japanese commercial restrictions meant that no other good alternatives were available. The compromise seems to have been satisfactory for a while at least. During the 1730s there was a distinct slump and export figures fell drastically. For the period 1701-1724, the VOC had exported an amount of slightly below 300,000 *koban* to the Coromandel Coast from Japan and, by doing so, had sustained a total loss of more than 1½ million guilders, which was handsomely compensated by the profits made on the trade in Coromandel textiles.[84]

In 1752, the High Government found a substitute for the Japanese gold to pay for its Indian textile trade, namely Chinese gold, in Canton. Until 1756, each season one (or two) of the homeward-bound ships unloaded this gold for the High Government when they put in in Batavia.[85] It is not surprising that this practice ceased shortly after the High Government transferred the control of the China trade to the China Committee. Nevertheless, the High Government was not left high and dry for it received permission to continue the gold trade in another way, by asking the trade representatives to buy gold in Canton. Unfortunately, the relief at this respite was short lived. The Chinese gold trade lasted a short period of thirteen years and was abandoned in 1765 because against

the expectations of the High Government every year the price of gold in Canton rose spectacularly.

The instructions of the China Committee spelled out that should some capital be left over after the purchase of the return cargoes in Canton, the supercargoes could spend what remained on purchasing gold for Batavia. If it was impossible to buy as much gold as the High Government required, the remaining funds should be taken back to Batavia with the gold purchased. It was one of those instances in which the wish was the father to the thought and reality provided cold comfort. After the late 1750s, the supercargoes did keep the remainder of the capital for the purchase of gold, but they seldom spent it in full before the departure of the Company ships. When this happened they held the money in reserve for the next trading season.[86] For example, when they were sent 427,876.18.9 guilders from Batavia in 1763, the supercargoes still had funds remaining from the previous season, plus a stock of clove oil, Ceylonese pearl dust and blue dye. They were ordered to spend these on the purchase of 4,500 taels of gold.[87]

In contrast to the transport of other goods for Batavia, gold could only be shipped by the homeward-bound China ships, as stipulated in the instruction of the China Committee. There are two feasible explanations for this: a lack of trust in the seaworthiness of foreign vessels and the honesty of their crews or the fear of pirates in the South China Sea. These China ships carrying only goods for Europe and gold for Batavia were under orders to head straight for the Netherlands on the homeward-bound journey without stopping at Batavia. In order to obtain its gold, the High Government sent a well-armed cruiser to the Northern Islands near the Sunda Strait, through which the homeward-bound China ships would definitely pass. There it would heave to and wait to tranship the gold and transfer it to Batavia as quickly as possible.

After this discussion of the capital reserved for gold and its transport, a short history of the gold trade between Canton and Batavia is in order to fill out the picture. In the season 1758-1759, the trade representatives experienced no difficulty in contracting with the Chinese merchants in Canton for gold at 123 taels of silver of 90 touch per 10 taels of gold, but in 1760 they realized that the high price demanded and the scarcity of gold would make it impossible to satisfy the High Government any longer and none of the Chinese merchants was willing to deliver the gold below 146.2.5 taels of silver of 90 touch per 10 taels of gold, which was 18.9 per cent more expensive than in the year 1758. But in November 1760, the security merchants of the Dutch Company, Tsja Hunqua, in conjunction with Semqua, Tan Chetqua and Swetja, offered 100 *schuitjes* [88] for 130 – later decreased to 120 and then 118 – taels of silver of 80 touch per 10 taels of gold. The supercargoes considered the price to be

2.61 per cent higher than in 1758 and 1759 and refused to accept the offer, although they had received an instruction of the High Government to buy more than 50,000 silver taels worth of gold at any price. The Trade Council disobeyed the instruction of the High Government, reasoning that the High Government would never have expected such an extreme increase in the price of gold and that the purchase of gold at such a high price would be disadvantageous to the Company. There was yet another, added danger. Purchasing gold at so high a price might lead the Chinese to imagine that the Dutch could still make money on its sale elsewhere even at such an excessive price. Finally, after laborious negotiations on 19 November, the trade representatives made a contract with Tsja Hunqua stating that, *in the following year* on 1 November or before the departure of the last ship, Tsja Hunqua would deliver 4,500 taels of Nanking gold of 90 touch at a price of 117 taels of silver for 10 taels of gold to the Dutch, a deal which was roughly equal to 54,263.2.3.8 taels of silver.

In accounting for the 4,500 taels of gold which were purchased in 1760 and sent to Batavia in 1762, the trade representatives explained in their report to the High Government that they had not valued 100 touch of gold at 24 carat or 373.2.5⅓ guilders, as the High Government had ordered, but appreciated 90 touch equal to 22½ carat or 349.15.15 guilders, because they had been forced to agree to this with the Company's trading partners during the negotiations in the season 1758-1759. Simultaneously, they had to assay with test-needles how the Chinese percentage in touch compared with its Dutch counterpart in carats. Each time before entering into a contract, the Dutch supercargoes reminded the gold merchants that they would test the value of the gold with the Dutch test-needles. Despite such solemn warnings, they discovered that the Chinese never gave them a true report of the exact percentage of gold and therefore they still needed to reforge the gold by themselves.[89]

After delaying the conclusion of the contract for the 7,750 taels of gold of 90 touch demanded by Batavia in 1763, at the end of 1764, during a meeting of the Trade Council the supercargoes resolved to contract the gold of 90 touch at a price of 125 taels for a sum of 80,000 taels of silver for the forthcoming season. But no Chinese merchant was willing to enter into such a contract. The supercargoes finally persuaded their security merchants, who owed the Dutch Company 139,178.6.9.2 taels of silver, to accept a contract for gold of 90 touch at 114.5 taels for the 45,000 taels of silver, and wrote to Batavia for approval.[90] In July 1765, the High Government in its instruction replied that this deal was very much against its expectations because the price was too high for it to make any reasonable profit on the trade.[91]

This spelled the real end to the gold trade. After 1765 practically no

more gold was purchased for the High Government,[92] although for several years in a row it still kept on reminding the trade representatives to keep the purchase of gold in mind should the opportunity arise. It was a forlorn hope, as the supercargoes declared there was not even the slightest hint of a drop in the price of gold. On the contrary, it even rose much higher.[93]

## *Conclusion*

As far as the High Government was concerned in the new setup of the direct China trade under the management of the China Committee, it rather reluctantly had to play two painful roles: one of a great contributor and the other of a poor beneficiary. None the less, from the angle of the Gentlemen Seventeen, the loss of the local interest of Batavia actually worked out well for the general interests of the Company.

As a great contributor, the High Government was cast in the role of supporting the direct China trade by offering and supplying all kinds of assistance which would ensure the successful management of its own erstwhile responsibility by the China Committee. All this assistance was indispensable and essential. Of course, the most significant contribution was in the supply of trade goods. The East Indies goods supplied by the High Government, in conjunction with the precious metals and other European goods sent from the Dutch Republic, was the fundamental guarantee of the boom in the VOC tea exports from the Canton market. Considering how much the High Government contributed to the China trade, it came off a poor second. The goods demanded for Batavia were more often than not sent on Chinese junks or the vessels of other nations than dispatched on the homeward-bound China ships of the VOC, and the Chinese gold trade between Batavia and Canton was but a short-lived enterprise, quenched by the steep increase in the purchase price of gold in Canton. In fact, this change in value, of course, could not be blamed on the administrative reforms of the Company but was a cogent reflection of developments in the Chinese economy itself.

CHAPTER THREE

# THE PURCHASE OF THE "VOC TEAS" IN CANTON

## *Introduction*

Before the establishment of the China Committee in 1756, the trade representatives of the VOC did their business in Canton on the orders of the High Government, which had organized the China trade for two decades since 1735. After the conclusion of their transactions in Canton, they would return to Batavia on the China ships. All this changed the moment the China Committee took control of the direct China trade in 1756. From that time on, the trade representatives were obliged to comply with the instructions of the China Committee. After the Canton trade had been fully institutionalized following the official confirmation of the Canton System in 1760,[1] the trade representatives were no longer obliged to sail back to Batavia but were permitted by the Chinese authorities to spend each off-season in Macao.[2]

Under these new conditions two significant changes in the China trade occurred. As a matter of course, the trade representatives in Canton now received their ultimate instructions directly from the China Committee in the Dutch Republic and in their turn reported back all the information on the Canton market more quickly than they had been able to before. Their local situation also changed for the better because, as the trade representatives no longer had to leave China on the China ships upon their departure, they were now supplied with more opportunities to negotiate the tea business with the Chinese supplying agents during the off-season. The most advantageous aspect of this new approach was that it made it possible for the trade representatives to sample and test a greater range of teas. Consequently their selection was much improved. Inevitably, the longer the trade representatives remained in China, the more closely they found themselves involved in the tea market. Ultimately this was of the greatest possible help to the China Committee when it was drawing up more apposite instructions for the purchase of the "VOC teas" in the next season.

The long and the short of the story was that the trade representatives' business in Canton entered a more favourable conjunction which continued unbroken until the early 1780s when the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784) broke out and the British Commutation Act (1784) was put in effect greatly to the detriment of the Dutch. For the time being,

*Illustration 2 Tea garden, tea plant, tea leaves, and tea products*

Tea garden



Tea




Tea leaves



Tea products


Green teas



Black teas



Oolong teas



during this halcyon period, a well functioning mode of transaction was established between the trade representatives of the VOC and the Chinese tea-supplying agents in Canton.

### *The "VOC teas"*

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, China remained the only major supplier of export tea to the world market.[3] The tea exported from China for the world market can be divided into three general sorts: green tea; black tea; and oolong tea. At the beginning of the trade towards the end of the seventeenth century, China exported only green tea. This changed at the beginning of the eighteenth century when black tea, which can be preserved much longer since the moisture has been removed during the process of manufacture, began to claim a slice of the market in the wake of increasing demand by the European companies. With this kind of tea, spoilage would be avoided on the months-long homeward voyage to Europe. In later years oolong tea also emerged as a much sought after variety and began to claim an important role in the tea export of China.

All teas come from the same plant: *Camellia sinensis* (Illustration 2).[4] After it is planted, the tea tree needs little care; and when it is three or four years old, it can be plucked three or four times annually, in other words, its production is seasonal. The first picking takes place in mid-spring; after two or three weeks, the second picking starts, and then follows a third and sometimes a fourth. All these pickings must be completed seventy to eighty days before autumn begins. The freshly plucked tea leaves must be cured by heating (under the sun to encourage fermentation, if it is for black tea), roasting, and rolling. Leaf-curing usually takes place on the night of the day the leaves are picked. The quality of the tea depends on whether the picking and curing are completed within a certain period of time. The best tea comes from the first leaf-picking as long as the harvest is cured on time.[5] Green tea, also known as unfermented tea, appears green because the chlorophyll (or green-plant pigment) still remains in the tea leaves and retains some of their moisture. The primary processing of green tea includes *fixation*, *rolling*, and *drying*. Black tea is 100 per cent fermented during the process of manufacture, which includes four procedures: *withering*, *rolling*, *fermenting*, and *drying*. Oolong tea is a partially fermented tea with 20 to 50 per cent of fermentation, combining the best qualities of green and black teas. It encapsulates the clarity and fragrance of green tea, with the refreshment and strength of black tea. True to its merits, the processing of oolong tea includes no less than six procedures: *sunshine withering*; *tedding the fresh leaves*; *rocking green*; *stir-fry green*; *rolling*; and *drying*.[6]


The teas purchased by the trade representatives of the VOC in Canton during the period concerned were the green and black teas of the afore-said three kinds. Their principal sources of supply were two regions, namely the south-easternmost part of Anhui Province and the Wuyi Mountains 武夷山 stretching along the border of the Provinces of Fujian and Jiangxi 江西.[7]

Chinese black tea originates from the Wuyi Mountains. Originally, Bohea (the local pronunciation of Wuyi) 武夷岩茶 evolved in Chong'an County (崇安, Wuyi Mountain City in what is now Fujian Province) in the late Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).[8] Compared to other varieties Bohea was dismissed as a black tea of an inferior sort. Despite the disdain of connoisseurs, it still occupied the biggest part of the European purchases in Canton because of its cheap price. Souchong 小种红茶, a unique black tea of high quality from the Wuyi Mountains, had a fragrance of smoked pine which put it into an altogether different class to Bohea. The finest quality Souchong was made of large leaves of great succulence and extreme delicacy gathered in fine, clear weather during the greatest heat of the day.[9] Congou 工夫茶 was a refined sort of Souchong, and was obtained from the fifth and largest leaf gathered from shoot tips of the branch of a tea tree. The processing of Congou, which required time and patience, was meticulously carried out, making sure to eliminate any dust, fannings, or twigs. Pekoe 白毫香红茶 was a very fine black tea, rivalling Souchong, and much sought after by the VOC.[10] It was made from the leaves around the buds at the end of the stem. The unopened leaf was often covered with a silvery dawn for forty-eight hours after it opened.[11] Besides this range of teas, small quantities of Ankay 安红, a low-quality black tea from Anxi 安溪 County were also often bought by the trade representatives to blend with Bohea, Congou, or even Souchong, in order to maintain an even quality.[12]

The bulk of the green tea sent to Canton to be sold to the European companies was processed in two areas in the south-eastern part of Anhui Province. One was the district forming the shape of a reversed triangle with its apex at Wuyuan 婺源 at the southern tip of the province[13] and its base extending from Xiuning 休宁 in the east to Qimen 祁门 in the west, where the teas known as Hyson 熙春茶, Hyson skin 熙春皮 originated. Hyson was processed in twisted, long, thin leaves which unfurled slowly to emit a fragrant, astringent taste. It has been defined as warm, sunny, and spring-like, reflecting both the colour and the season in which Hyson was harvested;[14] Hyson skin was processed from the light, inferior leaves which were separated from the better quality Hyson by a winnower.

The other green tea area was a belt of territory stretching north-west from Tunxi 屯溪, located slightly south-east of Xiuning, through the Yellow Mountains (or Huangshan 黄山) and Taiping 太平 to the northernmost point at Ningguo 宁国, from where the teas of Songlo 松萝茶 and Twankay 屯溪绿

*Map 3 The "VOC tea"-producing areas and the routes of transporting teas to Canton*



derived.[15] Songlo was one sort of green tea with a thick blade but a thin vein, which was produced since the early Ming Dynasty and was well-known for its dark green colour, lasting pure aroma, and strong but mellow taste.[16] Twankay, which was compared to "Green Gold", was developed on the basis of Songlo but was of a much higher quality. It was originally produced in the areas adjacent to Tunxi. Gunpowder tea (珠茶, *Joosjes* in the Dutch records) was known as "pearl" tea because it was rolled into small balls resembling gunpowder pellets of a dark green colour. It has a mellow but tangy taste.[17] Imperial tea (宫廷 贡绿, *Bing* in the Dutch records) had a stunning, distinctively bright green colour and an unusual spiky appearance. Its striking leaves emitted an enchanting floral aroma and an unexpected depth of flavour which "[…] can be crafted just once a year and only then if all aspects of climate, cultivation, harvesting and manufacture come together to produce just the right combination of conditions needed to produce the ultimate expression of green tea art".[18] Gunpowder tea and Imperial tea most likely originated from both areas with a long history.

The "VOC teas" in the period under study consisted of all the above-mentioned black and green teas. The origin of the names of the teas varied. Bohea, Ankay, Songlo, and Twankay were called after their production sites: the counties of Wuyi, Anxi, and Tunxi, and the hills of Songluo. Souchong (Xiaozhong, or "small sort") and Congou (Gongfu, or "elaborately prepared tea") were designated according to their different processing methods. Hyson and Hyson skin were named after the inventor of this method of processing green tea. Pekoe (Baihao, or "white hair") and Gunpowder tea (Zhucha, or "pearl tea") derived their nomenclature from their colour and shape. Imperial tea was acclaimed for its exceptional use – excellent-quality green tea worthy of being served to the Imperial family.

Before the teas destined for the European market arrived in Canton, they had already made a long journey from the tea-cultivating areas all the way to the south. The first stage of their travels began when the processed tea was collected by tea peddlers who went from village to village. They did so either on their own initiative or as intermediaries for the wholesalers. The collected tea was then sold to the latter, who also acquired supplies directly from the tea cultivators. It was the wholesalers who mixed, blended, and packed the teas in their stores in the tea-distributing centres. They sold the tea on to merchants who had contacts with the Canton-European market and who had their own guilds and special warehouses in Canton. Sometimes the distinction between the wholesalers and tea merchants was blurred.

When the teas were ready for transport, they were shipped to Canton along traditional as well as alternative routes (see Map 3). Along the tra-

ditional route, black tea was first transported by river raft from the market town of Xingcun 星村 in the heart of the Wuyi Mountains to Chong'an County, and then the porters carried it over tortuous mountain roads to the Qianshan River 铅山河 in the neighbouring province of Jiangxi. Via the Qianshan River, the tea was shipped down to Qianshan 铅山 (or Hekou 河口) and then on to Poyang Lake via the Yu River 余江. Crossing Poyang Lake 鄱阳湖, the tea boats sailed up to Nanchang 南昌 on the Gan River 赣江. From Nanchang, they sailed upstream to Dayu County 大余. From there, the tea cargoes were carried over the Meiling Mountains 梅岭 to Nanxiong 南雄 in the north of Guangdong Province 广东. At Nanxiong, the tea was again loaded on boats and shipped down to Canton via the Bei River 北江.[19] Green tea was first assembled and transported to Wuyuan, the southernmost county of Anhui Province, and shipped from there to Nanchang, where it joined the transport network for black tea. This transport via the traditional route was a very arduous one as we learn from a complaint made by the green tea merchants in 1819:[20]

> […] in transporting, seven times is it transhipped to different boats and at three different passes does it pay duty; on its way it passes thro' many dangers, and it has difficulties to surmount which make the removal of it from place [to place] a painful task.

An alternative route for black tea went from Chong'an to Fuzhou 福州 via the Min River 闽江, and then onwards to Canton by sea along the coast. In the VOC time, this was not a frequent practice, as the then-existing laws banned the exportation of black tea via Fuzhou or any other port of Fujian Province.[21] Another transport route for green and black tea followed intermittently in the Qianlong period (1736-1795) led to Hangzhou 杭州 via the Fuchun River 富春江, and from there to Canton by sea. Because in later years this route was often threatened by pirates lurking along the coast, the tea merchants had no option but to return to the inland route, which was also the most expensive, once again in 1797.[22]

Both black and green teas fell into the category of "VOC teas", but the difference of the proportion between the two kinds was strikingly great. From 1760 until 1780, black tea consisting of four sorts (Bohea, Congou, Souchong, and Pekoe)[23] occupied of all exports 90.89 per cent on average. Lagging far behind, green tea of which there were five or six sorts (Songlo, Twankay, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea, and Gunpowder tea for a couple of years) only amounted to 9.11 per cent (see Appendix 4). As has been said earlier, because of its dubious honour of being cheapest, Bohea was the most favoured purchase of black tea for the Dutch, taking up 80.5 per cent of black tea. Congou, Souchong and Pekoe represented 13, 5, and 1.5 per cent respectively. The proportion of Bohea declined from

88 in 1760-1770 to 73 per cent in 1771-1780; while that of Congou rose from 7 to 20 per cent (see Table 1). Among the green teas, in the period 1760-1780 Songlo (48.7 per cent) and Twankay (21.6 per cent) together represented about 80 per cent of the exports, and the other 20 per cent was made up by various other sorts (see Table 2).

*Table 1 Percentage of black teas purchased by the VOC in Canton, 1760-1780*

| *Type of black teas* | *1760* | *1761* | *1762* | *1763* | *1764* | *1765* | *1766* | *1767* | *1768* | *1769* | *1770* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea | 87.61 | 86.83 | 89.29 | 88.90 | 91.50 | 86.26 | 86.60 | 82.67 | 89.41 | 87.61 | 85.58 |
| Congou | 6.84 | 7.70 | 6.19 | 6.13 | 4.88 | 7.62 | 8.12 | 11.19 | 4.10 | 5.14 | 8.92 |
| Souchong | 4.60 | 5.10 | 4.22 | 3.78 | 2.95 | 5.33 | 4.50 | 5.01 | 4.97 | 4.70 | 3.87 |
| Pekoe | 0.95 | 0.37 | 0.30 | 1.19 | 0.66 | 0.79 | 0.78 | 1.13 | 1.52 | 2.55 | 1.63 |
| *Type of black teas* | *1771* | *1772* | *1773* | *1774* | *1775* | *1776* | *1777* | *1778* | *1779* | *1780* | |
| Bohea | 76.36 | 64.39 | 82.33 | 84.36 | 77.10 | 71.42 | 62.66 | 63.81 | 70.81 | 74.75 | |
| Congou | 16.65 | 27.53 | 10.88 | 9.20 | 17.43 | 24.03 | 30.43 | 25.44 | 19.74 | 16.01 | |
| Souchong | 5.73 | 5.69 | 5.33 | 5.11 | 4.43 | 3.11 | 4.50 | 7.91 | 6.74 | 6.54 | |
| Pekoe | 1.26 | 2.39 | 1.46 | 1.33 | 1.04 | 1.44 | 2.41 | 2.84 | 2.71 | 2.70 | |

Source: Appendix 4.

*Table 2 Percentage of green teas purchased by the VOC in Canton, 1760-1780*

| *Type of green teas* | *1760* | *1761*[1] | *1762* | *1763* | *1764* | *1765* | *1766* | *1767* | *1768* | *1769* | *1770* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Songlo | 51.61 | 57.03 | 53.46 | 53.22 | 50.55 | 55.99 | 45.30 | 36.31 | 51.88 | 48.07 | 42.85 |
| Twankay | 24.81 | 21.81 | 23.79 | 16.30 | 23.82 | 28.00 | 18.69 | 30.22 | 18.92 | 20.37 | 28.29 |
| Hyson | 12.55 | 6.31 | 13.84 | 14.72 | 13.53 | 15.57 | 15.85 | 14.27 | 11.78 | 9.86 | 10.01 |
| Hyson skin | 7.57 | 10.37 | 6.71 | 11.25 | 9.05 | — | 18.86 | 13.85 | 15.59 | 19.48 | 16.19 |
| Imperial tea | 3.46 | 4.40 | 2.20 | 4.51 | 3.05 | 0.44 | 1.30 | 5.35[2] | 1.83 | 2.22 | 2.66 |
| *Type of green teas green teas* | | *1771* | *1772* | *1773* | *1774* | *1775* | *1776* | *1777* | *1778* | *1779* | *1780* |
| Songlo | 55.55 | 53.80 | 53.44 | 55.21 | 59.91 | 50.30 | 49.12 | 44.43 | 48.38 | 50.43 | |
| Twankay | 17.38 | 16.02 | 18.94 | 17.72 | 16.56 | 20.99 | 16.96 | 21.86 | 32.52 | 21.08 | |
| Hyson | 11.02 | 15.46 | 9.21 | 9.42 | 10.30 | 16.08 | 15.84 | 12.96 | 9.94 | 12.39 | |
| Hyson skin | 16.05 | 14.72 | 18.41 | 17.65 | 13.23 | 12.63 | 18.08 | 20.61 | 8.44 | 15.24 | |
| Imperial tea | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | |
| Gunpowder | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.14 | 0.72 | 0.86 | |

[1] In this year the VOC also purchased 112½ pounds of Linchinsing tea which occupied 0.08 per cent of black teas.
[2] This 5.35% includes 3.81% for Songlo-Imperial tea and 1.54% for Imperial tea.
Source: Appendix 4.

*The "VOC tea"-supplying agents*

According to the Chinese regulations applying to the Canton System, tea merchants were forbidden to pursue their business directly with the foreign traders in Canton. As a result, in Canton there were three customary ways of delivering the teas into the hands of the VOC trade representatives: the tea merchants sold tea to either the Hong merchants (or *hangisten*); the shopkeepers; or even to the clerks (or *schrijvers*) of the Hong merchants; and they in turn sold the tea to the VOC trade representatives. Sometimes the tea merchants sold tea to the VOC trade representatives via the Hong merchants as intermediaries.[24]

The Hong merchants, the security merchants of the VOC in particular,[25] were the principal tea-supplying agents throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. However, there was a change in the late 1760s, even more marked after 1772, when the Co-hong (or *Co-hang*) was dissolved.[26] From that point, more and more supplying agents, especially shopkeepers, took the opportunity to join the Hong merchants in supplying service on the Canton-European tea market. Most of the shopkeepers were proprietors of porcelain shops, to which Bohea had been sent, probably to be used as a packaging material for the porcelain during transportation. Besides these, some of the Hong merchants' clerks often took advantage of their position as intermediaries between the Hong merchants and the European supercargoes to do business with the European companies on their own account. They capitalized on the fact they could easily acquire information about the demands for tea from the supercargoes as they went about their legitimate business and could therefore conveniently compensate for the lack of some teas from their own supply.[27]

Not all business required the intercession of go-betweens. What could be qualified as more or less direct deliveries by tea merchants and peddlers can be traced in the Dutch records of the years 1763, 1764, and 1776 at the very least. For instance, in 1763 a certain black tea merchant, Uhn-Sam-Ja, offered the Dutch supercargoes Bohea and Congou in the name of Tan Chetqua, via whom he also sold his tea to the English.[28] In 1764, the country people in the tea districts were said to have sent the best three-tenths of the tea for the Canton-European market on their own account and to have sold the worst tea to the agents sent thither by the Co-hong.[29] In 1776, in addition to these country people, a few tea peddlers also offered Bohea and Congou to the Dutch.[30]

Not to be outdone, the Hong merchants also sent their own agents into the tea districts to purchase tea, in order to guarantee the tea supply for their own businesses, bypassing the tea merchants. It is known that Swetja annually sent his brother into the tea districts to purchase tea.[31] In 1764, Poan Keequa, Tsja Hunqua, Chetqua, and Inksja (Swetja's successor), the

four chief Co-hong members (or *Co-hangisten*) at that moment, each sent two or more people to the Wuyi Mountains for the same purpose, and other small members of the Co-hong sent one man each at the behest of the Co-hong.[32] On 28 January 1770, Tsja Hunqua informed the Dutch that his son had returned from the tea districts, after having spent a part of the capital of 100,000 taels which Hunqua had given him for the purchase of the new harvest. He claimed that Bohea was amply available in the tea districts this year, but since the quality was unsatisfactory, he had not purchased more tea than the 6,000 piculs contracted for with the VOC.[33]

Now that we have classified the various types of the "VOC tea"-supplying agents in Canton, the right moment has arrived to introduce some of the outstanding tea-supplying agents (see Appendix 3).

*Swetja*[34] (1720-1763, Yan Ruishe 颜瑞舍, but properly Yan Shirui 颜时瑞) was the first-born son of Texia (Yan Deshe 颜德舍, but properly Yan Liangzhou 颜亮州), one of the prominent Cantonese merchants in the 1740s. He owned and managed the Taihe Hang 泰和行 and died in 1751. Swetja took over the family business in 1751 and ran it over the next decade, with the help of his brothers. Swetja died in 1763 and was succeeded in his business and in the capacity of security merchant for the VOC by his brother Inksja.[35]

*Tsja Hunqua* (d. 1770, Cai Ruiguan 蔡瑞官) was involved with the Jufeng Hang 聚丰行 and associated with the Shunli Hang 顺利行 and the Yihe Hang (probably 义和行), but he did his main business through the Yifeng Hang 义丰行. At least five of his sons were involved in his business, in the trade itself and helping behind the scenes: Anqua, Teonqua, Tayqua, Sequa, and Tsjonqua, some of whom sooner or later started their own business with the Europeans. Tsja Hunqua, in partnership with Semqua, did much trade with the Dutch, and became the leader of the three security merchants for the VOC until his death in May 1770.[36] In the eyes of the Dutch, Tsja Hunqua was: "The most upright of all the Chinese who have ever passed through this world" and "[…] has never misled us [the Dutch]".[37]

*Tan Chetqua* (d. 1771, Chen Jieguan 陈捷官) was another of the security merchants working with the VOC. He had the unenviable reputation for being known as an indecisive person who would take exception to even the smallest matter.[38] The name of his trading company was the Guangshun Hang 广顺行. Making his debut in 1742, Chetqua appears fairly consistently in the Dutch records, recording his trade with them.[39] He is thought to have taken over the family business sometime in 1758 or 1759, probably because of the advanced age of his father Tan Soequa (Chen Shouguan 陈寿官).[40] By 1758, it was obvious he was handling the Dutch trade by himself.[41] From 1759, Chetqua's name appears regularly

in the sources as a security merchant trading with the EIC, the VOC, and the Danish Asiatic Company (hereafter the DAC). In the 1760s, his youngest brother (Tan) Quyqua and another person by the name of Houqua served as his clerks.[42] The management of the family business passed to one of his brothers named (Tan) Tinqua (Chen Dengguan 陈登观) after Chetqua died in late 1771.[43]

*Inksja* (?-1792, or Yngshaw or Ingsia, Yan Yingshe 颜瑛舍, but properly Yan Shiying 颜时瑛) was the second son of Texia (Yan Deshe 颜德舍). Inksja succeeded to the management of the Taihe Hang 泰和行 after Swetja's death in 1763, and became one of the VOC security merchants. In the eyes of the Dutch supercargoes, Inksja, even though he appeared younger than Tan Chetqua, was a man with a reputation of courageousness and resoluteness,[44] to whom all the companies with which he worked accorded great credit.[45] Inksja traded extensively with the EIC, the DAC, and the VOC, and remained active until late 1779, when the Taihe Hang went bankrupt. As punishment for his debts the unfortunate Inksja was then exiled to Yili 伊犁 in the far western regions of China, along with another merchant Kousia.[46]

*Poan Keequa* (1714-1788, Pan Qiguan 潘启官, but properly Pan Wenyan 潘文岩) spent in his early years a considerable time in Manila with his father, where they were involved in the trade to Quanzhou, and where young Keequa learned to speak Spanish. Later, he began trading on his own account under the business name of Tongwen Hang 同文行, and the earliest appearance of his own business with the VOC was probably in 1751.[47] In the 1760s, Poan Keequa was appointed the head of the Co-hong and held that position until it was dissolved in 1771. Despite the fact that all other Co-hong members revolted against Poan Keequa in the 1760s, he made himself master of the European trade until his death in 1788.[48] Although Tsja Hunqua recommended him to the Dutch for a Bohea contract in 1764, he was rejected by the Dutch.[49] Therefore it seems that Poan Keequa did not start to sell tea to the Dutch until 1768.[50]

*Tan Tsjoqua* (1706-1789,[51] Chen Zuguan 陈祖官, but properly Chen Wenkuo 陈文扩) probably took over the Zhengfeng Hang 正丰行 from his father, "Mandarin Quyqua" (Chen Kuiguan 陈魁官), who was active on the Canton-European market from at least the 1720s to his death in 1742. Apart from his sales under the aegis of the Zhengfeng Hang, Tsjoqua also sold tea via the Yuanquan Hang (源泉行, or *Juun Suun Hang* as it is noted in the Dutch records). When he died on 27 March 1789, his eldest son, Locqua, succeeded to his business.[52]

*Tsjobqua* (?-1776,[53] Cai Yuguan 蔡玉官) took over the Jufeng Hang 聚丰行) after his elder brother, Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua (Ruiguan 瑞官), died in 1761. It was a thorny legacy as he inherited Suyqua's enormous debt. By 1768, he was even more deeply in debt to the European companies as

well. This was the year in which he stopped offering the "VOC teas", and 1769 is the last year in which he is found in the Dutch records actively trading in Canton.[54]

*Monqua* (?-1796, Cai Wenguan 蔡文官, but properly Cai Shiwen 蔡世文) was an interpreter *(linguist)* in Canton before his appointment as a Hong merchant in 1761 when his father, Teunqua, died sometime in 1760 or 1761. Monqua also assumed his father's debts. There seem to have been several firms affiliated to Monqua's branch, including the Yihe Hang 义和行, the Fengyuan Hang 逢源行, and the Wanhe Hang 万和行. Certainly, he regularly traded through the latter two businesses.[55] In 1767, his tea warehouse caught fire and he lost about 900 casks of tea which were lying ready for the Danes. Surmounting this blow, Monqua managed to survive as well as to circumvent the debt crisis which plagued the Hong merchants in the late 1770s. He was appointed chief Hong merchant in 1788 after Poan Keequa died.[56]

*Semqua* (Qiu Kun 邱崑) was Tsja Hunqua's partner. He shows up in the 1730s and 1740s as Hunqua's partner "Felix" (or other spellings) and later adopted the name Semqua. He was active in the trade from at least 1729 to 1774. He, not Hunqua as is often mentioned in the foreign records, was the real owner of the Yifeng Hang 义丰行. The two men traded with this firm until Hunqua died in 1769, whereupon Semqua and Anqua (or Hanqua, Hunqua's second son) took over the business. The new partnership lasted for a couple of years, but then experienced financial difficulties. The firm not only took care of the Dutch trade in Canton but also ran the Portuguese trade in Macao. By 1774, the Yifeng Hang was deeply in debt, at which point Semqua transferred the rights of the firm to Hunqua's son Tayqua.[57]

*Tayqua* (?-1775) was Tsja Hunqua's third or fourth son. He and his elder brother, Anqua, in conjunction with their father's partner Semqua, used to go to Macao to supervise the trade with the Portuguese.[58] From 1752 until his death in 1775, Tayqua shows up frequently in the Dutch records. From 1763 to 1774, he sold various teas to the VOC on his own account. Tayqua died in 1775 and his youngest brother, Tsjonqua (Cai Xiangguan 蔡相官, but properly Cai Zhaofu 蔡昭复), took over the reigns of the Yifeng Hang. Tsjonqua managed to keep it limping along for a few more years, but it finally failed in the early 1780s and was closed by order of the Emperor.[59]

*Consciens Giqua* (?-1765, Ye Yiguan 叶义官), also known as "Conscientia" Giqua, was from the Ye family, which had been active in the trade in Canton from the very early years of the eighteenth century. Consciens Giqua shows up in the companies' records connected to three different businesses, the Guangyuan Hang 广源行, the Houde Hang 厚得行, and the Fengjin Hang 丰晋行.[60] After the Co-hong was estab-

lished in 1760, he became one of the small Co-hong members and seemingly also was a tea-supplying agent for other Europeans, such as the EIC and the DAC.[61] Consciens Giqua died in 1765 and his son Huyqua took over the family business until his death on 3 July 1775, when the Guangyuan Hang was closed as well.[62]

*Kousia* (Zhang Tianqiu 张天球) succeeded his brother Foutia (Zhang Fushe 张富舍) as a Hong merchant when the latter died in 1761. The name of his business was the Yuyuan Hang 裕源行. Kousia was also landed with a sizeable debt by Foutia, which was a burden to him for many years. Kousia first appears in the VOC records selling porcelain in 1764 and selling tea and other goods from 1772 to 1779.[63] In the 1770s, Kousia was also the partner of a member of the Yan family, Limsia (Yan Linshe 颜琳舍). In 1773, Kousia's warehouse, which was located at Limsia's factory, caught fire and the damage was supposedly estimated at about 7,000 taels. He gradually began to fall behind in his obligations after this, and by the late 1770s his business was foundering in serious trouble. In 1779, another fire broke out which set him back an additional 10,000 to 15,000 taels. At the end of that same year, he was declared bankrupt. His business was then closed, and as punishment for his debts he was exiled to Yili with Inksja.[64]

*Pinqua* (Yang Bingguan 杨丙观, but properly Yang Cengong 杨岑龚) was the owner of a porcelain shop, trading with most of the European companies in Canton during the 1760s and 1770s. The name of his business was the Longhe Hang 隆和行, and he also sold his porcelain through Consciens Giqua's Guangyuan Hang 广源行. Besides porcelain, Pinqua also sold black tea, mostly Bohea, to the VOC. In 1782, he was appointed a Hong merchant, and after that he traded in a wide range of products of which tea was the most important. Two years later, he had to assume part of the huge debt of the failed merchant Tsjonqua. As part of the settlement, Pinqua was obliged to purchase the Dutch factory from Tsjonqua. By 1791, Pinqua's business was in serious trouble. He was indebted to several foreign companies, and was also in arrears to the tea merchants. In 1792, his business collapsed.[65]

Apart from Pinqua, the other small porcelain shops with which the Dutch contracted in the 1760s included: Lisjoncon (Li Xianggong 李相公, but properly Li Zhengmao 李正茂), Quonsching (Guangsheng Dian 广盛店), Quonschong (Guangchang Dian 广昌店), Habjak (Heyi 合益), Houqua (Guangyin 广益), Pontonchon (Tongchang 同昌), Neyschong (Yichang Dian 裔昌店), Tonchon (Yaochang 徭昌), Soyschong (Juchang 聚昌), Suchin Kinqua (Liangchang Ciqi Dian 良昌瓷器店),[66] Soyqua (Xiuqua 修官), Conjac, Taxion, Boohing, Tonhang, Winschong (Yongchang 永昌), Tongfong, Konqua, Hapwoa, Jauqua, Chonqua, Pouwchong, Echong (Yichang 义昌), Exchin (Yisheng 益disabled), Manuel

Corree, and Affu.[67] The porcelain shops which were involved in the VOC tea trade during the 1760s and 1770s were Pinqua, Suchin Kinqua, Lisjoncon, Conjac, Exchin, Echong, and Foyec (see Appendix 3).

### *The "VOC tea" procurements*

As we know, collecting the "VOC teas" in the tea districts and transporting them to Canton for the Canton-European market was a laborious business, which occurred totally out of the hands of the Dutch trade representatives. After the teas arrived in Canton, there was yet another taxing process, which was partly under control of the Dutch trade representatives. This was the rigmarole of the purchase of tea before the commodity was eventually loaded aboard the Company ships. This was the "VOC tea" bring-and-buy transaction between the Chinese tea-supplying agents and the Dutch trade representatives. The latter had three options to collecting the "VOC teas" from the tea-supplying agent. The first was to conclude a deal by off-season contract. The second was to make off-season purchases after the departure of the Company ships.[68] Finally there was the additional trading-season purchase on the free market.[69]

Most "VOC teas" were supplied through contracts concluded with the tea-supplying agents, of whom the Dutch trade representatives' regular trading partners, mainly their security merchants, formed the majority; some small Hong merchants made up the minority. As far as the Dutch were concerned, there was plenty of hard work involved in the whole process from the negotiations with the tea-supplying agents to the loading of the teas purchased aboard the Company ships. The handling of this business can be divided into five steps: the negotiation of a contract; the conclusion of the contract; the examination of the tea samples; the packing of the teas which were ready; and the loading and stowing of the teas bought-in on the Company ships.

The negotiation of a contract was the most strenuous task for both the Dutch supercargoes and their trading partners. It ordinarily began after the departure of the Company ships in the first quarter of each year, sometime in February or early March.[70] On paper it seemed simple. During the process of negotiation the trading partners presented the tea samples with their asking price, and then the Dutch supercargoes put in their bidding price after checking the samples. Finally both parties came to an agreement and fixed a price. But in practice, it was an extremely protracted process and there was a great deal of ostensibly polite to-ing and fro-ing between the two parties, which was a true mirror of Chinese and Dutch commercial astuteness and shrewd trading.

How much profit the tea-supplying agents could earn on average from

the fixed price is shrouded in obscurity, but, according to the Dutch records, the price of tea on the Canton market and in the tea districts was to a certain extent comparable. On 4 July 1765, the members of the Co-hong proposed the price of the new Bohea on board ship should be 18.5 taels per picul, as the price in the tea districts had risen to 15.5 taels per picul that year.[71] The Dutch supercargoes finally paid 19.6 taels (of Spanish rials at 72 Chinese candareens) per picul on average to diverse agents (see Appendix 4). In August 1766, the Co-hong members asked the slightly lower price of 18 taels per picul for the new Bohea, and this was the price the Dutch supercargoes paid on average to the various agents. The marginal reduction was because the price which the Co-hong merchants paid in the tea districts had dropped to 14.5 taels per picul.[72] The next year, the price of Bohea rose to 14.8 or even 15 taels per picul so the three security merchants of the Dutch claimed. In a knock-on effect they demanded 19 taels, of which 3 taels for their expenses in Canton and 1 tael for the charge by the Co-hong. Later, they themselves dropped the asking price to 18.5 taels, but with much difficulty the Dutch persuaded them to accept 18.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 72 Chinese candareens).[73] In 1768, the Co-hong fixed the price of new Bohea at 18 taels,[74] but Tsja Hunqua, the Hong merchant most trusted by the Dutch, thought the price was unreasonable and suggested it should be around 15.5 or 16 taels, as the price in the tea districts was only 10 or 10.4 taels.[75] All these examples give information about some of the detailed individual cases, and the whole gamut of the diverse prices offered by different tea-supplying agents for both old and new teas can be compared in the Appendix 4. One more example of the tedious negotiations between the Dutch trade representatives and their four trading partners in 1779 can be presented in the table below:

*Table 3 Comparison between the asking, bid, and fixed prices (taels/picul) of several teas by the Dutch supercargoes and their trading partners, 1779*

| Tea | Asking price | Bid price | Fixed price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea | 13.5 | 12.5 | 12.5 |
| Twankay | 24.5 | 23 | 23.5 |
| Songlo | 22.5 | 21 | 21.5 |

Source: NFC 42, Resolution of the Trade Council, 1 February 1779.

Once the negotiations had got under way, the tea-supplying agents usually urged the Dutch trade representatives to accept their offer as early as possible. They hinted that the earlier the Dutch accept their offer, the better the quality of the tea the Dutch could obtain at a lower price and the

sooner they could pack up the teas. The Dutch took a slightly different view of the matter, reasoning the earlier they did so, the less opportunity they would have to put pressure on the sellers and the higher the price they would actually pay. This principle was also applied to the negotiations with other companies. Shrewdly, the tea-supplying agents also knew how to take advantage of their negotiations with other companies, above all the EIC, to urge the Dutch to take the plunge. The fear that their competitors would steal a match on them was the real reason the Dutch trade representatives hastened to conclude the negotiations, not so much because they were really satisfied with the Chinese offer, but more because they were acutely aware that other competitors also had their eye on the same goods or had already put in a higher bid price. In such a situation, he who hesitates is lost! In January 1763, the Dutch supercargoes agreed to take Souchong from Tjobqua at 32 taels per picul, as the latter swore that this sort of tea was always bought up by other companies without the slightest hesitation at 45 taels, and the Danes and Swedes had already accepted his asking price of 32 taels.[76] In February 1772, the Dutch supercargoes were unwilling to wait and made an agreement with Inksja at 18 taels per picul for Twankay, because the stocks of Twankay were very low and especially because the English had earlier paid that same price.[77] On 19 January 1775, after persistently trying day after day the Dutch failed to persuade Inksja and Tinqua to accept the price of 14 taels per picul for Congou, for which both the English and Swedes were offering 15 taels, and finally surrendered and decided to offer 15 taels.[78] Sometimes, in order to drive up the asking price, the tea-supplying agents even pushed their luck, for example in early 1764 when they were expecting the arrival of more English ships and insisted on not commencing negotiations with the Dutch until the English ships arrived.[79]

Although it would seem that the Dutch were occasionally caught wrong footed, they often could surpass their competitors in their bids for the price of tea. The basic reason for this financial advantage was that the Dutch trade representatives nearly always possessed enough capital, including a sufficiency of cash brought from the Dutch Republic and left over from the former trading season in Canton (see Appendix 1), and this fortunate pecuniary position was bolstered even more by the ample supply of East Indies goods from Batavia, which they had at their disposal (see Appendix 2).[80]

In some years, the price fixed by other companies appeared to be lower than that set by the Dutch but, as a matter of fact, taking into consideration all the additional terms of the contract, this was actually higher. For example, in February 1769 the Swedes and again the English in April of the same year contracted for Bohea at 13.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 74 Chinese candareens) per picul, while the Dutch paid Tan Chetqua 14

taels. Yet, since they also had to pay what amounted to a 20 per cent interest both from 12 February and from 7 April until 7 July respectively for the delay of payment, these doughty competitors actually paid 14.3.3 and 14.0.6 taels respectively in the end.[81] Besides the competition from the Europeans rivals, for many years the Dutch and all the other companies also had to contend with another competitor, namely the operators of the Chinese junks destined for South-east Asia. According to Canton custom, such merchants could always easily obtain a lower price from the tea-supplying agents than their European rivals could. On 30 January 1764, for instance, the tea-supplying agents sold Souchong and Congou to the junk people at 20 taels and 17 to 18 taels per picul respectively, for which the Dutch paid 22.5 taels and 19.5 to 20.5 taels.[82] Again on 9 January 1769, Tan Tsjoqua offered part of his Congou to the Swedes at 19.5 to 20 taels per picul and another part to the junk people at 17.5 taels, which to no avail he had earlier offered to the Dutch for 18 to 19 taels.[83]

Besides the actual price of the tea, the means of payment for the purchase of tea was included in the negotiations of the contract as well. There were different detailed cases for each year during the period under study, but some conventions do seem to have been honoured. Because all the tea-supplying agents either had to advance money to the tea merchants in Canton or send this to those in the tea districts, not unnaturally these supplying agents in their turn desired an advance payment from the Dutch and the supercargoes of other companies. In their dealings with the small agents, who were always pressing for cash, the companies usually presented an advance payment of about 70 per cent in cash and 10 per cent in spices on the arrival of the first Company ship, and around 20 per cent in cash after the teas were on board.[84] When it came to dealing with the great trading partners, the VOC customarily agreed with them that an advance of up to 80 per cent of the payment should be handed over, of which one-eighth in spices at the Company prices and seven-eighths in cash, while they would accept the remaining about 20 per cent of the payment in tin, pepper or other Company goods (except the spices), at the market rate on the arrival of the Company ship.[85]

Following the negotiations, on the basis of the demands for the quantity and assortment of tea by the China Committee, the Dutch trade representatives went ahead and concluded the contracts with their trading partners for much of the export order. This could be done as early as March, but more probably in April or May, before the departure of the Company servants for Macao. In the contracts, the amount and price of teas which were going to be delivered to the Dutch, the due date of delivery of teas by the trading partners, the means of payment by the Dutch supercargoes, and the compensation for breach of contract were meticulously noted. The following contracts concluded in 1763 and 1769 may serve as practical illustrations.

On 15 May 1763, the Dutch chief signed a contract with Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, and Inksja for 9,000 pounds of Bohea at 15.4 taels (of Spanish rials at 74 Chinese candareens) per picul (namely 122½ pounds), under the following six conditions:[86] if the English were to contract at less than 15 taels with an advance payment of 10 taels at 72 candareens, the tea-supplying agents, who also did the business with the EIC, would demand the Dutch pay one penny (for which the Dutch always counted four maces) more than the English or anybody else would give. If the English, by such strategies as delaying the contracts or by seizing other opportunities, were forced to pay more than 15 taels at 72 candareens per picul, the Dutch would never have to pay more than the abovementioned 15.4 taels at 74 candareens. The Dutch agreed to pay 8.5 taels per picul, or 76,500 taels in total, immediately and an additional 1.5 taels per picul, or 13,500 taels in total, on the arrival of the first Company ship, plus the interest on the 13,500 taels at 2 per cent per each thirty days. The intervening period from the date of receipt of the 76,500 taels until the payment of the 13,500 taels was considered as if the Dutch had paid 10 taels. If later the English could not advance 10 taels in cash in default of funds, the tea-supplying agents would compensate the Dutch 20 per cent for the interest on the money paid more in advance. The tea-supplying agents would agree not to pack the new Bohea for any other nation until the Dutch had completely packed three chests at the premise of each of the tea-supplying agents; the Dutch might then pack turn and turn about with the English until they had stored the 9,000 piculs of teas. The tea-supplying agents promised to pack the 9,000 pounds of Bohea in chests smaller than the usual containers,[87] at the behest of the Dutch provided that the Dutch compensated them once again with five maces extra above the price agreed the last year. Should only two VOC ships arrive in Canton in that year and the Dutch not be able to ship the whole quantity of 9,000 piculs properly, the remaining teas would be divided fairly into two parts, of which the Dutch should accept one part at their own risk at the agreed price for the next year, and the other part would be kept on the tea-supplying agents' account;[88] for their part, the tea-supplying agents would compensate the VOC the interest of the advance payment at 10 taels per picul for six months or 2 per cent per month.[89]

On 18 March 1769, the Dutch trade representatives and the abovementioned three merchants agreed on contracts for purchasing Souchong, Congou, Songlo, and Twankay (without defining the price exactly, agreeing to regulate it in the light of the current circumstances): The tea-supplying agents had 230 days, or until 4 September 1770, in which to fix the first shipment, and the other shipments of the teas demanded over 250 days, or until 24 September 1770: 570 piculs of first-grade Souchong; 730 piculs of second-grade Souchong; 650 piculs of

first-grade Congou; 1,140 piculs of second-grade Congou; and 2,240 piculs of third- or lower-grade Congou to be packed in whole chests and mixed with Bohea. For their part, the three Chinese merchants who were to deliver together the afore-mentioned teas promised to do so on condition that they would bear responsibility for the quality, according to the assortment; if on reception the Dutch judged the teas unsatisfactory or if the three Chinese pressed them to receive the teas as the first grade, while they were convinced they were second or even a lower grade, they were free to reject the teas; in that case, the Chinese should be obliged to furnish such money from their capital for the imported Company goods destined for them, providing that the Dutch judged it necessary. The tea-supplying agents should deliver 650 piculs of first-grade Songlo repacked in ordinary half chests at 22.2 taels (of Spanish rials at 74 candareens) per picul in two parts on the date as above-mentioned, on condition that the Dutch should pay them on account 14 taels per picul in cash on the arrival of the Company ships and 320 piculs of first-grade Twankay in two parts, which was to be sent in casks, at 24 taels per picul on the same condition as that of the Songlo.[90] Regarding the additional terms of the contracts, it was also agreed that the tea-supplying agents would guarantee completely against fire, water, and any other damage until all the teas had been loaded aboard the Company ships.[91]

These two illustrations are more than enough to show the standard mode by which the Dutch trade representatives contracted both black and green teas with their supplying agents. In these win-win contracts, how either side, the sellers as well as the buyers, should abide by the articles and how they would suffer if the contract was breached was stipulated in detail.

Except for the large shipments of tea which were contracted in the manner discussed above, the rest of the tea was mostly purchased during the off-season. After the ships of all the European companies had departed and their delegates had concluded their current business, there were usually still a number of "old teas" remaining unsold on the market. The trade representatives of the VOC, as well as those of other companies, seized the opportunity to buy these leftover teas at a lower price, not only from their individual trading partners but also from other small Hong merchants and sometimes even, indirectly, from tea merchants and peddlers (see Appendix 3). This kind of purchase, of course, had to be completed before their departure for Macao. For example, in view of the fact that they would have the opportunity to buy the remaining fine teas in mid-February 1764, earlier or later the Dutch purchased several sorts of "old teas" from the following Hong merchants in February, March, and April: Inksja (Hyson at 28 taels per picul); Tsja Hunqua (Bohea at 13.5, Congou at 17, and Souchong at 20); Tjobqua (Bohea at 13.5); Fet Hunqua (Congou at 18); and Consciens Giqua (Ankay-Souchong at 13).[92]

Besides these opportunities, there was the possibility of the additional purchase on the free market during the trading-season. This purchase was governed by several factors. In some years, having accumulated the teas by contract and off-season purchase, the Dutch found themselves in a quandary as they were still unable to load all the homeward-bound ships fully. To solve their dilemma, they forced themselves to look for some surplus on the free market. In August 1765, the Dutch decided to increase the contracted quantities of Twankay from 40,000 pounds up to 90,000 pounds, and simultaneously to reduce the Songlo and Hyson skin from 240,000 and 60,000 pounds down to 184,000 and 30,000 pounds respectively.[93] The reason for the change was that the price of Twankay had risen considerably in Amsterdam and Middelburg in the past year;[94] while the supply of Songlo and Hyson skin to Canton was apparently scarce because of the fierce competition from the English and French and accordingly their prices rose sharply that year.[95] In November 1780, the Dutch agreed to buy an extra 833, 833, and 834 pounds of Bohea respectively from Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, and Tsjonqua at 13.5 taels, instead of the 12 taels which they had bid, after protracted negotiations, in order to adapt themselves to the current circumstances.[96] But more frequently, at their own convenience the Dutch made additional purchases at local shops, especially the porcelain shops, in the second half of the period under study. As mentioned before, when the porcelain was delivered to the Dutch by the shopkeepers, a number of teas, mostly Bohea, was also included (see Appendix 3).[97] The quantity of this is not clearly mentioned in the sources, but the price must have tallied with those on the current market.

Irrespective of how the Dutch trade representatives purchased the "VOC teas", all the teas arrived in Canton in October and/or November. After having made their own preparations, the tea-supplying agents presented some tea samples from each chop of different kinds of teas to be tested by the Dutch. The examination focused on the aroma, taste, infusion quality, and the colour of the tea. In 1762, the Company ships arrived in Canton with an instruction to the supercargoes from the China Committee concerning tea: "[…] for apart from the fact that the quality of each particular type of tea must be of the very best and, as they say, of the first and finest leaf, because experience has taught that in this country a greater differentiation is made in types than in China, it must therefore be remarked which additional qualities are regarded as virtues in tea in this country and for which a higher price is paid by the buyers. According to the present taste of the buyers, it is regarded as a prime virtue in all types of tea that it is soft, smooth, and pure in taste, and moreover is clear when poured out, and that in this, the Bohea of some foreign companies has particularly excelled of recent years."[98] In 1765, the

*Illustration 3 The packing of the "VOC teas" in Canton*



Saucer and teacup, Chine de Commande, diameter of rim 12.8 cm, Qianlong period, c. 1750; decorated with overglaze enamels and gold, showing Dutch and Chinese merchant in Canton overseeing the packing of tea at a warehouse.
Source: Courtesy of Princessehof Leeuwarden/Nationaal Keramiekmuseum, inventory number: BP 79.

Dutch trade representatives once again received a specific demand from the China Committee exacting that the quality of Bohea be accompanied by a reasonable good leaf as well as an absolutely pure taste, as this was always to be preferred.[99]

In the ordinary run of things, the standard of examination was not only strictly complied with by the Dutch trade representatives, it was also respected by the tea-supplying agents. Incontrovertibly the Dutch supercargoes had to be very responsible in heeding the interests of the VOC, but inevitably should an agent's teas be rejected by the Dutch, this would bring great shame on him and count very heavily against him in obtaining future credit in the European trade. All these precautionary measures notwithstanding, accidents still might occasionally happen. Should the Dutch discover a breach of contract with respect to the quality of tea during their examination, they would take the necessary action in responding to this according to their earlier agreement with the tea-supplying agents. On 23 October 1764, for example, while examining the Bohea samples from Tan Chetqua, Tsja Hunqua, and Inksja, the Dutch rejected the samples of Hunqua and Inksja because of their inferior quality. They felt constrained to accept Chetqua's because his tea was somewhat better, and at that time Bohea was in short supply and all the tea offered to the Europeans was poor that year. Later, the Dutch selected some substitute canasters (or baskets) of Bohea from Hunqua and Inksja, but demanded a subsidy from all three merchants citing as their reason the unsatisfactory quality of all the Bohea received, for which the merchants were only willing to pay 6,000 taels. Eventually, after a long hard bargaining, a subsidy of 9,000 taels was agreed upon by both sides on condition that it remained secret and would not be disclosed to all other Chinese and Europeans.[100]

After having carefully examined and tasted the samples, the Dutch decided on their purchase and agreed on what was known as the final price for each chop with the tea-supplying agents. Thereupon they had the accepted teas tared and packed, complying with the instructions in the demand stipulating how the teas were to be graded and packed (see Illustration 3).[101] The majority of the teas purchased in these three ways (mainly the teas by contract) were examined, tared, packed, marked, and numbered on the premises of the tea-supplying agents, while the minority (mainly the teas acquired by off-season purchases) were stored in the warehouse of the Dutch factory awaiting the arrival of the Company ships for the next trading season. This was not the end of the story. What was known officially as the final price still could be changed. This could happen should the Dutch, who had the right to re-check the chests after packing and/or before loading the chests aboard the Company ships,[102] once again discover some inconformity between the chops and the sam-

ples they had tested during the random re-checking. Theoretically, the price could be increased if the chests were superior to the samples after the re-checking. But, in practice, it seems that only inferior chests were encountered on a few occasions. In March 1770, for instance, the Dutch bought 450 chests of old Congou from Quyqua, one of Tan Chetqua's clerks, at 18 taels per picul, which became 433 chests by further allotment. After receipt, the Dutch found a great portion did not conform to the samples. They had no choice but to check all the chests one after another and consequently ascertained that 277 chests were eligible, but that 153 chests were of an inferior grade (there were also three chests missing). They resolved to demand a discount of almost two taels per picul on the whole chests. On the 31st, they succeeded in obtaining the discount at 2.2 taels per picul from Chetqua, and stored all the chests in the warehouse of their own factory.[103]

This is an apt juncture to make some remarks about the tea packing under the supervision of the Dutch assignees. During this exacting work, the most pertinent duty of those assigned by the Trade Council had always been to ensure as far as this was possible the prevention of the adulteration of the tea by dust, particularly Bohea. To assist them in this task, since 1760 the China Committee had a set of regulations drawn up as guide to the weight of the Bohea chests following complaints by the tea-buyers in the home country objecting to the dustiness of tea.[104] Especially after it received a strong admonition by the China Committee because of the dustiness in Bohea chests in 1764, the Trade Council tightened up the regulations guiding its assignees' work. As resolved by the Council, the supervision of the packing and weighing of the chests was assigned each year to various supercargoes, assistants, and bookkeepers as a team supplied to each of the tea-supplying agents. Both in 1765 and 1766 three teams were sent to Tsja Hunqua, Tan Chetqua, and Inksja; in 1779 four teams were sent to Tan Tsjoqua, Inksja, Tsjonqua, and Monqua; and in 1780 three teams to Tsjonqua, Tan Tsjoqua, and Monqua respectively.[105] The supervision of the assignees appointed by the Trade Council was believed to be the answer to reducing the dustiness of the tea during the packing, although even by making a super-human effort it was impossible to prevent it completely.

After all the above-mentioned work had been completed, eventually, the tea chests were loaded onto sampans, which were ordinarily hired by arrangements made by either the Hong merchants or the interpreters, to transport them to the Company ships in the roadstead of Whampoa.

Year after year, by and large the afore-discussed series of transactions in the tea trade carried out by the Dutch trade representatives in Canton proceeded smoothly. This can be deduced from the large quantities of the teas the VOC purchased in this period. The VOC archival data reveal that

the quantity of the teas bought annually in Canton by the Company for the home market from the season 1758-1760 fluctuated from 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 pounds in the seasons from 1758-1760 to 1761-1764, and from 3,000,000 to 3,900,000 pounds in the seasons from 1762-1765 to 1778-1781 (see Table 6 in Chapter Five). In comparison with the previous thirty years the quantity of the teas sent every year from both Canton and Batavia only three times reached 2,500,000 to 3,000,000 pounds. In the last twelve years until 1794, the quantity never exceeded 3,011,706.25 pounds in as many as six years (see Figure 2 in Chapter Five and Appendices 4 and 5).

## *Conclusion*

The period chosen for this study was an outstanding phase of the VOC tea trade with China. Three final remarks can be made on the transactions in the purchase of tea in Canton by the VOC.

The first of these concerns the sort of tea purchased. The "VOC teas" consisted mostly of sorts of black and green tea, of which black tea, in particular Bohea, was the firm favourite. The reason it seems was that the price of black teas was much cheaper, although their quality was inferior. This was a direct reflection of the demand on the home market: the low-quality tea with a low price catered to the mass of society, whereas the high quality tea at a higher price satisfied the more discerning palate of the upper classes.

The second and third points refer to the actual buying. During the twenty years studied three and later four principal tea-supplying agents acted as the regular trading partners of the VOC. The Dutch chose them because they were great Hong merchants armed with the essential capacity and credit. They were not the only parties involved. Small Hong merchants as well as local shopkeepers, and sometimes even the clerks of the Hong merchants, were also employed for two reasons: this could create some measure of competition among the Chinese and it could also make up for any shortfall in the supply.

Among these three ways of purchasing tea, contract purchase from the Company's regular trading partners, who also were the chief recipients of the Company import goods, was the principal method which basically secured the stability of the quantity of supply and the purchase price. In the meantime, the two other ways were both indispensable complements to the first. The combination of all the three ways, allied with the Company's ample supply of capital, coalesced to favour the success of the VOC delegates' business in Canton.

CHAPTER FOUR

# THE DUTCH-CHINESE-EUROPEAN TRIANGLE

## *Introduction*

On 12 April 1760, the Chinese Imperial Court officially introduced what was to become known as the Canton System (1760-1842).[1] By imperial decree, all the European companies were ordered to do their business at one port only, Canton. Simultaneously with this decree, several regulations relating to the European trade in Canton were also issued by the local authorities of Canton. One of the decisions was no longer to force the representatives of the European companies to leave China during the off-season, but to allow them to sojourn in Macao.[2] Following the introduction of the Canton System, the conditions, under which representatives of these companies were obliged to be stationed together on a small strip of land outside the walls of Canton would last until the conclusion of the First Opium War in 1842.

Under the Canton System, the European trade in that city was meticulously organized and followed an invariable pattern. Each step was strictly controlled by Chinese officialdom. Each company had to engage one or more Hong merchants, who had been designated by the Chinese authorities to trade with the European companies as an appointed security. The Hong merchants acted as guarantor for the payment of customs duties by the Europeans, but their role and responsibilities were much wider. The Chinese authorities also held them responsible for the behaviour of the foreigners. The various functions of this system were put into practice on the orders of the mandarins in Canton: the *Tsongtu* (Zongdu (两广) 总督, Governor-General),[3] the *Fooyuern* (Fuyuan 抚员 or (广东) 巡抚, Governor),[4] and the *Hoppo* (Hubu or Yue Haiguan Jiandu (粤) 海关监督, Superintendent of Maritime Customs)[5]. Obliged by the constraints of this strictly regulated trade system, the supercargoes of the European companies had no choice but to negotiate with their Chinese partners about the sale and purchase of goods, always locked in fierce competition with the delegates of the other companies.

Nor was this mediation restricted to business affairs. In daily life, all the relations of European traders with Chinese officialdom were mediated by the Hong merchants and the interpreters, since the Confucian administrative elite of China held the merchant class in great disdain. This condescension was even more marked when they had to deal with foreign

(barbarian) merchants. The *Hoppo* was the only relatively high official with whom foreign traders were able to get in touch on a regular basis, as he was directly in charge of the customs administration and of supervising the Canton trade.

The activities of all the European and Chinese participants and the various kinds of *guanxi*, or Chinese "networking", in terms of economic interests among them in this bustling emporium generated an extremely lively atmosphere during the business season. The process of negotiation between the Dutch trade representatives and the tea-supplying agents has already been discussed. This is then the juncture at which to give a description of other aspects of life in Sino-European interrelations. It is quite difficult to ascertain how the Dutch interacted with the Chinese and other Europeans at that time, but it is possible to find some clues from a close scrutiny of the records of the various companies.

### *Protests against the establishment of the Co-hong*

In 1759, the English supercargoes in Canton sent James Flint to the northern port of Tianjin 天津 to deliver the local authorities a memorial listing the grievances they held about the administration of the Canton trade. The memorial was subsequently forwarded to Peking. When the High Commissioner was dispatched to Canton to investigate the *Hoppo*'s alleged misconduct, his subsequent investigation confirmed that the complaints were largely justified. Even so, the Chinese authorities responded unfavourably to the demands voiced by the Europeans requesting a liberalization of their trade. The municipal authorities ordered the European merchants to limit their business dealings in China, and to instruct the Hong merchants to establish a united association of their members which would be privileged to decide the prices of import and export goods. The task of this so-called Co-hong corporation was to regulate the Canton trade of their respective members and to consolidate their monopoly on the European trade.[6] The European trade representatives were vociferous in their fervent objections to this modification of the trade at Canton.

At the beginning of 1760, as matters were not yet properly sorted out, the atmosphere in Canton could be cut by a knife because the Hong merchants refused to engage in any business for more than six months ahead, as they were at that time deliberating the establishment of the Co-hong. Faced with this delay, compounded by the uncertainty of what the new arrangement would entail, the European trade representatives were like cats on hot bricks, anxious that they would not be able to conclude any contracts for the purchase of tea in time.

In July, the Hong merchants were still deep in discussions about how

to establish the Co-hong most efficaciously, but had not yet been able to reach a consensus. Smarting at the uncertainty, the English threatened the Hong merchants from time to time, stating in no uncertain terms that they would not deal with them if they set up "such a pernicious association", and that they would seek co-operation from the other European nations in thwarting its establishment.[7] On 4 August, the Hong merchants asked the English why they had not begun to unload their ships. The answer was that they should ask the mandarins the reason. When they were asked whether they would trade with the Hong merchants as a company, the English replied that they were not free to do so. Naturally they were aware of the contents of the Emperor's edict which decreed that the Europeans should do their business through the Chinese Hong merchants, but they pointed out that the Emperor had not ordered the Hong merchants to join together in a unified body. This being the case, they were determined to continue to deal with the Hong merchants as they chose.[8]

The joint Hong merchants immediately reported the rejoinder of the English to the *Hoppo* on 8 August, and debated with each other about whether or not a meeting should be called to discuss the negative attitude of the Europeans.[9] When the Dutch returned from Macao around this time, they had very little or no chance to discuss these matters with the Hong merchants, although they sedulously visited the principal among them every day. None of the Hong merchants dared to come into the Dutch factory, with the exception of Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua who was the owner of the Dutch factory and resided in the front part. The Dutch never gave him credit because he was the joint protector of the Co-hong, along with Poan Keequa. During this time the Dutch did not see Swetja, Tsja Hunqua, or Poan Keequa, because the first two merchants deliberately chose to go into the city all the time to avoid being apprehended and beaten up because the officials might assume them collaborating with the Europeans. As president of the Co-hong Poan Keequa was busy with preparations for its establishment and simply had no time to spare.[10]

When the merchant Tan Tinqua (Chen Zhenguan 陈镇官) was detained at the Nanhai Court on 10 August, these merchants, who had seemed willing to talk to the Europeans, were now so discouraged that they also held themselves aloof. Tan Tinqua had been arrested on account of a few proposals which he had submitted to the *Hoppo* protesting about the establishment of the Co-hong to oblige the European merchants and to mediate in these matters. The *Tsongtu* distrained the effects of Tan Tinqua's family members, including their houses and other chattels as security for a debt of circa 2,400 taels which he owed to the Chinese authorities. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, Tan Tingqua was declared a risk to the peace and prosperity of the region, and his

Hong chop was withdrawn. With his family, the unfortunate merchant was sent back to his birthplace, Quanzhou, in Fujian Province in disgrace.[11]

As no Hong merchants came to the Dutch factory, the Dutch chief, Martin Wilhelm Hulle, went to the Hongs of the most prominent merchants on the 12th because he did not want to lose time. He said that from its inception, the Dutch had been led to understand that the merchants were holding discussions about how they would interact together within the legal confines of a company. He, however, was convinced that the Emperor had not ordered the Europeans to do business with a combination of eleven Hong merchants. If the *Tsongtu* wished to order the setting up of such an association on his own authority, he should inform the Europeans and give them the opportunity of whether to engage in trade or to refuse to comply with the new order and leave for Europe. It was impossible for the Dutch to commence trade or to leave on no firmer grounds than the Hong merchants' rumours. For such weighty matters, a chop or proclamation should be issued by the mandarins. Were this not forthcoming, he would lodge a formal complaint about the Hong merchants' conduct in a petition submitted to the *Tsongtu* and ask that they be punished.[12]

When the Hong merchants failed to give an unambiguous reply, the next day the Dutch chief hurried to the Swedish and English, fully resolved to clear up the matter once and for all. He requested his erstwhile rivals co-operate with him in finding a solution which would be acceptable to all of them. They should delay no longer but lead the Chinese to believe that they mutually disagreed with each other and, at the same time, secretly confer about what they should do. He said that because he had not received the desired mandarin's chop, he would summon all the eleven Hong merchants to his factory and ask them whether and on what conditions they were willing to trade with the Dutch this year. Thereupon, he proposed presenting a petition to the *Tsongtu* asking him to abolish the Co-hong. Hulle asked both the English and Swedes to send him one or two people to attend his meeting with the Chinese merchants, and subsequently, having hopefully learned the state of play, the three Companies could talk about the delivery of the request. Both nations promised to do so.

On the morning of 14 August, the Dutch chief went to see the merchants but heard nothing about the decree from the *Tsongtu* on this matter. On his return, he immediately sent the interpreters accompanied by the Dutch fiscal and clerk around to all eleven Hong merchants and asked them to present themselves at the Dutch factory for further discussions at eleven o'clock the next morning. When Hulle received a speedy reply intimating that the merchants would indeed attend at the appointed time, he

informed the English and Swedes of the positive response and arranged with them that two supercargoes of each nation should be present at that time to hear the merchants' answer; later, in the afternoon, they could meet again at the Dutch factory to deliberate on what further steps to take and how to deliver their requests.[13]

After all his preparations, the Dutch chief organized a meeting at his factory with the Hong merchants in the presence of two English and two Swedish supercargoes on 15 August. Since it was highly unlikely that the merchants would have already reached a firm decision, and to ensure the Hong merchants understood what he had in mind, Hulle acquainted the latter of the general content of the request which he planned to write to the mandarins in Chinese. This is what he told them:

To their great surprise the Dutch had learned that ten of the eleven Hong merchants,[14] who enjoyed the exclusive privilege of trading with the Europeans by order of the Emperor, had been forced to unite at the behest of and with the full approval of the mandarins. Dealing with such an association would be the same as dealing with one Chinese merchant. All the European companies had sent ships from so far away with only one intention to trade with as many Chinese merchants as seemed suitable to them. The free trade in which the Europeans had been engaged so far with the Emperor's permission greatly deviated from the manner of trade which they now wanted to introduce. If the Co-hong were to be established as they were planning, the Chinese merchants would be able to purchase the imported goods from the Europeans at a low price, but sell their own products at a high price. Such a policy would totally ruin the trade which was already on the decline.

The Dutch would beseech the Emperor to cast his beneficent gaze on them and to ensure that the freedom of trading with different Chinese merchants would not be abolished. The corporation of Chinese merchants which threatened to cut off the artery of all European traffic sooner or later should be abolished. The Hong merchants should be permitted to deal separately with the Europeans as they had done in the past. Only under these conditions would the Dutch be able to obtain some profit for their directors and maintain the shipping link to Canton.

During the fifteen days he had spent in Canton, he had assiduously made repeated efforts to discuss the matter with some of the Hong merchants, but had only succeeded a few times then by exerting the utmost effort and had never received any answer to his inquiry, namely: who would guarantee the customs fee and payment of the goods? Who would be members of the association and would pay any debt incurred should the association become insolvent or the members split up; and who should the Dutch address were the association not to fulfil its contracts and obligations in the stipulated time or not respect the contract, or pro-

duce shoddy wares when the goods were delivered? Were such a person not produced to set the minds of the Dutch at ease, who would resolve all disagreements between the Europeans and this association with absolute impartiality? He had added that were their questions not answered, they would be pertinently unable to enter into negotiation with the Hong merchants. The Dutch could not entrust goods or money to this association unless high-ranking mandarins were to stand guarantor for it, because on many occasions of two or more merchants the one had signed the contract for the other, but in the event of death of one of them, the other had been constrained to pay only his own portion under Chinese law, although under the terms of the contract he was also obliged to stand guarantor and pay for the other. This being so, he had good reason to fear that this association would not pay in proportion to its share at best and comply with this afore-mentioned judgement with respect to other members who did not have a penny to their names. Therefore, it was only reasonable the Dutch should do their best to obtain an explanation of the points just raised before they decided to take the plunge with this association "christened with whatever name or dressed in whichever garment."[15]

Having described the situation in general, the Dutch chief put his specific questions to the Hong merchants present:

1) Whether or not the Dutch could do any business at present.

The Hong merchants answered that the Dutch could do business with one or more of them as they wished.

2) How was it such an association that had been created among the Hong merchants?

The Hong merchants answered that the Emperor had issued various regulations about the Europeans and European trade in Canton. As example they stated, the Chinese should pay the Europeans' debts promptly to ensure the latter could depart at the stipulated time. Therefore, the *Tsongtu* had settled the matter as beneficently as possible, believing that the establishment of a corporation among the Hong merchants had been the best means to achieve such a purpose.

3) Whether this association had been created by order of the Emperor or by that of the *Tsongtu*, or simply on the initiative of the Hong merchants.

At that point, the Hong merchants fell silent. Although Hulle had asked them individually one after the other for an answer, they just said that they would have to read through all the chops again before they would be able to give a reply. When Hulle insisted on a response, they promised to answer his question the following evening.[16]

Around two o'clock in the afternoon on 16 August, the interpreters arrived at the Dutch factory with a communication of the *Hoppo*. In this chop was stated that all the foreign goods should be confided to the

administration of security merchants approved by the mandarins, and matters pertaining to trade be settled in a lawful way. The *Tsongtu* in conjunction with the *Fooyuern* and the *Hoppo* had presented a memorial to the Emperor and everything was now properly regulated. If the foreigners wished to engage in trade as they had done before, they should abide by the fixed regulations. Perhaps they were unaware that particular shopkeepers and all unapproved merchants were now banned from trading with them; those who erred against this prohibition would be punished. The interpreters and Hong merchants were ordered to be exceptionally diligent in their observance of these rules. Ill-natured merchants had been covert in their action and others spun webs of subterfuge and deception. Fortunately some of these had been detected and punished. The officials had established the corporation with no other purpose than to prevent the knavish tricks and deceptions of these malicious Chinese. Now, the officials had selected benevolent and sincere merchants in whom the Europeans could trust. The Dutch ships had already lain at anchor for a long time without unloading their goods. The Dutch were invariably considered honest men who should not be led astray by the false stories of the English. Now they should deal with the Hong merchants they preferred. They would do well to begin their business if they wished to return home in time. If they chose not to, it would be on their own heads and not that of the *Hoppo*. The foreigners should hasten to address themselves to the approved merchants and not delay the trade any longer, if they were not to risk losing out on the weather for their return voyage. Foreigners who behaved themselves and did not oppose the regulations would be treated with indulgence, but those who persisted in their obduracy would risk shame and find every reason to repent at leisure afterwards. The rules had already been issued to the Hong merchants, and the *Hoppo* would address the Hong merchants again urging them to remind the English and Dutch emphatically and with the utmost sincerity of the rules, granting them plenty of leeway to conduct themselves accordingly. The Hong merchants had given an unequivocal indication that they had understood the premises on which the officials had based the reasoning and had given assurances. They would not act against them, pleading ignorance as justification for their lapses. The *Hoppo* gave the interpreters three days to explain everything thoroughly and to make certain that the English and Dutch wished to submit themselves to the new rules.[17]

When the ten Hong merchants showed up at six o'clock in the evening, the Dutch chief, Hulle, demanded the promised answer from the merchants, with the English and Swedes as witnesses. In the name of all the merchants Swetja announced that vexed by the troubles with the Europeans which had occurred last year,[18] the *Tsongtu* had submitted several proposals to Peking. The imperial approval had now arrived, intimat-

ing that the Hong merchants should take care of all business in agreement with the requirements laid down by the mandarins in order to set the minds of the Europeans at rest. In order to be able to take care of the business imposed on them as effectively as possible, at their own request with the sanction of the *Tsongtu* the Hong merchants had agreed to unite into one business corporation. Their petition had been passed through several Courts of Justice and had obtained the approval of each court.[19]

As Hulle felt discomposed by the *Hoppo*'s letter, he again summoned the English and Swedes to his factory that same evening. They made a joint agreement that each nation should present a petition to the *Tsongtu*, arguing that an association such as the Co-hong would be extremely detrimental to the Europeans. Their trade should not be transacted with the association as a whole but with the Hong merchants individually, as had been the case in the past. The Swedish delegates excused themselves, saying that they needed further consultation with their factory and promised to give an answer either the same evening or the next morning. They returned to the Dutch factory early on the 17th and declared themselves opposed to the presentation of a petition before the arrival of their other ships, because for the moment they had no business to transact. At their factory, the English also debated the predicament of whether or not they should present a petition to the *Tsongtu*. Since the Swedes had cried and because there had been insinuations that the *Hoppo*'s chop in a very particular manner was a very clear indication of why the Dutch were not doing business, the English thought that all these arguments were specious and contradicted the interpretation they had received from the interpreters. They resolved to send for their security merchants and ask them ingenuously to explain the chop. In the meantime, they informed the Dutch that they needed more time to consider whether or not to present a petition. They said that the Dutch should go ahead without waiting for them, because they had heard the mandarins suspected the English of inciting the Dutch. They could not resolve to do anything at all as they feared the mandarins might again misconstrue their actions.[20]

This unexpected situation forced the Dutch to take action alone. They wrote the petition immediately and asked the security merchants to take it to the city. In this petition, Hulle announced that the Dutch had decided to postpone their business transactions because they had been told that the united Hong merchants were going to trade as a corporation. On the 21st the ten Hong merchants had solemnly declared at the Dutch factory that they united in a corporation to conduct all sorts of trade at the instigation of the high-ranking mandarins, but that the Dutch were still free to negotiate with those members with whom they wanted to deal. It mattered not one jot to them whether the Dutch traded with the corporation or one particular member since all the eggs were in the one basket.

On these grounds, the Dutch believed that the *Hoppo* should pronounce according to the usual legal provisions about all the disagreements which had arisen between themselves and the Hong merchants, now that he had been fully informed of their complaint. The Dutch were grateful for the beneficence, favours and kindness which high-ranking mandarins had bestowed on them for many years. Pertinently they had come to Canton with no intention other than to trade. They also wanted to unload their goods as soon as possible, but now that they had been informed about the formation of the Co-hong, they had some inhibitions about opening negotiations. They had appealed for permission to engage in business as before and continue to pursue their trading activities unhampered, but had been informed that they would be obliged to deal with the merchants in the association as a body. These new arrangements would be an insurmountable obstacle to pursuing negotiations, because the new association would be in the position to fix the price arbitrarily. In their petition the Dutch stated they were in the dark about whether it was the *Hoppo* who had ordered this association to be formed or whether it was a decision which the Hong merchants had taken on their own initiative. They believed that the knavery and deceit so prevalent in business could only be halted by the *Hoppo* and not by the formation of such an association. Therefore, they requested the *Hoppo* to issue orders which would be beneficial to the foreigners' interests and to take pity on their plight, and they begged the latter to disband this association because it benefited their situation not one iota. If the Co-hong were to be set up, they anticipated no more Dutch ships would be sent in the coming year.[21]

On the 22nd, the Dutch received a communication from the Chinese officials, saying that:

> The Europeans have traded here for a number of years without any damage on either side. But at present, shopkeepers and other members [of the public] are deceiving the Europeans in all sorts of ways, making contracts, then reneging on them, borrowing money without repaying it and misleading Europeans by suggesting ruinous schemes to their greatest detriment, [...]; We, the *Tsongtu*, *Fooyuern*, and *Hoppo*, have sought the assistance of His Imperial Majesty and have beseeched Him to decree that the Europeans shall only be permitted to trade with the present Imperial Merchants; [...]; therefore you should realize without entertaining a single shred of doubt that everything had been done for your own benefit; if the merchants do not behave magnanimously under the present conditions, we shall punish them severely and our unfailing scrutiny will certainly make their deeds known to us in good time [for steps to be taken].
>
> You people say that should you not have your own way, you will not be able to come here again and will lose absolutely on the trade. Be free to do what you think fit! The meagre duties which this far-flung Empire receives from your trade can be counted as nothing compared to those enormous sums which it raises for its Emperor every year and to all which pertaining

> to the life and enjoyments which abound in His lap.
>
> It will be best that you proceed with your affairs and deal with those of the Mandarin's Merchants whoever pleases you in fairness to both sides, without raising further objections to a company or concerning the connectedness of the merchant's circumstances, and it should be sufficient for you that we shall protect you in all cases against your enviers, while you will return to your home country sooner, &c.[22]

Obviously the answer the mandarins gave to their petition was not at all what the Dutch had expected. In order to take further action, the Dutch chief now again summoned the members of the Trade Council on 25 August. He announced that this association of Chinese merchants had been assembled, whether covertly or openly, in such a cunning and effective way that it would not be easy to shake its foundations unless other more emphatic means were planned. Since the European merchants had done everything to stop the formation of this association but had failed to achieve their end, they should seek to reach an accord as to how they could continue to carry on their trade as propitiously as possible.[23]

After a long discussion, the Council resolved to do all the business of selling and contracting Bohea with three security merchants, Tsja Hunqua and Semqua in association, Tan Chetqua, and Swetja, on condition that each of them stood surety for the others in every aspect, because the Dutch would rather give these three partners credit than to all the other seven members of this corporation. These three merchants were, after all, the most honest of their confreres who were favourably inclined towards the Europeans. Hulle suggested that business be commenced with these appointed merchants. Without further ado, the very next day, Hulle informed the English that he had already proceeded to do business.[24]

In the month of September, the Dutch sold their goods and contracted for teas. The Swedes, and Danes began their negotiations in October and the English followed in December.[25]

In this case, the Dutch, who all along were disinclined to oppose the mandarins in public, at first planned to lead this protest, and wanted to engage in an open dispute with the Hong merchants to persuade them into relinquishing their intention. After some mature reflection, they sensibly gave in at once after they had received the Chinese authorities' final confirmation, as they knew that foreign traders should never confront the authorities of this vast Empire if they wanted to do successful business in China. It was the English who raised the first protests about the intentions of the Hong merchants and it was their rumours which induced the Dutch to follow suit. Later, when they were planning to lead the protest against the establishment of the Co-hong, the Dutch expected the English to co-operate. The latter did so at the beginning, but when they

learned about how angry the Chinese authorities were with them, they beat a quick retreat, leaving the Dutch in an uncomfortable dilemma.

### *Purchase of the Herstelder*

On 10 July 1772, the Macao ship the *St Luz* arrived in Macao from Batavia bearing news that the Dutch Company ship the *Rijnsburg*, assigned to Canton by the High Government, had sailed from there on 8 June. This Macao ship also carried Governor-General Petrus Albertus van der Parra's missive, saying that owing to the delay in the arrival of the Company ships from Europe the High Government had resolved to fit out the ships the *Rijnsburg*, the *Bodt*, the *Prinses van Oranje*, and the *Veldhoen* for Canton. The *Rijnsburg* had already sailed and the loading of the other three was in progress and would probably be finished by the middle of June. If no ship from Europe were to arrive in Batavia, the High Government would send the other three ships to oblige the Company.


On 16 July, the English in Macao received news of the arrival of the ship the *London*, under the command of captain Webb. A terrible typhoon which had blown up that same night forced the *London* to put out to sea. From the topmast a crew member of this ship had seen a ship aft of them and suspected that was the *Rijnsburg*.

On 21 July, an English country ship and a Macao ship, the *St Simão*, from India arrived in Macao. The crew of the English ship, as said, had seen a Dutch ship at the latitude of St Jan, which, as they supposed, had anchored there to ride out the storm but shortly after had disappeared.[26] In the afternoon of the 22nd, the Dutch ship the *Bodt*, under the command of captain Staring, arrived in the outer roadstead of Macao. That captain was surprised that the *Rijnsburg*, which had sailed three weeks before he had, had not arrived.[27]

On 1 August, the Dutch supercargoes, who had returned to Canton on 30 July, heard that five men had entered into the toll house and these were survivors of the wreck of the *Rijnsburg*. These people would remain where they were until the mandarins had prepared a chop addressed to the *Tsongtu*. While awaiting this august document the Dutch supercargoes sent food and some refreshments to the men and were then informed that they were actually the first mate and four sailors from that ship. The same afternoon, these five people entered into the Dutch factory.[28]

As early as 2 August, the Dutch supercargoes considered replacing the *Rijnsburg* with another ship. They knew of nothing better than the *St Simão,* belonging to the Governor, or Captain-General, of Macao, so they wrote to him asking whether he would be willing to sell his ship. Five days later, the Governor replied that he was prepared to do so and he would send two people to bargain over the purchase in order to strike a deal,

*Map 4 The Pearl River Delta*




Source: Adapted from Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, x.

thereby avoiding a lengthy correspondence. The Dutch chief, Anthony Francois L'Heureux, immediately answered that he could not sign a contract until he had inspected the ship to judge whether she was seaworthy enough to be sent to Europe. The upshot was that the supercargo, Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest, and the assistant, Jan van den Bergh, went to Macao to bargain with the Governor. More professionally perhaps the first and second mates and the chief carpenter of the *Bodt* were also commissioned to inspect the Macao ship and its rigging.

On 15 August, L'Heureux received news from Van Braam in Macao informing him that the *St Simão*, 65.9 cubits long and 25.4 cubits at the beam, had been found to be sturdy and seaworthy according to the report of First Mate Justus Hendrik Pheil and the others. He had asked the Governor, Diogo Fernandes Salema e Saldanha, to proceed with the sale of the ship as soon as possible. His efforts were in vain because the Governor asked 43,000 taels of Spanish rials for the ship, for which Van Braam offered only 24,000 taels. The difference was so big that the Governor thought it superfluous to continue the negotiations and called the sale off. Not to be outdone L'Heureux ordered Van Braam to abandon the negotiations because he thought the Governor simply wanted to take advantage of the predicament, convinced that the Dutch would buy his ship at any price. On 19 August, L'Heureux again instructed Van Braam to bid as low as possible a price.[29] Eventually, on 21 August Van Braam reached an agreement with the Governor and bought the ship for 38,000 taels of Spanish rials, to be paid in October. The next day the formal transfer took place and the name of the ship was changed to the *Herstelder*. Poan Keequa was invited to be the security merchant of the *Herstelder*, a position which he accepted.[30] On the evening of the 28th, Van den Berg accompanied by Second Mate Weever and Chief Carpenter Jan Fredrik Smith left for Canton, and First Mate Pheil and Van Braam remained in Macao to sail for Canton on the *Herstelder*.[31]

On the morning of 31 August, the Governor of Macao informed Van Braam that the *Hoppo* of Macao had assembled some malevolent Macao people to prevent the ship from leaving the roadstead for Canton. As he wanted to be absolutely sure of his information, he requested Van Braam to inquire personally about the matter with the *Hoppo*. Van Braam immediately set off to see the *Hoppo* pretending to know nothing about what was afoot and applied for a chop for the pilot who would navigate the ship to Canton. The *Hoppo* replied that he could not give the ship a chop because she was a Macao ship and therefore should be loaded there. Van Braam objected to this explaining that the ship was no longer the property of the Governor of Macao but was now owned by the Dutch Company. Consequently the ship should sail for Whampoa (see Map 4) to take on cargo because the Company could not load her at Macao. The *Hoppo*

haughtily replied that this was none of his business, and the Dutch should not have bought a ship which belonged to Macao. Since nothing could be settled, Van Braam said that he would write directly to Canton to request a chop from the *Tsongtu*. The *Hoppo* answered that Van Braam was free to do as he pleased and that he would immediately give a chop if Van Braam received permission from Canton. Accordingly, Van Braam at once sent a report to Canton. Shortly after this, the procurator (*procurador*)[32] of the Senate of Macao sent an interpreter to Van Braam to explain that the *Hoppo* had ordered him to interdict the departure of the *Herstelder*. The ship was not to leave before a chop had been received from Canton in order to avoid any possible imbroglio between the Chinese administrations with the Senate of Macao.[33]

With this message in hand, Van Braam went to see the Macao procurator to find out what was going on. The procurator began by asking Van Braam to ignore the message sent. He had been forced to send it in his official capacity as a precautionary measure because the Chinese, as "great rascals", sought any excuse to lodge an attack against the Senate. Van Braam replied that he had talked to the *Hoppo* in person that same morning and had already been forewarned that he was seeking to hold the ship up. As he had already sent an express message to Canton to ask for a chop, he was confident that it would be dispatched soon. Van Braam also asked the procurator whether there might not be some other request or document which would have to be presented to the Senate in connection with the departure of this ship. He was authorized to act in the name of the Dutch Company in his capacity of deputy-president of the Trade Council. He was most adamant that he did not want to infringe any formalities and was determined to avoid any kind of argument with the procurator. The latter answered that with regard to the purchase of this ship, he could do nothing more than he had already done. The ship could leave as soon as he was in receipt of a chop from Canton. Nobody could then stop Van Braam from sailing it to Whampoa.

Van Braam went on to ask whether it was advisable he should also pay the Senate some money to muster the crew. The procurator answered this was unnecessary as this was one of the responsibilities of the Governor. If the latter gave Van Braam permission to sign on the sailors, that would be enough. Van Braam said that he had expressly requested information about what he was supposed to do because he did not want to be found wanting in anything that was required. He also expressed the hope that the Senate would not create any more hindrance which would detain this ship and block her departure. He also asked the Senate to be mindful of the fact that this was not private but Dutch East India Company business. Should any more obstacles be strewn in the path of this ship's departure, it was always still in the power of the Dutch Company to give tit for tat

with territorial Macao ships if they were to enter Dutch territorial waters. The procurator replied that there was no reason for any anxiety. He assured Van Braam that the Senate would gladly co-operate with the Dutch Company and that there was nothing for the Dutch to fear.

When Van Braam visited the Governor again, the latter inquired about his conversations with the *Hoppo* and the procurator. He was indignant about the *Hoppo*'s announcement, and declared that such a message was unacceptable because the matter of whether a ship was bought in Macao and whether it was sent full or empty to Whampoa was wholly out of the jurisdiction of the Chinese government. This was a matter solely for the ship-owner, and the *Hoppo* should not pretend otherwise and exact any more than the usual toll and tonnage fees. The Senators maintained their privileges by such chicanery whenever they saw a chance to put their power against him into effect. He accused them of offering the Chinese mandarins decisions which would undermine the laws in Macao. Meanwhile, the Governor had assured Van Braam that he feared no more trouble, because he had performed all his duties most astutely and he had no need at all to ask the procurator if anything else should be done. Subsequently, Van Braam wrote a report to the Trade Council in Canton explaining the situation in which he found himself and requested a chop from the *Hoppo* of Canton to obviate all the trouble. At the same time, he reported that he had already signed on sixty-seven ordinary ratings and three ship's officers.[34]

After receiving Van Braam's report, L'Heureux immediately went to Poan Keequa on 1 September, informing him of the state of play and requesting him to deliver a chop as soon as possible. Poan Keequa promised to attend upon the *Hoppo* early the next morning.

He was as good as his word. On 2 September, Poan Keequa informed the Dutch that he had spoken to the *Hoppo* and the latter had informed him that it was necessary to submit two requests, one to the *Tsongtu* and the other to himself. If these conditions were fulfilled, he might be in a position to receive a chop for Macao. Poan Keequa promised that he would visit the *Tsongtu* again the next afternoon. Meanwhile, in Macao Van Braam sailed the ship into the outer roadstead and anchored her there. Then, he went to see the Governor and asked permission for the ship to pass the Barra Fort so it could enter the Bay of Taipa.[35] The Governor said that he would inform Van Braam of the answer the next day.[36]

Back in Canton, Poan Keequa came to the Dutch factory on 3 September, and reported what he had done at the office of the *Tsongtu*. He had explained in detail that the ship had been bought in Macao as a replacement for the wrecked ship the *Rijnsburg*. The Dutch chose not to load the ship in Macao because of the high expenses involved, but preferred to load at Whampoa as they used to do with all their ships.

Therefore, a chop was requested granting the ship permission to sail upriver. The *Hoppo* of Macao, who was also present, took good measure of how anxious Poan Keequa was. He said that the Dutch had no urgent need to move the ship from Macao. If this ship were to sail, there would not be more than ten ships remaining at Macao which in effect meant a loss of income for him. Last year one had been burnt and two others had been forced to return without completing their journey. In these straits he would be distressed to see yet another ship taken away from Macao. Poan Keequa then turned to the *Tsongtu*, who promised to discuss the business with other mandarins and to announce the result the following day. He intimated that all this should be not much of a problem and that the only reason which might prevent the ship from entering the Bocca Tigris would be the fact that it arrived empty and therefore deprived the *Hoppo* of Macao of any fee from its cargo. This might arouse some suspicion at the Imperial Court that he might be retaining the impost on the cargo. Nevertheless, there was still room for a reciprocal discussion.[37]

In Macao, Van Braam received the answer from the Governor telling him to go to the procurator to find out whether or not some trouble might also be stirred up with the Chinese government if the ship was moved to the Bay of Taipa. Van Braam did as he was bid, but the procurator explained that, in his opinion, no obstacle could be thrown up by the Chinese side, because this business was completely out of their hands and that nothing could prevent Van Braam from moving the ship to Taipa if he had permission from the Governor to pass the Barra Fort. When Van Braam notified the Governor of this, the latter declared that Van Braam should present a request only on this subject to him, whereupon he would give the order to let the ship pass. Van Braam immediately followed this up and made the request.[38]

However, in response to Van Braam's request the Governor sent him the order that the ship still had to remain and could not sail outside that day. This confused Van Braam, so he went directly to the Governor and asked the reason why the ship might not depart for Taipa. The Governor clarified his decision by explaining that it would be better for the ship to remain inside until the coming Monday when Van Braam would receive a message from the Senate. Now it really no longer made any difference if the ship did remain inside longer, because Van Braam could not possibly leave without the promised message from the Senate. The Governor announced that he could not take any risk with the Senators who were suspicious of him. As far as the protestations of the Chinese administration were concerned, he grumbled that they had been unjustifiably made and it was therefore a scandal that the procurator had responded to this protest. Despite this acknowledgement he was careful not to get into trouble with the Senate which would happen were the ship to leave with-

out awaiting its permission. Van Braam replied that he did not intend to inconvenience the Governor by organizing a hasty departure and would not leave Macao before he had received the message from the Senate. His purpose in sending the ship to Taipa was to muster the crew and to round up any absentee while the ship was still in the bay. The Governor said that if Van Braam departed after having received the assent of the Senate, he would not procrastinate but sign Van Braam's request and send an order to the Barra Fort to let the ship pass.[39]

On the evening of 4 September, Poan Keequa came to the Dutch factory with bad news concerning the granting of a chop which would allow the *Herstelder* to go to Whampoa. He explained that the *Hoppo* of Canton had summoned him and informed him that he had discussed this business in detail with the *Tsongtu* and other mandarins. They had advised him not to grant a chop if he wanted to be sure of not receiving an imperial reprimand. The Emperor undoubtedly would be convinced that they had embezzled the *Hoppo* money or import duties on the goods brought on one of the Dutch ships and that the mandarins had lined their own pockets. Even if there was a formal statement to the effect that one Dutch ship had shipwrecked and that another ship had been bought at Macao as a replacement, it would still be impossible for the Imperial Court to comprehend that this ship from Macao had arrived in the roadstead of Whampoa empty. He suggested that the ship be loaded at Macao.

The Dutch supercargoes were surprised by this answer and wondered whether they would ever be able to procure a chop at all, since, as they pointed out, the *Hoppo* of Macao also complained about the drop in the number of ships entering his port and was not overjoyed at the prospect of the *Herstelder* leaving Macao and sailing into the hands of strangers. He had protested about her departure as strongly as it was possible for him to do so because he felt he would certainly be punished were he to allow the ship to leave. It was certain that should the *Tsongtu* and *Hoppo* persist in refusing a chop to allow the ship go to Whampoa, she would have to remain at Macao. The purchase would either have to be cancelled or its cargo would have to be loaded there. There was absolutely no doubt that the *Tsongtu* feared an imperial reprimand if he let the ship approach Whampoa without taking the appropriate measures. Faced with this impasse, Poan Keequa hurriedly said that he would see the *Tsongtu* again the next day and would try to persuade him to think it all over again. Surely the Emperor would not be happy were his export duties to be lost.[40]

On the morning of 4 September, the *Herstelder* left the Inner Harbour of Macao and anchored in the Bay of Praia Grande. In the afternoon, Van Braam went on board accompanied by First Mate Pheil. He hoisted the Prince's flag with a seven-gun salute, and the Guia Castle hoisted the flag

as well and returned the salute. Van Braam then mustered the crew and found fourteen absentees. Going back ashore, he sent their names to the Governor with a request that they be arrested and sent on board. On the morning of 5 September, the Governor informed him that the most of the absentees had been arrested and Van Braam could take them on board. Van Braam therefore sent orders for a boat which could transport the crew.[41]

The same day, Poan Keequa came in declaring that he had spoken to the *Hoppo* of Canton but, as matters were still inconclusive, he would have to continue his discussion the next day. In order to facilitate the business, the frustrated Dutch now proposed that the *Herstelder* should take over part of the cargo of the *Veldhoen*, which had just arrived, before sailing into the Bocca Tigris.[42] On 6 September, Poan Keequa was invited by the English for a meal, but he excused himself saying that he had to see the *Hoppo*. L'Heureux was then asked to see him to be given some good news, because he could not afford to come to the Dutch factory as the English might see him. When L'Heureux went to see him in his office, Poan Keequa explained that, having deliberated the business in question with the *Tsongtu* and *Hoppo*, he had proposed once again that some of the goods from the *Veldhoen* be transferred to the *Herstelder*. Upon hearing this, the *Tsongtu* promised to give a chop to allow the ship to be loaded in this way. The *Tsongtu* recommended to Poan Keequa that the Dutch should submit a request to him and to the *Hoppo*. The next day, the draft submission to the *Tsongtu* and *Hoppo* was delivered to Poan Keequa who promised to hand it over that same day.[43]

On 6 September, L'Heureux wanted to talk with Poan Keequa about the chop for the *Herstelder*, but the latter had gone to the city. Upon his return from the city, Poan Keequa declared that the chop could not be delivered right away because of the festivities for the *Tsongtu*'s birthday, but it would be handed over as quickly as possible. On the evening of 10 September, Poan Keequa again said that he would do all the work required on the 11th.[44]

On the morning of 11 September, L'Heureux received a letter from Van Braam dated 9 September, in which he stated that he had decided to wait no longer for the chop from the *Hoppo* because he had already received the message containing the assent of the Senate. He had sailed out of Taipa that same evening, and at present he was sailing through the Bocca Tigris without a pilot and hoped to arrive at Whampoa the following day. This unexpected news caused the chief great consternation and anxiety, and he worried about how to present this *fait accompli* to the *Hoppo*, since no chop had been received to allow the ship to enter Whampoa.

At noon, Poan Keequa arrived at the Dutch factory, anxiously impart-

ing the news that he had been summoned by the *Hoppo*. The latter declared that he was curious to know why the *Herstelder* had arrived before she had been granted a chop. He urgently recommended that Poan Keequa speak to the *Tsongtu* and also ask the Dutch what was going on. In order to delay his exposure to the *Tsongtu*'s fury, Poan Keequa chose to visit the Dutch factory first and then report to the *Tsongtu*.

L'Heureux decided to give the *Hoppo* as innocent an explanation as possible, telling him that the ship was compelled to go to the Bocca Tigris by the bad weather and had even been forced to sail to Whampoa without a pilot since there was no secure anchorage at the Bocca Tigris. Standing his ground, he ordered Van Braam in an express not to approach Whampoa itself but to anchor outside until further orders. Meanwhile, Poan Keequa went to see the *Hoppo*. That afternoon, Poan Keequa's chief clerk informed the Dutch that his master had talked with the *Hoppo*, who suggested that the *Herstelder* should leave the Bocca Tigris again and then after one or two days enter when the chop was ready. The Dutch were requested that this be put into effect without further ado. This offered the only escape-route from what would otherwise be a sea of trouble and a plethora of administrative turmoil.

The Dutch supercargoes adduced diverse excuses, but in vain. They were assured that without the chop the *Tsongtu* would never allow the ship to appear in the roadstead of Whampoa to be loaded. Seeing there seemed to be no solution in sight, the members of the Trade Council considered their predicament and reached the unanimous decision to follow Poan Keequa's advice, as was recommended by the *Hoppo*. Consequently it dispatched a letter to Van Braam, informing him of everything and recommending that he sail back out of the Bocca Tigris and anchor at an appropriate spot.[45]

On 12 September, the comprador, Ajet,[46] who had left with L'Heureux's letter to Van Braam on the 11th, reported that he had handed the letter over and had been told that the ship would remain where she lay close to the Bocca Tigris. In the afternoon, L'Heureux received news from Van Braam stating that he had sailed the *Herstelder* close to the Zoet-Zoet-Ham[47] where he would anchor according to instructions. L'Heureux communicated this to Poan Keequa, who was satisfied and recommended sailing the ship out of the Bocca Tigris.[48] Early on the morning of 13 September, L'Heureux received a letter from Van Braam, announcing that he had anchored outside the castle at the Bocca Tigris at the place he deemed safest and that he was waiting for the chop. L'Heureux immediately informed Poan Keequa who was very pleased and promised to work with might and main to expedite the reception of the chop. That evening, Poan Keequa came out of the city and informed the Dutch that he had had a very embarrassing meeting with the *Hoppo* and consequently no

chop for the *Herstelder* was forthcoming. He thought that he needed one more day when the *Hoppo* would hopefully be in a better mood to grant the chop. Therefore the Dutch should be patient and wait. That same day, a commission had gone to the Bocca Tigris in the name of the *Tsongtu* and *Hoppo* to investigate whether the *Herstelder* really lay outside or not. When the commission came on board, Van Braam requested its permission to sail inside the Zoet-Zoet-Ham. The mandarins refused but promised that the chop would be issued in three days.[49] September 16 came and went and the interpreter arrived at the Dutch factory to report that the mandarins would grant no chop because they believed that the whole matter was suspect and quite irregular. The next day Poan Keequa even said that the high-ranking mandarins who had boarded the *Herstelder* had not reported to the *Tsongtu* and the *Hoppo*. He stated that the ship lay fairly close to the Bocca Tigris. He reckoned that it would take three more days before the Dutch were granted the chop.[50]

On the afternoon of 24 September, Poan Keequa privately announced via one of the clerks that he had returned from the city and was happy to discuss affairs. In response to this invitation, L'Heureux went to see him and asked why there was such a delay with the chop for the *Herstelder*. What was this all about? L'Heureux said that if matters could be facilitated with some presents, he might be prepared to undertake this on the account of the Company, but if Poan Keequa thought that obtaining a chop was completely out of the question, he should say so. In that case, the Dutch Trade Council would send the ship back to Macao. Poan Keequa answered that no presents were needed because he dealt directly with the *Tsongtu* and *Hoppo* about the matter, but that "presents" might be needed if things were to be speeded up by the mandarins. He was absolutely confident that the chop would be granted, but he could not ascertain when exactly this would happen. He said that he had requested the *Hoppo* for the chop again that very day but it still had not been forthcoming. The *Hoppo* absolved himself of blame saying that he himself was awaiting an answer with definite information about permission for the ship from the Casa Branca.

After L'Heureux had patiently listened to all the excuses, he pointed out to Poan Keequa the dangers besetting the ship lying exposed off the Bocca Tigris should there be any high winds or electrical storms. She ran the risk of shipwreck owing to the long delay with the chop. Also, costly time was running out to make the ship ready for departure that year. In view of the perils which might await her, he proposed that should the *Hoppo* not approve the chop, at least the mandarins should permit the ship to sail inside the Bocca Tigris so as to protect her against potential damage. Poan Keequa thought he should apprise the *Hoppo* of this idea, and he believed the coming day would be the right moment to do so,

principally because the *Tsongtu* would then be receiving good wishes for his birthday, at which time he was usually in a good mood.[51]

Quite unexpectedly, the Dutch received the chop from Poan Keequa in the afternoon of 25 September. The mandarins permitted the *Herstelder* to sail to Whampoa from the Bocca Tigris. L'Heureux immediately sent this message to Van Braam.[52] Consequently the matter of the *Herstelder* was settled.[53]

This incident shows that in order to settle the *Herstelder* business the Dutch not only had to negotiate with the ship-owner, the Governor of Macao, they also had to treat cautiously with the Macao Government, of which the Senate was the principal authority in all dealings with the *Hoppo* of Macao and with the Chinese authorities in Canton.[54] The Macao Government consisted of the Governor (or the Captain-General) and the Senate. The Governor was just in charge of the forts and of the exiguous garrison, and the real governing body was the Senate which frequently was at loggerheads with the Governor. No matter what the state of the relationship between the Governor and the Senate was, living under the roof of the Chinese authority, the Macao Government had no escape from the Chinese rules and laws when any business pertaining to the Canton trade had to be dealt with. This was, of course, also applied to all the European companies trading in Canton and sojourning in Macao.

### *Recapture of the Goede Hoop*

On 17 August 1781, the English trade representatives in Macao were reported that captain John McClary of the English country ship the *Dadoloy* had that day captured the private merchantman the *Goede Hoop* which was anchored at Whampoa under Dutch colours. Captain McClary justified his action by pointing out that Great Britain had declared war on the Dutch Republic in December 1780.

The Dutch trade representatives in Macao reacted promptly to this act of violence. They first desired a co-signed statement from other European delegates pressing the English supercargoes to condemn captain McClary for his action, but they refused to comply. Then, on the security merchants' advice, on 21 August the Dutch requested the mandarins in Canton to intervene because Canton was a neutral port where the ships of foreign nations – even if they were at war with each other – should never break the local peace; more acts of violence might follow if they did not take immediate action.[55] The Dutch chief, Cornelis Heyligendorp, who also happened to be in Macao, lodged a strong protest with the English supercargoes:[56]

> In view of the justification of this act on account of the rupture between the two nations, we think it proper to address ourselves to you the representatives of your sovereign and the Company in this empire in order to point out the injustice of such a procedure. You should be aware that ships of belligerent powers anchored in a neutral port are always considered safe from the attacks of each other. This may have very prejudicial consequences to both Companies, [... and] will be exposed to similar enterprises as well as those of private persons. We require your assistance, so that the Dutch ship with her crew and cargo will be given back immediately. In case this will not be put in effect we shall feel ourselves forced to lodge a protest in the strongest manner against this action and make the author of it answerable for all the consequences it might have.

This letter was originally written in Dutch but was then translated into French, because the English said no one in their factory understood Dutch. The English replied in English, saying not without a touch of arrogance that some of the Dutch understood English well enough. In their reply, the English stated that they agreed with the practice of respecting the neutrality of ports in the countries with which they were living in peace, but that they had no control over the captains of the country ships. Their only option, they said, was to apply the strictest observation of neutrality on the ships of the English Company, but they would not tackle the private traders.[57] The Dutch, of course, were not satisfied with being brushed off with such an answer. Suffering from an obviously disadvantageous position as the weaker party in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, their only recourse was to appeal to the Chinese authorities.

After receiving complaints from the Dutch condemning this act of violence, the mandarins in Canton instantly demanded restitution of the Dutch ship. Captain McClary did not want to return his prize, and proposed that the cargo would be sold to the Chinese merchants as if she belonged to the Dutch, ensuring the *Hoppo* would not lose his duties, on the condition that the mandarins did not interfere. He threatened that he would take his prize out of the river and sail her away if he were molested in any way by the Chinese authorities. The mandarins were infuriated by his words. When they continued to press McClary to return the ship, he began preparations to make sail, weigh anchor, and go downriver towards the Bocca Tigris with the tide. Every man in the Chinese Customs House was now alarmed. All the troops who could be hurriedly assembled, about 2,000 soldiers in all, were ordered to a rendezvous on the Tiger Island, and preparations were made to obstruct captain McClary's passage.

The mandarins still preferred a peaceful solution to a violent one, and dispatched messengers to the English in Macao who now found themselves in a very disagreeable predicament. On 24 August, a mandarin travelled to Macao and addressed the English supercargoes, not through

a merchant or an interpreter as was usual, but through the Portuguese procurator of the Senate. He complained loud and long about the outrage and insult to the Imperial Government brought about by their English fellow countryman, and announced that the Chinese would hold the English supercargoes accountable for his behaviour, if they did not oblige captain McClary to restore everything he had taken forthwith. The supercargoes replied that they had heard of what had happened at Whampoa only by word of mouth because they did not regard this as part of their responsibilities. They said they had no control over McClary, the captain of a country ship, and therefore could not compel him to do anything. None the less, they assured the mandarin that they also considered the act both illegal and violent, and were also desirous of preventing captain McClary from carrying out his threats; they would exhort him to restitute his prize in order to appease the mandarins. Their offer was accepted, and the mandarin himself delivered the English supercargoes' letter to captain McClary, in which the latter was merely informed that his non-compliance might endanger the Company trade in this port.

When another mandarin was treated just as cavalierly one day later, the mandarins sent an order requiring the attendance of the English chief and other supercargoes at the Bocca Tigris, in order to compel captain McClary to comply with the *Tsongtu*'s demands. The English chief, James Bradshaw, complained that no Hong merchant had been sent to acquaint him with the particulars of this affair about which he knew only from hearsay. He protested that the supercargoes had already done everything in their power and he, as the chief, would neither put himself in such a humiliating and disagreeable situation nor would he subject himself to being sent to the Bocca Tigris. This blunt reply obviously displeased the mandarin, yet from that moment on other mandarins continued to come to Macao almost every day, threatening that the trade of the English Company as well as that of private persons would be made to pay for captain McClary's conduct. They refused to accept the argument that the English supercargoes had no control over any ships other than those of the Company. The more the mandarins of Canton perceived their lack of control over the real offender, the more it seemed their resolve to implicate the English supercargoes hardened. Fortunately, for the English supercargoes a way out of this tricky situation presented itself.

While they were pressing the English in Macao, the Chinese authorities also were continuing direct negotiations with captain McClary on the Pearl River. As the *Dadoloy* was moving downriver with the tide, the principal magistrates of Canton and the merchants surrounded her with their boats. They kept up a constant barrage of intercourse with captain McClary; sometimes attempting to intimidate him, at other times trying to soothe him, but he was not at all impressed by these ravenous oppo-

nents. Despite his display of *sang-froid*, it was clear to him that he would never be able to leave the river unscathed. At long last, Poan Keequa, the principal security merchant of the EIC, contrived the following strategy with the English captain. They agreed that when McClary approached the Bocca Tigris with his prize, he would order his men off the *Goede Hoop*. He was as good as his word and immediately the ship was triumphantly boarded by the shouting Chinese.

The mandarin went to see the English in Macao again on 29 August, for the *Fooyuern* had had representations made by the aggrieved [Dutch] party, claiming that part of the cargo of the *Goede Hoop* was still missing. He maintained that the English supercargoes should oblige captain McClary to return everything. The English cavilled that this time the mandarin in Canton had contacted them in an extraordinary and highly unusual manner. On every former occasion the mandarins had assiduously made use of the Hong merchants and interpreters to convey their messages.

Captain McClary's conduct created a sea of troubles for the English supercargoes in Macao, because the officials of Canton had ordered the local magistrates to send boats to prevent McClary escaping with his prize. It was rumoured in Canton that the *Fooyuern* was preparing to do whatever was in his power to compel captain McClary to make a full restitution of the captured goods. On 3 September, the English were even informed that a mandarin from Canton had asked the Governor of Macao to seize some persons belonging to the English factory and have them delivered to him, but this had been refused by the latter. On 8 September, the Dutch supercargoes once again wrote a letter to the mandarins, informing them that captain McClary still refused to return all the remaining items in compliance with the mandarins' order. The *Dadoloy* therefore was once more surrounded by Chinese war junks stationed to prevent any communication with the English supercargoes.

On 23 September, the EIC trade representatives returned to Canton and at once discussed the captain McClary affair with Poan Keequa. Poan Keequa informed them that the *Fooyuern* was extremely displeased with captain McClary's behaviour and wanted to punish him as if he were a pirate; he was also highly incensed with the English supercargoes, because they had procrastinated in complying with his orders. It seemed that nothing could have prevented him from perpetrating some violence against the English, but Poan Keequa had dexterously made up a story explaining that the English Company resided in the "north" [England], whereas the individual traders came from the "south" [India], and that the English were at war with these people, even in their own country. Consequently it was no wonder that these people would not allow the English supercargoes to exert any power over them in Canton. Somewhat

soothed by such strategies, the *Fooyuern* seemed to have calmed down a little. Then, on 28 September, the English supercargoes, together with the other European supercargoes, received a general chop in the name of the *Tsongtu*, *Fooyuern*, and *Hoppo*, dated 9 September, saying that:[58]

> As it is the first time a thing of this nature has happened, and as the offender pleaded ignorance of the laws and customs of this country, we have forgiven him and have moreover excused him the payment of port charges, and ordered all the assistance that may be necessary for the repairing of his ship and preparing her for the voyage.
>
> This is to give notice to the supercargoes of the different nations in order that they may inform their countrymen that the Emperor will not suffer them to bring war into his dominions, and that whoever does so in the future shall be treated as an enemy."

After reading the chop, it was painfully clear to the English supercargoes how much the mandarins were inclined to consider them responsible for all the irregularities or outrages that were committed by the commanders of the country ships. To set the matter straight, they therefore thought it proper to address a letter to the mandarins, expressing their opinion of captain McClary's unjustifiable conduct, disclaiming once again any kind of power over ships not belonging to the English Company. They explained that their failure to go to the Bocca Tigris was the result of sickness, and then complained of the ill-treatment they had experienced at the hands of the lower-ranking mandarins. Finally, they hotly denied there was a difference between Englishmen from the "north" and the "south", insisting that all this was the fault of a mistranslation by the security merchant. In no uncertain terms they said that they found the answer of the *Fooyuern* of 2 October bristled with "boasting, insults, and threats, as was never before uttered to Europeans, even in this scene of their humiliation."[59] Not mincing his words the *Fooyuern* had written as follows:[60]

> You English are a lying and injurious people, for other nations that come to Canton are peaceful and do not hurt anyone, but you English are always making trouble. Some time ago one McClary took a ship and her cargo. Supercargoes are sent here by your king to superintend the Company business, and private persons are permitted to trade here by the same power. Why did you therefore say that you had no power to prevent the misdeeds of those individuals, and why did you refuse to obey me when I ordered you to come to Bocca Tigris to oblige this McClary to restore what he had taken? [...] If your sickness was not feigned, why do you excuse yourselves for not coming to the Bocca Tigris by telling me you have no control over private persons? From such equivocations I see that all this is bogus, and it is not clear to me but this attempt to take away the ship was made by your order [...]. Let me inform you that if hereafter you do not follow my orders the English ships shall not be permitted to trade here any more, and I will send my soldiers to expel you from the country. What will you then do? [...] To

> my tribunal your representations seem insolent and impertinent. [...] If any of you English in future shall do wrong, whether supercargoes or individuals, he shall be punished to the full measure of his crime.

The mandarins' reply exacerbated the English supercargoes' thoughts of how unpleasant their present situation was: it seemed to them that every mandarin in Canton exerted his authority over them according to his own particular humour and was invariably hostile to them. They realized that they could not have recourse to the justice from the mandarins for their affairs. The only solution was to bear this treatment patiently as if they were timid of character, although they were by no means willing to be at all submissive.

In fact, the English very much envied the relations the Dutch entertained with the mandarins in Canton. One striking example was the case of a Dutch seaman who had been murdered by one of his own countrymen some months earlier. The Dutch supercargoes were not forced to hand the murderer over to the mandarins but executed him themselves on board one of their ships, in sight of the Chinese. Such privileges of this kind were not extended to other Europeans. For example, in October 1780 a French sailor killed a Portuguese sailor in Canton and consequently the Portuguese petitioned that the culprit should be handed over to them so he could be tried for murder in Portugal. The *Fooyuern* refused to consider this petition and put the murderer on trial and had him executed. These two instances show the variable nature in the proceedings of the Chinese tribunal in the trials of different Europeans. The English supercargoes drew the conclusion that if a murder concerning the English were committed, there was little probability that they would be allowed to try the culprit themselves. The mandarins would try, condemn, and execute the murderer.[61]

The atrocious situation of the English supercargoes in Canton and Macao was the result of their own non-intervention in captain McClary's business. They had made their own bed and they had to lie in it. Apparently, the English had learned the wrong lesson from the "Chinese debts" trouble in 1779, in which Sir Edward Vernon (Admiral and Commander in chief of the squadron and fleet of the EIC in India) dispatched captain John A. Panton to the mandarins of Canton, requesting the liquidation of the Chinese merchants' debts borrowed from the British creditors in Madras and in Britain. On this occasion, the English supercargoes were forced to negotiate with the mandarins in Canton on behalf of the British creditors. After the negotiations broke down, the mandarins reported this business to Peking and consequently the defaulting Chinese debtors were severely punished. Nevertheless, the British creditors received a very unreasonable recompense for their loans and the Company business also ran into difficulties because of this trouble.[62]

When called upon to intervene in clearing up the matter of captain McClary's privateering acts, the English supercargoes preferred not to stick their noses into the trouble caused by their fellow countryman, shrugging aside the admonishments from both the Dutch and the Chinese who felt that the English supercargoes should intervene. Hence, it is easy to understand why the Dutch headed directly for the English supercargoes when some cargo and a chest belonging to the *Goede Hoop* had still not been returned. On 28 October, the Dutch chief who arrived in Canton from Macao handed a paper over to the English chief, containing a detailed account of sundry stores as well as a chest of gold and pearls seized by captain McClary.[63] Confronted with this evidence, the English supercargoes at once strongly remonstrated with McClary and demanded he return all the remaining goods forthwith.

On 4 November, the *Goede Hoop* was advertised for sale by auction at Whampoa, but was only sold a year later in October 1782, when she became British property. On 16 December 1781, the troublemaker captain McClary fitted out his ship in warlike array and left the Pearl River for Bengal loudly declaring that he intended to take many Dutch prizes on his trip back to India. This was not an idle boast, because a few months later, without hesitation he plundered a Chinese junk bound for Batavia in the Bangka Straits under the pretext that the property on board the junk belonged to the Dutch.[64]

In seeking redress, the Dutch had finally made use of their satisfactory contacts with the Chinese merchants and their good terms with the Chinese authorities. The Dutch understood they would never win in any direct confrontation with the English, which had been their unhappy experience in previous years.[65] They behaved very shrewdly throughout the whole process. They did not take up arms directly against the troublesome captain but lodged protests with the English supercargoes, at the same time as they begged the mandarins to intervene, and picked the Chinese merchants' brains for suggestions as to how to outmanoeuvre the English. Simultaneously this case exposes the English supercargoes' difficulty in controlling the country traders, whereas the Dutch did not have the same kind of "private trader" problem in China.

## *Conclusion*

Since the official establishment of the Canton System in 1760, every year the delegates of the VOC, as well as those of the other European companies, had remained in Canton during the trading season and in Macao during the off-season. Under such conditions, they would perforce interact in various ways not only with the Chinese merchants and local author-

ities but also with the servants of other companies and the Macao Government. The three cases set out above collectively give a fine illustration of the Dutch-Chinese-European (principally English and Portuguese) triangle.

As far as relations with the Chinese were concerned, the VOC trade representatives in Canton were well aware of the need to preserve agreeable contacts with the Chinese merchants and to remain on good terms with the mandarins. In other words, the Dutch supercargoes always did their best to negotiate with the Chinese merchants for fair dealings,[66] and to make a favourable impression on the mandarins by presenting themselves as "honest men". The inescapable conclusion is that the Dutch delegates carried out their business in Canton by conscientiously paying full respect to the Chinese authorities, as they were painfully aware of the dominant role of the Chinese authorities in the European trade in Canton. They behaved in a similar manner towards the Japanese bureaucracy when they traded at their trading-station Deshima in Nagasaki.[67]

As for the relations with the English in Canton, as shown by the first and third cases, the Dutch competed on the market and conflicted in daily life with their rivals far more than they co-operated with them. In comparison to the good relations between the VOC trade representatives and the Chinese authorities, interestingly enough, the English had suffered very shaky relations with the Chinese authorities since they started their China trade at the beginning of the eighteenth century, although the volume of their business with the Chinese merchants was much larger than that of the Dutch. In the third case, by their independent and sometimes rash behaviour the English country traders must have acted as the spoilsports in any efforts to maintain good relations.

As regards the relations with the Macao Government, the second case, the purchase of the *Herstelder*, shows that the VOC trade representatives kept in close contact with this administration no matter whether they were sojourning in Macao during the off-season or whether they negotiated some business with this administration while in Canton. Frankly speaking, the Dutch delegates probably received such fair treatment from the Macao Government because they had strong backing: the High Government. A number of Macao (Portuguese) vessels sailed to Batavia to trade every year, and the Portuguese traders frequently put in at Batavia for a short call when they sailed to Timor and other Asiatic ports, so to a large extent the treatment the High Government meted out to these Portuguese, mirrored the treatment the Macao Government gave to the Dutch supercargoes.[68]

# CHAPTER FIVE

# THE SALE OF THE "VOC TEAS" IN EUROPE

## *Introduction*

When the China Committee took control of the VOC China trade at the end of the 1750s, the procedures regarding the entire voyage of the China ships changed virtually completely from those which had been followed in the previous phases.[1] From then onwards, the China ships set out any time between September and December every year (or rarely at the beginning of the next year) from the Dutch Republic, and arrived in Canton in the summer, or October at the latest, of the next year; the ships left Canton late that same year (in October, November or December) or early the following January or February, and arrived home at any time between June and October.[2]

The homecoming of a China ship after a voyage which may have taken as long as three years did not yet herald the conclusion of the whole trading venture. The greatest concern of the Company about the voyage still had to take place: the sale of the return cargoes, in other words, the realization of the Company's trading profit. In the case of the Company's tea trade, this was done at one or two Company auctions held between the second half of the year and the first half of the next year separately by the various chambers.

Such Company auctions were not the final destination of the "VOC teas". Once they had taken place, the "VOC teas" were resold by the domestic tea-dealers, both wholesalers and retailers, to shopkeepers from whom they were purchased by the consumers. Not all tea remained in the Dutch Republic. Dutch traders re-exported some part of the "VOC teas" to other European countries which did not import tea directly from China and on whose domestic market there was a demand for more teas.

## *Company auctions of the "VOC teas"*

The Gentlemen Seventeen of the VOC represented the six Chambers of Amsterdam, Zeeland, Delft, Rotterdam, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen, whose delegates also participated in the China Committee.[3] These chambers fitted out ships under their own control for the Dutch-Asian trade, and they each received their share of the return cargoes of tea when the China ships

returned home. Therefore, a number of barges were dispatched by the Chambers of Zeeland, Delft, and Rotterdam to unload the goods ordered once the China ships made port in the southern estuaries of Zeeland and Holland. The Chambers of Hoorn, Enkhuizen, and Amsterdam did the same when the China ships anchored in the roadstead of Texel in the north.[4]

Subsequently, according to the rule of the Gentlemen Seventeen, the return cargoes were sold in each of the various chamber cities. In the early phase of the Company's existence, these chambers disposed of their share of the goods in three ways. Most frequently, they sold the goods by organizing an auction. Failing this, they drew up a contract with one or more domestic trading groups. Finally, they occasionally offered tea to individual traders at a fixed price.[5] Later, especially in the eighteenth century, all the goods were sold at the Company auctions in the chamber cities.

Although these chambers held their own auctions of tea and other Asian goods each year, the dates and other additional stipulations pertaining to the running of the auctions were decreed by the Gentlemen Seventeen at the end of each trading season. The Gentlemen Seventeen issued an annual pamphlet, which mentioned when and where such auctions were to take place, including a comprehensive description of the quantities and value of the goods for sale.

All chambers participated in the trade with Asia, but as far as the Chinese tea trade was concerned, the number of chambers taking part in this trade fluctuated every year. Consequently, the number of chamber cities in which the tea auctions took place yearly varied from all six to only one in the sixty years between 1731 and 1790. Only Amsterdam held tea auctions every year, with the exception of 1782 and 1783, when no China ship was sent back to the Dutch Republic because of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.[6]

Scanning the data in Appendix 6, we can establish that all the six chamber cities had public tea auctions each year in 1731-1744, 1748, and 1752, but in other years an auction did not take place in one or more of the cities. When considering the number of chamber cities where the teas were auctioned, it should be pointed out that, even though all six chamber cities organized tea auctions in some years, this does not mean that all of them sent ships to China, especially in the first two phases of the direct China trade. Before the China Committee was established, some of the chambers frequently made their purchases of tea in Batavia. There were also instances when some chambers sent ships to Canton but did not purchase tea but acquired other products instead. Sometimes ships were lost on the homeward voyage. Such a fate befell the ship the *Abbekerk* sent by the Hoorn Chamber in 1778. Its cargo was scheduled to be sold in 1780.[7] However, in the years 1760-1781, most of the chambers which held

tea auctions in their own cities also joined in sending ships to Canton.

Although the tea auctions were arranged by these chamber cities separately, an overview of all auctions held by the six chambers was eventually compiled by the Gentlemen Seventeen in one VOC document under the title of "Annual Statements of the Goods Sold by all the VOC Chambers, 1731-1790" (see Appendix 6). In these statements, which were recorded on 15 or 31 May each year, the results of the auctions of tea and other products can be easily consulted.[8] Perusing this information, we discover that every auction dealt with the cargo of one complete voyage of the China ships over the past three years.

Those chambers which had the commodity to trade sold the teas on the market every year at one or two public auctions held in succession.[9] Detailed information on this can be abstracted from the "Annual Statements" and the "Lists of the Deliveries, with the Names of the Buyers and the Prices Paid at the Sales of the Zeeland Chamber, 1757-1776" (see Appendix 8). In the first record, the auction dates for the Chambers of Delft and Rotterdam are clearly noted throughout the year in the months of April, May, August, September, October, December, and (most frequently) November, and the auction dates for all other chambers are omitted.[10] Examining the second record, we find that the auctions of the Zeeland Chamber took place in both April and October, November, or December for the years 1758, 1761-1764, and in either of May, October, November, or December for other years 1765-1767 and 1772-1776.[11]

Customarily, the tea-buyers assembled at a VOC auction in the chamber cities to bid for the goods they wanted to purchase on the auction date. It is a pity that no detailed account has survived of the spectacle of customers outbidding one another, but one fact is crystal clear: the number of buyers involved in the tea business in the eighteenth century was great.[12] Appendix 8 gives an impression of the tea-dealers' purchases in Middelburg. The quantity, price, and value of the teas sold are meticulously recorded. The number of the tea-buyers vying with each other to acquire the sought-after commodity in the periods 1758-1766 and 1772-1776 was quite considerable (see Table 4). Unfortunately, there is hardly any information about the tea-buyers in other chamber cities to be retrieved from the VOC archives. J.A. ter Molen claims there were forty tea-dealers in Amsterdam in 1766, most of whom also sold coffee;[13] a practice also followed by tea-dealers in Zeeland.[14]

Among the tea-buyers, the quality and the price of tea were the two most important thoughts uppermost in their minds when they made their bids at the Company auctions. In discerning quality, tea-buyers paid particular attention to the dustiness of the tea auctioned. After the middle of the eighteenth century, they frequently complained to the VOC about the

*Table 4 Number of the tea-buyers at the auctions in Middelburg by the Zeeland Chamber, 1758-1766 and 1772-1776*

| Year | Number | Year | Number |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1758* | 38 | *1765* | 51 |
| *1759* | 29 | *1766* | 49 |
| *1760* | 47 | *1772* | 42 |
| *1761* | 41 | *1773* | 51 |
| *1762* | 58 | *1774* | 50 |
| *1763* | 58 | *1775* | 53 |
| *1764* | 44 | *1776* | 48 |

NB: it should be pointed out that this amount, as shown in Appendix 8, includes not only the persons who bought tea directly from the Company but also those who purchased tea from the private sellers via the Company.
Source: Appendix 8.

dusty nature of the tea, Bohea in particular, in spite of the fact that ever since 1760 this matter had already engaged the undivided attention of the Gentlemen Seventeen. In their seasonal instructions, the latter never failed to remind the VOC trade representatives in Canton to check the quality of the teas. The tea-buyers were also displeased with the short-weighting. They argued that before the direct trade had been inaugurated in 1757, the "VOC tea" chests were packed very carelessly and they were light weight. After that date the chest had admittedly grown heavier but the contents were heavily contaminated by dust. The excuse for this adulteration was according to the supercargoes' later caustic assumption that the tea-buyers benefited from adulterating the Company's coarsely packed teas with dust; and should the "VOC teas" already be heavily mixed with dust before they were transported to the Dutch Republic, the tea-buyers would be deprived of the opportunity to fiddle the goods themselves.[15]

Defending the way they went about their business, the trade representatives declared that they could not possibly satisfy the tea-buyers at home without harming the interests of the Company. If they wanted the teas less dusty, they should purchase little or no Ankay,[16] which was very friable and could not be packed without badly pulverizing it. They should opt for Bohea instead. This would push the price of Bohea up higher than it already was and that would certainly militate against the interests of the Company. To their credit, the trade representatives continued to do their best to minimize the damage to the tea-buyers, but they saw no possibility to meet all the tea-buyers' wishes, because their first duty was to care for the interests of the Company and not allow the purchase price of tea to rise too high.[17] The road open to them to help the tea-buyers at home, while still considering the interests of the Company, was to assign their own people to supervise the packing and weighing of tea by the Chinese

tea-supplying agents, especially when they happened to be mixing Bohea, Congou, or Souchong with Ankay. This procedure was observed throughout the second half of the eighteenth century.[18]

There is irrefutable evidence that the "VOC teas" were sold at different prices in different chamber cities in each auction season. The minimum prices were calculated to cover prime costs, freight, and such charges on the merchandise as the supercargoes' commission and the expenses incurred by the Company's establishment in Canton, insurance, interest, and the customs duties – an *ad valorem* tax assessed on the sale of tea and paid by the Company. Even armed with these data, it is quite difficult to gather information about the selling price in the archives. There are, however, three sources which can be used for this purpose: the purchase and selling prices of Twankay in Canton and the Dutch Republic, 1756-1764 (NA NFC 28); the selling prices of teas by different chambers, 1777-1780 (NA Aanwinsten 541); and the auctions held by the Zeeland Chamber in the years 1757-1776 (NA VOC 13377).

*Table 5 The VOC purchase (in Canton) and sales (in the Dutch Republic) prices of Twankay, 1756-1781*

| Season | Purchase price (taels/picul) | Purchase price (stivers/pound) | Sales price (stivers/pound) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1756-59* | 29 | 20 4/5 | 48½ - 49¼ |
| *1757-60* | unknown | unknown | unknown |
| *1758-61* | 26 | 19 | 45 - 50¾ |
| *1759-62* | 29 - 31 | 20 4/5 - 22 1/3 | 44 - 46½ |
| *1760-63* | 29 | 20 4/5 | 42 - 45 |
| *1761-64* | 26 | 19 | 52 - 55½ |
| *1775-78* | 19¼ | 13 4/5 | 32 - 35½ |
| *1776-79* | 22 1/3 | 16 | 38½ - 46½ |
| *1777-80* | 24 | 17 | unknown |
| *1778-81* | 22 5/8 | 16¼ | 34½ - 54½ |

NB: The China Committee fixed 88 stivers equal to one tael, which means that 4.4 guilders were equal to one tael, for the China trade since 1765 (NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton, 28 May 1765). Before that year, it was customary to reckon about 71 to 72 stivers to one tael (see the section on "Preparations for the improved management of the China trade" in Chapter One).
Sources: NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council in Canton, 25 August 1765; Appendices 4 and 7.

When we compare the buying and selling prices of Twankay between 1756-1759 and 1761-64 (see Table 5), we are left in no doubt about how much profit the VOC earned on this one single article during this period. In the season 1760-1763, for instance, the trade representatives in Canton paid 29 taels per picul for this article, which was equivalent to

about 20.8 stivers per pound, and subsequently the Company sold it in the Dutch Republic at 42 to 45 stivers per pound. A simple sum shows that the Company made a gross trading profit of 21 to 24 stivers per pound or 50 to 53 per cent.[19] The VOC record-keeping makes it very hard to calculate the net profit, but the gain on this article after all expenses had been deducted still seemed to be profitable, not least thanks to the fact that the tea market in the Republic was by and large in the hands of the Company, although strictly speaking tea was not a monopoly product on the domestic market. There is cogent evidence that the VOC was not the only tea merchant in the Republic. Non-"VOC teas", which always represented a comparatively small market share, could be sold as well.[20]

In Appendix 7, the selling prices of Bohea and Congou are listed, following the method by which the tea chests were packed. This was because of the fact that, as soon as the VOC trade representatives in Canton bought in these teas, they had already packed them not only in whole chests, which had a capacity of 340 pounds, but also in half, quarter, and one-eighth chests, even on occasion in two-thirds as well as one-third chests. Generally speaking, the smaller the chest, the better the quality of the tea packed in it. Such difference was shown particularly obvious on the price of Congou. In Appendix 8, the prices of teas which were calculated in Zeeland's own currency are listed not according to the kind of tea but according to the names of the tea-buyers who purchased them.[21] Such confusion obviates the making of any deeper analysis of the sales prices of tea.

Despite such hurdles, thanks to the above-mentioned "Annual Statements", it is still possible to get some idea of the quantity and the value of the teas auctioned by the different chambers. Three remarks may be made on this topic.

First of all, throughout the long period between 1730 and 1790, the two Chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland almost invariably always sold the biggest amounts.[22] These two chambers were the best funded chambers of all, and their undisputed prominence unequivocally is demonstrated by the fact that they served alternately as the presiding chamber of the VOC.

Another factor which has to be taken into consideration is that in some years the tea sold by some chambers had been procured from two different sources: it was the property of either the Company or private individuals. The part owned by private parties was categorized as consisting of teas *op recognitie* or *op vracht*, and these were comparatively smaller amounts (see Appendix 6). In the "Annual Statements", the Zeeland Chamber customarily used the term of *op vracht* to designate these teas while the others used *op recognitie*. These kinds of tea appeared at the auctions because a number of private individuals – businessmen or trading


group(s) in the Dutch Republic as well as Batavia – could entrust the Company with a commission to buy tea for them. It is believed on the basis of the source materials that most of the teas on recognition (and at freight) were sent from Batavia. The reason for this is obscure, but it is possible that it was purchased locally there. Considering the teas owned by the private parties in Zeeland, one more factor should be mentioned. The information about the auctions of tea held by the Zeeland Chamber reveals that, besides the teas *op recognitie*, this chamber also oftentimes auctioned teas *van particulieren* (see Appendix 8). How these teas ended up at the Company auction is shrouded in mystery, but undoubtedly they, like those *op recognitie*, were the property of private parties.

When the teas *op recognitie* came up for auction, the chambers deducted a percentage from the money received on selling this kind of tea as the Company's commission, generally claiming 40 or 50 per cent and on a few rare occasions 30 per cent. For teas sold in the *op vracht* category, the Company's commission varied from 30 to 50 per cent, with only two exceptions.[23] The teas *op vracht,* or *op recognitie*, were shipped to the Dutch Republic from Batavia only during the "Batavia period" of the China trade,[24] and in 1769 the Gentlemen Seventeen resolved to limit the transport of teas for the private parties and a few years later, in 1772, brought it to an end.[25] Only in the years 1787-1788 did these teas appear on the home market again.[26] Since the Company did not pay for purchasing these teas and simply asked a commission on selling them, I have not included them in the computations of the quantities and the value of the "VOC teas" bought and sold.

Finally, if we compare the data on the amounts of teas sold in the Dutch Republic (see Appendix 6) with those sent from Canton and also from Batavia (see Appendices 4 and 5),[27] there can be no single shred of doubt, as shown in Figure 2, that in the first and second phases of the China trade, the teas sold in the Republic originated both from China and from Batavia. How much tea was purchased in the seasons from 1734-1737 to 1739-1742 is not clearly listed in Figure 2, but when we look at the money paid for the purchases of tea in those seasons, as shown in Figure 3, the aggregate volume probably amounted to about half all teas sold in the Republic. From the season 1751-1753, and especially after the establishment of the China Committee at the end of 1756, this situation was utterly transformed when the transportation of teas from Batavia to the Republic on the account of private persons in the Republic was definitely limited. Eventually no more tea was sent from Batavia on the account of the Company. Consequently after 1756 all the "VOC teas" sold in the Republic had to have been basically purchased and sent from Canton, with only a few exceptions (see Table 6).


As shown in the table, there is a difference – in most years more was

*Figure 2. Volumes of teas bought in Canton and Batavia and sold in the Dutch Republic by the VOC, 1729-1790*




NB: a) Purchases in Batavia during the seasons 1734-1737, 1735-1738, 1739-1742, 1742-1745, 1743-1746, 1744-1747, 1745-1748, 1746-1749, 1747-1750, 1748-1751, 1749-1752, 1753-1756, and 1754-1757 are not available; in these seasons purchases in Canton are given only.
b) Purchases in Canton during 1745-1748 and 1765-1768 and in Batavia during 1731-1734 and 1732-1735 are not clear in Jörg's book (218-219). Here I give my own calculation.
Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6; Appendix Specification of the return shipments from Canton for the Netherlands (Jörg, Porcelain, 217-220).

*Figure 3. Purchases (in Canton and Batavia) and sales (in the Dutch Republic) of the "VOC teas", 1729-1790*




NB: a) Purchases in Batavia during the seasons 1734-1737, 1735-1738, 1739-1742, 1742-1745, 1743-1746, 1744-1747, 1745-1748, 1746-1749, 1747-1750, 1748-1751, 1749-1752, 1753-1756, and 1754-1757 are not available; in these seasons purchases in Canton are given only.
b) Purchases in Canton during 1745-1748 and 1765-1768 and in Batavia during 1731-1734 and 1732-1735 are not clear in Jörg's book (218-219). Here I give my own calculation.
Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6; Appendix Specification of the return shipments from Canton for the Netherlands (Jörg, *Porcelain*, 217-220).

*Table 6 Comparison of volumes between tea sent from Canton and sold at auction in the Dutch Republic, 1756-1790*

| Season | Volumes (in pounds) Sent from Canton | Sold at auction | Deficit | Surplus |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1756-59* | 1,686,884 | 1,700,897 | 14,013 | |
| *1757-60* | 1,772,005 | 1,527,766 | | 244,239 |
| *1758-61* | 2,836,555 | 1,516,768 | | 1,319,787 |
| *1759-62* | 2,528,203 | 2,846,403 | 318,200 | |
| *1760-63* | 2,950,024 | 1,641,672 | | 1,308,352 |
| *1761-64* | 2,846,176 | 2,652,812 | | 193,364 |
| *1762-65* | 3,802,122 | 1,706,949 | | 2,095,173 |
| *1763-66* | 3,663,571 | 4,140,874 | 477,303 | |
| *1764-67* | 3,622,816 | 3,317,266 | | 305,550 |
| *1765-68* | 3,724,440 | 3,193,006 | | 531,434 |
| *1766-69* | 3,638,791 | 3,341,164 | | 297,627 |
| *1767-70* | 3,763,629 | 3,452,945 | | 310,684 |
| *1768-71* | 3,894,460 | 3,365,108 | | 529,352 |
| *1769-72* | 3,432,942 | 3,474,144 | 41,202 | |
| *1770-73* | 3,017,285 | 3,203,696 | 186,411 | |
| *1771-74* | 3,666,399 | 3,052,479 | | 613,920 |
| *1772-75* | 3,704,908 | 3,282,673 | | 422,235 |
| *1773-76* | 3,748,410 | 3,287,164 | | 461,246 |
| *1774-77* | 3,715,294 | 3,315,334 | | 399,960 |
| *1775-78* | 3,680,465 | 3,249,842 | | 430,623 |
| *1776-79* | 3,391,016 | 3,189,892 | | 201,124 |
| *1777-80* | 3,562,416 | 1,627,821 | | 1,934,595 |
| *1778-81* | 3,637,784 | 2,030,506 | | 1,607,278 |
| *1779-82* | no tea sent from Canton | | | |
| *1780-83* | no tea sent from Canton | | | |
| *1781-84* | 1,911,778 | 213,687 | | 1,698,091 |
| *1782-85* | 3,927,361 | 1,335,022 | | 2,592,339 |
| *1783-86* | 3,011,706 | 2,630,485 | | 381,221 |
| *1784-87* | 4,077,086 | 2,015,307 | | 2,061,779 |
| *1785-88* | 4,358,499 | 3,960,840 | | 397,659 |
| *1786-89* | 3,322,437 | 1,623,417 | | 1,699,020 |
| *1787-90* | 3,696,763 | 1,429,355 | | 2,267,408 |

Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6.

sent than sold – between the quantities of teas sent from Canton and of those sold at the Company auctions nearly every year during the second half of the eighteenth century. Why and how did this happen? Various reasons can be adduced to explain this.

The Company servants in Canton frequently purchased more teas than the China Committee demanded. In the annual instructions to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton, the China Committee always fixed certain amount for most kinds of teas (see Appendix 4), but in most instances the trade representatives oversupplied the return ships because they had taken advantage of the favourable purchase price (especially during the off-season) in Canton. Cogently, in the second half of the eighteenth century, the China Committee never settled an exact amount for

the Bohea demanded but simply instructed the supercargoes to buy as much as they could depending, of course, on the quality of Bohea available. This, in practice, resulted in an oversupply of tea but one which did not really hurt the interests of the Company.[28] In a few years, more teas were sold than received in that same year from Canton, therefore the difference must have been made up by shipments of tea from the previous and/or the following seasons. There were several possibilities which would explain why the quantity of tea sold in Europe would have been less than that purchased in Canton. During the long journey to Europe, almost inevitably the teas on board tended to go stale. As this meant a drying out, it involved some unavoidable weight loss. In *patria* the unloaded teas were repacked before the auction and during this process some of the dust, which had been mixed in with it by the Chinese tea-supplying agents and their coolies,[29] would have been removed somewhat. This caused yet another weight loss. Such matters were understood and in these cases, a 10 to 15 per cent weight loss was acceptable.

In any attempt to make an analysis of the value of the teas sold at auction by the VOC, the "Annual Statements" made by the Gentlemen Seventeen is still the best source to consult. The statistics of the annual proceeds in Appendix 6 illustrate that during the twenty-seven seasons between 1729-1732 and 1755-1758, when the annual proceeds hovered around 1,995,215 guilders, the sales actually exceeded 2,500,000 guilders in the seven seasons 1743-1746, 1744-1747, 1749-1752, 1751-1754, 1752-1755, 1753-1756, and 1755-1758. In the twenty-three seasons between 1756-1759 and 1778-1781, the annual proceeds were much larger, about 3,268,412 guilders on average, and now the sum of sales fell below 2,500,000 guilders only in the three seasons 1756-1759, 1762-1765, and 1777-1780. In short, sales surpassed 2,500,000 guilders in as many as twenty seasons and even over 3,000,000 guilders in eleven seasons. In the seven seasons between 1781-1784 and 1787-1790, during and after the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, as could have been expected from the upsets to shipping, the annual proceeds were only 2,095,192 guilders on average. The sales even surpassed 3,000,000 guilders in the three seasons 1781-1784, 1783-1786, and 1785-1788, but hovered around 1,600,000 guilders in the other four seasons 1782-1785, 1784-1787, 1786-1789, and 1787-1790.

On the basis of the information derived from the "Annual Statements" and the teas sent from Canton and Batavia, compared with the specification of the shipments from Canton to the Netherlands provided by Jörg, it is possible to compare, as shown in Figure 3, the trading profit made on the sale of the "VOC teas" through the seasons from 1729 to 1790. On the basis of this computation, it can be argued that the seasons between 1756-1759 and 1778-1781 were the "Golden years" of the VOC

*Table 7 Gross profits margins on selling the "VOC teas" by the Company, 1756-1790*

| Season | Value (in guilders) paid in Canton | received in Europe | Profits margin |
|---|---|---|---|
| *1756-59* | 777,409 | 2,483,414 | 219% |
| *1757-60* | 1,486,611 | 2,287,140 | 54% |
| *1758-61* | 1,614,841 | 2,294,510 | 42% |
| *1759-62* | 1,037,991 | 4,158,927 | 300% |
| *1760-63* | 1,651,976 | 2,810,944 | 70% |
| *1761-64* | 1,427,968 | 3,688,542 | 158% |
| *1762-65* | 2,093,534 | 2,291,483 | 9.5% |
| *1763-66* | 2,199,097 | 5,039,351 | 129% |
| *1764-67* | 2,087,036 | 4,047,350 | 94% |
| *1765-68* | 2,009,217 | 3,791,377 | 89% |
| *1766-69* | 1,829,786 | 3,519,360 | 92% |
| *1767-70* | 1,864,660 | 3,046,539 | 63% |
| *1768-71* | 1,777,256 | 2,893,271 | 62% |
| *1769-72* | 1,740,889 | 3,644,758 | 109% |
| *1770-73* | 1,632,644 | 4,007,786 | 145% |
| *1771-74* | 1,657,285 | 2,991,147 | 80% |
| *1772-75* | 1,608,419 | 3,243,977 | 102% |
| *1773-76* | 1,625,045 | 2,891,489 | 78% |
| *1774-77* | 1,723,870 | 2,803,403 | 62% |
| *1775-78* | 2,028,413 | 2,534,388 | 25% |
| *1776-79* | 1,970,198 | 3,785,493 | 92% |
| *1777-80* | 1,744,791 | 2,280,929 | 31% |
| *1778-81* | 1,738,936 | 2,679,128 | 54% |
| *1779-82* | no tea sent from Canton | | |
| *1780-83* | no tea sent from Canton | | |
| *1781-84* | 1,076,991 | 358,451 | – 67% |
| *1782-85* | 2,255,619 | 1,402,558 | – 38% |
| *1783-86* | 1,768,428 | 3,009,116 | 70% |
| *1784-87* | 3,342,391 | 2,698,184 | – 19% |
| *1785-88* | 3,435,415 | 4,089,218 | 19% |
| *1786-89* | 3,171,942 | 1,646,633 | – 48% |
| *1787-90* | 3,316,479 | 1,385,457 | – 58% |

Sources: Appendices 4, 5, and 6; Jörg, *Porcelain*, Appendix 8, 217-220.

tea trade with China. Most of the 1780s and half of the 1750s yielded only a low profitability as trade in Asia suffered the aftershocks of wars in Europe. The last seven years of the 1780s were especially gloomy and only two years (1786 and 1788) were reasonably successful; in the other five years the Company by then ailing from bad management allied with corruption lost money drastically. In the short seasons fairly early on from 1729-1732 to 1733-1736 and from 1736-1739 to 1737-1740, the gross profit margins were 22, 171, 148, 154, 172, 102, and 41 per cent respectively. In the seasons from 1742-1745 to 1744-1747, since the amounts of money paid in Batavia were not clear, it is no easy task to calculate the profit margins, but there is little reason to think that they would not have been as lucrative as in the afore-mentioned periods. Even so, the profits

in these short periods still trail far behind those made in the period of the direct Canton trade, when the trading profits on sales of tea were high in all years (see Table 7). The one exception was the season 1762-1765, when the profit was low at 9.5 per cent but made up for by the 158 per cent profit in the previous and the 129 per cent profit in the following season.

## *Domestic distribution of the "VOC teas"*

After the Company auctions, the "VOC teas" entered two distribution channels. One was the domestic distribution, and the other was the re-export to other European countries. In comparison with the detailed study on the domestic distribution of the "EIC teas" by the British domestic tea-dealers,[30] there are still large gaps in our understanding of the extent or magnitude of the two distribution channels under the control of the Dutch. This can largely be attributed to the scarcity of source materials available to compile a statistical analysis of the two channels. None the less, there is at least enough to be able to draw a simple sketch. First of all, both sets of tea-dealers – the wholesalers as well as retailers, who, presumably also, put in their bids at the Company auctions – and shopkeepers were involved in this distribution channel. The imported teas probably reached the households of the common people as follows: tea-dealers, either from the chamber cities or from surrounding towns, purchased the "VOC teas" at the Company auctions in the chamber cities; then, these tea-dealers sold tea to shopkeepers who in their turn sold it to the ordinary customers. It should be pointed out that the shopkeepers could purchase teas directly from the wholesalers, but the latter often sold first to those retailers who were not involved in the Company auctions and who then in turn sold the teas on to the shopkeepers.

The profits tea-dealers earned by reselling the "VOC teas" to the next group of buyers are hard to compute, but we can get some idea if we look at the profits earned by one famous group of tea-dealers, Jan Jacob Voute & Sons, in Amsterdam from 1778 to 1781 and compare the prices of teas sold by this group with those at the VOC auctions in that city. As shown in Table 8, the profits the tea-dealers earned were much lower in total than those which had already accrued to the Company, and the tea-dealers even lost money on some sorts of teas by selling them at lower prices than they paid at the Company auction. Likewise, the comparison of the prices at which the teas were sold by this group in 1777, 1788, and 1795 (see Table 9) provides some idea of the fluctuations in the prices of teas sold by the same group in the last three decades of the eighteenth century. More information about the selling prices of these teas by various

*Table 8 Comparison of prices of teas (stivers/pound) between the tea-dealers Jan Jacob Voute & Sons and the VOC in Amsterdam, 1777-1781*

| | *1777-1778* | | | | | | *1778-1779* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | by the VOC | by J.J. Voute & Sons | | | | | by the VOC | by J.J. Voute & Sons | |
| | *02/12/77* | *09/02/78* | *09/03/78* | *29/06/78* | *13/07/78* | *07/09/78* | *10/11/78* | *29/03/79* | *09/08/79* |
| Bohea | 11.5 - 16.5 | 13.5 - 16 | 14 - 16 | 16 - 17 | 16 - 17 | 16 - 17 | 16.5 - 18 | 19 - 20 | 19.5 - 20 |
| Congo | 23.25 - 23.75 | 28 - 36 | 28 - 36 | 28 - 36 | 28 - 36 | 28 - 45 | 22.5 - 43 | 28 - 46 | 28 - 46 |
| Souchong | 32.5 - 50 | 35 - 50 | 35 - 50 | 35 - 50 | 35 - 50 | 34 - 60 | 39 - 62 | 36 - 60 | 32 - 60 |
| Pekoe | 34 - 58 | 46 - 60 | 46 - 60 | 46 - 60 | 46 - 60 | 45 - 60 | 38 - 51 | 48 - 60 | 34 - 56 |
| Songlo | 33 - 33.75 | 34 - 36 | 34 - 36 | 36 - 37 | 36 - 37 | 37 - 39 | 37.5 - 39.5 | 45 - 48 | 46 - 50 |
| Tawnkay | 32 - 35.5 | 36 - 38 | 36 - 38 | 38 - 42 | 38 - 42 | 38 - 42 | 38.5 - 46 | 49 - 50 | 50 - 56 |
| Hyson skin | 38 - 46 | 42 - 46 | 42 - 46 | 40 - 50 | 40 - 50 | 40 - 50 | 43.5 - 51.5 | 50 - 54 | 58 - 60 |
| Hyson | 80 - 81 | 82 - 90 | 82 - 90 | 82 - 86 | 82 - 86 | 82 - 90 | 86.5 - 89.5 | 85 - 95 | 92 - 96 |
| | *1779-1780* | | | | | | *1780-1781* | | |
| | by the VOC | by J.J. Voute & Sons | | | | | by the VOC | by J.J. Voute & Sons | |
| | *01&02/11/79* | *13/11/79* | *03/01/80* | *31/01/80* | *24/03/80* | *11/09/80* | *13&14/11/80* | *05/03/81* | |
| Bohea | 21.5 - 22 | 22 - 23 | 22 - 23 | 22 - 23 | 22 - 22.5 | 21 - 21.5 | 19.75 - 20.25 | 22 - 24 | |
| Congo | 25.75 - 26.5 | 28 - 45 | 28 - 45 | 28 - 45 | 28 - 45 | 30 - 40 | 30.5 - 41 | 36 - 50 | |
| Souchong | 32.5 - 52 | 34 - 60 | 34 - 60 | 34 - 60 | 34 - 60 | 34 - 60 | 34.5 - 41 | 38 - 60 | |
| Pekoe | 44 - 57 | 48 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 42 - 60 | 45 - 48.5 | 48 - 56 | |
| Songlo | 49 - 49.5 | 50 - 56 | 50 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 50 - 52 | 42 - 45 | 32.5 - 35.5 | 36 - 38 | |
| Tawnkay | — | 54 - 56 | 54 - 56 | 54 - 56 | 54 - 56 | 44 - 46 | 35 - 37 | 38 - 44 | |
| Hyson skin | 51.5 - 56.5 | 52 - 60 | 52 - 60 | 52 - 60 | 54 - 60 | 48 - 56 | 40 - 60 | 50 - 60 | |
| Hyson | 89.5 - 93.5 | 78 - 102 | 78 - 100 | 78 - 100 | 80 - 100 | 70 - 95 | 86 - 92 | 80 - 105 | |

Sources: NA Aanwinsten 541; GAA, Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, "Coffee and Tea".

*Table 9 Prices of teas sold by Jan Jacob Voute & Sons in 1777, 1788, and 1795 (stivers/pound)*

| | 6 September 1777 | 18 August 1788 | 10 August 1795 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bohea | 13 – 16 | 11 – 13 | 10 – 12.5 |
| Congo | 28 – 36 | 24 – 42 | 27 – 45 |
| Souchong | 34 – 56 | 34 – 52 | 37 – 50 |
| Pekoe | 40 – 56 | 78 – 85 | 40 – 60 |
| Songlo | 33 – 34 | 26 – 31 | 20 – 26 |
| Tawnkay | 35 – 36 | 27 – 31 | 22 – 28 |
| Hyson skin | 36 – 40 | 28 – 40 | 26 – 34 |
| Hyson | 80 – 85 | 50 – 65 | 38 – 56 |

Source: GAA, Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, "Coffee and Tea".

tea-dealers in Amsterdam during the period 1776-1795 can be found in Appendix 10.

As a rule, selling tea in the street to the common people was forbidden in the Dutch Republic.[31] Since the beginning of the seventeenth century, tea had been sold to ordinary citizens originally only at the apothecaries' shops because initially Dutch people drank tea as a medicinal beverage. It was believed that tea was beneficial to human health. According to medical practitioners, such various deficiencies which then were rampant in this country in that era as heavy-headedness, weepy eyes, and weak sight could be cured by imbibing this exotic product, and it was even said to guarantee longevity without the illnesses which usually accompany great age.[32] During the first half of the eighteenth century, there was a change in conceptions about tea and its sale was moved to special tea businesses, when the beverage became popular in society as an enjoyable drink. Shops specialized in selling tea mushroomed in nearly every town of the Republic.

No statistical data about tea shops in the Dutch cities during the eighteenth century are still extant; only some scattered references can be gleaned from various sources. In 1749 in the city of Leiden, fifty shops sold coffee as well as tea. In addition, five special tea shops and no less than a hundred coffee shops were registered and there were twenty-three male and female dealers in tea and/or coffee.[33]

Since 1752 in Utrecht all sellers of coffee and tea had to be duly registered with their names and addresses. The wholesalers on the official list were in the majority and licensed victualers formed a minority.[34] Names of coffee shops appeared more frequently than those of tea shops, but this does not necessarily mean that the shops, devoted to the coffee business, did not also deal in tea business. Many coffee shops usually sold coffee and tea at the same time, even though coffee was the principal product of the shop.

Traditionally, the tea shops were easily recognizable by a suitably decorated window in the transom above the door or a sign with a logo on it, such as a "Big Tea Caddy" or "Small Tea Tree" (see Illustration 4). Window-dressings in the form of a bag bearing the label "Coffee and Tea" were employed to attract the passing potential clients.

*Illustration 4 Wooden-framed transom of a tea shop, with the inscription "The Green Tea Tree"*



This shop was situated on the Boterstraat, on the west corner of the Kreupelstraat, in Schiedam at the end of the eighteenth century, 98x75x1.5 cm; this object was received as a donation by the Museum in 1899.
Source: Courtesy of Stedelijk Museum Schiedam, inventory number: H/00000088/1-2/01.

Sometimes a striking text was written on the awning over the shop front. In late-seventeenth-century Amsterdam, Hieronymus Sweerts copied one so interesting text from the signboard of the shop "The Two Tea-Bottles" (*De Twee Thee-Flessen*) on the Oude Leliestraat which reads as follows: [35]

Don't pass by<br>
If you<br>
Seek good tea.<br>
Look, smell, and taste,<br>
To your heart's content<br>
And take something with you.

(*Ga niet voorby*<br>
*Indien dat gy*<br>
*Soekt goeje thee.*<br>
*Sie, ruyk, en smaak,*<br>
*Tot u vermaak,*<br>
*En neemt wat mee.*)

In Utrecht in the first half of the eighteenth century, after the imposition of a tax on tea, shopkeepers were even obliged to put or hang out a board in front of their shops or display a message on the awning of their houses, which stated: "Here we sell coffee and tea".[36]

This was the period in which the selling of tea was permitted only in shops. The certified shopkeepers were obliged to keep a list recording the weight of their canisters, kegs, and caddies. This should be clearly discernible on the basis of a number, in order to facilitate the quick checking of the stock available in the shop. The prohibition on street sales proved impossible to enforce all of the time, and there were a few exceptions in some years. So far, it has proved an insuperable problem to determine how often such exceptions occurred in the eighteenth century, but we know of at least one example in Amsterdam in 1721. In that year, because the price of tea had been drastically cut by the manipulations of the VOC, the market was literally swamped by the beverage and as a consequence this commodity was hawked around the streets of Amsterdam in wheelbarrows.[37]

How the owners of tea shops went about running their enterprises in the eighteenth century is also of interest to us. Normally, when a client, usually a housewife, walked in to buy tea, the shopkeeper would first present and recommend some samples of various teas; and then, as was custom, the client would put some dry tea leaves into his or her mouth and chew them. After this first test, the shopkeeper (or the shop assistant) prepared a "sample" of tea of the chosen kind – mostly in an adjacent room – so as to enable the potential customer to take a sip of the tea prepared with boiled water. Small test-cups which belonged to the shop were used or were brought along by the prospective customers themselves.

Advertisements for selling tea were already being printed on the packing-paper and/or small bags used in the shops in the eighteenth century. Around 1730, for instance, Joannes Kramer, the owner of the shop "The Old Town Hall" (*Het Oude Stadhuys*), which was situated on the Oudezijds Kapelsteeg in Amsterdam, advertised that he sold various sorts of tobacco as well as all kinds of tea and coffee beans at a fair price (see Illustration 5); his fellow shopkeeper, J.P. van Bergen, kept "strong liquor" and a medicine-chest as well as tea and coffee on his premises on the Warmoesstraat.[38]

One excellent example can be adduced to illustrate the history of tea shops in the Netherlands. As early as 1769, the wig-maker Jacobus van der Kreek (see Illustration 6) opened a shop "The Cloverleaf" (*Het Klaverblad*) selling tea, coffee and other sorts of groceries on the southern side of the Hoogewoerd close to the Barbarasteeg in the university town of Leiden. A signboard in the shape of a small wooden tea chest bearing the logo of the "VOC" was fixed to the shop front to indicate that the

*Illustration 5 Advertisement for the shop "The Old Town Hall"*




The text of this advertisement reads: "This and more other sorts of tobacco are for sale in larger and smaller (quantities). In the Oude Zijds Kapelsteeg, in the Old Town Hall of Amsterdam, the fifth house on the Warmoesstraat, by Joannes Kramer in Amsterdam; NB: As well as all sorts of tea and coffee beans all at a fair price."
Source: GAA, Bibliotheek N 40.03.012.24, "Advertising Material".

*Illustration 6 The first shopkeepers of "The Cloverleaf"*




The subtitle reads "1769 – a wig-maker in Leiden and his daughter launch a coffee and tea shop in the Hogewoerd".
Portraits of the wig-maker Jacobus van der Kreek (?-1800) and his daughter, Elisabeth Maria van der Kreek (1761-1831).
Source: Courtesy of the shop "The Cloverleaf", Leiden.

shop sold the Company products. Van der Kreek obtained the patent for this logo from the Company.[39] After Van der Kreek passed away in 1800, his eldest daughter, Elisabeth Maria van der Kreek, took over the business. Via a niece, who succeeded Elisabeth Maria, the shop passed into the hands of the Molkenboer family, who continued to specialize in the sale of tea and coffee. Nowadays, passers-by can still see the very conspicuous yellow signboard suspended between the big windows on the shop front (see Illustration 7), which still bears the same name "The Cloverleaf". With its 237-year history, "The Cloverleaf" is the oldest-existing tea and coffee shop in the Netherlands.[40]

A highly refined consumer product like tea could hardly escape being subjected to taxes in the Dutch Republic. From the last decade of the seventeenth century, tax was levied not only on the consumption of tea but also on the selling of tea in the Republic. In September 1691, a "summons" was issued by the States of Holland and West Friesland (*Staten van Holland en West-Friesland*), in which a notice was given that an addition-

*Illustration 7 The shop "The Cloverleaf"*



This shop has been in operation since 1769 at Hoogewoerd 15; the signboard on the shop front is a small square wooden chest, 36x33x43 cm.
Source: Courtesy of the shop "The Cloverleaf", Leiden.

al tax would be added because of the crushing war costs being incurred at that moment.[41] Apparently, the warfare being waged against the power-hungry King Louis XIV of France, which obliged the Dutch to finance a big army and enlarge their fleet considerably, made enormous inroads on the Dutch national treasury. The new tax measure, which was put into effect on 15 March 1692, decreed that "All the people, in whose houses, gardens, rooms or other places coffee, tea, chocolate, sorbet, mineral water, lemonade, or some other suchlike beverage which has been prepared with water, whey, or milk, by infusion of sage or other spices, will be drunk", would be liable to pay extra excise duty (Illustration 8).[42]

Depending on the tax category in which the Dutch were classified on the grounds of their wealth, this excise duty varied from six to fifteen guilders per year, which was changed to four to fifteen guilders in 1724, depending on total sales.[43] In the unlikely case a person might swear that in the past season none of the afore-mentioned drinks had been consumed in his home, either alone or in the company of others, an exemption from this impost could be obtained. It is said that many people submitted petitions because, if their explanations are to be believed, they had been classed in too high a category or because they seldom or never could afford coffee or tea, because of their straitened circumstances. Exceptionally, the professors of Leiden University were exempted by a senatorial decision of 31 March 1693 from their duty to pay tax on such exotic drinks as coffee, tea, and chocolate.[44]

In Utrecht, a direct excise duty was levied on all coffee, chickpea, and tea which were brought into this province. This impost was fixed at one guilder for each pound of tea in 1702, an amount which was subsequently decreased to eight stivers in 1744; without doubt, this tax relief was directly related to the drastically reduced price of tea.

Those who were involved in the sale of tea, coffee, and chocolate, as well as those who wished to serve these exotic beverages in their houses for gain, were subjected to the same obligation.[45] Coffee-dealers had to pay a lower tax than shopkeepers in tea. Shopkeepers were permitted to sell both products without having to pay any additional impost. An ordinance of the States of Holland and West Friesland in 1776 shows that the shopkeepers had to pay taxes for selling tea, related to the volume of their business:[46]

Annually if:

2,000 pounds of tea or more were sold, 25 guilders of taxes should be paid;


1,200 to less than 2,000 pounds were sold, 15 guilders should be paid;

480 to less than 1,200 pounds were sold, six guilders should be paid;

200 to less than 480 pounds were sold, four guilders should be paid;

less than 200 pounds were sold, two guilders should be paid.

*Illustration 8 Announcement of the tax on coffee, tea, chocolate et al., 1734*



Quotizatie Biljet, op de Coffy, Thee, Chocolate, &c.

W. Redoch, Impostmeester van de Quotisatie op den Impost van de Coffy, Thee, Chocolate, Serbeth, Born-Water, Limoenade en andere Dranken met Water gemengt, over WEESP, en de Jurisdictie van dien, Ingegaan Primo October 1733. en eyndigende Ultimo September 1734.

Doet U

Source: CAS, HMR, Rotterdam.

Fifteen years later in 1791, the taxation on the shopkeepers was specified in even more detail:[47]

Annually if:

less than 200 pounds of tea were sold, two guilders should be paid;
200 to less than 500 pounds were sold, four guilders should be paid;
500 to less than 1,200 pounds were sold, six guilders should be paid;
1,200 to less than 2,000 pounds were sold, 15 guilders should be paid;
2,000 to less than 3,000 pounds were sold, 25 guilders should be paid;
3,000 to less than 4,000 pounds were sold, 31.1 guilders should be paid;
4,000 to less than 5,000 pounds were sold, 40 guilders should be paid;
5,000 to less than 6,000 pounds were sold, 50 guilders should be paid;
6,000 to less than 10,000 pounds were sold, 60 guilders should be paid;
10,000 to less than 20,000 pounds were sold, 80 guilders should be paid;
20,000 pounds or more were sold, 100 guilders should be paid.

### *Re-export of the "VOC teas"*

So far no detailed attention has been given to the re-export of the teas that the VOC imported,[48] but it is for sure that part of the auctioned "VOC teas" was re-exported to other European countries by the tea-dealers in the Dutch Republic.[49] On the Continent, the Dutch teas were re-exported to Brabant, Flanders and Hainaut in the Southern Netherlands, the riverine areas along the Maas and Rhine, East Friesland, Prussia and other countries where tea was consumed but which did not import tea directly from China,[50] and Russia which also imported tea from North China via the land route.[51] Although it is difficult to ascertain how much tea was re-exported to these nations in the second half of the eighteenth century, some succinct but very helpful information can be gleaned from the instructions of the China Committee to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton. In 1768, the instruction referring to Pekoe explained that for the coming season two-thirds of the 60,000 to 70,000 pounds ordered should be of top quality, while the rest could be of lesser quality, or second rank. They added the information that the increasing demand for Pekoe originated not only in Germany but that Moscow (Russia) had made a particular request.[52]

When it was all said and done, the Continental re-export of the Dutch teas was small in volume. Paradoxically, the biggest European client for Dutch teas was Britain to where considerable quantities were smuggled. The most important reason for resorting to smuggling was the tax which was levied on the legal import of tea into Britain – at least 80 per cent of the value, but frequently more than 100 per cent. For a long time the EIC did not import enough tea before it was able to satisfy the thirst of the

British domestic tea market in the second half of the 1780s. The "Continental teas", including the Dutch teas of course, were therefore able to make big profits there. A group of Dutch tea traders, under the leadership of the firm of J.J. Voute & Sons, knew how to capitalize on the inability of the EIC to supply the British domestic market. They were able to lay their hands on half the continental supply in 1784, which the EIC was obliged to purchase from them at high prices, and in the following year their supply was even considerably more. This consortium acquired a strangle-hold on almost all European teas. In February 1786, Amsterdam traders exported 8,000,000 pounds of teas to the English Company, nearly 40 per cent of all the British import.[53]

The smuggled teas shipped to Britain from other European countries were carried by their own special routes to particular areas of Britain. These routes had been set up in the 1740s, although none claimed an exclusive right. Whenever the shipping season allowed, some of the teas from Sweden and Denmark were customarily smuggled directly to the west and east coasts of Scotland and to Ireland. In France the chief centres of sale were Lorient and Nantes, and by 1760s Roscoff had become one of the major ports from where tea was sent to the east, south, and west coasts of Britain.[54] There is some uncertainty about which secret routes the Dutch favoured, but it is known that the Dutch did make use of the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, neither of which fell under British customs regulations, as strategic entrepôts for smuggling their contraband tea into Britain. Although Dutch traders exported a large quantity of tea to Britain, they had actually acquired a bad reputation for bringing "teas of the worst qualities" to Europe, the refuse of all other nations. A lasting memorial to Dutch tea is the adage: "Dutch tea has become a name for all teas that are bad in quality and unfit for [British?] use."[55]

## *Conclusion*

A comparison of the sales of tea by the VOC in the Dutch Republic throughout the entire span of the Company's China trade shows that this trade with China was not always profitable. The period between 1757 and 1781 was, however, an outstanding one: it was the only period in which the VOC profited from the Chinese tea trade for as long as twenty-three years without a break, with a seasonal 3,316,808 pounds imported from Canton, making a gross trading profit of 94 per cent on average. The first ten years of the Company's China trade were also quite successful, but the quantities of teas then brought from Asia were much smaller in comparison.

Generally speaking, the movement of the "VOC teas" from the Company, through the tea-dealers and then the shopkeepers to the common consumers reveals a centralized and comparatively simple network of inland distribution. This was very advantageous to the VOC, the dominant supplier of the domestic tea market in the Dutch Republic. At the apex of the network, the Company completely controlled the source of teas imported into the Republic, and according to the principle of "more pay for more work", it shared the biggest portion of profits on the tea sales in the Republic.

The domestic tea market in the Dutch Republic was, because of its limited size, too small a stage and therefore the re-export of the "VOC teas" by Dutch traders to other European countries helped to swallow up the surplus of the "VOC teas". In this sense, the re-export of the "VOC teas" not only benefited those Dutch traders involved in the commerce, it indirectly also guaranteed the profits of the Company at the same time.

CHAPTER SIX

# THE "GOLDEN AGE" OF THE TEA TRADE AND ITS CONCLUSION

## *The "Golden Age" of the tea trade*

The Dutch East India Company could claim to have played a pioneering role as an importer of Chinese tea into Europe. But it was not until its trade with China was thoroughly reorganized by the establishment of the China Committee that the VOC tea trade entered into an extraordinary boom period which lasted for about two decades, that is, until the beginning of the 1780s. This prosperity led the Amsterdam director, Cornelis van der Oudermeulen, to laud the direct China trade when he analysed the profit and loss account of the Company in 1785. He asserted that the improved results in the period 1760-1780 should be directly attributed to it, and that it had acquired the VOC a better position in the international tea trade.[1]

Plagued by hindrances and delays, in order to arrive at a more flexible and satisfactory management of the China trade, in 1756 the VOC set up the China Committee in Amsterdam, which was given absolute authority to make decisions on the China trade. Henceforth, every year a fixed number of China ships were fitted out by the Chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland, and from the season 1763-1765 the smaller chambers were also allotted their share in this profitable trade route (see Appendix 2). This new policy ensured that the VOC remained second only to the EIC, the biggest East India Company, in the tea trade at Canton.

After this reorganization, the resultant direct China trade benefited from the effective hands-on management of the China Committee. It was also boosted by the more effective organization of business affairs by the VOC trade representatives in China and also by that of the crews on the China ships. All these Company servants co-operated closely with each other in assiduously observing the instructions of the China Committee for the benefit of this particular trade. Even though the running of the China trade had been taken out of the hands of the High Government in Batavia, the headquarters of the VOC in Asia continued to contribute to the success of the operations in Canton as it was always ready to step in whenever quick and decisive assistance was needed. Finally, the sufficient sale of fresh teas at the Company auctions in the Netherlands realized the interests of the Company in a highly satisfactory manner. Tea was easily

the most profitable product in which the VOC dealt in the second half of the eighteenth century, and it is interesting to see that the Company which had experienced almost overwhelming difficulty in adjusting to the shifts in global trade was able to take innovative steps towards effectuating reorganizations.

All the above steps were intrinsic factors on the side of the VOC management. But, when we look at the VOC tea trade with China from an even wider angle, the realization also dawns that this "Golden Age" in the tea trade was also inextricably linked to other external factors which were embedded in particular political, social, and economic developments in both Europe and China during the second half of the eighteenth century.

In Europe, up to the 1780s the Dutch Republic had managed to stay neutral in the global struggle for supremacy between France and Britain. This neutral stance seemed the safest policy for the Republic allowing it to remain aloof from the Anglo-French rivalry and to preserve its international position in finance and overseas trade. Nevertheless, this neutrality was somewhat biased. The Dutch and English had maintained an enduring alliance since the seventeenth century and, until the middle of the eighteenth century, the English considered the Dutch Republic an important ally in international, especially European, politics. The English believed that maintaining good relations with the Dutch Republic would be helpful in the event of any war on the Continent. In French eyes, the Dutch Republic was the *régulateur de la politique anglaise* should there be a Continental war.[2] Yet, in French conflicts with Britain, the neutral Dutch Republic could continue to provide its southern neighbour with the foreign goods it needed. Therefore, during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763),[3] which was fought in Europe, North America, and India between France, Austria, Russia, the German Kingdom of Saxony, Sweden and (after 1762) Spain on the one side, and Britain, Prussia, and Hanover on the other, both Britain and France, the principal participants respected Dutch neutrality.[4]

Safely entrenched in their neutrality, the Dutch were able to take advantage of the war conditions which offered them a favourable opportunity to expand their commerce and trade. At home, Amsterdam grew rapidly as a financial market, a process which was not only attributable to a major extension of acceptance credit, but also had a great deal to do with the enormous growth in the trade in specie – gold and silver coins and bullion – and the continual transfer of British subsidies to the Continent and the marketing of British domestic loans by the Amsterdam houses.[5] This step in the development of the Amsterdam financial market was closely related to the steady demand for specie emanating in part from the reorganized direct trade with China. All preparations for the

new management of the China trade were effectuated during the early part of the Seven Years' War. Britain, France, and Sweden, which participated in this war and had commercial companies trading with China, were unable to devote much attention to their China trade: Britain, Sweden, and Denmark as well, had few ships to spare; and France had no ships at all sailing to Canton during the war years. After a few rather unsteady years of experimentation, the VOC tea trade settled into a stably developing curve and continued to prosper for over twenty years.[6]

In the Dutch Republic during the second half of the eighteenth century, there were also several positive socio-economic developments which affected the VOC tea business. Although the Republic failed to participate in the general European revival marked by a strong population growth in the second half of the eighteenth century, the population still kept growing yearly.[7] Throughout the whole eighteenth century, the population of the Republic grew from 1,850,000-1,950,000 in 1700 to 1,900,000-1,950,000 in 1750 and to 2,100,000 in 1800. In the last fifty years of the eighteenth century the population increased by 0.2 per cent a year. A steadily mounting number of consumers was absolutely essential to a steady rise in the consumption of tea in the Republic. But the number of tea-drinkers did not stop at the border; not all the "VOC teas" were consumed in the Republic itself but a considerable proportion of the tea was either re-exported or smuggled into other European countries. The strong demographic growth in neighbouring countries, such as France, the Austrian Netherlands, the German States, and Britain,[8] stimulated and guaranteed the re-export of the "VOC teas".

The purchasing power for tea among Dutch people can be analysed by comparing the average income with the selling price of tea in the eighteenth-century Dutch Republic (see Appendices 9 and 10), by looking at average summer daily wages for various grades of craftsmen and workers: masters (carpenters and masons), journeymen, masons' assistants, and unskilled labourers in both the Western and Eastern Netherlands and comparing these with the selling price of Bohea (since it then was the most popular tea). The daily summer wages of these occupations increased at a steady rate, though slowly, in the Netherlands from 1725 to 1790, nearly the whole period of the VOC tea trade with China. Throughout these sixty-five years we see a slight decline in the selling price of Bohea on the Amsterdam Commodity Exchange, which was the price offered by the tea-dealers (wholesalers) to the retailers and/or the shopkeepers and which could by correspondence be said to reflect the price of Bohea which the mass consumers eventually paid. The price of tea was not the only cost to fall. Other common food expenditures, such as that for bread, meat, fish, and beer, also decreased in Amsterdam during the second half of the eighteenth century.[9]

On the other side of the globe, several significant factors in China stimulated the VOC China trade as well. The second half of the eighteenth century was an era of outstanding florescence in China, the time at which the Qing Empire reached the height of its power and splendour. The sixty-year rule of the Qianlong Emperor (1736-1795) virtually coincided with the history of the VOC China trade.

Chinese trade with the West benefited from the strength of the Chinese economy, even though it was restricted to the sole port of Canton. The Hong merchants in Canton monopolized the tea trade, because tea was exported only from China to Europe during that time. Throughout the eighteenth century, until the eve of the First Opium War (1839-1842), the port of Canton continued to satisfy, with an ever-growing supply, Western demands for tea which mounted decade by decade. Such a beneficent development of both demand and supply guaranteed the steady increase in the tea trade throughout the eighteenth century and prevented any excessive increase in the price of tea.

In order to obtain teas of good quality, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices, the European companies had to send ships loaded with as many trade goods and funds as possible to Canton, where their trade representatives were forced to compete fiercely with each other. The VOC delegates were well aware that the better the relations, or *guanxi*, they nourished with the Hong merchants and the lower mandarins with whom they met, the more able they would be to surpass their competitors. They made an effort to maintain excellent contacts with their Chinese trading partners and remained on particularly good terms with the local mandarins. In this behaviour, the VOC was well served by its servants in Canton.

In 1760, the Co-hong, the so-called monopoly bureau of the Hong merchants, was officially established in Canton not without manifestations of protest from the European side. This union was detrimental to the interests of the European companies, because its members could decide the price of import and export goods unilaterally. However, since it was only an experiment, and there was always discord among its members, in particular the great Hong merchants, and confusion in its regulations, the proper functioning of the Co-hong was very problematic.[10] The Dutch trade representatives' negotiations with the Hong merchants did not comply strictly with the regulations of this combine, and the business with the tea-supplying agents was not really greatly harmed by its establishment. Early in 1771 the Co-hong was dissolved,[11] and afterwards the delegates of the European companies dealt freely with their Chinese trading partners once again until its re-establishment in 1782 around the time when the "Golden Age" of the VOC tea trade drew to an end.

By all accounts, the Canton trade was conducted professionally by the

trade representatives of the European companies and their Chinese partners during the period under study. On the Chinese side in particular, local official procedures for supervising the European trade were predictable and not too burdensome, pilots showed an amazing ability to guide the ships up the river. Once the European ships had dropped anchor they could unload goods, acquire supplies, and find reliable partners in the tea trade itself.[12]

### *Conclusion of the "Golden Age"*

Good fortune did not continue to smile on the Dutch. On 20 December 1780, England declared war on the Dutch Republic, because the Dutch, as the English complained, had interfered in the American War of Independence (1775-1783), by lending assistance to the American insurgents.[13] British warships searched and attacked Dutch ships suspected of carrying contraband to the American rebels. The English Navy had 122 ships of the line at its disposal while the Dutch possessed only seventeen. The Dutch Republic was therefore incapable of providing its merchantmen effective protection against English attacks.

The war dealt a heavy blow to Dutch maritime trade. In January 1781 alone, British naval ships and privateers captured no fewer than 200 Dutch vessels, completely paralysing Dutch shipping.[14] Ship-owners were only just able to prevent a total collapse of their trade by transferring the registration of their ships to neutral nationalities.[15] In the Caribbean, on 3 February 1781 the British admiral George Bridges Rodney conquered the island of St Eustatius, the so-called Golden Rock where the American revolutionaries had been able to buy goods which they could not obtain directly from Europe. Hammering their superiority home, the British captured all the West African forts belonging to the Dutch West India Company, with the exception of Elmina; the Dutch also lost their colonies in Guiana on the South American Coast.[16] The upshot was that the trade in the Dutch West Indies would never regain its former glory.[17] The war also proved to be a disaster for the operations of the VOC in Asia. Various Dutch possessions in South India and Ceylon were lost: a short time after the conquest of Sadras on the Coromandel Coast, just 100 Englishmen were sufficient to occupy the Dutch possessions on the West Coast of Sumatra. In Ceylon, the British took the strategically important harbour of Trincomale, which served as a strategic base for the Dutch possessions in the Indian Sub-Continent.[18] At the Peace of Paris which concluded the war, the VOC ceded Negapatnam in India to the EIC, and granted the EIC free access to the Moluccas.[19]

During the disastrous Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784), the

thriving Dutch tea trade in Canton was also brought to a full stop. The Company's China ships suffered from the attacks of the British warships and of country traders; therefore the export of tea from Canton to the Dutch market sharply declined. No ships arrived in Canton from the Dutch Republic in 1781-1782. Soon after hostilities began in Europe in December 1780, three of the four VOC ships, which had left Canton in January 1781 and were not aware of the war, were captured in Saldanha Bay near the Cape of Good Hope, and the fourth was set on fire and sank on the spot. In order to continue the profitable China trade, the VOC was forced to send ships under a neutral flag. In 1783, three ships were chartered (two for the Amsterdam Chamber and one for the Zeeland Chamber) under the Prussian flag and sailed to Canton, but two of them were lost on the outward- and homeward-bound voyage.[20] Obviously, the war with the British plunged the VOC trade representatives in Canton into a financial dilemma. They had no option but to go heavily into debt to the Chinese Hong merchants, as they were completely cut off from capital from overseas to purchase tea and other products, just at a time when the demand for tea in Europe was soaring and EIC was rapidly increasing its own purchases of tea. The successful running of its tea trade by the EIC in some senses was certainly to the detriment of the VOC business in Canton.

In all, the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War hurt the Dutch Republic more economically than territorially. This war relentlessly revealed the internal weakness of the VOC which made the Company vulnerable, although it was still a giant enterprise.[21] De Vries and Van der Woude have calculated how, as a direct result of the loss of ships and their costly cargoes alone, the VOC suffered enormous financial problems. Altogether the direct losses of the VOC can be calculated at 43 million guilders.[22] Loans to keep the Company afloat reduced its net assets to zero in 1784. Its creditworthiness destroyed, it was forced to become a ward of the state.[23] The VOC Chambers even had to ask for suspension of payment, thereby converting the Company's short-term credit into a long-term one. The Company was unable to continue under its own power, and left the state with a gigantic debt which weighed on the Republic as an enormous burden.[24] Only by grace of the magnanimity of the States-General, which gave guarantees of the payment of interest on financial commitments, could the VOC carry on its business.[25] After the French invasion of 1795, the management of the VOC teetered on the verge of bankruptcy, and the only solution was for it to be taken over by the newly created Batavian Republic. In the same year, the tea trade under the Dutch flag was halted again.[26] It was not the real end as it continued on for several years still, again with chartered vessels under foreign flags.

Misfortunes never come singly. In the 1780s, more and more competi-

tors flooded into Canton. Among them the Americans, who soon emerged as competitors of the VOC in the China trade, were very conspicuous.[27] Although they posed a serious threat, the position of the VOC was irretrievably undermined by shifts in the tea trade in Europe itself which were set in motion by the passing of the British Commutation Act in 1784, just after the conclusion of the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War on 1 June. The aim of the Commutation Act was to remove all incentives for smuggling tea into Britain from the Continent. On the eve of the passing of the Commutation Act, a large part of the tea consumed on the British domestic market was supplied not just by the EIC but was smuggled in from other Continental nations, including of course the Dutch Republic. Since the mid-eighteenth century, 4,000,000 to 7,500,000 (English) pounds of tea per year had been smuggled into Britain from France, the Dutch Republic, and Scandinavia;[28] and just before the outbreak of the war in 1780 the annual consumption of tea in Britain already amounted to 18,000,000 (English) pounds. The Companies of France, the Dutch Republic, Sweden, Denmark, and the Austrian Netherlands imported two-thirds of the tea, leaving the EIC to attend to about one-third.[29] The Continental companies profited abundantly from the tea smuggling to Britain, but their contraband seriously hurt the interests of the EIC as well as those of the domestic tea-dealers in Britain.

The Commutation Act, which was put into effect in September 1784, therefore reinforced the monopoly of the EIC on the import of tea into Britain. Under the provisions of the Act, the EIC was required to import sufficient tea to supply the domestic market; to maintain in its warehouses a quantity equal to one year’s consumption; to hold public sales by auction four times a year “at equal distance of time”; to put tea up for sale at prices which should not exceed the capital from the time of the arrival of such tea in Britain, and the common premium of insurance; and to sell such tea “without reserve to the highest bidder, provided an advance of one penny per pound should be bid upon the [put-up] prices”.[30] In the wake of the Commutation Act of 1784, the import duties on tea were drastically dropped from over 100 per cent to 12.5 per cent of the value of the teas.[31] This dealt an enormous blow to the foreign tea-smugglers who could earn no more profits. This all happened at a time at which the consumption of tea in Britain was rising to even newer heights. In this sense, the passing of the Commutation Act of 1784 can be considered a turning point in the history of the British tea trade.[32]

It goes without saying that the British Commutation Act of 1784 also had an impact on the tea trade of the VOC. Even if the Dutch were not the biggest smugglers for the British domestic tea market, legitimately Britain had always been the most important foreign client for the “VOC teas”. The Dutch Republic was a small state with a comparatively small

outlet for selling tea, so the VOC was heavily dependent on the export of its tea cargoes. The Commutation Act of 1784 therefore inevitably shattered the Dutch dream of sharing in the profits made on the British domestic tea market, although for several years after 1784 the Dutch were allowed to continue to supply tea to the EIC. This was because at that moment the EIC was not able to provide sufficient shipping to meet the domestic demand. Two years later, the picture had changed completely. From 1786 the EIC in Canton was practically able to exclude the VOC, its most dangerous competitor, from the tea trade. It managed to pay higher prices than the Dutch supercargoes could afford and forced the prices of tin and pepper down by flooding Canton with these products which had previously been abundantly supplied by the VOC. It also sent more and more Company ships to China to purchase larger quantities of tea and encouraged the country trade between India and Canton.[33] By doing so, after the season 1786-1787 the EIC was able to provide for most of the tea imports required by Britain, and the year 1788 was the last year in which it purchased a small quantity of tea from the Continent. At the end of the 1780s, the EIC totally dominated the European purchase of tea in Canton and succeeded in completely fulfilling the demand for tea in England.

Now the tables were turned and the English could even export all the tea which could not be sold in England to the Netherlands, the only country in Europe where no import restrictions were imposed. In 1789, the United States of America also introduced a tax on tea imported from Europe, to protect its own direct trade with China.[34] In the meantime, ever-growing pressure was being exerted on the VOC to be able to find and to carry sufficient goods and money to Canton for the purchase of tea.[35] With limited funds, therefore most of the tea the VOC was still able to obtain was of inferior quality.[36] The inevitable upshot was that the VOC market in the Dutch Republic was entirely ruined by foreign teas of superior quality. In 1791 the States-General finally could not but grant the VOC the monopoly to sell tea in the Dutch Republic, in a last-ditch attempt to guarantee the interests of the VOC.[37] The domestic market was now assured, and the China Committee was able to increase the number of the China ships from two to four again. It was to be an ephemeral renaissance as this situation lasted just a few years till 1795 when the last Company ships sailing under the Dutch flag left China.[38] From then on until 1802, no Dutch ships sailed to China, although in the intervening period tea, porcelain and other Chinese goods could still be found on the Amsterdam market.[39] How that was brought about by ingenious planning and the leaving of ships to sail under "neutral flags" can be read in the study on this Dutch trade in the period 1795-1810 by E.S. van Eyck van Heslinga.

# NOTES

## *Notes to Introduction*

[1] "Answer of the Emperor of China to the King of England", 7 October 1793. See Hosea Ballou Morse, *The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834* (London: Routledge, 2000), Vol. II, 248.

[2] The regular tax quota from the foreign trade in Canton generally rose in the eighteenth century. The Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu* 内务府, the organization which managed the Emperor's private affairs) drew 43,750 taels in 1727 which had mounted to over 1,000,000 taels by the end of the Qianlong Emperor's reign from the revenues of the Customs House at Canton. See Preston M. Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662-1796* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), 98.

[3] H.B. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910-1918), Vol. I, 238.

[4] C.R. Boxer, *Jan Compagnie in War and Peace 1602-1799* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1979), 56.

[5] Rupert Faulkner (ed.), *Tea: East and West* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 2003), 8-9.

[6] F.S. Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company: Expansion and Decline* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2003), 20.

[7] W.P. Groeneveldt, *De Nederlanders in China: eerster stuk: de eerste bemoeiingen om den handel in China en de vestiging in de Pescadores (1610-1624)* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1898), 14-34; J.L. Blussé, *Tribuut aan China: vier eeuwen Nederlands-Chinese betrekkingen* (Amsterdam: Cramwinckel, 1989), 36-40.

[8] Gaspard Bauhin, *Theatri Botanici* (Basel, 1623), in William H. Ukers, *All about Tea* (New York: The Tea and Coffee Trade Journal Company, 1935), 28.

[9] J.L. Blussé, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1986), 97; Blussé, *Badaweiya huaren yu zhonghe maoyi* 巴达维亚华人与中荷贸易 [The Chinese of Batavia and the Dutch-China Trade] (Nanning: Guangxi renmen chubanshe, 1997), 144-151.

[10] In 1715, Ostend merchants started to send ships to Canton, the Malabar or Coromandel Coast, Surat, Bengal, and Mocha. In December 1722, they established the Ostend East India Company under a charter granted by the Austrian Emperor. This flourishing company only survived until 1731 because of international political pressure on the Austrian Emperor.

[11] In 1711, the EIC established a trading post in Canton.

[12] Johannes de Hullu, "Over den Chinaschen handel der Oost-Indische Compagnie in de eerste dertig jaar van de 18e eeuw", *Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië* 73 (hereafter *BKI*) (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1917): 60-69.

[13] C.J.A. Jörg, *Porcelain and the Dutch China Trade* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 21-45.

[14] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 77, 217-220.

[15] After the Zeeland Chamber joined in the trade in 1737, the Gentlemen Seventeen permitted three ships to be sent to Canton from Batavia, two of which would return directly to the Republic and one would sail back to Batavia (NA *(Nationaal Archief)* VOC 166, Resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen, 28 February and 3 March 1739). Later, the smaller chambers also took part in the trade in rotation, and the number of ships sailing back to the Republic varied from two to six. There were two exceptions to the number of ships returning to Batavia: these were the *Langewijk* and the *Noordwijkerhout* in the season 1739-1740 and the *Kievitsheuvel* and the *Brouwer* in 1756-1757. See Jörg, *Porcelain*, 196-197.

[16] Hullu, "Over den Chinaschen handel", 32-151.
[17] Hullu, "De instelling van de commissie voor den handel der Oost-Indische Compagnie op China in 1756", *BKI* 79 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1923): 523-545.
[18] Kristof Glamann, *Dutch Asiatic Trade, 1620-1740* (Copenhagen and The Hague: Danish Science Press and Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), 218-243.
[19] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 77-81.
[20] Els M. Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië: de handel van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tijdens de 18de eeuw* (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2000), 137-142 and 294.
[21] Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vols I-V.
[22] Louis Dermigny, *La Chine et l'Occident: le commerce à Canton au XVIIIe siècle, 1719-1833* (Paris: SEVPEN, 1964).
[23] F.J.A. Broeze, "Het einde van de Nederlandse theehandel op China", *Economisch- en Sociaal-Historisch Jaarboek* 34 ('s-Gravenhage, 1971): 124-177.
[24] Hoh-cheung Mui and H. Lorna Mui, *The Management of Monopoly: A Study of the East India Company's Conduct of Its Tea Trade, 1784-1833* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984). In previous articles, they have mentioned in detail the impact of smuggling on the British tea trade before 1784 and the effect of the Commutation Act of 1784 on the British tea trade in 1784-1793. See Hoh-cheung Mui and H. Lorna Mui, "The Commutation Act and the Tea Trade in Britain 1784-1793", *The Economic History Review* 16-2 (Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 1963): 234-253; Hoh-cheung Mui and H. Lorna Mui, "Smuggling and the British Tea Trade before 1784", *The American Historical Review* 74-1 (Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1968): 44-73.
[25] Robert Paul Gardella, *Fukien's Tea Industry and Trade in Ch'ing and Republic China: the Development Consequences of a Traditional Commodity Export* (PhD dissertation, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1976); see also Gardella, *Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
[26] In two articles, Zhuang Guotu 庄国土 reinforces Gardella's research to a great extent regarding, in particular, the impact of the international tea trade on the social economy of Fujian Province in the eighteenth century. See Zhuang Guotu, "Fujian Tea Industry and its Relation with Taiwan Tea Industry for Export in the Nineteenth Century" (offprint) (Leiden: Sinology Institute, 1995); Zhuang Guotu, "The Impact of the International Tea Trade on the Social Economy of Northwest Fujian in the Eighteenth Century", in J.L. Blussé and F.S. Gaastra (eds), *On the Eighteenth Century as a Category of Asian History* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998). In his contemporaneous research, Zhuang also discusses in detail the relationship of the international tea trade to Western commercial expansion into China. See Zhuang, *Tea, Silver, Opium and War: The International Tea Trade and Western Commercial Expansion into China in 1740-1840* (Xiamen: Xiamendaxue chubanshe, 1993).
[27] Ch'en Kuo-tung 陈国栋, "Transaction Practices in China's Export Tea Trade, 1760-1833", paper presented at the second conference on modern Chinese economic history (January 5-7) (Taipei: The Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1989).
[28] The Pearl River Delta is here defined in geographical terms as the triangle between Canton, Hong Kong, and Macao. See Map 4.
[29] Paul A. Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006).
[30] Of course, many details about the Hong merchants, supercargoes, Chinese officials and the relationship between them also can be found in previous works. See Henri Cordier, *Le Voyage à la Chine au XVIIIe Siècle. Extrait du Journal de M. Bouvet Commandant le Vaisseau de la Compagnie des Indes le <Villevault> (1765-1766)* (Paris: Édouard Champion et Émile Larose, 1913); Liang Jiabin 梁嘉彬, *Guangdong shisanhang kao* 广东十三行考 [The Thirteen Hongs of Canton] (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1999); Ann Bolbach White, *The Hong Merchants of Canton* (PhD dissertation, Philadelphia: Department of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1967); Jörg, *Porcelain*, 46-73; Ch'en Kuo-tung, *The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants, 1760-1834* (Taipei: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1990); Weng-eang Cheong, *The Hong*

*Merchants of Canton: Chinese Merchants in Sino-Western Trade* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997).

[31] J.R. ter Molen, *Thema thee: de geschiedenis van de thee en het theegebruik in Nederland* (Rotterdam: Museum Boymans-van Beuningen, 1978).

[32] The VOC archives dating from 1602 to 1795 are classified under the category of the Archives of the United East India Company (*Archieven van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie*). See M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, R. Raben, and H. Spijkerman (eds), *De archieven van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (1602-1795)* ('s-Gravenhage: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1992).

[33] See Julianti L. Poorani, *Inventaris van het archief van de Nederlandse factorij te Canton 1742-1826* (Den Haag: Nationaal Archief, 1972).

[34] See W.D. Post and E.A.T.M. Schreuder, *Plaatsingslijst van de collectie Aanwinsten 1820-1992* (Den Haag: Nationaal Archief, 1993).

[35] See *Inventaris van het archief van de Boekhouder-Generaal te Batavia, 1700-1801* (Den Haag: Nationaal Archief, no date).

[36] See Mirjam Heijs, *Plaatsingslijst van de collectie Hope 1602-1784* (Den Haag: Nationaal Archief, 1994).

[37] National Palace Museum (ed.), *Shiliao xunkan* 史料旬刊 [Historical Documents Published Every Ten Days] (Peking: Gugong bowuyuan wenxianguan, 1930-1931), 40 vols; Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠 (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi* 粤海关志 [The Chronicle of Guangdong Customs House] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), 30 vols.

## *Notes to Chapter One*

[1] NA VOC 172, Resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen, 11 April 1755; NA Hope Collection 90.

[2] Until 1759, the leader of the trade representatives was known as the director *(directeur)* (NA NFC 23, Memorandum of capital by the director et al., 25 January 1759). From 1759 to 1761, the function of director was assumed by the first supercargo *(eerste supercarga)* (NA VOC 4543, Particular instructions of the China Committee to the first supercargo et al., 10 October 1759 and 13 November 1761). From 1762, the first supercargo began to be referred to as the first supercargo and chief *(eerste supercarga en (opper-)hoofd*, mentioned as the "Dutch chief" in the following chapters) and the task devolved upon one person (NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 17 September 1762).

From 1760, the first supercargo and most of his subordinates began to stay over in China, but a few supercargoes (or assistants or bookkeepers) sailed back to the Dutch Republic with the China ships.

[3] NA VOC 4747, "Reflections on the intrinsic state of the VOC" by Jacob Mossel (*Bedenkingen over den intrinsiquen staat van de g'octroyeerde Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Compagnie*), 28 November 1752.

[4] Ibid.

[5] NA VOC 4750, Answer of the Gentlemen Seventeen to Jacob Mossel *("Kopie-missive van de Heren XVII van 1752 november 28 ter beantwoording van de memorie van Gouverneur-Generaal Jacob Mossel over het verval van de VOC")*, 28 March 1754.

[6] This society received a patent from the High Government in August 1751 allowing it to conduct the trade between Padang and Batavia exclusively for three years. See Hullu, "De instelling", 529-533.

[7] According to J. de Hullu's explanation, they were the areas in and around the Indian Ocean to the west of Malacca. See Hullu, "De instelling", 524.

[8] See note 5.

[9] It was gathered in June or July to prepare for the meetings of the Gentlemen Seventeen held in August.

[10] NA VOC 4748, Report of the Representatives of the "Hague Affairs" *("Kopie-rapport van de gecommitteerden van het Haags Besogne over het verval van de VOC, uitgebracht op verzoek van de hoofdparticipanten, in verband met de memorie van gouverneur-*

*generaal Jacob Mossel over het verval van de VOC")*, 24 July 1754; NA Hope Collection 98.

[11] This means the cargoes which were sent from Europe on the outward-bound ships and re-loaded on the China-bound ships by the High Government. During the period of the management of the High Government, it also offered several European goods for the China trade.

[12] See note 10.

[13] See note 1.

[14] Cornelis van der Hoop was also from the Amsterdam Chamber; Samuel Radermacher was concurrently Mayor of Middelburg; Johan Constantin Matthias passed away on 13 September 1756. Later, other chambers which took part in the China trade also sent delegates to this committee.

[15] NA VOC 172, Resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen, 14 October 1755.

[16] In the whole period of the VOC, the Chambers of Amsterdam and Zeeland were the Presiding Chambers by turn. According to the Charter of 1602, the rule governing the Presiding Chamber was that Amsterdam had the presidency for six years, starting from 1602 to 1608, and then the Zeeland Chamber took over for two years. The system was maintained until the very end of the VOC. When meetings were held in Amsterdam this Chamber was the chair, and when in Zeeland this privilege fell to the Zeeland Chamber. See J.R. Bruijn, F.S. Gaastra, and I. Schöffer (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping in the 17th and 18th Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), Vol. I, 15.

[17] Hullu, "De instelling", 535-536.

[18] NA VOC 333, Letter from the Gentlemen Seventeen to the High Government, 12 April 1755.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] VOC 4543, Report of the China Committee, 9 November 1756.

[22] This was the *Königlich Preussischen Asiatischen Compagnie in Emden nach Canton und China (KPAC)*. This Company, founded in 1751, had organized six voyages to Canton. The last voyage was of the ship the *Prinz Ferdinant*; this ship returned in 1757, but the voyage ended in Porthmouth. The port city of Emden was taken by the French in the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the *KPAC* was dissolved soon afterwards. See Dennis de Graaf, "De koninklijke Compagnie: de Pruisische Aziatische Compagnie 'von Emden nach China' (1751-1765)", *Tijdschrift voor zeegeschiedenis* 20-2 (Hilversum, September 2001): 143 and 160.

[23] See note 21.

[24] NA VOC 4543, Report of the China Committee, 8 October 1757.

[25] Hullu, "De instelling", 544-545.

[26] NA VOC 4557, General instruction of the China Committee to all the servants for the China trade, Article 1, 1756.

The regulations of 4 September 1742 included 121 articles which were divided into twelve parts each referring to a different subject. For the contents of the regulations, see J.A. van der Chijs (ed.), *Nederlandsch-Indisch plakaatboek, 1602-1811* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1893), Vol. IV, 547-576.

[27] NA NFC 24, Resolutions of the supercargoes, 4 October 1758 and 25 January 1759.

[28] NA VOC 4557, General instruction of the China Committee to all the servants for the China trade, Article 4, 1756; NA VOC 4542, General instruction of the China Committee to the director, captains, and supercargoes, Article 4, 1757; NA VOC 4543, General instruction of the China Committee to the first captains et al., Article 4, 1758; Jörg, *Porcelain*, 203.

[29] NA VOC 4557, General instruction of the China Committee to all the servants for the China trade, Article 3, 1756.

[30] NA VOC 4543, General instructions of the China Committee to the supercargoes et al., Articles 7-11, 1757 and 1758.

[31] Ibid., Articles 13-15, 1757 and 1758.

[32] Ibid., Articles 16-18, 1757 and 1758.

[33] Ibid., Articles 19-21, 1757 and 1758.

[34] In the later practice, the homeward-bound ships did not stop over at Batavia for the unloading of the gold demanded for Batavia, but transferred it to an armed cruiser (*kruiser*), sent by the High Government, in the Sunda Strait, as the China ships passed through there. See the paragraph "Commodities for Batavia's use" in Chapter Two.

[35] Of course, outward- and homeward-bound ships might call at other places to take on fresh food and water if necessary.

It was also recorded by a Cantonese observer in the late seventeenth century that there was a small vegetable garden and a fresh-water reservoir on board the Dutch ships (Qu Dajun 屈大均, *Guangdong xinyu* 广东新语 [New Works in Guangdong] (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1985), Vol. 18, 484). Describing the water reservoir, Qu explained that if the water reservoir was turbid with deposits, the water could be filtered clean and the sailors raised the buckets and drank the filtered water; mentioning the small vegetable garden, Qu did not go into more detail, but it is believed that its produce was used only for the sick and the ship's officers, not for ordinary seamen and soldiers.

[36] NA VOC 4543, General instructions of the China Committee to the supercargoes et al., Articles 22-24, 1757 and 1758.

[37] Ibid., Articles 22-29, 1757 and 1758.

[38] NA VOC 4543, General instructions of the China Committee to the supercargoes et al., Article 2-8, 9 October 1759, 29 October 1770 and 22 September 1775.

[39] NA VOC 4543, Particular instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes and assistants, Article 3, 10 October 1759.

[40] Ibid., Articles 2-4, 10 October 1759.

For example, in 1763 the Trade Council consisted of the Dutch chief, Marten Willem Hulle, the supercargoes Anthony Francois L'Heureux, Christaan W. Stisser, Johan Christoffel Steeger, and Jan Willem Spliethoff, and the assistants Pieter Kintsius, Isaac Guitard, Pieter Jan Texier, Nanning Wijnberg and Pieter Ribaut Schellewaard. The assistant Nanning Wijnberg also served as clerk and was ordered to draw up the resolutions of the Trade Council properly. See NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes, 13 September 1763.

[41] In 1773, for example, the assignments were allotted by the Trade Council to the supercargoes, assistants and bookkeepers as follows:

Supercargo P. Kintsius served as cashier for the dispensation, shipment and so forth; J. van den Bergh was secretary to the Broad Council and keeper of the pay book; assistant J.P. Certon took charge of purchasing and packing porcelain and annexes and served as secretary to the Broad Council; Egbert van Karnebeek managed the factory and all the mercantile business; S. Klinkert worked as keeper of the trade books and annexes; U.G. Hemmingson prosecuted all offenders in that season and also assisted Supercargo E. Klinkert; J.H. Alphusius joined forces with the writer, J.J. Rhenius, as assistants to Supercargo E. Kintsius; Bookkeepers B. Kuijper and E.L. Steijn were assistants to Supercargo E. Certon; W. Hanke was assistant to Supercargo E. van den Bergh; and F. Benthem remained (at the Dutch chief's disposal) at the factory. In addition, Supercargo J. van den Bergh and Bookkeeper F. Benthem, Assistant E. Certon and Bookkeeper E.L. Steijn, Assistant S. Klinkert and Bookkeeper W. Hanke, Assistant U.G. Hemmingson, and Bookkeeper B. Kuijper were responsible for the loading of the ships the *Jonge Hellingman*, the *Voorberg*, the *Europa*, and the *Holland*. See NA NFC 36, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1773.

[42] NA VOC 4543, Particular instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes and assistants, Articles 4-8, 10 October 1759.

[43] Ibid., Articles 9-15, 10 October 1759.

[44] Namely the Spanish rial, which had fluctuated between 48 and 49¾ stivers since the seventeenth century. See Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, 50-51.

[45] NA VOC 4543, Particular instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes and assistants, Articles 16-17, 10 October 1759.

[46] Ibid., Article 18, 10 October 1759.

[47] Ibid., Articles 19-21, 10 October 1759.

[48] NA VOC 4542, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government, 28 October 1757.

[49] The ship's officers had to adhere to the general regulations concerning the sales notice pertaining to underweight or an insufficiency of goods issued by this Government on 15 August 1752.

[50] NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government, 24 November 1760.

[51] See the paragraph "Supplementing the general funds" in Chapter Two.

[52] NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government, 10 October 1759.

[53] In the instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes in Canton, pepper was always noted separately from other spices.

[54] NA NFC 278, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 24 June 1763.

[55] For a further description, see the paragraph "Commodities for Batavia's use" in Chapter Two.

[56] The exception was the years 1757-1761, for which an explanation was found only in the reports of the China Committee to the Gentlemen Seventeen (NA VOC 4543); besides this, in the records of the "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships, the "Assessment" of 1759-1762 were not included.

[57] The so-called "Assessments of the merchandise" on the China ships were annexed to the Resolutions of the Dutch supercargoes in Canton each year during the second half of the eighteenth century. In this both the "Home goods" and "Batavia goods" are included. Thanks to the records, we know that the imported Company goods were mainly delivered to the Chinese trade partners, among whom the security merchants took the greatest portions.

[58] For the discussion of spelter, see the paragraph "Commodities for Batavia's use" in Chapter Two.

[59] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 78.

[60] N.W. Posthumus (ed.), *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis van de Leidsche textielnijverheid* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1910-1922), Vol. 6, N. 26, "Agreement between the representatives of Leiden and the directors of the East India Company on the annual purchase of Leiden *lakens*, *polemieten*, *grijnen* and suchlike draperies, 26 April 1776" *(Overeenkomst tusschen de afgevaardigden van Leiden aan de eene, en de bewindhebbers van de Oost-Indische Compagnie aan de andere zijde aangaande het jaarlijksch inkoopen van Leidsche lakens, polemieten, grijnen en soortgelijke manufacturen)*, 49-51; N. 470, "Decision of the Amsterdam Chamber of the East India Company about the supplies of *lakens* by the fabricants in Leiden, 11 January 1742" *(Besluit van de kamer van Amsterdam der Oost-Indische Compagnie aangaande leveranties van lakens door de fabrikeurs te Leiden)*, 781-782; Valentijn Schenk, "'Een naare en bedroefde eeuw': De verschepingen van Leidse textiel naar Azië door tussenkomst van de VOC in de periode 1770-1790 en de rol van het contract van 1776", *Textielhistorische bijdragen* 41 (Veenendaal: de Stichting Textielgeschiedenis, 2001), 49-64.

[61] NA NFC 164, Letter from the China Committee to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton, 17 October 1787.

[62] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 76.

[63] Appendix 8 of Jörg's *Porcelain* gives a survey of the money spent by the VOC personnel on the return shipments in Canton from 1729 to 1793. The periods 1764-1780 and 1784-1789 show outstanding peaks compared to the other years. The Company's tea trade exhibited the same steep curves. See Figure 2 in Chapter Five.

[64] For example, the China Committee demanded Pekoe for 1758 (4,000 pounds) and 1759 (6,000); Hyson for 1760 (15,000); Imperial tea for 1772 (6,000); 1773 (6,000), 1775 (4,000 to 6,000), 1776 (4,000 to 6,000) and 1778 (5,000), types of tea which the Company servants in China had not yet purchased. See NA VOC 4381 and 4543-4545, Instructions of the China Committee to the Dutch chief in Canton, 1757-1759, 1771-1772, 1774-1775, and 1777; NA NFC 234-235, 237-238, and 241, Reports of the supercargoes in Canton, 1772-1773, 1775-1776, and 1778.

[65] Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company*, 66.

[66] J.J. Steur, *Herstel of ondergang: de voorstellen tot redres van de V.O.C. 1740-1795* (Utrecht: Hes Uitgevers, 1984), 48.

[67] NA VOC 172, Resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen, 14 April 1755.

## *Notes to Chapter Two*

[1] The provisions and necessities were especially those for daily use in the factory. They were of two kinds – those from Europe such as wine, beer, salted meat and bacon, butter, cheese, wax candles, lamp oil, and the like, and those from Batavia such as rice, arrack, olive oil, spices, and other Asian commodities.

[2] NA VOC 4542, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government, 28 October 1757.

[3] In the eighteenth century, tin deposits were found in three areas: the Siamese islands of Ujung Salang, the mountainous regions of the Malay Peninsula (Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Rembau), and the island of Bangka, which was an outlying dependency of Palembang. Unlike Bangka with its tin deposit, the port of Malacca itself did not produce tin, but was a place where tin was collected and exported.

[4] Reinout Vos, *Gentle Janus, Merchant Prince* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1993), 8.

[5] Sinnappah Arasaratnam, "Dutch Commercial Policy and Interests in the Malay Peninsula, 1750-1795", in Blair B. Kling and M.N. Pearson (eds), *The Age of Partnership: Europeans in Asia before Dominion* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1979), 159-190.

[6] According to the NFC records, there were a few occasions on which Chinese junks exported tin and pepper to Canton from Palembang during the period under study: about 15,000 piculs of tin were carried on seven Chinese junks in 1763; 10,000 piculs by four junks in 1765; 2,838 piculs by one junk in 1779; 241 piculs by one junk in 1780; and only two piculs of pepper by one junk in 1779 and two piculs by one junk in 1780 (NA NFC 278-279 and 289-290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 24 June 1763, 5 July 1765, 16 July 1779 and 27 July 1780); most likely no tin and pepper were sent from Batavia by Chinese junks. However, a large quantity of "illegal" tin and pepper was smuggled from Palembang (and Banten) by Chinese junks and other foreign merchants, either directly to China or by way of other South-east Asian ports. See Vos, *Gentle Janus*, 26-29; Ota Atsushi, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics in West Java: Society, State and the Outer World of Banten, 1750-1830* (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 118-123.

[7] This operation is first mentioned in the instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes in Canton in 1765; and according to the instruction of 1780, there were still cruisers patrolling in the roadstead of Malacca (NA NFC 279 and 290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765 and 30 July 1780).

[8] Arasaratnam, "Dutch Commercial Policy", 174.

[9] Vos, *Gentle Janus*, 213.

[10] For the price of tin in Canton, see the Resolutions of the Trade Council (NA NFC 22-44) and Daily records of the supercargoes (NA NFC 278-291) in Canton as well as the instructions of the High Government to the Dutch supercargoes in Canton between 1760 and 1781 (NA NFC 278-291). For a comparison of prices the Bugis, English, and Portuguese paid, see Arasaratnam, "Dutch Commercial Policy", 173.

[11] For this kind of use, there is a very interesting description by the Dutch supercargoes in the general report on 4 January 1765. See NA VOC 4396.

[12] Ernest S. Hedges, *Tin in Social and Economic History* (London: Edward Arnold, 1964), 95.

[13] The simpler sorts for the Asian market were packed in bamboo baskets. See Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië*, 147.

[14] The Dutch fixed both the "Company" picul in the East Indies and Chinese piculs at Canton at 122½ pounds.

[15] Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië*, 54.

[16] Ota, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics*, 117 and 124.

[17] No information about the "Assessments of the merchandise" for Canton is available for the years 1760-1762.

[18] Ota, *Changes of Regime and Social Dynamics*, 25.

[19] NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 January 1765.

[20] The prices of pepper in Canton: 11.2 taels of silver per picul in 1764 (NA NFC 279,

Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765; NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 3 August 1765), 12.3 taels in 1776 (NA NFC 287, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777) and 13.5 taels in 1778 (NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July 1779).

[21] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 76.

[22] About the VOC intra-Asian trade in copper, see Ryuto Shimada, *The Intra-Asian Trade in Japanese Copper by the Dutch East India Company during the Eighteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 2006).

[23] Annual emission of bronze coins began at 1.5 million strings (1 string = 1,000 coins) in 1735, and had risen to 2 million strings annually until 1742 and gradually increased to more than 3 million strings by 1754. Mint output had peaked at 3.9 million strings annually in 1759-1767, and an average annual output had fallen to 3 million strings in the 1770s and 2.5 million strings throughout the 1780s. During the period 1793-1796 there was a large-scale rebellion in western China that hindered commerce with Yunnan. After that, annual mint output remained at 2.0-2.5 million strings to 1840. See Richard von Glahn, "Money Use in China and Changing Patterns of Global Trade in Monetary Metals, 1500-1800", in Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, and Richard von Glahn (eds), *Global Connections and Monetary History, 1470-1800* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 196-197.

[24] NA NFC 288-290, Instructions of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777, 16 July 1779, and 27 July 1780.

[25] NA NFC 289 and 290, Instructions of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July 1779 and 27 July 1780.

[26] For a description of the Dutch ducat in the eighteenth century, see Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade,* 69-72.

[27] NA NFC 290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 27 July 1780.

[28] Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vol. I, 74.

[29] An infrastructure consisting of such facilities as shipyards, warehouses, and workmen's quarters was indispensable to the High Government. It set up the facilities for this on the island of Onrust ("No rest" or "Busy" in English), which lay just off the coast of Batavia. On this island, the VOC repaired all its shipping and kept a large quantity of stores of trade goods. The maintenance and repair work was carried out under the charge of the master of the equipage.

[30] For example, in 1766 the *Jonge Thomas* replaced the *Lindenhof*, in 1771 the *Lam* replaced the *Vreedejaar*, in 1772 the *Veldhoen* replaced the *Honcoop* and the *Prinses van Oranje* replaced the *Groenendaal*, the *Bodt* replaced the *Willem de Vijfde*, in 1773 the *Jonge Hellingman* replaced the *Juno*, in 1774 the *Oostcapelle* replaced the *Mars* and the *Beemster Welvaaren* replaced the *Vreedenhoff*, in 1775 the *Morgenster* replaced the *Huijs te Spijk*, in 1780 the *Hoogcarspel* replaced the *Batavia*, in 1785 the *Pollux* replaced the *Slot ter Hooge*, in 1787 the *Middelwijk* replaced the *St Laurens*, in 1791 the *Alblasserdam* replaced the *Erfprins* and the *Blitterswijk* replaced the *Meerwijk*, in 1792 the *Roozenburgh* replaced the *Westcapelle* and the *Zuijderburgh* replaced the *Buijten Verwachting* from Batavia. This information has been taken from Jörg, *Porcelain*, 198-201. Many of these replacements were forced by the delay of the ships.

[31] Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vol. I, 70.

[32] In 1764, the China Committee asked the High Government for a limited number of carpenters and sailors, as well as 120 hands for the ships of 150 feet and 110 for the ships of 140 feet. See NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765.

[33] NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765.

[34] NA VOC 4543, Instruction of the China Committee to the High Government, 10 October 1759.

[35] For the order of the Chinese authorities on the Europeans' stay at Macao in the off-season, see Liu Yong, "Culture Clash in Canton", unpublished paper presented at the TANAP Workshop in Xiamen in October 2003.

[36] From 1761 on, the Dutch supercargoes in China turned to writing an official business report annually to the China Committee. See NA NFC 223-246.

[37] These instructions were sent to the Trade Council with all the names of the Council members. See NA NFC 278-301.

Of course, besides these official instructions, there were also personal letters carried between Batavia and China, for example, in the names of the High Government in Batavia and president of the Trade Council in Canton.

[38] NA NFC 287, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777.

[39] NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July 1779. On 23 January 1779, the High Government received the letter from the Governor and Council of Macao, in which the Macao Government expressed its gratitude for the assistance given to the shipwrecked victims of the *Estrela de Aurora* near the Island Nor de Vaca; in his reply of 16 July that year, the Governor-General in Batavia, Reijnier de Klerk, very politely wrote that it was his pleasure that the captain of a Dutch ship had so generously assisted the *Estrela de Aurora*. He was sure that the Macao Government would have given the same orders should a misfortune be visited on a Dutch ship. See NA NFC 289, Letter from the Governor-General and Council in Batavia to the Macao Government, 16 July 1779.

[40] BL IOR-G/12/58, Diary and consultation, 4 December 1778.

[41] A *bankzaal* (or "banksaul" in English records) was a storage space for shipping equipment and ballast material. All European ships had their own *bankzaals*. The *bankzaals* were also the place where sick sailors were sent to recover from their illnesses. The French paid an extra amount to the Hoppo to build their *bankzaals* on the "French Island" near Whampoa, which was also used as a place of recreation. The other Europeans were generally restricted to setting up their *bankzaals* on the "Danes Island", which is called "Whampoa Island" by Paul A. Van Dyke. See Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 8. For the Danes and French Island, see BL IOR-G/12/66, Letter from the Council at Canton to Captain William Thomson commander of Calcutta, No. 3, 8 July 1779.

The interpreters and/or compradors were responsible for seeking permission from the Hoppo for the construction of *bankzaals*, and the compradors arranged for the actual building of the structures. The *bankzaals* were usually dismantled at the end of each trading season, and rebuilt again when the ships arrived next season. See Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter Four.

[42] BL IOR-G/12/58, Diary and consultation, 4 December 1778.

[43] NA NFC 289, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 16 July 1779.

[44] NA NFC 290, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 27 July 1780.

[45] NA NFC 291, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 6 July 1781.

[46] Raids by the English on Chinese junks actually occurred after the *Goede Hoop* affair, which took place between the English captain McClary and the Dutch in China in 1781. See the part of "Recapture of the *Goede Hoop*" in Chapter Four.

As for these occurrences, an example also can be found in the paragraph "Commodities for Batavia's use" in this chapter.

[47] Captain McClary attacked two Macao ships with goods for the VOC in the Bangka Strait in 1782, until he was driven away by the warships sent by the High Government. See NA NFC 292, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 14 June 1782.

Early the next year, another Macao ship, the *St Antonio*, carrying goods for the VOC was captured by the same captain. See NA NFC 44, Resolution of the Trade Council, 7 October 1782; NA NFC 293, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 3 June 1784.

[48] The Batavia demand for porcelain consisted of all the various assortments.

[49] There was no tea mentioned among the wares ordered, but this does not mean that tea was not in demand in Batavia. In fact, the required tea was transported to Batavia on Chinese junks or other private vessels. See NA NFC 292, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 14 July 1782.

[50] Information about these sales can be found in all the business reports of the supercargoes to the High Government (NA NFC 220-222) and the homeland (NA NFC 223-254).

[51] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 85.

[52] Hugh Chisholm (ed.), *The Encyclopædia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, Literature and General Information* (Eleventh edition, New York: Horace Everett Hooper, 1911), "Musk".

[53] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 86.

[54] Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company*, 82.

[55] Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vol. I, 170; Blussé, *Strange Company*, 16.

[56] By looking at the figures of "the total population inside and outside Batavia" and "the major population groups at Batavia" in *Strange Company* (Blussé: 18-19), it is possible to build up a picture of the connection between the import of Chinese textiles and the population of Batavia in the latter half of the eighteenth century.

[57] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 89.

[58] See the section on "Instructions of the China Committee" in Chapter One.

[59] The junk the *Sam-con-hing* (or the *San Guang Xing* 三广兴), *Nachoda* Zhang Zhenguan 张阵观, belonged to the San Guang Xing Company 三广兴公司 in Canton; the junk the *Sweehing* (or the *Rui Xing* 瑞兴 ), *Nachoda* Wen Xiongguan 温雄官 belonged to the Rui Xing Company 瑞兴公司 in Canton. See NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 15 January 1764.

[60] The junk the *Eckthaaij* (or the *Yi Tai* 益泰 ), *Nachoda* Yan Lishe 颜立舍 , belonged to the Mao Sheng Company 茂盛公司 . See NA NFC 277, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769.

[61] NA NFC 74, Daily records of the supercargoes, 18 January and 27 February 1765.

[62] NA NFC 76, Daily record of the supercargoes, 16 December 1767.

[63] NA NFC 280, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769.

[64] The junk the *Honka* (or the *Huang Zai* 黄仔), *Nachoda* Tsoa Tsoagua (Cai Quguan, 蔡诹观 ), belonging to the Da Xing Company 大兴公司 in Canton. See NA NFC 277, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769.

[65] According to the daily records of the supercargoes, during the season 1768-1769, this junk sailed the route between Canton, Batavia, and Cochin China. See NA NFC 77 and 78-79, Daily records of the supercargoes, 26 December 1768, 3 January and 14 July 1769.

[66] NA NFC 78-79, Daily record of the supercargoes, 21 December 1769.

[67] The *St Luz* in 1772 (NA NFC 282A, Missive from the Trade Council to the High Government, 6 January 1773), the *Nossa Senhora da Luz* in 1777 (NA NFC 287, Report of the Trade Council to the High Government, 31 January 1778), the *St Vincenti* in 1778 (NA NFC 288, Report of the Trade Council to the High Government, 24 January 1779), the *N. Sr.ª de Boa Viageme* in 1779 (NA NFC 289, Report of the Trade Council to the High Government, 14 February 1780), the *St Anthonij* in 1781 (NA NFC 291, Missive from the Trade Council to the High Government, 6 January 1782).

[68] The *Royal Chartolle* in 1773 (NA NFC 283, Missive from the Trade Council to the High Government, 1 November 1773), the *Neptune* in 1774 (NA NFC 284, Missive from the Trade Council to the High Government, 10 November 1774), the *Nancy* in 1776 (NA NFC 286, Missive from the Trade Council to the High Government, 12 January 1777).

[69] In 1769, for example, the junks the *Eckthaaij* and the *Honka* received their freight fare in this way: they were paid 2½ rix-dollars for porcelain and 1 rix-dollar, or 48 stivers, for spelter per picul at freight (NA NFC 277, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 22 February 1769). This manner of consigning shipments and delivery of goods for Batavia was also applied to the Portuguese, and occasionally the English, private ships. See NA NFC 78-79, Daily records of the supercargoes, 18 and 21 December 1769; NA NFC 280, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777.

[70] NA NFC 82 and 86, Daily records of the supercargoes, 20 December 1773 and 12 January 1777.

[71] NA NFC 278, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 24 June 1763.

[72] NA NFC 287, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 8 July 1777.

[73] It is obvious that the Portuguese Macao ships were not included in the "foreign European ships" but were referred to as Macao vessels in the instruction of the High Government to the Trade Council in Canton.

[74] It is spelled as *"Wongsong"* in the daily record of the supercargoes in 1769 (NA NFC 78-79, Daily record of the supercargoes, 14 July 1769) but as *"Wonchan"* in the instruction of the High Government in 1770 (NA NFC 281, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 12 June 1770). It is certain, however, that both names refer to the same junk.

[75] NA NFC 281, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 12 June 1770.

[76] Together with the translator, Lundert Goossen, the junior Chinese secretary, Lim Tjoenkong, and the *nachoda*, Tan Hoatka, plus the clerk, Ting Jonko, of the junk the *Thaij-an* from Canton.

[77] NA NFC 292, Letter from the High Government to the supercargoes, 27 April 1782.

[78] NA NFC 293, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 3 June 1784.

[79] Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, 59.

[80] Ibid., 63.

[81] Ibid., 64.

[82] It was agreed that 100 touch was pure gold, which was equivalent to 24 carats. Ninety-three was most highly favoured as the touch standard for gold and 94 for silver; and the less foreign matter that the gold and silver contained, the more the touch, for example, 90 touch was 90 per cent gold, with 10 per cent extraneous matter content. See Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. 1, 68-69; Paul A. Van Dyke and Cynthia Viallé (eds), *The Canton-Macao Dagregisters 1762* (hereafter referred to as *CMD*) (Macao: Culture Institute, forthcoming), note 46; C. Scholten, *The Coins of the Dutch Overseas Territories 1601-1948* (Amsterdam: J. Schulman, 1953), 5; NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 18 September 1762.

[83] Om Prakash, "Precious Metal Flows in Asia and World Economic Integration in the Seventeenth Century", in Wolfram Fischer (ed.), *The Emergence of a World Economy 1500-1914: Papers of the IX. International Congress of Economic History Association* (Part one) (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1986), 92.

[84] Glamann, *Dutch-Asiatic Trade*, 69.

[85] See note 15 in Introduction.

[86] According to the instructions from Batavia, the trade representatives in China could use the remaining funds not only for the gold trade of Batavia but also for the VOC direct China trade for the coming season, depending on the situation. See the instructions of the High Government in 1763 and 1765.

[87] NA NFC 278, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 24 July 1763.

[88] Silver, copper, gold, and tin in the shape of a *schuitje* (small boat) used to be called *schuitjes zilver*, *schuitjes koper*, *schuitjes goud*, and *schuitjes tin* in Dutch). See O. Nachod, *Die Beziehungen der niederländischen Kompagnie zu Japan im siebzehnten Jahrhundert* (Berlijn, 1897), 134; Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië*, 154 and 172.

[89] NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 18 September 1762.

[90] NA NFC 27, Resolution of the Trade Council, 8 December 1764.

[91] NA NFC 279, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 5 July 1765.

[92] According to the NFC records, 1764 was the last year in which the Dutch supercargoes purchased gold for Batavia. See NA NFC 27, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 8 and 10 August and 8 December 1764.

[93] NA NFC 280, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 19 May 1769; NA NFC 281, Instruction of the High Government to the supercargoes, 12 June 1770.

## *Notes to Chapter Three*

[1] The ins-and-outs of the Canton trade as well as the Canton System are explained in more detail in the introduction to Chapter Four.

[2] According to the regulations of the Chinese authorities, the off-season lasted from the departure of the European ships (customarily in January, but sometimes in February or even early March) until the arrival of the next season's European ships (in August or September); correspondingly, the trading season lasted from the arrival of the current-season European ships until their departure.

[3] From the 1830s, the Dutch and English earlier or later succeeded in cultivating the tea plant for their home markets in Java, India, and Ceylon, and the export of Chinese tea from then on suffered a big decline. See A. Bierens de Haan, C.F. Bierens de Haan, and L.L. Bierens de Haan, *Memorie Boek van Pakhuismeesteren van de thee te Amsterdam 1818-1918 en de Nederlandsche Theehandel in den loop der tijden* (Amsterdam: J.H. de Bussy, 1918), 130-155; Her Majesty's Stationery Office, *Reports on the Tea and Tobacco Industries in India* (London: Printed by George Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoode, 1874), 13-14; R. Jayaraman, *Caste Continuities in Ceylon: A Study of the Social Structure of Three Tea Plantations* (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1975), 12-13.

[4] Although these teas are still produced today, I shall refer to them here in the past tense as I am describing these varieties as they were purchased for the VOC.

[5] Zhuang, "Fujian Tea Industry", 11.

[6] "Chinese tea", at: http://www.fmltea.com by the FML Tea Trading Co., LTD., Xiamen, 19/04/2005.

[7] Ch'en, "Transaction Practices", 746. However, it is also likely that a small portion of tea from Jiangxi Province was added to the teas from the Provinces of Fujian and Anhui when they were transported to Canton.

[8] "The naming of teas", at http: //www.teanet.com.cn/chaye3.htm by the China Teanet Group, Beijing, 20/04/2005.

[9] Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, *The Management of Monopoly*, 5.

[10] According to *VOC-Glossarium: verklaringen van termen, verzameld uit de Rijks Geschiedkundige Publicatiën, die betrekking hebben op de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (M. Kooijmans et al. (eds), Den Haag: Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, 2000, 89) Pekoe was the best quality black tea bought by the VOC, but as stated in the reports of the supercargoes, the price they paid for it was not higher than that disbursed for Souchong.

[11] "What is Orange Pekoe?", at: http://www.virtualtea.com/vt/tips.html by Virtual Tea, Depoe Bay Oregon, 19/04/2005.

[12] It should be noted that in their daily records or the resolutions of the Trade Council the Dutch trade representatives mention Ankay mixing with the two teas, but they fail to mention Ankay in connection with Bohea, Congou, or Souchong when they composed the general reports on the expeditions for the Company.

[13] Nowadays Wuyuan is a county in Jiangxi Province, but during the Qing period it belonged to Anhui Province.

[14] Diana Rosen, "Teas of yore: Bohea, Hyson and Congou", at: http://www.teamuse.com/article_031001.html by the Tea Muse, 18/04/2005.

[15] All types of names of the black and green teas in European languages originate from Chinese. Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Pekoe, Ankay, and Twankay obviously derive from the Quanzhou 泉州 dialect spoken in South Fujian; Songlo and Hyson probably stem from Mandarin.

[16] [明] Luo Bing 罗廪, *Cha jie* 茶解 [Explanation about Tea], "Songluo cha" 松萝茶 [Songlo Tea], in: Guo Mengliang 郭孟良, *Zhongguo chadian* 中国茶典 [Chinese Tea Thesaurus] (Taiyuan: Shanxi guji chubanshe, 2004), 39. Guo's book also extracts several other works from the Tang to the Ming Dynasty, which all involve topics about the plucking of tea leaves, the production, drinking and storage of tea, and the use of different tea services. For example, [唐] Lu Yu 陆羽, *Cha jing* 茶经 [Tea Scripture]; [宋] Cai Xiang 蔡襄, *Cha lu* 茶录 [Records about Tea]; [宋] Huang Ru 黄儒, *Pincha yaolu* 品茶要录 [Useful Notes about Tea-tasting]; [明] Zhu Quan 朱权, *Cha pu* 茶谱 [The Chronicle of

Tea]; [明] Huang Longde 黄龙德, *Cha shuo* 茶说 [Talk about Tea]; [明] Tian Yiheng 田艺蘅, *Zhu quan xiaopin* 煮泉小品 [Small Talks about Tea-brewing].

[17] Hyson was the most expensive tea the Dutch supercargoes purchased in Canton until they began to purchase Gunpowder tea in 1778. See Appendix 4.

[18] Michael Plant, "Imperial green", at: http://www.normbrero.com/cgi-bin/viewTea.cgi?search1=SHOW_TEA&param1=5&param2=Imperial+Green&param3=Michael&param4=2003-11-13, 21/04/2005.

[19] Gardella, *Fukien's Tea Industry and Trade*, 101-103; Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, *The Management of Monopoly*, 10-11; Ch'en, "Transaction Practices", 746.

[20] BL IOR-G/12/214, Diary and consultation, 25 February 1819.

[21] [清] Zhou Kai 周凯, *Xiamen zhi* 厦门志 [Xiamen Gazetteer], in: *Taiwan wenxian congkan* 台湾文献丛刊 [A Collection of Documentary Materials on Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi, 1961), N. 95, 177.

[22] Ch'en, "Transaction Practices", 747; BL IOR-G/12/214, Diary and consultation, 22 January 1797.

[23] With the only exception being 112½ pounds of Linchinsing, which is supposed to be "Linki-sam" tea, one kind of black tea, which was bought by the Dutch in 1761. See Appendix 4.

[24] In Ch'en's opinion, the tea merchants did not trade personally with the Hong merchants but employed the proprietors of warehouses as go-betweens to negotiate with them. See Ch'en, "Transaction Practices", 746.

[25] A security merchant was appointed under the provisions of the security merchant system, which had been institutionalized in Canton around 1745. This system required all foreign traders to engage several Hong merchants to stand as sureties for their ships, crews, and for the due payment of their duties during their stay in China. In return, the security merchants were granted the largest portion of the trade of the ships they secured. Generally foreigners took good care not to allow the security merchants to supply more than about 50 per cent of the total cargo, and the amount often fluctuated between 20 and 25 per cent. In their turn the security merchants usually insisted on being given a portion larger than that accorded to any other supplier to the ships they had secured. See Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. I, 247; Vol. V, 28-29; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 8-10; Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 11.

There were many differences between the security merchants acting for the EIC and those allied to the VOC: in the case of the EIC, it was palpably clear which security merchant(s) guaranteed which ship(s), and how much merchandise he or they could obtain from the ship(s); in the case of the VOC, three or four security merchants were always mentioned together, alongside the merchandise given to the security merchants from which ship. The Dutch used the word *"fiador"*, or *"(onze) marchandeurs/kooplieden"* to designate the security merchants who were their regular trading partners. During the period under study, the security merchants for the VOC were Tsja Hunqua & Co., Swetja, and Tan Chetqua in 1757; Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, and Inksja in 1763-1769; Semqua & Co., Inksja, and Tan Chetqua in 1769-1772; Semqua & Co. (replaced by Tayqua & Co. from 1774), Inksja, and Tinqua in 1772-1776; Inksja, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, and Tsjonqua in 1776-1778; and Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, and Tsjonqua in 1778-1780. See NA NFC 22-43, passim.

[26] Chapter Four deals in detail with the establishment of the Co-hong and the protest lodged by the European supercargoes against this combination.

[27] They did in 1766 (Houqua, Chetqua's clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja's clerk); 1768 (Emanuel, Tsjobqua's clerk; Quyqua, Chetqua's clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja's clerk); 1769 (Quyqua, Chetqua's clerk; Tsja Kinqua, Inksja's clerk); 1772 (Kiouqua, Inksja's clerk); 1775 (Keequa, Inksja's clerk); 1776 (Heyqua, Monqua's clerk; Kiouqua, Inksja's clerk; and Tetqua, Tan Tsjonqua's clerk); and 1777 (Jemqua, Koqua's clerk). See Appendix 3.

[28] NA NFC 26, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 10 and 15 March 1763.

[29] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 27 October 1764.

[30] NA NFC 85, Daily record of the supercargoes, 27 January 1776.

[31] NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 November 1762.

[32] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 23 October 1764.

[33] NA NFC 79 and 80, Daily record of the supercargoes, 28 January 1770.
[34] When the Co-hong was established in 1760, ten Hong merchants joined this association. During the short existence of the Co-hong, 1760 to 1771, there were four chief and six smaller Co-hong members, who have been clearly described by Ch'en (*The Insolvency*, 13).
[35] Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapter Five; and his "The Yan Family: Merchants of Canton, 1734-1780s", *Review of Culture* (International Edition 9) (Macao, January 2004): 30-85.
[36] NA NFC 33, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 August 1770.
[37] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 10 August 1764.
[38] Ibid., 24 June 1764.
[39] See NA NFC 1, 2, 3, 5, and 7.
[40] NA NFC 222, Report of the supercargoes to the High Government, 8 May 1759.
[41] NA VOC 4382, Trade journal of the direct council in Canton, 7 and 18 November 1758.
[42] See NA NFC 29, 31, 77, and 79.
[43] Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 71 (note 74), 140; Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vols 1 and 5, passim; Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, Chapters Five and Six; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 268-269; and see NA NFC 34, 80.
[44] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 24 June 1764.
[45] NA NFC 38, Resolution of the Trade Council, 6 January 1774.
[46] A place far away in the north-west of China which in the Qing period was especially notorious as a penal colony for those exiled by the government.
[47] See NA NFC 15.
[48] Ch'en Kuo-tung, "Pan Youdu, a Successful Businessman for a Foreign Firm", in Liu Ping 刘平 et al. (eds), *Guangzhou shisanhang cangsang* 广州十三行沧桑 [The Transformation of the Thirteen Hongs of Canton] (Guangzhou: Guangdongsheng ditu chubanshe, 2001), 150-193; Dilip Kumar Basu, *Asian Merchants and Western Trade: A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800-1840* (PhD dissertation, Berkeley: University of California, 1975), 355; Cheong, *Hong Merchants*, 40-41 and 71 (note 79); Huang Qichen 黄启臣 and Pang Xinping 庞新平, *Mingqing guangdong shangren* 明清广东商人 [Guangdong Merchants in Ming and Qing Period] (Guangzhou: Guangdong jingji chubanshe, 2001), 259-269; Liang Jiabin, *Guangdong shisanhang kao*, 259; NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 18 April 1764.
[49] When Tsja Hunqua suggested so to the Dutch chief, the latter felt very surprised why he would do so, as Poan Keequa was his biggest opponent for the European trade in Canton. The Dutch refused because, as they explained, Poan Keequa was a "sly fox", always full of intrigues, and they thus did not want Poan Keequa "to put his nose directly into our affairs". See NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 31 May and 23 June 1764.
[50] NA NFC 31, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 May 1768.
[51] See NA NFC 51, 95.
[52] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 71, 338 (note 84); Cheong, *Hong Merchants,* 40 and 72 (note 80); Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 19 and 294-296.
[53] Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 259.
[54] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 58-59; Paul A. Van Dyke, *Port Canton and the Pearl River Delta, 1690-1845* (PhD dissertation, California: Department of History, University of Southern California, 2002), Chapter Five and Appendices O, P, Q, S; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 259-260; NA NFC 25, 26, 32, 72, and 78; NA VOC 4394.
[55] Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), *CMD 1762*, note 104.
[56] Van Dyke, *Port Canton*, 316-317 and Appendices N-S; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 307-311; Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 98, 131, 212, and 264-265.
[57] Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), *CMD 1762*, note 12; *CMD 1763*, note 7.
[58] That was the reason why the Dutch called him a "Macao merchant" in 1763 (NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 November 1763).
[59] Van Dyke and Viallé (eds), *CMD 1762*, note 12 and 67; Van Dyke, "The Ye Merchants of Canton, 1720-1804", *Review of Culture* (International Edition 13) (Macao:

Culture Institute, 2005): 7-37; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 261-268; NA NFC 7, 17-39 and 76-84, NA VOC 4381-4413.

[60] Van Dyke, "The Ye Merchants", 7-37.

[61] NA NFC 25, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 November 1762; NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 November 1763.

[62] Van Dyke, *Port Canton*, Appendixes O, P, Q; Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 40; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 260-261; NA NFC 28, 31, 74, and 77; NA VOC 4397 and 4402.

[63] NA VOC 4396, Capital to the Chinese merchants, 5 July 1764; Appendix 3.

[64] Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 200-208 and 275-277; Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 152-153 and 253; Van Dyke, "The Yan Family", 30-85; Van Dyke and Viallé (trans), *CMD 1762*, note 47.

[65] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 61; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 296-297; Cheong, *The Hong Merchants*, 263; NA NFC 24, 37, 43-60, 88-96, and 326; NA VOC 4381-4446.

[66] The name "Suchin" (Suizhen 璲珍) is the romanization of the Cantonese pronunciation of a porcelain shop, and "Kinqua" is a reference to the merchant. The European supercargoes often combined these two names into one. See Appendix 3.

[67] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 116 and 351 (note 80); Van Dyke, "The Ye Merchants", 7-37; NA VOC 4382-4397.

[68] The teas bought by contract or additional trading-season purchases on the free market were called "new tea" by the Dutch (or Xincha 新茶 in Chinese). The price differences between "old tea" and "new tea" were very large, as can be seen in Appendix 4.

[69] These three avenues were also those open to the EIC. See Ch'en, "Transaction Practices", 749.

[70] For the duration of one expedition of the China ships each season, see Chapter Five. In the eighteenth century, a homeward-bound journey took six to eight months, so that the ships returned to the Dutch Republic in the Summer or the beginning of the Autumn.

[71] NA NFC 74, Daily record of the supercargoes, 4 July 1765.

[72] NA NFC 29, Resolution of the Trade Council, 14 August 1766.

[73] NA NFC 30, Resolution of the Trade Council, 20 August 1767.

[74] During the Co-hong period, the Co-hong decided the price of Bohea each year, but the European supercargoes still could obtain various other prices from the individual tea-supplying agents.

[75] NA NFC 77, Daily record of the supercargoes, 23 July 1768.

[76] NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 11 February 1763.

[77] NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 18 February 1772.

[78] NA NFC 38, Resolution of the Trade Council, 19 January 1775.

[79] NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 26-29 February 1764.

[80] The assortments of the East Indies goods from Batavia are specifically explained in Chapter Two.

[81] NA NFC 32, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 April 1769.

[82] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 30 January 1764.

[83] NA NFC 79, Daily record of the supercargoes, 9 January 1770.

[84] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 8 March 1764.

[85] NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 29 January 1763.

[86] Ibid., 25 May 1763.

[87] From 1760 to 1764, one whole chest of Bohea weighed on average $348\frac{13}{16}$, $346\frac{1}{8}$, $359\frac{13}{16}$, $339\frac{5}{16}$ and 342¾ pounds respectively each year (NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 24 November 1764), but from 1765 onwards one whole chest of Bohea was fixed at a weight of 340 pounds on average (NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 7 November 1765). In the meantime, the weight of other tea chests was always changing.

[88] Three VOC ships were supposed to arrive in Canton this year. For the number of the ships each season, see Appendix 2.

[89] On 19 May 1763, some remarks were made with respect to the first, second, and third conditions of the contract to the effect that the so-called off-season or the drawn consideration should end on 1 June and anything which happened afterwards would have no relation to this contract; on the 24th, one more stipulation was added with regard to

the sixth condition, namely that half of the remaining part of the contracted 9,000 piculs of teas which the tea-supplying agents promised to keep on their account would not be more than 1,250 piculs. See NA NFC 26, Resolution of the Trade Council, 19 May 1763.

[90] NA NFC 32, Resolution of the Trade Council, 30 April 1769.

[91] NA NFC 30 and 31, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 14 April 1767 and 2 May 1768.

[92] NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 10 February - 29 April 1764. In fact, examples of this kind are scattered mainly in the daily records and sometimes in the resolutions of the Trade Council each year.

[93] The final quantities on board differed slightly from those following the actual purchase (Twankay from 90,000 to 50,302 pounds; Songlo from 184,000 to 106,764 pounds; and Hyson skin from 30,000 to 19,103 pounds). It also should be mentioned that they all diverged greatly from the demands by the China Committee. For all different figures, see Appendix 4.

[94] Some comparisons between the purchase and sales prices of Twankay are demonstrated in Chapter Five.

[95] NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 31 August 1765.

[96] NA NFC 43, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 November 1780.

[97] For instance, the storage of Bohea with porcelain at the Dutch factory from Kousia and Conjac in 1773, and from Suchin Kinqua in 1779 (NA NFC 82 and 88, Daily records of the supercargoes, 7-12 October 1773 and 10 February 1779). More information about the teas from the porcelain shops also can be found in Appendix 3.

[98] NA NFC 124, Instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes, 13 November 1761.

[99] NA NFC 28, Resolution of the Trade Council, 7 November 1765.

[100] NA NFC 73, Daily records of the supercargoes, 22 October - 2 November 1764.

[101] NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 3 November 1764. The work of packing tea, of course, was delegated to the Chinese coolies who were employed by the tea-supplying agents. As they packed, the coolies rammed the tea into the chests by trampling on it with their feet. There is the following interesting description of the coolies' work by the Dutch in 1764:

> [Today] there are seven places where the tea is being packed and more than 1,200 coolies are occupied, of whom our three merchants have employed only around 700 to serve us.
>
> Each nation which is packing screams a thousand times a day: "Do not grind the tea to dust, but stamp it straight up and down!" and perhaps one has 100 chests which are already half-full thrown back upon the heap of tea which is not yet packed, because the tea has been ground to dust. It never ever always goes the way one wants it, for how can two or three people keep 200 or more workers, who are of the worst scum of common people, in order? And, if the clerks of the merchants reprimand them too severely, all of them jump out of the chests. In order to get them back to work again and make things right, one has to cajole them and give them more *comtsia* [Gongqian 工钱, i.e. wage].

[102] On 29 September 1779, for example, the Dutch picked up Bohea packed in the off-season in small barrels to examine before sending it aboard the *Blok* the next day. See NA NFC 88, Daily record of the supercargoes, 29 September 1779.

[103] NA NFC 33, Resolution of the Trade Council, 2 April 1770.

[104] For the tea-buyers' complaint about the dustiness of tea, see the section on "Company auctions of the 'VOC teas'" in Chapter Five.

[105] In 1765, E. Steeger (supercargo) with P. Rocquette (assistant) and Van den Bergh (assistant); E. Schartouw (supercargo) with Karsseboom (supercargo), Guitard (assistant), and H. Klinkert (bookkeeper); and E. Kintsius (supercargo) with Helene (assistant) and Rijnagh (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 28, 7 November 1765); in 1766, Schartouw (supercargo) with Wijnberg (assistant), Arends (bookkeeper), and Kuijper (koopkeeper); Karsseboom (supercargo) with H. Klinkert (assistant), Alphusius (bookkeeper), and Teschemacher (bookkeeper); and Van Braam (supercargo) with Rocquette (assistant), Hemmingson (bookkeeper), and Van Veen (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 29, 23 October

1766); in 1779, H. Klinkert (supercargo) with A. Benthem (assistant) and B. Nebbens (bookkeeper); S. van Karnebeek (supercargo) with A. Boers (assistant) and B. Idemans (bookkeeper); S. Certon (supercargo) with Hemmingson (supercargo), A. Rhenius (assistant), and W. in 't Anker (bookkeeper); and S. Klinkert (supercargo) with A. Serrurier (assistant) and B. Lunt (bookkeeper) (NA NFC 42, 30 October 1779); and in 1780, Karnebeek (supercargo) with Benthem (assitant) and Idemans (bookkeeper); Hemmingson (supercargo) with Rhenius (assistant) and Nebbens (bookkeeper); and S. Klinkert (supercargo) with Serrurier (assistant) and Lunt (bookkeeper). See NA NFC 43, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 October 1780.

## *Notes to Chapter Four*

[1] The Canton System was specially designed for the European trade with China from the eighteenth century until the First Opium War. As for this system, see Li Shiyao 李侍尧, "Qianlong ershisinian yingjili tongshang an" 乾隆二十四年英吉利通商案 [Case of the English Petition for Trade in the 24th Year of the Qianlong Emperor] of "Li Shiyao zhe san" 李侍尧折三 [The Third Memorial to the Throne by Li Shiyao], in *Shiliao xunkan*, Vol. 9, 307-310; Morse, *The International Relations*, Vols I-III, passim.

[2] It is difficult to fix the exact period of the off-season for European traders at Macao, as it varied for the different companies each year. But, generally speaking, the off-season of roughly four months would start from the end of February, March, or April, and last to the end of June, July, or August.

[3] The highest civil official with authority over the Provinces of Guangdong 广东 and Guangxi 广西.

[4] The subordinate colleague of the Viceroy in matters relating to Guangdong Province.

[5] The Imperial Commissioner of the Guangdong Customs House, with headquarters in Canton.

[6] The principal Hong merchant Poan Keequa, in alliance with other great Hong merchants, applied to establish the Co-hong to monopolize the European trade. See Liang Tingnan 梁廷楠 (ed.), *Yue haiguan zhi* 粤海关志 [The Chronicle of Guangdong Customs House] (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), Vol. 25, 1797; Ch'en, *The Insolvency*, 8. An earlier association of such kind appeared as early as the end of 1720 but only lasted for one year. See Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. I, 161-165.

[7] BL IOR-R/10/4, Diary and consultation, 23 July 1760.

[8] Ibid., 4 August 1760.

[9] Ibid., 8 August 1760.

[10] NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 15 August 1760.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] The eleven Hong merchants were Poan Keequa, Tswaa (Tsja) Suyqua, Tsja Hunqua, Tan Chetqua, Swetja, Tan Tinqua, Consciens Giqua, Theonqua (or The Onqua), Tan Tsjoqua, Foutia, and Tan Hunqua (NA VOC 4387, Letter of M.W. Hulle to other supercargoes, 6 February 1761). After Tan Tinqua's arrest on 15 August, the other ten Hong merchants formed the Co-hong.

[15] See note 10.

[16] Ibid.

[17] NA VOC 4384, Order of the *Hoppo* to the English and Dutch, 16 August 1760.

[18] These troubles derived from the *Flint* incident between the English merchants and the Chinese authorities in 1759. See Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. V, 68-107.

[19] NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1760.

[20] Ibid; BL IOR-R/10/4, Diary and consultation, 17 August 1760.

[21] NA VOC 4384, Request of the Dutch to the *Tsongtu*, 17 August 1760.

[22] The reply of the *Tsongtu* to the Dutch in August 1760, which is inserted in the Resolution of the Trade Council. See NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1760.

[23] NA VOC 4384, Resolution of the Trade Council, 25 August 1760.
[24] Ibid.
[25] BL IOR-R/10/4, Diaries and consultations, September-December 1760.
[26] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 21 July 1772.
[27] Ibid., 22 July 1772.
[28] Ibid., 1 August 1772.
[29] NA NFC 81, Daily records of the supercargoes, 15 and 19 August 1772.
[30] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 25 August 1772.
[31] NA NFC 35, Daily record of E. van Braam, 28 August 1772. The text of his records is inserted in the Resolution of the Trade Council in the same year.
[32] Being assisted by the Chinese interpreter, he was the accredited representative of the Senate in all dealings with the Chinese officials, and was accorded the grade of a junior mandarin by the Chinese authorities. See C.R. Boxer, *Portuguese Society in the Tropics: The Municipal Councils of Goa, Macao, Bahia, and Luanda, 1510-1800* (Madison and Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 45-46.
[33] NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 31 August 1772.
[34] Ibid.
[35] The territory of Macao consisted of the Macao Peninsula and two islands, Taipa (Dangzai 氹仔) and Coloane (Luhuan 路环).
[36] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 2 September 1772.
[37] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 3 September 1772.
[38] NA NFC 35, Resolution of the Trade Council, 3 September 1772.
[39] Ibid.
[40] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 4 September 1772.
[41] NA NFC 35, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 4 and 5 September 1772.
[42] Qing soldiers guarded the Bocca Tigris to the Pearl River with numerous forts and batteries, through where the Western ships had to pass and be checked before reaching Whampoa.
[43] NA NFC 81, Daily records of the supercargoes, 5 and 6 September 1772.
[44] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 10 September 1772.
[45] Ibid., 11 September 1772.
[46] Yayi 亚乙 (or Yadi 亚帝), who together with three other colleagues, Allay 亚日, Attay 亚佐 and Adjo 亚黎 (or 亚礼) served the European companies, under the name of the "Whampoa Comprador Company" 黄埔买办. See NA VOC 4387, Receipts and statements of the compradors, 6 October and 4 December 1760.
[47] Its location was known by several different names, for example, the "Bocca Tigris Roads", the "2nd Bar anchorage" or "the Bogue". See Van Dyke, *The Canton Trade*, 268 and 280.
[48] NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 12 September 1772.
[49] Ibid., 13 September 1772.
[50] Ibid., 16 September 1772.
[51] Ibid., 24 September 1772.
[52] Ibid., 25 September 1772.
[53] On 29 November, the Dutch received a grand chop for the *Herstelder*. On the morning of 2 December, the *Herstelder* passed by Macao. See NA NFC 81, Daily record of the supercargoes, 29 November 1772.
[54] Boxer, *Portuguese Society*, 48, 50, and 70.
[55] NA NFC 44, Resolutions of the Trade Council, 21 August and 15 October 1781.
[56] NA NFC 292, Letter from the Dutch supercargoes to the English supercargoes, 21 August 1781; BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 22 August 1781.
[57] BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Letter from the English supercargoes to the Dutch supercargoes, 23 August 1781.
[58] BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Chop of the *Tsongtu*, *Fooyuern,* and *Hoppo*, 9 September 1781.
[59] BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 2 October 1781.
[60] BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Edict of the *Fooyuern* to the English supercargoes, 2 October 1781.

[61] This judgment was strongly expressed by the English supercargoes in their diary. See BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 14 February 1781.

[62] BL IOR-G/12/66, Diaries and consultations, 16 October - 3 November 1779; 1 March - 17 April 1780.

[63] The detailed account of sundry stores and a chest of gold and pearls are annexed to the paper. See BL IOR-G/12/72-73, Diary and consultation, 28 October 1781.

[64] For the capture of the Chinese junk, see BL IOR-G/12/76, Diary and consultation, 25 April 1782. After Captain McClary returned to Bengal in July 1782, the Governor-General and Supreme Court of Bengal charged him with murdering several Malays in the Straits of Malacca. Finally, Captain McClary was released because of lack of evidence.

[65] The incident of cutting down the flagstaff in Chapter Two may be a good example.

[66] The examples can be found in Chapter Three.

[67] J.L. Blussé, "Divesting a Myth: Seventeenth Century Dutch-Portuguese Rivalry in the Far East", in Anthony Disney and Emily Booth, *Vasco Da Gama and the Linking of Europe and Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 387.

[68] Examples of this are given in Chapter Two.

## *Notes to Chapter Five*

[1] The data on the homeward- as well as outward-bound voyages of the VOC ships can be found in Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vols II and III.

[2] There still were a few exceptions. For example, the *Voorschoten* departed from Canton late on 1 March 1788, and arrived home on 1 June 1789; the *Rozenburg* left Canton on 20 December 1792, but only arrived home on 19 February 1794. See Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic shipping*, Vol. III, 542 and 564.

[3] Some descriptions of the chambers which sent members to the board of the Gentlemen Seventeen as well as the China Committee can be found in the first section of Chapter One; but for more detailed information about the chambers, Gaastra's *The Dutch East India Company* (20-22) should be read carefully.

[4] This was because the Hollandsdiep in the south and the Waddenzee and Zuiderzee in the north were too shallow to allow the deeply loaded China ships to sail to the chamber cities. Detailed descriptions of how the chambers unloaded their return cargoes and loaded the out-going goods can be found in such monographs as *The Dutch East India Company* by Gaastra, *De Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (Utrecht: Teleac/NOT, 1997) by Els M. Jacobs, *Nederlanders ontdekken Australië* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988) by J.P. Sigmond and L.H. Zuiderbaan, and *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping* by Bruijn et al. (eds)

[5] N.W. Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis: scheepsarcheologische vondsten op het Zuidland* (Leiden: Brill, 1943), dl. I, lxxiv.

[6] A discussion of the connection between the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War and the VOC China trade can be found in Chapter Six.

[7] See Appendix 2; Jörg, *Porcelain*, 199.

[8] The only exception was the year of 1731, in which it is dated on 15 June.

[9] Broeze, "Het einde", 124-177.

[10] The auction dates for all chambers in Appendix 6 are simply left out by the author.

[11] In Jörg's opinion, the cargoes of the return ships from China were sold at the autumn sales in November or December (*Porcelain*, 130), but this does not appear to be correct if we look at the above-mentioned archival records.

[12] Ter Molen, *Thema thee*, 21.

[13] Ibid.

[14] The examples can be traced throughout the records of NA VOC 13377. See Appendix 8.

[15] NA NFC 73, Daily Record of the supercargoes, 3 November 1764.

[16] To mix Bohea, Congou, and Souchong with Ankay was practised by the Dutch trade representatives after they bought the teas from the Chinese tea-supplying agents in Canton. For some remarks about this custom, see notes 12 and 92 in Chapter Three.

[17] See note 15.

[18] For a description of this custom, see note 105 in Chapter Three.

[19] One "Company" or Chinese picul was equal to 122½ pounds during the direct China trade of the VOC in the eighteenth century.

[20] In 1791, the VOC was granted the monopoly to sell tea in the Dutch Republic. The short-lived monopoly of the VOC on selling tea on the domestic market requires some further explanation. In the early 1780s, the VOC China trade found itself facing strong competition from the Americans who, after the conclusion of the American Revolutionary War in 1781 and the subsequent confirmation of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, immediately proclaimed the freedom of overseas trade and sent out their first China ship which arrived in Canton as early as 28 August 1784. From the late 1780s, the American trade with China surpassed the VOC China trade in volume and occupied the second place in Canton. See Jean Gordon Lee, *Philadelphians and the China Trade, 1784-1844* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1984); Philip Chadwick Foster Smith, *The Empress of China* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Arts, 1984)).

Tea, the staple product in the American China trade, was destined not only for the home market, the Americans had also set their sights on the European markets, particularly in the Dutch Republic and Germany. See Lai Delie 赖德烈, *Zaoqi zhongmei guanxi shi* 早期中美关系史 [The Early Sino-American Relations] (Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1963), 73. Noting the nascent competition, the States-General judged the Dutch Company's importation and sale of tea in the Dutch Republic to be under threat, and therefore it decided to forbid the import and sale of all foreign teas in the Low Countries. To shoot the bolt well and truly home, the monopoly resolution was announced on 15 February 1791 (P.H. van der Kemp, *Oost-Indië's geldmiddelen: Japansche en Chineesche handel van 1817 op 1818: in- en uitvoerrechten, opium, zout, tolpoorten, kleinzegel, boschwezen, Decima, Canton* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1919), 299-303; Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company,* 137). At the same time, the VOC was ordered to import tea from China in as large a quantity and as good a quality as possible (Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek*, Vol. 11, 279). The VOC had little time left to benefit from this privilege because it went bankrupt a few years later.

[21] The prices of the various VOC goods fixed by the Zeeland Chamber were exclusively quoted in Flemish pound *(pond)*, shilling *(schelling)*, and pence *(penning* or *groot)*.

[22] As shown in Appendix 6, for example, in 1751 and 1755 the Rotterdam Chamber came second to the Amsterdam Chamber and sold more teas than the Zeeland Chamber; in 1759 the Enkhuizen Chamber sold the second largest portion of teas, taking precedence over the Chambers of Rotterdam and Zeeland; in 1784 the Delft Chamber sold more teas than the Zeeland Chamber, and so did the Hoorn Chamber in 1786; in 1789 the Rotterdam Chamber sold the biggest amount of tea, and in 1790 only the Amsterdam Chamber sold teas.

[23] For example, 34.1 per cent in 1745, 34.3 in 1746, 35 in 1747, 34.8 in 1748, 36.3 in 1749, 46.1 in 1752, 44.9 in 1753, 48.8 in 1754, 37.5 in 1761, and 36.1 in 1763; 56 in 1750 and 72.3 in 1751. See Appendix 6.

[24] See Appendices 4, 5, and 6; more detailed information can be obtained from Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek*.

[25] Van der Chijs, *Plakaatboek*, Vol. 8, 597 and 757.

[26] See Appendices 4, 5, and 6.

[27] NA NFC 191-251; NA VOC 4381-4384; NA 1.04.18.02, NA BGB 10767-10799.

[28] The amount of teas demanded by the China Committee can be found in the annual instruction of the China Committee to the supercargoes in Canton (NA VOC 4381 and 4542-4547). It is feasible to compare the amounts of tea demanded with those purchased, relying on Appendix 4.

[29] See note 101 in Chapter Three.

[30] Hoh-cheung and Lorna H. Mui, *The Management of Monopoly*, 13-22.

[31] Ter Molen, *Thema thee*, 47.

[32] Isaac Commelin, *Begin ende voortgangh van de Vereenighde Nederlandsche Geoctroyeerde Oost-Indische Compagnie: Vervattende de voornaemste reysen, by de inwoonderen der selver provincien derwaerts gedaen: alles nevens de beschrijvinghen der rijcken, eylanden, havenen, revieren, stroomen, rheeden, winden, diepten en ondiepten: mitsgaders religien,*

*manieren, aerdt, politie ende regeeringhe der volckeren: oock meede haerder speceryen, drooghen, geldt ende andere koopmanschappen met veele discoursen verrijckt: nevens eenighe koopere platen verciert: nut ende dienstigh alle curieuse, ende de andere zee-varende liefhebbers* (Amsterdam: Jan Jansz., 1646), dl. 2, 102.

It is interesting that in the late seventeenth century Dutch public opinion about the power of tea, whether this be true or not, was comprehensively summed up by Dr Cornelis Bontekoe who listed twenty-six "merits", for example: 1) to purify the coarse blood; 2) to expel nightmares; 3) to relieve pressure of the brain; 4) to alleviate and cure all forms of dizziness and head-aches; 5) to promote the curing of dropsy; [...]; 7) to absorb all excess fluids; 8) to relieve all constipation; 9) to clarify vision; 10) to eradicate choler and calm the liver; [...]; 12) to ease a disturbed spleen; 13) to expel drowsiness; 14) to eradicate foolishness; 15) to keep awake and alert; 16) to strengthen the heart; 17) to ease anxiety; 18) to act as a carminative; [...]; 21) to sharpen the intelligence; [...]; 24) to purge gall gently; 25) as an aphrodisiac useful in early marriage; and 26) to quench thirst. See Eelco Hesse, *Thee: de oogleden van Bodhidharma: de wereld van de thee: het theedrinken in China, Tibet en Japan, thee in Europa, bereiding van thee, kruidenthee, theegerei, theezetten en thee-recepten* (Den Haag: Bert Bakker, 1975), 119; Ter Molen, *Thema thee*, 23.

[33] Ter Molen, *Thema thee*, 44.

[34] GAU, Inventory II, N 354, "Registers of acts of permission for doing pub-business or for selling strong drinks, light beer, coffee, and tea, designed according to the resolution of city council on 28 August 1752" (5 vols); N 355, "General registers of the wholesalers and licensed victualers of coffee, chickpea, and tea in the city and its surrounding, who have sworn their oath on the ordinance of the Sates over the impost over coffee, 23 April 1755" (2 vols).

[35] Hieronymus Sweerts, *Het derde, en laatste deel der koddige en ernstige opschriften op luyffens, wagens, glazen, borden, graven, en elders* (Amsterdam: Jeroen Jeronsz., 1700), 103.

[36] This citation is extracted from the ordinance on the impost of coffee, chickpea and tea, Utrecht 1744. See Ter Molen, *Thema thee*, 47.

[37] Broeze, "Het einde", 128.

[38] GAA, Bibliotheek N 40.03.012.24 and N 61.01.016.33, "Advertising Materials".

[39] Although the emblem of the "VOC" on the chest tell us about the relationship of the shop with the renowned Company, it is difficult to know precisely when the patent was obtained from the VOC.

[40] All the written information about the shop "The Cloverleaf" was obtained from Marion de Vries-Jacobs, the present owner of this shop.

[41] Jacobus Scheltus (ed.), *Groot placaet-boek, vervattende de placaten, ordonnantien ende edicten van de [...] Staten Generael der Vereenighde Nederlanden, ende van de [...] Staten van Hollandt en West-Vrieslandt, mitsgaders van de [...] Staten van Zeeland* ('s-Gravenhage: P. Scheltus, 1705), dl. 4, 713.

[42] CAS 3873, Announcement of the tax on coffee, tea, chocolate et al., 1734; four different bills were presented in the years 1734, 1735, 1736, and 1740 on coffee, tea, chocolate, sorbet, spa-water, lemonade and other mixed beverages. See G. van Rijn, *Atlas van Stolk te Rotterdam: Katalogus der historie, spot- en zinneprenten betrekkelijk de geschiedenis van Nederland, verzameld door A. van Stolk* (Amsterdam, 1901), 135.

[43] BHIC, *Plakkaten* 2237, 1 October 1724. The taxes were levied on a sliding scale relating to the household income: a household with an income of less than 4,000 guilders paid four guilders; that with 4,000 to 10,000 guilders paid six guilders; with 10,000 to 20,000 guilders paid twelve guilders in duties; a household with an income of more than 20,000 guilders paid fifteen guilders in duties.

[44] P.C. Molhuysen (ed.), *Bronnen tot de geschiedenis der Leidsche Universiteit* ('s-Gravenhage: Nijhoff, 1920), "Act of Senate in the year of 1639 under the decision of Rector D. Philippus Reinhardus Vitriarius" (*Acta Senatus anno 1693 Rectore Magnificus D. Philippo Reinhardo Vitriario*), dl. 4, 109.

[45] See note 42.

[46] BHIC, *Plakkaten* 1607, 17 May 1776.

[47] BHIC, *Plakkaten* 2157, 2 September 1791.

[48] F.S. Gaastra, "The Dutch East India Company in National and International Perspective", in Philippe Haudère, René Estienne, and Gérard Le Bouëdec, *Les flottes des Compagnies des Indes, 1600-1857* (Vincennes: Service Historique de la Marine, 1996), 310.

[49] Broeze, "Het einde", 131.

[50] Van der Kemp, *Oost-Indië's geldmiddelen*, 299-302.

[51] Both the Russian Government caravan trade and private trade were engaged in the tea business with China, but in 1762 the Government caravan trade came to an end, and then the private traders began to dominate the tea trade. See Zhuang, *Tea, Silver, Opium and War,* 142-146.

[52] NA VOC 4544, Demand of return by the China Committee for 1770, 20 September 1768.

[53] Broeze, "Het einde", 134.

[54] Hoh-cheung Mui and Lorna H. Mui, "Smuggling", 50.

[55] NA (UK) PRO 30/8/354:247, *Memorial on Smuggling*, 12 March 1784.

## *Notes to Chapter Six*

[1] Ingrid G. Dillo, *De nadagen van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie 1783-1795: Schepen en zeevarenden* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1992), 28.

[2] J. Aalbers, "Het machtsverval van de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden 1713-1741", in J. Aalbers and A.P. van Goudoever (eds), *Machtsverval in de internationale context* (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff: Forsten, 1986), 32.

[3] For the nature, beginning, and conduct of the war, see Reginald Savory, *His Britannic Majesty's Army in Germany during the Seven Years' War* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966); Lawrence Jay Oliva, *Misalliance: A Study of French Policy in Russia during the Seven Years' War* (New York: New York University Press, 1964); Herbert H. Kaplan, *Russia and the Outbreak of the Seven Years' War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

[4] For a further explanation of why and how the Republic decided to retain the neutralist policy at the beginning of the Seven Years' War, see Alice Clare Carter, *The Dutch Republic in Europe in the Seven Years' War* (London: Macmillan, 1971); Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall 1477-1806* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 1113-1115.

[5] M.G. Buist, "The Sinews of War: The Role of Dutch Finance in European Politics (c. 1750-1815)", in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds), *Britain and the Netherlands* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), Vol. 1, 126.

[6] Els M. Jacobs argues that the direct trade with China in the second half of the eighteenth century did not really prepare the VOC for battle in the Chinese tea trade, because in that half century the financial situation of the VOC was worrying and the directors had great difficulty finding ways to decrease its indebtedness, and in such a situation the Gentlemen Seventeen could not release extra funds for the business in China. This thesis needs to be analysed more deeply, and it is probably very true for the years 1780-1795 when the VOC suffered a loss on the total Company sales and the Chinese tea sales. Yet, in the period 1750-1780 the VOC earned profits of 3,100,000, 14,700,000, and 13,100,000 guilders per decade from the total Company sales, and in the years 1757-1781 the VOC earned gross profits of 17,471,052 and 14,574,623 guilders each eleven years. See Jacobs, *Koopman in Azië*, 148; J.P. de Korte, *De jaarlijkse financiële verantwoording in de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), Appendix I (D and E); Jörg, *Porcelain*, Appendix 2; Figure 3 in Chapter Five, and Appendices 5 and 6.

[7] Jan de Vries and A.M. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 46.

[8] Ibid; Peter Razzell, *Essays in English Population History* (London: Caliban Books, 1994), 12.

[9] Razzell, *Essays in English Population History*, 623.

[10] Especially the three security merchants of the VOC, who were supported by the small Hong merchants, often came into conflict with Poan Keequa, the president of the Co-hong, about some of his abuse of power (NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 23 March 1764); sometimes its members themselves were also confused about how to strictly apply the regulations (NA NFC 73, Daily record of the supercargoes, 11 April 1764); some new regulations were even issued six years later in 1766 by the *Tsongtu* (NA NFC 75, Daily record of the supercargoes, 29 January 1766). These chaotic situations were certainly advantageous to the Europeans to do their business in Canton.

[11] In February 1771, *Tsongtu* Li Shiyao ordered the Co-hong be dissolved, and the European traders could negotiate with the respective Hong merchants with whom they wanted to deal. According to the English sources, the *Tsongtu* did so at the request of the English who bribed the latter with 100,000 taels via Poan Keequa. See Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. I, 301.

[12] I completely concur with the views of Van Dyke in his detailed study of the inner workings of the port of Canton. See Van Dyke, *Port Canton*, passim.

[13] The Dutch Republic was the first nation to salute the flag of the United States of America.

[14] Jan Wilhelm Schulte Nordholt, *The Dutch Republic and American Independence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 150-156.

[15] Vries and Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 491.

[16] Cornelis Christiaan Goslinga, *The Dutch in the Caribbean and the Guianas 1680-1791* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1985), 56, 147-151, and 583.

[17] Jur van Goor, *De Nederlandse koloniën: geschiedenis van de Nederlandse expansie, 1600-1975* (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgeverij, 1993), 175-177.

[18] Jur van Goor, "The Colonial Factor in Anglo-Dutch Relations, 1780-1820", in: Nigel Ashton and Duco Hellema (eds), *Unspoken Allies: Anglo-Dutch Relations since 1780* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001), 22.

[19] H.P.H. Jansen, *Kalendarium: geschiedenis van de Lage Landen in jaartallen* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1999), 141.

[20] Jörg, *Porcelain*, 200.

[21] Gaastra, "War, Competition and Collaboration: Relations between the English and Dutch East India Companies in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", in H.V. Bowen et al. (eds), *The Worlds of the East India Company* (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2002), 66.

[22] J.J. Steur has calculated the total loss at 43.5 instead of 43 million guilders. See Steur, *Herstel of ondergang*, 155. All their calculations are derived from NA VOC 191, Resolution of the Gentlemen Seventeen, 3 July 1783.

[23] Vries and Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 455.

[24] Gaastra, *The Dutch East India Company*, 167-168.

[25] Gaastra, "De organisatie van de Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie", in *Inventaris van het archief van de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden van Indië 1612-1811* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2002), 25.

[26] E.S. van Eijck van Heslinga, *Van Compagnie naar koopvaardij: de scheepvaartverbinding van de Bataafse Republiek met de koloniën in Azië 1795-1806* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1988), 35.

[27] In 1784, businessmen from Philadelphia and New York launched the direct Sino-American trade with the ship the *Empress of China*. Foster Rhea Dulles, *The Old China Trade* (New York: AMA Press, 1970), 1-12.

[28] Zhuang, *Tea, Silver, Opium and War*, 117.

[29] Broeze, "Het einde", 132.

[30] Hoh-cheung Mui and L.H. Mui, *The Management of Monopoly*, xi.

[31] The duties on tea were at least 80 per cent of the value, but frequently more than 100 per cent.

[32] Hoh-cheung Mui and L.H. Mui, "The Commutation Act", 234.

[33] The Dutch business practice of supplying goods (tin and pepper) in exchange for goods (tea) was skilfully imitated by English country traders. They then offered the earnings in silver to the EIC trade representatives in Canton for bills of exchange drawn on

London. In such a way, the EIC had enough silver for the purchase of tea. See NA VOC 4435, Letter from the Dutch supercargoes to the China Committee, 10 December 1787; Morse, *The Chronicles*, Vol. II, 119-121, 137, 141-144; Jörg, *Porcelain*, 42.

[34] An import duty of 15 per cent was fixed on Bohea; 22 per cent on Souchong; 45 per cent on Hyson; and 27 per cent on other green teas. See A. Bierens de Haan et al., *Memorie boek van Pakhuismeesteren*, 51.

[35] In 1787, there was a great scarcity of silver in Canton because of the costly war against the rebels on Taiwan, for which the merchants in Canton were also forced to help to foot the bill. See James W. Davidson, *The Island of Formosa: Historical View from 1430-1900; History, People Resources, and Commercial Prospects: Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants and other Productions* (Taihoku, 1903), 79-80.

[36] The Dutch supercargoes were overwhelmed by a storm of complaints about bad quality Bohea from the Republic. See NA NFC 169, Letters from the China Committee to the supercargoes, 8 and 26 November 1790.

[37] See note 15 in Chapter Five.

[38] In the years 1794-1795, the High Government, at the suggestion of the Dutch chief A.E. van Braam Houckgeest, even sent an embassy under Isaac Titsingh to Peking, in order to obtain better trading conditions and score over the EIC. See J.J.L. Duyvendak, "The Last Dutch Embassy to the Chinese Court (1794-1795)", *T'oung Pao* 34 (Leiden: Sinology Institute, 1938): 1-137.

[39] Eijck van Heslinga, *Van Compagnie naar koopvaardij*, 93.

## APPENDIX 1

# PRECIOUS METALS BROUGHT BY THE VOC CHINA SHIPS INTO CANTON, 1758-1794

(in guilders approximately)

| Year | Value (sent from Europe) | Value (remained at Canton) | Remarks (on the precious metals from home) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1759* | 1,000,000 | none | calculated in guilders only | |
| *1760* | 1,000,000 | none | calculated in guilders only | |
| *1761* | 500,000 | none | Spanish rials | 200,000 |
| *1762* | 875,000 | none | Spanish rials | 350,000 |
| *1763* | 750,000 | none | Spanish rials | 300,000 |
| *1764* | 750,000 | 854,140 | Spanish rials | 300,000 |
| *1765* | 950,000 | 1,120,000 | Spanish rials | 380,000 |
| *1766* | 1,446,700 | 320,000 | *Mexicanen* (marks) | 62,900 |
| *1767* | 1,446,700 | 320,000 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1768* | 1,446,700 | 1,179,284 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1769* | 1,446,700 | 706,536 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1770* | 1,446,700 | 800,000 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1771* | 1,446,700 | 800,000 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1772* | 1,446,700 | 800,000 | *Mexicanen* | 62,900 |
| *1773* | 828,000 | 600,000 | *Mexicanen* | 36,000 |
| *1774* | 510,830 | 406,392 | *Mexicanen* | 22,210 |
| *1775* | 839,500 | 951,536 | *Mexicanen* | 36,500 |
| *1776* | 759,000 | 700,424 | *Mexicanen* | 33,000 |
| *1777* | 846,400 | 716,228 | *Mexicanen* | 36,800 |
| *1778* | 759,000 | 459,816 | *Mexicanen* | 33,000 |
| *1779* | 1,237,009 | 359,116 | *Mexicanen* | 53,783 |
| *1780* | 1,771,000 | 259,104 | *Mexicanen* | 77,000 |
| *1781* | 1,209,990 | 743,020 | *Mexicanen* | 53,000 |
| *1782* | none | * 328,000 | * left over for the next season | |
| *1783* | 960,428 | none | piasters > half, ducats < half | |
| *1784* | 1,200,000 | none | gold ducats half, piasters half | |
| *1785* | 897,000 | none | piaster | 39,000 |
| *1786* | 1,237,400 | none | *Mexicanen* | 53,800 |
| *1787* | 1,380,000 | none | piaster | 60,000 |
| *1788* | 2,070,000 | none | piaster | 90,000 |
| *1789* | 2,760,000 | none | *Mexicanen* | 120,000 |
| *1790* | 1,200,100 | none | *Mexicanen* | (calculated in guilders) |
| *1791* | 718,000 | none | *Mexicanen* | (calculated in guilders) |
| *1792* | 1,440,000 | none | piaster | (calculated in guilders) |
| *1793* | 1,400,000 | none | *Mexicanen* | (calculated in guilders) |
| *1794* | 1,080,000 | none | *Mexicanen* | (calculated in guilders) |

Sources: NA VOC 4543-4547; NA NFC 25, 36-43; J.R. Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vol. I, 240-245.

APPENDIX 2

# ASSESSMENTS OF THE MERCHANDISE IMPORTED BY THE VOC INTO CANTON, 1758-1793

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| *1758-1759* | | |
| With the *Zuidbeveland* (150 feet, Captain Hendrik Booms, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Banten pepper | 119,602 | to Tsja Hunqua, Semqua, & Tayqua |
| Bangka tin | 800,068 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Soequa, Swetja, & Jong Hoeyqua |
| Surat cotton | 114,796 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| Malabar sandalwood | 46,433 | to Tsja Hunqua |
| rattan | 41,548 | to the shopkeeper Babtist (alias) |
| myrrh | 2,311 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| catechu | 3,388 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| liquid storax | 225 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| Baros camphor | 70 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| Ceylon pearl dust | 21 | |
| Banda pearl dust | 17/64 | |
| lead | 2,650 | to Macq (comprador) |
| | (ells) | |
| *laken* | 5,346 | to Tsja Hunqua |
| printed *laken* | 1,226 | |
| *polemieten* | 10,451 | |
| *ras de Marocco* | 5,553 | |
| | (pieces) | |
| *perpetuanen* | 100 | |
| *imperialen* | 46 | |
| delivery date: 23 September 1758 | | deliverer: H. Booms |
| delivery place: Dutch factory in Canton | | receiver: B. Karsseboom |
| | | |
| With the *Velsen* (150 feet, Captain Marcus Tetting, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 6,200 | to Tan Chetqua & Swetja |
| cloves | 6,452 | to Tan Chetqua & Swetja |
| delivery date: 16 November 1758 | | deliverer: M. Tetting |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: M. Graal, Eg. Geniets, M.W. Hulle, etc. |
| | | |
| With the *Renswoude* (150 feet, Captain Jan Zacharias Nauwman, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 868,003 | to Swetja, Tan Chetqua, Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| nutmeg | 6,116 | to Tan Chetqua & Swetja |
| cloves | 6,285 | to Tan Chetqua & Swetja |
| Surat cotton | 221,387 | to Tsja Hunqua |
| Baros camphor | 933 | to diverse merchants |
| cochineal | 505 | to diverse merchants |
| delivery date: 16 November 1758 & 12 January 1759 | | deliverer: J.Z. Nauwman |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: M.W. Hulle, J.B. Schartouw, & B. Karsseboom |
| *1763* | | |
| With the *Slooten* (150 feet, Captain Christian Hagerop, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 948,213 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| nutmeg | 8,369 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 8,288 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Banten pepper | 297,590 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 8,459 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| blue dye | 984 | to Consciens Giqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 126 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| | (taels) | |
| Banda pearl dust | 4.1 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Ceylon pearl dust | 33 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 31 October 1763 | | deliverer: C. Hagerop |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: M.W. Hulle |
| With the *Huijs te Bijweg* (150 feet, Captain Dirk van Mastricht, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca & Bangka tin | 948,389 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| nutmeg | 4,159 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 4,250 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Banten pepper | 293,873 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 8,605 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| blue dye | 1,036 | to Consciens Giqua |
| clove oil | 2½ | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| mother-of-cloves | 125 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| delivery date: 31 October 1763 | | deliverer: D. van Mastricht |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: M.W. Hulle |
| With the *Westerveld* (150 feet, Captain Hans Bruns, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin | 769,358 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| rattan | 8,660 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| bird's nests | 670 | to Tan Tsjoqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 125 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| | (pieces) | |
| *polemieten* | 15 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| printed carpets | 127 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| printed *laken* | 42 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co. |
| delivery date: 31 October 1763 | | deliverer: H. Bruns |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: M.W. Hulle |
| *1764* | | |
| With the *Aschat* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin | 835,003 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Banten & Palembang pepper | 495,158 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Baros camphor | 258 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| *olibanum* | 1,488 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,381 | to the above-mentioned merchants |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| | (pieces) | |
| *polemieten* | 27 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| printed *laken* | 39 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (chest) | |
| fire engine & accessories | 1 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 8 October 1764 | | deliverer: C. Kuijper |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Spliethof & Guitard |
| | | |
| With the *Ruijterveld* (150 feet, Captain Isaac van den Bergh, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin | 961,786 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Cheribon arrack | 194,307 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| printed *laken* | 33 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 4 October 1764 | | deliverer: I. van den Bergh |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Spliethof & Guitard |
| | | |
| With the *Huijs Om* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca (inkpot) & Bangka tin | 1,065,388 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Banten pepper | 197,378 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Surat cotton | 4,083 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 10 October 1764 | | deliverer: C. Pietersz. |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & R. Schellewaart |
| | | |
| With the *'s Lands Welvaaren* (140 feet, Captain Pieter Fruijt, by the Delft Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| tin | 80,000 | for return ballast |
| tin | 619,490 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Banten pepper | 302,358 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,377 | for use on board |
| mother-of-cloves | 128 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 7 October 1764 | | deliverer: P. Fruijt |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & R. Schellewaart |
| | | |
| *1765* | | |
| With the *Vreedenhoff* (150 feet, Captain Willem van Braam, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 73,550 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 775,080 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Palembang pepper | 398,540 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese copper | 125,175 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 125 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 834 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| mother-of-cloves | 250 | stored in the warehouse |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 1,294 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| printed *laken* | 1,192 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| *laken* carpets | 38 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 12 September 1765 | | deliverer: W. van Braam |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & F. Helen |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
| --- | --- | --- |
| With the *Noordbeveland* (150 feet, Captain Simon Both, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 73,550 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 824,030 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Banten pepper | 297,698 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese bar-copper | 124,704 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 739 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Surat putchuck | 7,996 | stored in the warehouse |
| bird's nests | 110 | stored in the warehouse |
| mother-of-cloves | 252 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 1,710 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| printed *laken* | 1,310 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 8 September 1765 | | deliverer: S. Both |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.C. Steeger & J. van der Bergh |
| With the *Pallas* (150 feet, Captain Jacobus Boekhoudt, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 73,550 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 1,023,825 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Palembang pepper | 298,017 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 27 September 1765 | | deliverer: J. Boekhoudt |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Schartouw & Karneboom |
| With the *Walenburg* (140 feet, Captain Crasmus de Vries, by the Rotterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 60,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 695,219 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 167,169 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| bird's nests | 68 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 22 September 1765 | | deliverer: C. de Vries |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Guitard & Rocquette |
| *1766* | | |
| With the *Jonge Thomas* (150 feet, Captain Jacob Wiebe, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 110,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 890,267 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Palembang pepper | 297,000 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese copper | 74,871 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,277 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 6,281 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 8 September 1766 | | deliverer: J. Wiebe |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Schartouw & Hemmingson |
| With the *Jonge Lieve* (150 feet, Captain Hendrik de Haart, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Malacca inkpot tin | 114,500 | for return ballast |
| Malacca inkpot tin | 886,842 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese copper | 74,975 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: xx October 1766 | | deliverer: H. de Haart |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karneboom & C.H. Alphusius |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| With the *Nieuw Rhoon* (150 feet, Captain A. in 't Anker, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 110,021 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 890,813 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Palembang pepper | 198,400 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese copper | 100,154 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 10,565 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,257 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 6,279 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 22 September 1766 | | deliverer: A. in 't Anker |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: van Braam Houckgeest & Rocquette |
| With the *Bartha Petronella* (140 feet, Captain Leendert van Coopstad, by the Chambers of Hoorn & Enkhuizen) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 516,299 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 85,036 | for return ballast |
| Banten pepper | 195,555 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Japanese copper | 125,156 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 35,144 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 8,348 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 22 September 1766 | | deliverer: L. van Coopstad |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & Hemmingson |
| *1767* | | |
| With the *Geijnwensch* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 449,851 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| lead | 51,027 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 252 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 2,056 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 15 September 1767 | | deliverer: C. Kuijper |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Spliethoff & Arents |
| With the *Ganzenhoeff* (150 feet, Captain Tijs Fiereman, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 800,921 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 125,829 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 679 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 254½ | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 6,272 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 14 September 1767 | | deliverer: T. Fiereman |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: Kintsius & J. H. Rijnagh |
| With the *Pallas* (150 feet, Captain Jacobus Boekhoudt, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 449,695 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,406 | stored in the warehouse |
| cloves | 6,392 | stored in the warehouse |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| mother-of-cloves | 253 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 14 & 30 September 1767 | | deliverer: J. Boekhoudt |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Schartouw, F. Helene, B. Houckgeest, & J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Vrouwe Margaretha Marria* (150 feet, Captain Arij Arkenbout, by the Chambers of Hoorn & Enkhuizen) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 11,619 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 300,357 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 50,234 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,353 | stored in the warehouse |
| cloves | 6,344 | stored in the warehouse |
| mother-of-cloves | 256 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 14 September 1767 | | deliverer: A. Arkenbout |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karneboom & J. van den Bergh |
| *1768* | | |
| With the *Woestduijn* (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 132,250 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 673,595 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| lead | 55,042 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 125 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 11,853 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 15 September 1768 | | deliverer: J. Och |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J. van den Bergh & L. Serrurier |
| With the *Jonge Thomas* (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 132,260 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 670,028 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 54,393 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 125 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 10,776 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 15 September 1767 | | deliverer: W. Popta |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: B. Houckgeest & Teschemacher |
| With the *Willem de Vijfde* (150 feet, Captain Jan Cauvas, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 132,260 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 670,418 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| mother-of-cloves | 206 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 15 September 1768 | | deliverer: J. Cauvas |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.C. Steeger & Hemmingson |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| With the *Paauw* (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Chambers of Rotterdam & Delft) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 103,230 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 495,321 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 8,562 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 28 September 1768 | | deliverer: G. Harmeijer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: I. Guitard & B. Stuijper |
| *1769* | | |
| With the *Oostcapelle* (150 feet, Captain Fredrick Papegaaij, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 171,523 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 200,000 | for return ballast |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 29 September 1769 | | deliverer: F. Papegaaij |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.C. Steeger & L. Serrurier |
| With the *'t Loo* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 805,076 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 105,933 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 247 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,282 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 6,408 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,398 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 24 September 1769 | | deliverer: C. Pietersz. |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & J.P. Certon |
| With the *Oud Haarlem* (150 feet, Captain Pieter Sijbrands Flouth, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 107,175 | to Tsja Hunqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| mother-of-cloves | 249 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,362 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 27 September 1769 | | deliverer: P.S. Flouth |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Houckgeest & J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Tempel* (140 feet, Captain Wouter Macquelijn, by the Chambers of Rotterdam & Delft) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 70,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 589,766 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,266 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| cloves | 5,938 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: xx 1769 | | deliverer: W. Macquelijn |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karneboom & Arents |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| *1770* | | |
| With the *Prinses van Oranje* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Kuijper, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 698,503 | to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| lead | 66,674 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 250 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| pearl dust | 93 | stored in the warehouse |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 6,526 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 27 September 1770 | | deliverer: C. Kuijper |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.C. Steeger & J.H. Rijnnagh |
| With the *Willem de Vijfde* (150 feet, Captain Fredrik Visser, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 702,040 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 193,862 | to the above-mentioned merchants & the Co-hong |
| lead | 117,306 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 250 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| *polemieten* | 6,598 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 27 September 1770 | | deliverer: F. Visser |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & Karneboom |
| With the *Bodt* (150 feet, Captain Jan Rondekrans, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 697,590 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 19,718 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 27 September 1770 | | deliverer: J. Rondekrans |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Houckgeest & Teschemacher |
| With the *Jonge Hellingman* (140 feet, Captain Jan Baltus Meijer, by the Chambers of Hoorn & Enkhuizen) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 499,333 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 98,784 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 17 September 1770 | | deliverer: J. B. Meijer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J. van de Bergh & J.H. Alphusius |
| *1771* | | |
| With the *Lam* (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Enkhuizen Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 699,725 | to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co., Tan Chetqua, & Inksja |
| pepper | 99,789 | to the above-mentioned merchants |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 15 October 1771 | | deliverer: G. Harmeijer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karneboom & M. Gardijn |
| | | |
| With the *Oud Haarlem* (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 550,188 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 296,376 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 349 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg & cloves | 12,624 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 100,490 | stored in the warehouse |
| pearl dust | 85 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 16 October 1771 | | deliverer: J. Och |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| | | |
| With the *'t Loo* (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 552,808 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Malacca tin | 199,996 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Banten pepper | 295,811 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg & cloves | 12,458 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 240 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 100,334 | stored in the warehouse |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 8 October 1771 | | deliverer: W. Popta |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Kintsius & M. Gardij |
| | | |
| With the *Oostcapelle* (150 feet, Captain Frederik Papegaaij, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 602,516 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Malacca tin | 200,367 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 297,539 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| mother-of-cloves | 250 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 15 October 1771 | | deliverer: F. Papegaaij |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: B. Houckgeest |
| | | |
| *1772* | | |
| With the *Bodt* (150 feet, Captain Damian Húgo Staring, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 133,334 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 715,944 | to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co. |
| Banten pepper | 337,418 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg & cloves | 12,504 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 16 October 1772 | | deliverer: D.H. Staring |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: P. Kintsius |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| With the *Prinses van Oranje* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis Pietersz., by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 133,333 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 714,751 | to Tingqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| Banten pepper | 345,061 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 99,806 | to Tinqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 982 | to Tinqua |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 18 September 1772 | | deliverer: C. Pietersz. |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Veldhoen* (150 feet, Captain Pieter Sijbrands Flouth, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 133,333 | for return ballast |
| Bangka & Malacca tin | 710,394 | to Tinqua, Poan Keequa, & Monqua |
| Banten pepper | 393,232 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 99,103 | to Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co. |
| mother-of-cloves | 927 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 7 October 1772 | | deliverer: P.S. Flouth |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Kuijper & Certon |
| *1773* | | |
| With the *Holland* (150 feet, Captain Hans Hansse, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 10,775 | to Tayqua & brothers, & Inksja |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 51,354 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| Bangka tin | 401,592 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| nutmeg | 6,252 | to Tinqua & Inksja |
| cloves | 6,219 | to Tinqua & Inksja |
| mother-of-cloves | 860 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| Timor sandalwood | 7,630 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 26 September 1773 | | deliverer: H. Hansse |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & Kuijper |
| With the *Voorberg* (150 feet, Captain Fredrik Visser, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 10,888 | to Tayqua & brothers, & Inksja |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 51,278 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| Malacca tin | 152,008 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 129,329 | to diverse merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 26 September 1773 | | deliverer: F. Visser |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.P. Certon & J.G. Steijn |
| With the *Europa* (155 feet, Captain Jacobus de Freijn, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 400,746 | to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja, Tinqua, & Poan Keequa |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| lead | 100,147 | to Tayqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 800 | to Tinqua |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 30 September 1773 | | deliverer: J. de Freijn |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den S. Hancke |
| | | |
| With the *Jonge Hellingman* (140 feet, Captain Jan Baltus Meijer, by the Rotterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 502,088 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| nutmeg & cloves | 12,543 | to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja, & Tinqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 840 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pearl dust | 27 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 24 September 1773 | | deliverer: J. B. Meijer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Kintsius & Benthem |
| | | |
| *1774* | | |
| With the *Vrijheid* (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 10,897 | to Inksja |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 1,008 | to Inksja |
| lead | 104,053 | to Inksja & Tinqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 1,240 | to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja |
| Banten pepper | 247,455 | to Inksja |
| Bangka tin | 602,620 | to Inksja |
| pearl dust | 40 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| delivery date: 4 October 1774 | | deliverer: J. Och |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Kintsius & Hemmingson |
| | | |
| With the *Ceres* (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 10,937 | to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 952 | to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers |
| lead | 103,162 | to Inksja, Tayqua & brothers |
| Banten pepper | 243,143 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| Bangka tin | 401,211 | to Tayqua & brothers |
| delivery date: 3 October 1774 | | deliverer: W. Popta |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J. van den Bergh & J. van den S. Hancke |
| | | |
| With the *Oostcapelle* (150 feet, Captain Jan Abel, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 247,581 | to Tayqua & brothers, Inksja, & Tinqua |
| lead | 100,327 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Malacca tin | 89,019 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 312,110 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 16 October 1774 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & J.H. Alphusius |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| With the *Beemster Welvaaren* (140 feet, Captain Marten Schoning, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 237,972 | to Tinqua |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 601,336 | to Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers |
| lead | 100,357 | to Inksja, Tinqua, Tayqua & brothers |
| mother-of-cloves | 1,326 | to Inksja |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: xx October 1774 | | deliverer: M. Schoning |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: P. Kintsius & J.H. Alphusius |
| *1775* | | |
| With the *Indiaan* (150 feet, Captain Jan Fredrik Raatjes, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 598,964 | to Inksja |
| pepper | 295,673 | to Inksja |
| pearl dust | 28 | to Inkjsa |
| blue dye | 600 | to Inksja |
| lead | 149,640 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Inksja |
| nutmeg | 6,275 | to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua |
| cloves | 31,274 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 1,538 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,241 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 19 September 1775 | | deliverer: J.F. Raatjes |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Morgenster* (150 feet, Captain Gerrit Springer, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 301,129 | to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| pepper | 201,786 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 19 September 1775 | | deliverer: G. Springer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J.H. Alphusius |
| With the *Europa* (155 feet, Captain Francois van Ewijk, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 236,492 | to Tinqua |
| pepper | 488,318 | to Tinqua, Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| lead | 52,272 | to Tinqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 2,800 | to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| blue dye | 100 | |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 19 September 1775 | | deliverer: F. van Ewijk |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Jonge Hugo* (140 feet, Captain Hendrik Hilverduijn, by the Enkhuizen Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| tin | 100,000 | for return ballast |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| tin | 403,956 | to Tinqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua |
| pepper | 296,757 | to Tinqua |
| mother-of-cloves | 250 | to Tinqua |
| rattan | 9,375 | for use on board |
| delivery date: 19 September 1775 | | deliverer: H. Hilverduijn |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J.H. Alphusius |
| *1776* | | |
| With the *Triton* (150 feet, Captain Pieter van Prooijen, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,449 | to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua |
| *Grijnen* | 815 | to Inksja |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 151,613 | to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua |
| Bangka tin | 500,869 | to Inksja & Monqua |
| sandalwood | 24,708 | to Tsjonqua |
| cloves | 8,524 | to Inksja, Tinqua, Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 18 September 1776 | | deliverer: P. van Prooijen |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| With the *Blok* (150 feet, Captain Jacob de Lange, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 11,117 | to Inksja & Tan Tsjoqua |
| *laken* | 3,656 | to Inksja & Tinqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 2,177 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Inksja, & Tinqua |
| Bangka tin | 415,969 | to Tinqua, Tsjonqua, Inksja, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua |
| lead | 200,437 | to Inksja |
| delivery date: 18 September 1776 | | deliverer: J. de Lange |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & B. Kuijper |
| With the *Ceres* (150 feet, Captain Johannes van Voorst, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 21,994 | to Tinqua, Tsjonqua, & Tan Tsjoqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 1,816 | to Tinqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| nutmeg & cloves | 16,520 | to Inksja, Tinqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 301,198 | to Tinqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| arrack | 29,895 | to Tinqua |
| sapanwood | 33,925 | to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| lead | 8,190 | to Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 18 September 1776 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karnebeek & Benthem |
| With the *Buijtenleeven* (140 feet, Captain Jan Caatman, by the Delft Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Siam sapanwood | 189,929 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua |
| Bangka tin | 150,027 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Inksja |
| delivery date: 18 September 1776 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: [no signature] |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| *1777* | | |
| With the *Zeepaard* (150 feet, Captain Jan Och, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 15,480 | to Koqua, Tsjonqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 1,482 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 100,764 | to Inksja & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 300,146 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Cheribon arrack | 95,512 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua |
| sandalwood | 46,825 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pearl dust | 34 | |
| delivery date: 14 September 1777 | | deliverer: J. Och |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & A.A. Boers |
| With the *Ganges* (150 feet, Captain Wopke Popta, by the Amsterdam Cahmber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 17,616 | to Inksja & Koqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 1,832 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 50,089 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 499,150 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| Palembang pepper | 149,636 | to Inksja |
| nutmeg | 12,481 | to Inksja, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| cloves | 12,547 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 13 September 1777 | | deliverer: W. Popta |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & B. Kuijper |
| With the *Overduijn* (150 feet, Captain J.C. Roose, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Palembang pepper | 147,886 | to Inksja |
| Bangka tin | 499,819 | to Inksja, Tsjonqua, Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| delivery date: 19 September 1777 | | deliverer: J.C. Roose |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karnebeek & Benthem |
| With the *Canaän* (140 feet, Captain Willem Koelbier, by the Rotterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 400,904 | to Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| lead | 102,657 | to Koqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 14 September 1777 | | deliverer: W. Koelbier |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.P. Certon & J. van den S. Hancke |
| *1778* | | |
| With the *Abbekerk* (140 feet, Captain Kasper Burger, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 705,602 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Palembang pepper | 97,074 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 14 November 1778 | | deliverer: K. Burger |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Kuijper & Rhenius |
| With the *Dolphijn* (150 feet, Captain J.F. Raatjes, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 23,152 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 2,307 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 399,328 | to Inksja |
| Palembang pepper | 99,531 | to Inksja |
| kapok | 27,135 | to Tsjonqua |
| Timor sandalwood | 50,768 | to Tsjonqua |
| lead | 152,910 | to Inksja & Tsjonqua |
| pearl dust | 38 | |
| delivery date: 8 October 1778 | | deliverer: J.F. Raatjes |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: E. van Karnebeek & J. Nebbens |
| | | |
| With the *Vreedenhoff* (150 feet, Captain R. den Uijt, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 9,928 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 967 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 150,401 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 601,078 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Palembang pepper | 97,831 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| delivery date: 11 November 1778 | | deliverer: R. den Uijt |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J. van den Bergh |
| | | |
| With the *Zeeuw* (150 feet, Captain J. Sierevelt, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 399,512 | to Tsjonqua |
| pepper | 97,661 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| nutmeg | 12,544 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| cloves | 12,547 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| arrack | 57,385 | to Tsjonqua |
| kapok | 26,797 | to Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 2 October 1778 | | deliverer: J. Sierevelt |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & Serrurier |
| | | |
| *1779* | | |
| With the *Blok* (150 feet, Captain Jacob de Lange, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,553 | to Inksja, Tsjonqua, Monqua, & Tan Tsjoqua |
| *laken* | 2,295 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,164 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Timor sandalwood | 46,514 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 707,672 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 113,727 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 7 October 1779 | | deliverer: J. de Lange |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & J.J. Idemans |
| | | |
| With the *Zeeploeg* (150 feet, Captain Jan Still, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 16,531 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, & Poan Keequa |
| *laken* | 4,946 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,290 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 122,516 | to Monqua & Tsjonqua |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| pepper | 396,943 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 403,166 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 50,169 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 25 October 1779 | | deliverer: J. Still |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karnebeek & Idemans |
| | | |
| With the *Voorberg* (150 feet, Captain Johannes van Voorst, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 3,156 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| cloves | 9,376 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| arrack | 125,435 | to Inksja |
| pepper | 392,127 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, & Monqua |
| tin | 175,048 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua |
| tin | 327,311 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 4 November 1779 | | deliverer: J. van Voorst |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & Nebbens |
| | | |
| With the *Java* (140 feet, Captain Jan Mijndertse Swaal, by the Enkhuizen Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 3,175 | to Inksja, Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| cloves | 8,368 | |
| pepper | 392,942 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| tin | 454,950 | stored in the warehouse |
| lead | 99,985 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 17 November 1779 | | deliverer: J.M. Swaal |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & Benthem |
| | | |
| *1780* | | |
| With the *Honcoop* (150 feet, Captain Axel Land, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pearl dust | 53 | to Pinqua |
| lead | 161,580 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua |
| cloves | 12,347 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| pepper | 197,842 | to Monqua & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 605,148 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 12,045 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, & Poan Keequ |
| *laken* | 6,020 | to Monqua & Tan Tsjoqua |
| delivery date: 31 October 1780 | | deliverer: A. Land |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Karnebeek & Idemans |
| | | |
| With the *Paerl* (150 feet, Captain D.C. Plokker, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 21,368 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, Poan Keequa, & Limpo Tsjouqua |
| *laken* | 3,527 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,065 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 158,294 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Monqua |
| pepper | 98,376 | to Tan Tsjoqua |
| Bangka tin | 524,727 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua, and stored in the warehouse |
| Malacca tin | 118,761 | to Tsjonqua |
| delivery date: 1 October 1780 | | deliverer: D.C. Plokker |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & L. Lund |
| | | |
| With the *Middelburg* (150 feet, Captain J. van Gennep, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 193,840 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 668,838 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua, and stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 15,000 | for return ballast |
| Malacca tin | 14,652 | to Tsjonqua |
| Malacca tin | 20,017 | for return ballast |
| delivery date: 1 November 1780 | | deliverer: J. van Gennep |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & Nebbens |
| | | |
| With the *Hoogkarspel* (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Harmeijer, by the Delft Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| cloves | 12,533 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tsjonqua |
| pepper | 294,722 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Tiqua (silk fabricant) |
| Bangka tin | 549,283 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, & Tiqua |
| delivery date: 31 October 1780 | | deliverer: G. Harmeijer |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Serrurier & Idemans |
| | | |
| *1781* | | |
| No ships at Canton | | |
| *1782* | | |
| No ships at Canton | | |
| | | |
| *1783* | | |
| With the *Potsdam* (150 feet, Captain Bernard Christian Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 22,065 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Tsjonqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| *laken* | 4,986 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,717 | to Tsjonqua |
| clove oil | 3½ | to Monqua |
| Japanese bar-copper | 62,511 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| lead | 56,373 | to Tsjonqua |
| pepper | 600,736 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Tsjonqua, & Pinqua |
| Bangka tin | 81,800 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 245,575 | stored in the warehouse |
| Malacca tin | 15,028 | stored in the warehouse |
| nutmeg | 6,214 | stored in the warehouse |
| cloves | 6,260 | stored in the warehouse |
| delivery date: 16 November 1783 | | deliverer: B.C. Muller |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & Idemans |
| | | |
| With the *Breslau* (150 feet, Captain Johannes Cornelis Roose, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 44,404 | to Tsjonqua |
| Japanese bar-copper | 62,574 | to Tsjonqua, Pinqua, & Monqua |
| pepper | 601,358 | to Monqua & Tsjonqua |
| Bangka tin | 255,188 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| Bangka tin | 72,668 | stored in the warehouse |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| Malacca tin | 15,033 | stored in the warehouse |
| nutmeg | 6,332 | stored in the warehouse |
| cloves | 6,270 | stored in the warehouse |
| clove oil | 3½ | to Monqua |
| delivery date: 19 November 1783 | | deliverer: J.C. Roose |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Rhenius & Klinkert |
| | | |
| *1784* | | |
| With the *Gouverneur Generaal de Klerk* (150 feet, Captain Jochem Bank, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| black pepper | 295,261 | to Monqua, Tan Tsjoqua, Kiouqua, & Pinqua |
| Japanese bar-copper | 60,453 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 642,164 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 160,000 | for return ballast |
| delivery date: 29 September 1784 | | deliverer: J. Bank |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Serrurier & J.H. Rabinel |
| | | |
| With the *Draak* (150 feet, Captain Arie Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 28,275 | stored in the warehouse |
| | (pounds) | |
| Japanese bar-copper | 62,555 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 621,636 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 180,000 | for return ballast |
| clove oil | 3½ | stored in the warehouse |
| pepper | 234,057 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua |
| delivery date: 20 October 1784 | | deliverer: A. Kikkert |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: E. van Karnebeek & M. Nolthenius |
| | | |
| With the *Brederode* (150 feet, Captain Gottlieb Mulder, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *laken* | 4,584 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 1,327 | to Attacq* (comprador) |
| pepper | 236,465 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua |
| Japanese bar-copper | 62,507 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 624,865 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua |
| Bangka tin | 180,000 | for return ballast |
| delivery date: 4 December 1784 | | deliverer: G. Mulder |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Idemans & Klinkert |
| | | |
| With the *Berkhout* (150 feet, Captain Herman Jacob Hulleman, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 28,043 | the goods were partly kept for return ballast; partly stored in the warehouse, and party delivered to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| *laken* | 4,457 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,921 | |
| pepper | 223,449 | |
| Japanese copper | 186,971 | |
| Bangka tin | 481,271 | |
| delivery date: 27 November 1784 | | deliverer: H.J. Hulleman |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & R.J. Dozij |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| *1785* | | |
| With the *Voorschooten* (150 feet, Captain C. Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 28,153 | all dgoods elivered to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, Kiouqua and so on |
| *laken* | 3,699 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,676 | |
| cloves | 10,517 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| pepper | 177,275 | |
| Bangka tin | 726,519 | |
| delivery date: 17 November 1785 | | deliverer: C. Muller |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Klinkert & Nolthenius |
| With the *Barbesteijn* (150 feet, Captain D.C. Plokker, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (ells) | |
| *polemieten* | 28,206 | all goods stored in the warehouse |
| *laken* | 7,383 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 4,836 | |
| cloves | 10,526 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| pepper | 217,117 | |
| tin | 725,226 | |
| delivery date: 20 October 1785 | | deliverer: D.C. Plokker |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: A.A. Boers & R.J. Dozij |
| With the *Pollux* (140 feet, Captain L. Kappelhoff, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 96,809 | the goods were partly received & partly remained |
| tin | 60,346 | on board |
| delivery date: 2 November 1785 | | deliverer: L. Kappelhoff |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: L. Serrurier & G. Schouten |
| With the *Afrikaan* (140 feet, Captain P. Moddenman, by the Enkhuizen Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| cloves | 10,221 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| pepper | 115,947 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 713,419 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 87,616 | for return ballast |
| delivery date: 25 November 1785 | | deliverer: P. Moddenman |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: Hemmingson & J.A. de Melander |
| *1786* | | |
| With the *Zoutman* (150 feet, Captain B.C. Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pieces) | |
| *laken* | 130 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| *polemieten* | 390 | to the above-mentioned merchants & Poan Keequa |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,730 | to Attacq |
| clove oil | 3½ | to Sequa (shopkeeper) |
| nutmeg | 1,565 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| cloves | 6,292 | to the above-mentioned merchcants |
| Timor sandalwood | 12,335 | stored in the warehouse |
| pepper | 124,031 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| Bangka tin | 590,302 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| Bangka tin | 60,000 | for return ballast |
| delivery date: 2 November 1786 | | deliverer: B.C. Muller |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J. Nebbens & J.A. de Melander |
| With the *Horssen* (140 feet, Captain J. van de Berg, by the Delft Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 1,560 | stored in the warehouse |
| cloves | 6,216 | stored in the warehouse |
| sandalwood | 12,335 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 384,965 | stored in the warehouse |
| Bangka tin | 130,000 | for return ballast |
| Bangka tin | 133,607 | to Tan Tsjoqua & Kiouqua |
| pepper | 122,423 | to Tan Tsjoqua |
| delivery date: 19 October 1786 | | deliverer: J. van de Berg |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.J. Idemans & G. Schouten |
| With the *Gouverneur Generaal de Klerk* (150 feet, Captain J. Arend, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 1,552 | the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; partly kept for return ballast, and partly delivered to diverse merchants |
| cloves | 6,302 | |
| sandalwood | 12,025 | |
| pepper | 122,051 | |
| Bangka tin | 750,118 | |
| delivery date: 23 October 1786 | | deliverer: J. Arend |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: A.A. Boers & M. Nolthenius |
| With the *Beeverwijk* (150 feet, Captain A.E.L.P. van Baggen, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| cloves | 6,262 | stored in the warehouse |
| pepper | 99,184 | to Pinqua |
| tin | 160,000 | for return ballast |
| tin | 490,181 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, & Pinqua |
| delivery date: 23 October 1786 | | deliverer: A.E.L.P. van Baggen |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.J. Idemans & M. Nolthenius |
| With the *Vreedenburg* (150 feet, Captain H. Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pieces) | |
| *laken* | 170 | the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; partly kept for return ballast, and partly delivered to diverse merchants |
| *polemieten* | 776 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 6,694 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| nutmeg | 1,573 | |
| cloves | 6,306 | |
| Timor sandalwood | 12,165 | |
| pepper | 122,302 | |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| Bangka tin | 551,905 | |
| delivery date: 16 October 1786 | | deliverer: H. Kikkert |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: F. Benthem & J.H. Rabinel |
| | | |
| *1787* | | |
| With the *Nederlands Welvaaren* (150 feet, Captain Arie Kikkert, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *laken* | 16 | the goods were partly stored in the warehouse; partly delivered to diverse merchants, and a part of tin remained for return ballast |
| *polemieten* | 30 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 5,105 | |
| Bangka tin | 802,658 | |
| pepper | 99,491 | |
| | (bottle) | |
| clove oil | 1 | |
| delivery date: 31 October 1787 | | deliverer: A. Kikkert |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: A.A. Boers & E.L. Steijn |
| | | |
| With the *Canton* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis de Wit, by the Rotterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 96,684 | all goods delivered to diverse merchants |
| Japanese bar-copper | 200,557 | |
| Bangka tin | 589,773 | |
| clove oil | 5 | |
| delivery date: 5 December 1787 | | deliverer: C. de Wit |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: L. Serrurier & J.H. Rabinel |
| | | |
| With the *Admiraal de Suffren* (150 feet, Captain G. Mulder, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (pieces) | |
| *laken* | 140 | to Tan Tsjoqua, Monqua, Pinqua, & Kiouqua |
| *polemieten* | 320 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| | (pounds) | |
| Japanese bar-copper | 201,079 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| pepper | 97,917 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| rice | 154,829 | to the above-mentioned merchants |
| lead | 3,881 | to Attacq |
| delivery date: 1 November 1787 | | deliverer: G. Mulder |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.J. Idemans & J.A. de Melander |
| | | |
| With the *Barbesteijn* (150 feet, Captain K. van Vlaanderen, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 100,017 | |
| Bangka tin | 60,056 | |
| cloves | 107 | |
| | (chests) | |
| nutmeg | 57 | |
| | (layers) | |
| arrack | 96 | |
| delivery date: 5 December 1787 | | deliverer: K. van Vlaanderen |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: A.A. Boers |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| With the *Voorschooten* (150 feet, Captain W. van Groningen, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 25 | |
| nutmeg & cloves | 55 | |
| cloves | 112 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 2,687 | |
| pepper | 98,388 | |
| rice | 154,820 | |
| delivery date: 5 December 1787 | | deliverer: W. van Groningen |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn |
| *1788* | | |
| With the *Leijden* (150 feet, Captain J.H. Gevels, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *laken* | 8 | |
| *polemieten* | 50 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 6,078 | |
| Bangka tin | 801,946 | |
| pepper | 98,171 | |
| delivery date: 27 October 1788 | | deliverer: J.H. Gevels |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: F. Benthem |
| With the *Gouverneur-Generaal Maatzuijker* (150 feet, Captain Gerrit Esman, by the Amsterdam) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *laken* | 27 | |
| *polemieten* | 25 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 5,346 | |
| Bangka tin | 803,788 | |
| pepper | 98,907 | |
| cloves | 15,521 | |
| mother-of-cloves | 202 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| rattan | 15,401 | |
| delivery date: 6 December 1788 | | deliverer: Gerrit Esman |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: R.J. Dozij & W. Tros |
| With the *Goede Trouw* (150 feet, Captain Jan Arendsz., by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 3,040 | |
| cloves & nutmeg | 12,558 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| Bangka tin | 803,945 | |
| pepper | 99,812 | |
| delivery date: 24 November 1788 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: M. Nolthenius & J.A. de Melander |
| With the *Blitterswijk* (150 feet, Captain Lodewijk Elgenhuizen, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| nutmeg | 3,067 | * of which 3,675 pounds were totally rotten |
| cloves | 12,514 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| mother-of-cloves | 409 | |
| Bangka tin | 638,900 | |
| pepper | 97,790 | |
| rattan | 13,900 | |
| rice | 309,441* | |
| delivery date: 20 December 1788 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.H. Rabinel & G. Schouten |
| *1789* | | |
| With the *Delft* (140 feet, Captain Jacob Swetman, by the Delft Chamber ) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| tin | 601,607 | |
| pepper | 198,975 | |
| rattan | 18,750 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| cloves | 7,482 | |
| delivery date: 14 November 1789 | | deliverer: J. Swetman |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: R.J. Dozij & M.A. van Schoor |
| With the *Meerwijk* (150 feet, Captain Bernard Christiaan Muller, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 35 | |
| *laken* | 16 | |
| printed *laken* | 7 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| tin | 6,976 | |
| Bangka tin | 701,084 | |
| pepper | 198,983 | |
| rattan | 18,750 | |
| delivery date: 17 November 1789 | | deliverer: B.C. Muller |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn |
| With the *Schagen* (140 feet, Captain Pieter Stokbroo, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 196,741 | |
| rattan | 18,750 | |
| | (chests) | |
| cloves | 63 | |
| delivery date: 22 November 1789 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: F. Benthem & E.L. Steijn |
| With the *Christoffel Columbus* (150 feet, Captain Jurriaan Pietersen, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 40 | |
| *laken* | 19 | |
| printed *laken* | 5 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 7,959 | |
| Bangka tin | 260,021 | |
| pepper | 196,012 | |
| cloves | 5,712 | |
| rattan | 18,750 | |
| clove oil | 3½ | |
| delivery date: 1 December 1789 | | deliverer: [no signature] |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.H. Rabinel & J.A. de Melander |
| | | |
| With the *Vrouwe Maria Cornelia* (150 feet, Captain Pieter Modderman, by the Enkhuizen Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 394,588 | |
| tin | 276,836 | |
| nutmeg | 6,182 | |
| cloves | 4,973 | |
| rattan | 56,250 | |
| delivery date: 9 December 1789 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: B. Teerlink & M.A. van Schoor |
| | | |
| *1790* | | |
| With the *Alblasserdam** (150 feet, Captain Pieter Mallet Junior, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *laken* | 6 | * the *Alblasserdam* left Canton in the following season |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 685 | |
| Bangka tin | 902,633 | |
| pepper | 194,759 | |
| delivery date: 11 October 1790 | | deliverer: P. Mallet Junior |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: F. Benthem & E. L. Steijn |
| | | |
| With the *Vasco de Gama* (150 feet, Captain Hans Barendse, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 35 | |
| *laken* | 16 | |
| printed *laken* | 7 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 6,639 | |
| pepper | 197,032 | |
| Bangka tin | 197,032 | |
| delivery date: 14 October 1790 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: B. Houckgeest, B. Teerlink & van Braam |
| | | |
| *1791* | | |
| With the *Alblasserdam* (150 feet, Captain P. Mallet Junior, by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *laken* | 28 | |
| cloves | 91 | |
| nutmeg & cloves | 10 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 3,435 | |
| Bangka tin | 80,143 | |
| pepper | 48,685 | |
| clove oil | 8 | |
| delivery date: 3 October 1791 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: E.L. Steijn & J.H. Bletterman |
| | | |
| With the *Blitterswijk* (150 feet, Captain Jacob Thomsen, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 50 | |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
|---|---|---|
| *laken* | 25 | |
| printed *laken* | 12 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| lead | 10,271 | |
| Bangka tin | 638,667 | |
| pepper | 98,540 | |
| cloves | 9,338 | |
| nutmeg | 2,200 | |
| delivery date: 1 December 1791 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: E.L. Steijn & J.P. Kranth |
| | | |
| *1792* | | |
| With the *Zeeland* (150 feet, Captain Albert Tjerksz., by the Zeeland Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 601,170 | |
| pepper | 144,522 | |
| cloves | 17,528 | |
| clove oil | 8 | |
| delivery date: 4 October 1792 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: E.L. Steijn & M.A. van Schoor |
| | | |
| With the *Roozenburg* (140 feet, Captain Roelof Bengtson, by the Delft Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 399,098 | |
| pepper | 185,581 | |
| cloves | 3,365 | |
| delivery date: 13 October 1792 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: J.A. de Melander & J.M. Bosma |
| | | |
| With the *Oosthuizen* (140 feet, Captain Gerrit Scheler, by the Hoorn Chamber) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 139,095 | |
| Bangka tin | 513,064 | |
| cloves | 4,062 | |
| delivery date: 15 October 1792 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receivers: B. Teerlink & J.W.D. van der Sleijden |
| | | |
| *1793* | | |
| With the *Schelde* (150 feet, Captain Cornelis van Eps, by the Zeeland Chamber ) | | |
| | (pounds) | |
| Bangka tin | 596,382 | |
| pepper | 147,746 | |
| | (chests) | |
| cloves | 98 | |
| delivery date: 20 September 1793 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: B. Teerlink |
| | | |
| With the *Nagelboom* (150 feet, Captain Hans Barendse, by the Amsterdam Chamber) | | |
| | (chests) | |
| *polemieten* | 44 | |
| *laken* | 10 | |
| printed *laken* | 2 | |
| | (pounds) | |
| pepper | 149,440 | |

| Assortment of merchandise | Volumes | Destination of merchandise |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Bangka tin | 284,270 | |
| cloves | 9,369 | |
| delivery date: 24 September 1793 | | deliverer: [no signature] |
| delivery place: the Dutch factory | | receiver: J.W.D. van der Sleijden |

* Attacq 亚德, Ami 亚美, and Apo 亚保 organized the "Yuehe Comprador Company" 悦和(号)买办 to serve the European companies. See NA VOC 4387, Receipt and statement of the compradors, 10 August 1760.

Sources: NA NFC 24-55; J.R. Bruijn et al. (eds), *Dutch-Asiatic Shipping*, Vol. II, 564-757.

APPENDIX 3

## TEA-SUPPLYING AGENTS OF THE VOC IN CANTON, 1762-1780

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| *1762* | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson skin, Twankay |
| | Tan Chetqua | Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson, Imperial tea |
| | Swetja | Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson skin, Imperial tea, Twankay |
| | Lisjoncon | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Tsjobqua | Souchong, Songlo |
| | Consciens Giqua | Congou, Souchong |
| | Monqua | Congou, Hyson |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Souchong, Pekoe |
| *1763* | Swetja | Bohea, Ankay, Congou, Ankay Congou |
| | Tan Chetqua | Bohea, Congou, Ankay Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea |
| | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Congou, Ankay Congou, Hyson, Hyson skin, Twankay |
| | Uhn-Sam-Ja (under the name of Chetqua) | Bohea, Congou |
| | A country merchant (under Chetqua's name) | Bohea |
| | Tsjobqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Songlo |
| | Consciens Giqua | Souchong |
| | Inksja | Ankay Congou, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, Twankay |
| | Quyqua (Tan Chetqua's brother & clerk) | Congou |
| | Consciens Giqua | Souchong |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Tayqua (Tsja Hunqua's son, under the name of Giqua) | Pekoe |
| *1764* | Consciens Giqua | Congou, Ankay Congou, Ankay, Ankay Souchong, Twankay, Songlo |
| | Tsjobqua | Souchong, Bohea, Congou |
| | Fet Hunqua | Congou |
| | Quyqua | Souchong |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | Tsja Kinqua (Inksja's cousin & clerk) | Souchong |
| | Inksja | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Songlo, Hyson, Twankay, Ankay |
| | Tsja Hunqua | Congou, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Ankay, Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Pekoe |
| *1765* | Tsja Hunqua | Congou, Bohea, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Souchong, Ankay, Twankay |
| | Inksja | Congou, Bohea, Hyson skin, Souchong, Pekoe, Ankay, Imperial tea, Songlo |
| | Tan Chetqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, Songlo, Pekoe, Ankay, Twankay |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Souchong |
| | Tsjobqua | Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Tan Anqua (under the name of Tsjobqua) | Souchong |
| | Tsja Kinqua | Souchong, Hyson |
| | Tayqua (under the name of Inksja) | Pekoe |
| | Monqua | Hyson |
| | Quyqua | Congou |
| *1766* | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Bohea, Imperial tea, Twankay, Songlo |
| | Inksja | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Bohea, Twankay, Songlo |
| | Tsja Hunqua | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Bohea, Twankay, Songlo |
| | Quyqua | Souchong |
| | Houqua (Chetqua's clerk) | Souchong |
| | Tsja Kinqua | Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Tsjobqua | Pekoe, Souchong |
| *1767* | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Ankay, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson skin, Pekoe |
| | Tan Chetqua | Bohea, Pekoe, Congou, Songlo, Songlo-Imperial tea, Twankay, Hyson skin, Souchong |
| | Inksja | Bohea, Songlo, Souchong, Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson, Congou, Ankay, Pekoe |
| | Namqua (with Poan Keequa's permission) | Bohea, Pekoe |
| | Monqua | Bohea, Ankay, Twankay, Hyson skin, Songlo |
| | Tayqua | Bohea |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Bohea |
| *1768* | Huyqua (Consciens Giqua's son & successor) | Songlo, Hyson, Bohea, Ankay |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Pekoe, Bohea, Ankay |
| | Poan Keequa | Congou, Hyson, Souchong, Bohea, Ankay |
| | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Ankay, Hyson skin, Souchong |
| | Inksja | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Ankay, Hyson skin, Hyson |
| | Tsjobqua | Hyson, Twankay, Songlo, Souchong, Congou, Pekoe |
| | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Pekoe, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea |
| | Monqua | Bohea, Ankay |
| | Tayqua | Pekoe |
| | Poqua (Fet Hunqua's son) | Souchong |
| | Emanuel (Tsjobqua's clerk) | Pekoe |
| | Quyqua | Pekoe, Souchong, Congou |
| | Tsja Kinqua | Souchong |
| *1769* | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Imperial tea, Ankay |
| | Tan Chetqua | Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Hyson, Hyson skin, Twankay |
| | Tan Anqua | Congou |
| | Inksja | Bohea, Souchong, Congou, Hyson, Hyson skin, Songlo, Twankay |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Pekoe |
| | Quyqua | Pekoe, Congou |
| | Tsja Kinqua | Pekoe, Souchong, Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Tayqua | Pekoe |
| | Ajou (boutiquier) | Pekoe |
| | Pinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1770* | Quyqua | Congou, Pekoe, Souchong |
| | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Souchong, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tsja Hunqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Imperial tea, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Tinqua (Tan Chetqua's brother) | Souchong, Congou, Pekoe |
| | Inksja | Souchong, Bohea, Ankay, Songlo, Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Bohea, Ankay, Souchong, Pekoe |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | (Tsja) Anqua (or Hanqua, Tsja Hunqua's son) | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson skin |
| | Tayqua | Congou, Souchong, Ankay, Pekoe, Twankay |
| | Monqua | Songlo |
| | Echong | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Pinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1771* | Tsja Hunqua | Congou, Souchong, Bohea, Pekoe, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Bohea, Ankay, Hyson skin, Songlo |
| | Inksja | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Ankay, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson |
| | Wijsee (Inksja's brother) & Quyqua | Congou, Bohea, Pekoe |
| | Loncsia | Bohea |
| | Lamsia (Inksja's brother) | Bohea, Congou |
| | Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co. | Congou, Songlo, Souchong |
| | Tayqua | Souchong, Congou |
| | Poan Keequa | Bohea |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Bohea, Pekoe, Souchong |
| | Monqua | Congou, Bohea, Souchong |
| | Aiou | Bohea, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay, Congou |
| | Jemqua (Tan Tinqua's son) | Congou |
| | Luchoncon | Souchong |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Pinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1772* | Tan Chetqua | Congou, Bohea |
| | Tayqua (sometimes Semqua, Tayqua and Co.) | Congou, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Imperial tea |
| | Ajou & Loncsia | Bohea, Congou, Souchong |
| | Wijsee & Quyqua | Congou, Bohea |
| | Inksja | Congou, Pekoe, Bohea, Ankay (mixed with Bohea), Hyson |
| | Lamsia | Congou, Souchong |
| | Luchoncon | Congou |
| | Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co. | Congou |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | Gregorij Chan | Congou |
| | Tan Tinqua | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, Imperial tea |
| | Phoqua (shopkeeper) | Souchong, Congou, Pekoe, Songlo |
| | Honksia | Twankay, Songlo |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Lisjoncon | Congou |
| | Kiouqua (Inksja's clerk) | Congou |
| | Poan Keequa | Souchong, Hyson, Twankay |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Bohea |
| | Monqua | Souchong, Hyson, Bohea, Imperial tea |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1773* | Tan Tinqua | Bohea, Congou, Songlo, Souchong, Twankay, Pekoe |
| | Semqua, (Tsja) Anqua & Co. | Bohea, Congou, Souchong |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo |
| | Monqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Twankay |
| | Poan Keequa | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Hyson skin, Hyson, Twankay |
| | Tsjonqua (Tsja Hunqua's youngest son) | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay |
| | Tayqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay, Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Kousia | Bohea (with porcelain), Congou |
| | Inksja | Congou, Souchong, Hyson skin |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1774* | Tayqua | Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson skin |
| | Inksja | Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, Pekoe |
| | Poan Keequa | Songlo, Congou, Bohea, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Songlo, Bohea, Souchong |
| | Monqua | Songlo, Bohea |
| | Tan Tinqua | Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Ajou | Bohea |
| | Heyqua (Monqua's clerk) | Congou |
| | Tsjonqua | Congou |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1775* | Tan Tinqua | Bohea, Congou, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo |
| | Inksja | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Hyson skin, Hyson, Songlo, Twankay |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | Monqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Kiouqua | Souchong, Hyson skin |
| | Keequa (Inksja's clerk) | Souchong |
| | Conjac | Hyson |
| | Tayqua & brothers | Songlo, Twankay, Pekoe |
| | Quyqua | Congou, Souchong |
| | Lisia (Inksja's brother) | Congou |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Pinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1776* | Inksja | Congou, Songlo, Twankay, Bohea, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Kousia | Bohea, Congou, Souchong |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Bohea, Congou, Pekoe |
| | Monqua | Pekoe, Souchong, Bohea, Congou, Hyson |
| | Heyqua | Souchong, Congou |
| | Koqua (Tayqua's brother) | Bohea, Congou, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong |
| | Tsjonqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Longsia | Souchong |
| | Kiouqua | Hyson skin |
| | Tan Tinqua | Congou, Songlo, Twankay, Bohea |
| | Tetqua (Tsjonqua's clerk) | Souchong |
| | Keequa | Souchong |
| | Conjac | Bohea |
| | Pinqua | Bohea |
| | A few countrymen | Congou, Bohea |
| | Lhie sien-sang (Mr Li 李先生, hawker) | Congou, Souchong |
| *1777* | Inksja | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Monqua | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Hyson |
| | Lisjoncon (shopkeeper) | Songlo, Souchong |
| | Tayqua & brothers | Songlo |
| | Koqua | Bohea, Congou, Souchong, Songlo, Twankay |
| | Tsjonqua | Bohea, Congou, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe |
| | Jemqua (Koqua's clerk) | Souchong, Congou |
| | Kousia | Souchong, Congou |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| | Tan Tinqua | Congou |
| | Kiouqua | Congou, Songlo, Twankay |
| | Tan Anqua | Souchong |
| | Tetqua (Tsjonqua's clerk and interpreter) | Congou, Souchong |
| | Conjac | Bohea (with porcelain), Hyson |
| | Keequa | Hyson |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1778* | Inksja | Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Congou, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tsjonqua | Souchong, Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Tetqua | Souchong, Congou |
| | Monqua | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Hyson skin |
| | Tan Anqua | Souchong |
| | Conjac | Hyson |
| | Kiouqua | Songlo, Twankay |
| | Kousia | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Foyec | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Pinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| | Exhin | Bohea (with porcelain) |
| *1779* | Inksja | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea |
| | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Monqua | Congou, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Souchong, Hyson, Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea |
| | Tsjonqua | Congou, Pekoe, Bohea, Songlo, Twankay, Pekoe, Hyson |
| | Kiouqua | Songlo, Twankay |
| | Tetqua | Souchong |
| | Keequa | Souchong |
| | Conqua (Fet Hunqua's son) | Gunpowder tea |
| | Tsja Kinqua | Souchong |
| | Kousia | Congou, Bohea |
| | Suchin Kinqua | Bohea (with porcelain) |

| Year | Tea-supplying agents | Teas from the supplying agent |
|---|---|---|
| *1780* | Tan Tsjoqua | Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Hyson, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson skin, Gunpowder tea |
| | Tsjonqua | Congou, Twankay, Songlo, Bohea, Souchong, Pekoe, Hyson, Gunpowder tea |
| | Monqua | Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Songlo, Hyson, Hyson skin |
| | Conqua | Souchong |
| | Inksja | Twankay, Songlo, Bohea |
| | Limpo | Congou, Souchong, Twankay, Hyson skin, Hyson, Gunpowder tea |

Sources: NA NFC 25-43, 72-89; P. Van Dyke and C. Viallé (eds), *The Canton-Macao Dagregister 1763*, Macao Cultural Institute, note 24.

APPENDIX 4

# TEAS EXPORTED FROM CANTON TO THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1742-1794

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Volumes (pounds) Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1742* | Bohea | | 635,393 | 67.33 | 0.45, 0.49, 0.51, 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 119,290 | 12.64 | 0.81, 0.84, 1.13, 1.15 |
| | Souchong | | 34,121 | 3.62 | 0.84, 1.40, 1.44 |
| | Songlo | | 75,710 | 8.02 | 0.60, 0.84, 0.86 |
| | Pekoe | | 28,637 | 3.03 | 0.56, 0.90, 0.92 |
| | Hyson | | 12,249 | 1.30 | 1.72 |
| | Imperial tea | | 38,233½ | 4.05 | 0.98, 1.13, 1.15 |
| *1743* | Bohea | | 581,573 | 55.09 | 0.43 |
| | Congou | | 105,291 | 9.97 | 0.65, 0.72 |
| | Souchong | | 57,372 | 5.43 | 1.01, 1.04 |
| | Songlo | | 193,041 | 18.28 | 0.51, 0.53 |
| | Pekoe | | 40,338 | 3.82 | 0.65, 0.72 |
| | Hyson | | 31,352 | 2.97 | 1.08 |
| | Imperial tea | | 46,790 | 4.43 | 0.65, 0.72, 0.79 |
| *1744* | Bohea | | 561,731 | 60.46 | 0.34, 0.36, 0.47, 0.48, 0.50 |
| | Congou | | 96,170 | 10.35 | 0.83, 0.84 |
| | Souchong | | 91,839 | 9.88 | 1.24, 1.26 |
| | Songlo | | 91,179 | 9.81 | 0.72 |
| | Pekoe | | 24,154 | 2.60 | 0.79 |
| | Hyson | | 64,067 | 6.90 | 1.44 |
| *1745* | Bohea | | 561,731 | 56.55 | 0.40, 0.41, 0.49 |
| | Congou | | 96,170 | 9.69 | 0.54, 0.65, 0.72, 0.84 |
| | Souchong | | 91,839 | 9.24 | 1.08, 1.15, 1.23 |
| | Songlo | | 131,179 | 13.21 | 0.57, 0.72 |
| | Pekoe | | 24,154 | 2.43 | 0.65, 0.72, 0.79 |
| | Hyson | | 64,067 | 6.45 | 1.22, 1.44 |
| | Imperial tea | | 24,255 | 2.44 | 0.65, 0.79 |
| *1746* | Bohea | | 650,030 | 54.88 | 0.38, 0.40, 0.43, 0.45 |
| | Congou | | 140,348 | 11.85 | 0.68, 0.84 |
| | Souchong | | 92,875 | 7.84 | 1.11, 1.15, 1.19 |
| | Pekoe | | 96,280 | 8.13 | 0.61, 0.68, 0.75, 0.77, 0.79 |
| | Songlo | | 105,879 | 8.94 | 0.61, 0.65, 0.72 |
| | Hyson | | 73,792 | 6.23 | 1.29, 1.33, 2.08 |
| | Imperial tea | | 25,200 | 2.13 | 0.68, 0.72, 0.75, 0.90 |
| *1747* | Bohea | | 675,110 | 52.09 | 0.38, 0.40, 0.43 |
| | Congou | | 212,960 | 16.43 | 0.68, 0.74, 0.79, 0.84 |
| | Souchong | | 113,508½ | 8.76 | 1.15, 1.19 |
| | Songlo | | 97,391 | 7.51 | 0.61, 0.72 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pekoe | | 97,545½ | 7.53 | 0.68, 0.75, 0.77, 0.79, 0.83 |
| | Hyson | | 73,112 | 5.64 | 1.29, 2.08 |
| | Imperial tea | | 26,341 | 2.03 | 0.68, 0.75, 0.83, 0.90 |
| *1748* | Bohea | | 308,189 | 44.34 | 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 88,201 | 12.69 | 0.75, 0.84 |
| | Songlo | | 128,178 | 18.44 | 0.83, 0.86 |
| | Souchong | | 63,908 | 9.20 | 1.08 |
| | Pekoe | | 70,039 | 10.08 | 0.75, 0.84 |
| | Hyson | | 22,360 | 3.22 | 2.01 |
| | Imperial tea | | 14,210 | 2.04 | 0.75 |
| *1749* | Bohea | | 578,774 | 50.39 | 0.49, 0.52, 0.56, 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 88,902 | 7.74 | 0.61, 0.65, 0.67, 0.68 |
| | Souchong | | 110,904 | 9.66 | 0.82 |
| | Songlo | | 160,442 | 13.97 | 1.08 |
| | Pekoe | | 97,793½ | 8.51 | 0.57, 0.79 |
| | Hyson | | 111,831 | 9.74 | 2.01 |
| *1750* | Bohea | | 463,765 | 44.95 | 0.34, 0.40 |
| | Congou | | 122,584 | 11.88 | 0.61 |
| | Souchong | | 85,278 | 8.27 | 0.84 |
| | Pekoe | | 97,051½ | 9.41 | 0.61 |
| | Songlo | | 146,099 | 14.16 | 0.65 |
| | Hyson | | 97,187½ | 9.42 | 1.54 |
| | Imperial tea | | 19,668 | 1.91 | |
| *1751* | Bohea | | 509,723 | 36.19 | 0.34, 0.40, 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 212,783 | 15.11 | 0.61, 0.83 |
| | Souchong | | 118,457 | 8.41 | 0.84, 1.02, 1.08 |
| | Songlo | | 201,880 | 14.33 | 0.65, 0.86 |
| | Pekoe | | 64,803 | 4.60 | 0.61, 0.83 |
| | Hyson | | 140,753 | 9.99 | 1.54, 2.08 |
| | Imperial tea | | 12,250 | 0.87 | 0.86 |
| | Ankay Congou | | 147,980 | 10.51 | 0.32, 0.38, 0.40 |
| *1752* | Bohea | | 765,625 | 57 | 0.29, 0.34, 0.40, 0.38, 0.52, 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 165,375 | 12.44 | 0.61, 0.65 |
| | Souchong | | 122,500 | 9.22 | 0.84, 1.08 |
| | Songlo | | 85,750 | 6.45 | 0.65 |
| | Pekoe | | 49,000 | 3.69 | 0.61 |
| | Hyson | | 116,375 | 8.76 | 1.38 |
| | Imperial tea | | 24,500 | 1.84 | 0.86 |
| *1753* | Bohea | | 1,976,783 | 81.26 | 0.56, 0.57, 0.59 |
| | Congou | | 221,603 | 9.08 | 0.83 |
| | Souchong | | 159,985 | 6.55 | 1.08 |
| | Songlo | | 59,903 | 2.45 | 0.86 |
| | Pekoe | | 6,186 | 0.25 | 0.83 |
| | Hyson | | 10,045 | 0.41 | 1.98 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Volumes (pounds) Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1754* | Bohea | | 2,694,388 | 85.56 | 0.54, 0.57 |
| | Congou | | 203,963 | 6.48 | 0.83 |
| | Souchong | | 158,638 | 5.04 | 1.11 |
| | Songlo | | 61,495 | 1.95 | 0.90 |
| | Pekoe | | 10,474 | 0.33 | 0.83 |
| | Hyson | | 20,151 | 0.64 | 1.98 |
| *1755* | Bohea | | 2,666,213 | 74.76 | 0.38, 0.60 |
| | Congou | | 417,082 | 11.65 | 0.88 |
| | Souchong | | 366,618 | 10.24 | 1.15, 2.93 |
| | Songlo | | 49,980 | 1.40 | 0.92 |
| | Pekoe | | 36,597 | 1.02 | 0.88 |
| | Hyson | | 44,345 | 1.24 | 1.99 |
| *1756* | Bohea | | 141,120 | 35.74 | 0.38 |
| | Congou | | 76,073 | 19.26 | 0.63 |
| | Souchong | | 177,748 | 45 | 0.77 |
| *1757* | Bohea | as much as possible | 478,217 | 67.03 | 0.41, 0.43 |
| | Congou | 100,000 | 129,082 | 18.09 | 0.54, 0.59, 0.63, 0.64, 0.65 |
| | Souchong | 50,000 | 36,361 | 5.10 | 0.65, 0.86, 0.90, 1.58, 1.98, 2.66 |
| | Songlo | 60,000 | 59,563 | 8.35 | 0.43, 0.47, 0.54 |
| | Hyson | 5,000 | 6,634 | 0.93 | 1.22 |
| | Imperial tea | 3,000 | 3,602 | 0.50 | 0.72 |
| *1758* | Bohea | as much as possible | 1,224,612 | 72.60 | 0.41, 0.45 |
| | Congou | 170,000 | 205,743 | 12.20 | 0.86, 0.88, 0.93, 0.95, 0.99, 1, 1.08 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 125,043 | 7.41 | 1.13, 1.15, 1.17, 1.29, 1.33, 1.36, 1.65 |
| | Songlo | 100,000 or 120,000 | 112,499 | 6.67 | 0.77, 0.90, 1.04 |
| | Hyson | 10,000 | 9,422 | 0.56 | 1.40, 1.58 |
| | Hyson skin | 6,000 | 3,042 | 0.18 | 1.10 |
| | Imperial tea | 6,000 | 6,523 | 0.39 | 1.08, 1.15 |
| *1759* | Bohea | as much as possible | unknown | | 0.38, 0.43, 0.65 |
| | Congou | 250,000 | unknown | | 0.93, 1.01 |
| | Souchong | 150,000 | unknown | | 1.08, 1.44, 2.59 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | unknown | | 1.01, 1.10 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 | unknown | | 0.89 |
| | Hyson | 25,000 | unknown | | 1.72 |
| | Hyson skin | no order | unknown | | 0.94 |
| | Imperial tea | 10,000 | unknown | | 1.11 |
| *1760* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,302,177 | 81.16 | 0.56, 0.57, 0.61, 0.65 |
| | Congou | 150,000 | 179,673½ | 6.33 | 0.93, 0.97, 0.99, 1 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 121,094¾ | 4.27 | 1.08, 1.19, 1.26, 1.29, 1.44, 2.59 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | 25,078½ | 0.88 | 1, 1.10 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 | 107,623 | 3.79 | 0.89 |
| | Twankay | no order | 51,746½ | 1.82 | 0.93 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hyson | 25,000 | 26,166 | 0.92 | 1.72 |
| | Hyson skin | 15,000 | 15,786 | 0.56 | 0.93 |
| | Imperial tea | 6,000 | 7,210 | 0.25 | 1.11 |
| *1761* | Bohea | unknown | 1,472,960 | 80.57 | unknown |
| | Congou | unknown | 130,604 | 7.14 | unknown |
| | Souchong | unknown | 86,552½ | 4.73 | unknown |
| | Pekoe | unknown | 6,217 | 0.34 | unknown |
| | Songlo | unknown | 75,175 | 4.10 | unknown |
| | Twankay | unknown | 28,746½ | 1.57 | unknown |
| | Hyson | unknown | 8,313 | 0.45 | unknown |
| | Hyson skin | unknown | 13,674 | 0.75 | unknown |
| | Imperial tea | unknown | 5,803 | 0.32 | unknown |
| | Linchinsing* | unknown | 112½ | 0.07 | unknown |
| | | | | * probably the Linki-sam tea, a type of black tea | |
| *1762* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,460,683 | 83.41 | 0.52, 0.64, 0.69, 0.72, 0.75, 0.76 |
| | Congou | 150,000 | 170,635¼ | 5.78 | 0.83, 0.88, 0.93 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 116,231½ | 3.94 | 0.93, 1, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 2.87 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | 8,351 | 0.28 | 1.15 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 | 103,791 | 3.51 | 0.97 |
| | Twankay | no order | 46,176 | 1.57 | 1.04 |
| | Hyson | 25,000 | 26,874 | 0.91 | 1.98, 2.08 |
| | Hyson skin | 15,000 | 13,018 | 0.44 | 1.04 |
| | Imperial tea | 6,000 | 4,265 | 0.14 | 1.19 |
| *1763* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,398,212 | 84.26 | 0.48, 0.52, 0.55, 0.63, 0.70, 0.71, 0.73, 0.79 |
| | Congou | 150,000 | 165,596½ | 5.82 | 0.72, 0.88, 0.93, 1, 1.08 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 101,842 | 3.58 | 0.72, 1, 1.08, 1.15, 1.80, 1.98, 2.33, 2.66 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | 32,000 | 1.12 | 1.08, 1.15 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 | 79,044 | 2.78 | 0.53 |
| | Twankay | no order | 24,200¾ | 0.85 | 0.90 |
| | Hyson | 25,000 | 21,862¾ | 0.77 | 2.16 |
| | Hyson skin | 15,000 | 16,715 | 0.59 | 1.08, 1.11 |
| | Imperial tea | 6,000 | 6,703 | 0.24 | 1.19 |
| *1764* | Bohea | as much as possible | 3,285,576 | 86.41 | 0.34, 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, 0.64, 0.67, 0.70, 0.71, 0.73, 0.75 |
| | Congou | 150,000 | 175,548¾ | 4.62 | 0.53, 0.65, 0.68, 0.72, 0.79, 0.83, 0.86, 0.97 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 106,177 | 2.79 | 0.77, 0.97, 1.44, 2.16, 2.37 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | 23,626¼ | 0.62 | 0.93, 1.15, 1.22 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 | 106,764 | 2.81 | 0.86 |
| | Twankay | no order | 50,302 | 1.32 | 0.93 |
| | Hyson | 25,000 | 28,577 | 0.75 | 2.05 |
| | Hyson skin | 15,000 | 19,103 | 0.50 | 1 |
| | Imperial tea | no order | 6,448 | 0.17 | 1, 1.11 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1765* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,879,601 | 78.61 | 0.61, 0.65, 0.68, 0.75 |
| | Congou | 240,000 | 254,398⅞ | 6.94 | 1, 1.04, 1.06, 1.08 |
| | Souchong | 170,000 | 177,771⅝ | 4.85 | 1.11, 1.19, 1.20, 1.26, .35, 44, 1.54, 1.58, 1.65, 1.98, 2.33, 2.66 |
| | Pekoe | 24,000 | 26,440¾ | 0.72 | 1.26, 1.44, 2.16 |
| | Songlo | 240,000 | 182,170 | 4.97 | 0.88 |
| | Twankay | 4,000 | 91,096½ | 2.49 | 0.93 |
| | Hyson | 60,000 | 50,655½ | 1.38 | 1.98, 2.05, 2.16, 2.33 |
| | Imperial tea | no order | 1,437½ | 0.04 | 1.11 |
| *1766* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,823,388 | 77.93 | 0.57, 0.59, 0.60, 0.64, 0.68, 0.71, 0.72 |
| | Congou | 240,000 | 264,635⅞ | 7.30 | 0.83, 0.86, 0.93, 1 |
| | Souchong | 170,000 | 146,598 | 4.05 | 1, 1.29, 1.44, 1.80 |
| | Pekoe | 24,000 | 25,690¼ | 0.71 | 1.44, 1.80 |
| | Songlo | 163,000 | 164,214 | 4.53 | 0.86 |
| | Twankay | 81,000 | 67,752¼ | 1.87 | 0.88, 0.93 |
| | Hyson | 48,000 | 57,473 | 1.59 | 2.16, 2.30, 2.33 |
| | Hyson skin | 48,000 | 68,360¼ | 1.89 | 0.93, 1.08 |
| | Imperial tea | no order | 4,705 | 1.30 | 1.08 |
| *1767* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,791,033 | 74.94 | 0.40, 0.44, 0.46, 0.47, 0.48, 0.49, 0.57, 0.65, 0.69, 0.70, 0.71 |
| | Congou | 240,000 | 377,897 | 11.37 | 0.65, 0.67, 0.72, 0.89, 0.90, 0.96, 1.08 |
| | Souchong | 170,000 | 169,181½ | 4.54 | 1.08, 1.15, 1.80 |
| | Pekoe | 36,000 | 37,845 | 1.02 | 0.65, 0.72, 1.44 |
| | Songlo | 160,000 | 126,518 | 3.40 | 0.57, 0.61 |
| | Twankay | 20,000 | 105,296 | 2.83 | 0.57, 0.67, 0.68 |
| | Hyson | 48,000 | 49,717 | 1.33 | 2.30 |
| | Hyson skin | 48,000 | 48,285½ | 1.30 | 0.67, 0.72, 1.08, 1.11 |
| | Songlo-Imperial tea | no order | 13,290 | 0.36 | 0.57 |
| | Imperial tea | no order | 5,377 | 0.14 | 1.29 |
| *1768* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,955,758 | 81.23 | 0.37, 0.38, 0.40, 0.41, 0.42, 0.50, 0.54, 0.57, 0.70 |
| | Congou | 220,000 | 135,406 | 3.72 | 0.90, 0.97, 1.08 |
| | Souchong | 160,000 | 164,526¾ | 4.52 | 0.97, 1, 1.08, 1.22, 1.65, 1.72 |
| | Pekoe | 50,000 | 50,233 | 1.38 | 0.86, 1, 1.22 |
| | Songlo | 160,000 | 172,678 | 4.75 | 0.49, 0.50, 0.52, 0.53 |
| | Twankay | 65,000 | 62,962 | 1.73 | 0.54, 0.59 |
| | Hyson | 40,000 | 39,204¾ | 1.08 | 2.16 |
| | Hyson skin | 50,000 | 51,917 | 1.42 | 1.08 |
| | Imperial tea | 7,000 | 6,106 | 1.67 | 1.11 |
| *1769* | Bohea | as much as possible | 3,010,719 | 79.99 | 0.42, 0.43, 0.47, 0.54, 0.62, 0.63, 0.64 |
| | Congou | 160,000 | 176,720¾ | 4.70 | 0.88, 0.95, 1.02 |
| | Souchong | 140,000 | 161,317½ | 4.29 | 1.08, 1.15 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Pekoe | 60,000 or 70,000 | 87,584 | 2.33 | 1.26, 1.28, 1.31, 1.40, 1.51 |
| | Songlo | 240,000 | 157,315 | 4.18 | 0.73, 0.78, 0.80 |
| | Twankay | 65,000 | 66,653 | 1.77 | 0.86 |
| | Hyson | 30,000 | 32,274½ | 0.86 | 2.19 |
| | Hyson skin | 60,000 | 63,767¾ | 1.69 | 1.11 |
| | Imperial tea | 7,000 | 7,278 | 0.19 | 1.26 |
| *1770* | Bohea | as much as possible | 3,075,685 | 78.98 | 0.42, 0.54, 0.72, 0.74, 0.75, 0.77 |
| | Congou | 100,000 | 320,519½ | 8.23 | 0.68, 0.95, 1.33 |
| | Souchong | 140,000 | 139,226¾ | 3.57 | 0.82, 1.10, 1.47, 1.51, 1.65, 1.69, 1.72 |
| | Pekoe | 25,000 | 58,510 | 1.50 | 1.11, 1.15, 1.86, 1.90, 1.94 |
| | Songlo | 160,000 | 128,767 | 3.31 | 0.55, 1.40, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 1.54, 1.65 |
| | Twankay | 50,000 or 60,000 | 85,003¼ | 2.18 | 0.64, 1.51, 1.58, 1.69 |
| | Hyson | 30,000 | 30,075½ | 0.77 | 2.19, 2.59, 2.62, 2.66, 2.73, 2.80 |
| | Hyson skin | 50,000 | 48,652½ | 1.25 | 1.11, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 1.94 |
| | Imperial tea | no order | 8,020½ | 0.21 | 0.65, 1.54 |
| *1771* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,396,843 | 69.82 | 0.43, 0.47, 0.49 |
| | Congou | 390,000 | 522,640 | 15.22 | 0.64, 0.65, 0.67, 0.72, 0.75 |
| | Souchong | 150,000 | 179,896½ | 5.24 | 0.75, 0.78, 0.95, 1.02, 1.65, 1.80, 2.26 |
| | Pekoe | 40,000 | 39,396½ | 1.15 | 1.22 |
| | Songlo | 150,000 or 160,000 | 163,399 | 4.76 | 0.57, 0.79 |
| | Twankay | 40,000 or 50,000 | 51,123 | 1.49 | 0.65, 0.86 |
| | Hyson | 30,000 | 32,431 | 0.94 | 2.44 |
| | Hyson skin | 50,000 | 47,213½ | 1.38 | 1.11 |
| *1772* | Bohea | as much as possible | 1,699,163 | 56.31 | 0.38, 0.40, 0.43, 0.50, 0.54, 0.57 |
| | Congou | 360,000 | 726,359½ | 24.07 | 0.54, 0.57, 0.57, 0.59. 0.59 |
| | Souchong | 150,000 | 150,041 | 4.97 | 0.54, 0.57, 1.11, 1.15, 1.29, 1.33, 1.44, 1.58, 1.72 |
| | Pekoe | 60,000 or 70,000 | 63,200½ | 2.09 | 0.57, 0.72, 1.15, 1.22 |
| | Songlo | 200,000 | 203,662 | 6.75 | 0.57, 0.75, 0.79 |
| | Twankay | 60,000 | 60,634 | 2.01 | 0.65, 0.83 |
| | Hyson | 40,000 | 58,515¾ | 1.94 | 1.98, 2.01, 2.05, 2.08 |
| | Hyson skin | 55,000 | 55,710 | 1.85 | 1.11 |
| *1773* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,745,486 | 74.88 | 0.40, 0.43, 0.45, 0.47, 13.5 |
| | Congou | 360,000 | 362,962½ | 9.90 | 0.50, 0.54, 0.79, 0.83, 0.86, 0.93 |
| | Souchong | 160,000 | 177,612½ | 4.84 | 0.78, 0.95, 1.02, 1.65, 1.80, 2.26 |
| | Pekoe | 50,000 or 60,000 | 48,528½ | 1.32 | 1.22, 1.36, 1.44 |
| | Songlo | 200,000 | 203,245¾ | 5.54 | 0.57, 0.79 |
| | Twankay | 65,000 | 72,048 | 1.97 | 0.65, 0.86 |
| | Hyson | 34,000 | 35,039 | 0.96 | 2.01, 2.44 |
| | Hyson skin | 70,000 | 70,005¼ | 1.91 | 1.11 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1774* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,799,797 | 75.57 | 0.39, 0.43, 0.46 |
| | Congou | 300,000 | 305,334⅛ | 8.24 | 0.50, 0.79, 0.93 |
| | Souchong | 155,000 | 169,445¼ | 4.57 | 0.57, 0.93, 1.22, 1.36, 1.51, 1.58, 1.90 |
| | Pekoe | 30,000 | 44,364 | 1.20 | 1.36 |
| | Songlo | 180,000 | 213,076 | 5.75 | 0.54, 0.56 |
| | Twankay | 50,000 | 68,390½ | 1.85 | 0.61 |
| | Hyson | 32,000 | 36,363 | 0.98 | 1.98 |
| | Hyson skin | 54,000 | 68,139 | 1.84 | 1.11 |
| *1775* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,654,838 | 70.83 | 0.39, 0.42, 0.43, 0.48 |
| | Congou | 600,000 | 600,096¾ | 16 | 0.50, 0.54, 0.77, 0.79 |
| | Souchong | 150,000 | 152,559 | 4.07 | 0.61, 0.65, 0.72, 1, 1.08, 1.11, 1.15, 1.47, 1.51, 1.54 |
| | Pekoe | 40,000 | 35,769 | 0.95 | 1.26, 1.33 |
| | Songlo | 180,000 | 182,821½ | 4.88 | 0.54, 0.56, 0.73, 0.75 |
| | Twankay | 50,000 | 50,503 | 1.35 | 0.61, 0.79 |
| | Hyson | 30,000 | 31,443 | 0.84 | 1.90 |
| | Hyson skin | 40,000 | 40,380 | 1.08 | 1.11 |
| *1776* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,483,609 | 66.85 | 0.37, 0.41, 0.43, 0.60 |
| | Congou | 108,000 | 835,556¾ | 22.49 | 0.47, 0.50, 0.52, 0.79, 0.81, 0.83, 0.86, 0.88, 0.90, 1.19, 1.33, 1.44, 1.80 |
| | Souchong | 100,000 | 108,047¼ | 2.91 | 0.54, 0.61, 0.73, 1.15, 1.19, 1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.80 |
| | Pekoe | 48,000 | 50,306¾ | 1.35 | 0.54, 1.44 |
| | Songlo | 120,000 | 119,602 | 3.22 | 0.50, 0.75 |
| | Twankay | 50,000 | 49,916 | 1.34 | 0.56, 0.83 |
| | Hyson | 36,000 | 38,233½ | 1.03 | 1.98 |
| | Hyson skin | 30,000 | 30,023¼ | 0.81 | 1.11 |
| *1777* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,059,018 | 55.94 | 0.38, 0.41, 0.43, 0.47, 0.60 |
| | Congou | 1,000,000 | 1,000,002 | 27.17 | 0.50, 0.57, 0.61, 0.75, 0.83, 0.90, 1 |
| | Souchong | 150,000 | 147,993 | 4.02 | 1.29, 1.40, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 1.72, 1.80 |
| | Pekoe | no order | 79,193½ | 2.15 | 1.40, 1.51, 1.54 |
| | Songlo | 200,000 | 164,009½ | 4.46 | 0.52, 0.73, 0.75, 0.79 |
| | Twankay | 80,000 | 56,615¼ | 1.54 | 0.73, 0.81, 0.86 |
| | Hyson | 50,000 | 52,886¼ | 1.44 | 1.98 |
| | Hyson skin | 60,000 | 60,374¼ | 1.64 | 1.11 |
| *1778* | Bohea | as much as possible | 1,919,936 | 56.62 | 0.37, 0.45, 0.49, 0.60 |
| | Congou | 800,000 | 765,512 | 22.57 | 0.54, 0.77, 0.83, 0.84, 0.86, 0.88, 0.90 |
| | Souchong | 200,000 | 238,127¾ | 7.02 | 0.72, 1.08, 1.15, 1.19, 1.22, 1.29, 1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.65, 1.69, 1.72 |
| | Pekoe | 80,000 | 85,468½ | 2.52 | 1.40, 1.51, 1.69, 1.72 |
| | Songlo | 200,000 | 169,715 | 5 | 0.75, 0.77, 0.83 |
| | Twankay | 100,000 | 83,480½ | 2.46 | 0.83, 0.90 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Volumes (pounds) Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hyson | 50,000 | 49,499½ | 1.46 | 1.98 |
| | Hyson skin | 80,000 | 78,742½ | 2.32 | 1.11 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 500 | 535 | 0.02 | 2.33 |
| *1779* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,152,349 | 60.42 | 0.34, 0.45, 0.47 |
| | Congou | 600,000 | 599,879¼ | 16.84 | 0.52, 0.73, 0.79, 0.97 |
| | Souchong | 200,000 | 204,833 | 5.75 | 0.59, 0.63, 0.97, 1.04, 1.08, 1.15, 1.29, 1.36, 1.40 |
| | Pekoe | 80,000 | 82,608 | 2.32 | 0.67, 1.31, 1.36 |
| | Songlo | 250,000 | 252,903¾ | 7.10 | 0.56, 0.57, 0.77, 0.79, 0.86 |
| | Twankay | 125,000 | 169,981 | 4.77 | 0.61, 0.84, 0.86, 0.93 |
| | Hyson | 50,000 | 51,948¾ | 1.46 | 1.90 |
| | Hyson skin | 80,000 | 44,114 | 1.24 | 1, 1.08 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 4,000 | 3,799¾ | 0.11 | 2.30 |
| *1780* | Bohea | as much as possible | 2,338,060 | 64.27 | 0.36, 0.40, 0.43, 0.50 |
| | Congou | 500,000 | 500,788¾ | 13.77 | 0.52, 0.54, 0.56, 0.72, 0.75, 0.77 |
| | Souchong | 200,000 | 204,447¼ | 5.62 | 0.57, 0.61, 0.65, 0.68, 0.72, 1.08, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15, 1.19, 1.22, 1.26, 1.29, 1.44 |
| | Pekoe | 80,000 | 84,689 | 2.33 | 1.31, 1.65 |
| | Songlo | 250,000 | 257,070½ | 7.07 | 0.50, 0.52, 0.79, 0.83 |
| | Twankay | 125,000 | 107,460½ | 2.95 | 0.54, 0.56, 0.57, 0.61, 0.88, 0.95 |
| | Hyson | 50,000 | 63,175¼ | 1.74 | 1.72, 1.87, 1.94 |
| | Hyson skin | 80,000 | 77,670¾ | 2.14 | 1.06, 1.08, 1.11, 1.15 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 4,000 | 4,422½ | 0.12 | 2.16, 2.23 |
| *1783* | Bohea | as much as possible | 1,243,225 | 65.03 | 0.38, 0.41, 0.45, 0.47, 0.52 |
| | Congou | 800,000 | 345,117 | 18.05 | 0.56, 1, 1.02, 1.04, 1.08, 1.10, 1.11 |
| | Souchong | 180,000 | 171,214 | 8.96 | 0.65, 0.75, 1.15, 1.19, 1.51, 1.54, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87 |
| | Pekoe | 60,000 | 14,788½ | 0.77 | 1.54, 1.80 |
| | Songlo | 120,000 | 73,142 | 3.83 | 0.54, 0.90, 0.93 |
| | Twankay | 60,000 | 30,817 | 1.61 | 1 |
| | Hyson | 20,000 or 22,000 | 19,899 | 1.04 | 2.12 |
| | Hyson skin | 40,000 | 12,867½ | 0.67 | 1.08, 1.15 |
| | Soulang* | 600 | 708½ | 0.04 | 3.59 |
| | | | | | * a high-quality type of green tea |
| *1784* | Bohea | 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 | 2,546,982 | 64.85 | 0.49, 0.50, 0.51, 0.52, 0.55, 0.56 |
| | Congou | 800,000 or 120,000 | 803,972¾ | 20.47 | 0.93 |
| | Souchong | 180,000 or 270,000 | 180,001¾ | 4.58 | 1.08, 1.15, 1.22, 1.26, 1.29,1.33, 1.44, 1.54, 1.58, 1.87 |
| | Pekoe | 60,000 or 90,000 | 59,937½ | 1.53 | 1.36, 1.44, 1.51, 1.54 |
| | Songlo | 160,000 or 240,000 | 158,168½ | 4.03 | 0.86, 0.88 |
| | Hysont | 40,000 or 60,000 | 55,728¾ | 1.42 | 1.36, 1.72 |
| | Hysont skin | 56,000 or 84,000 | 40,259½ | 1.03 | 1.08 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Twankay | 80,000 | 79,720 | 2.03 | 0.93 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 2,000 or 3,000 | 2,012½ | 0.05 | 2.33 |
| | Soulang | 600 or 900 | 578 | 0.01 | 3.41 |
| *1785* | Bohea | 1,840,000 | 1,453,242 | 48.25 | 0.43, 0.47, 0.51 |
| | Congou | 1,320,000 | 944,076½ | 31.35 | 0.57, 0.58, 0.61, 0.63, 0.65, 0.97 |
| | Souchong | 136,000 | 139,634¼ | 4.64 | 0.65, 0.68, 0.86, 0.90, 0.93, 1, 1.04, 1.08, 1.65, 1.72 |
| | Pekoe | 48,000 | 59,511½ | 1.98 | 1.54, 1.65, 1.72 |
| | Songlo | 344,000 | 200,210½ | 6.65 | 0.59, 0.61, 0.63, 0.70, 0.86, 0.88 |
| | Hyson | 64,000 | 58,365 | 1.94 | 1.94, 1.98, 2.01, 2.05 |
| | Hyson skin | 96,000 | 69,816¼ | 2.32 | 0.72, 1.08 |
| | Twankay | 134,000 | 84,379 | 2.80 | 0.65, 0.93 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 1,000 | 1,217¼ | 0.040 | 2.33 |
| | Soulang | 1,500 | 1,254 | 0.042 | 3.41 |
| *1786* | Bohea | 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 | 1,458,737 | 35.78 | 0.40, 0.43, 0.47, 0.50 |
| | Bohea (mixed with Congou) | no order | 154,407 | 3.79 | 0.77, 0.80, 0.81, 0.82 |
| | Congou | 1,600,000 or 2,400,000 | 1,344,490¾ | 32.98 | 0.57, 1.11, 1.15, 1.17, 1.19, 1.22, 1.24 |
| | Souchong | 380,000 or 570,000 | 398,169 | 9.77 | 1.44, 1.58, 1.65, 1.80, 1.87, 1.94, 2.01, 2.05, 2.08, 2.16 |
| | Pekoe | 60,000 or 90,000 | 67,387 | 1.65 | 1.36, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 2.08 |
| | Songlo | 320,000 or 480,000 | 300,799¼ | 7.38 | 0.57, 0.92, 0.93, 0.95 |
| | Hyson | 320,000 or 480,000 | 126,597 | 3.11 | 2.19, 2.23, 2.26, 2.30, 2.33 |
| | Hyson skin | 160,000 or 240,000 | 97,157 | 2.38 | 0.72, 1.11, 1.15, 1.19, 1.22 |
| | Twankay | 160,000 or 240,000 | 126,145¼ | 3.09 | 0.65, 1 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 1,000 | 976 | 0.024 | 2.51 |
| | Soulang | 1,500 | 1,502 | 0.037 | 3.59 |
| | Uutsjien* | no order | 719 | 0.018 | 1.44 |
| | * Yuqian (means "before the Grain Rain" 雨前 (19, 20, or 21 April)) tea, a high quality type of green tea | | | | |
| *1787* | Bohea | 1,370,000 | 2,394,709 | 54.94 | 0.50, 0.57 |
| | Congou | 2,600,000 | 1,096,164¾ | 25.15 | 1.19, 1.26, 1.29, 1.33 |
| | Souchong | 240,000 | 210,975½ | 4.84 | 1.44, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 2.33 |
| | Souchong (labelled as Congou) | no order | 338,836 | 7.77 | 1.36, 1.44, 1.51, 1.54, 1.58, 1.65, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87 |
| | Pekoe | 200,000 | 56,468½ | 1.30 | 2.16, 2.33, 2.37, 3.23 |
| | Songlo | 200,000 | 102,474 | 2.35 | 0.93, 1 |
| | Hyson | 500,000 | 67,819 | 0.15 | 2.51 |
| | Hyson skin | 100,000 | 92,793¾ | 2.13 | 1.08, 1.15, 1.26 |
| | Twankay | 100,000 | 57,984 | 1.33 | 1, 1.04 |
| | Gunpowder tea | no order | 690 | 0.0158 | 2.87 |
| | Soulang | no order | 685 | 0.0157 | 3.92 |
| *1788* | Bohea | 1,000,000 | 1,015,889 | 30.58 | 0.50 |
| | Congou | 2,000,000 | 1,188,214¼ | 35.76 | 1.15, 1.19, 1.20, 1.26, 1.28 |

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Souchong | 24,000 | 351,660 | 10.58 | 1.36, 1.44, 1.58, 1.65, 1.65, 1.83, 1.94, 1.98, 2.33, 3.23 |
| | Souchong (labelled as Congou) | no order | 369,059 | 11.11 | 1.33, 1.36, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 1.54, 1.58 |
| | Pekoe | 300,000 | 70,319¾ | 2.12 | 1.94, 2.44, 2.69 |
| | Songlo | 700,000 | 42,434 | 1.28 | 0.93 |
| | Hyson | 500,000 | 208,263¾ | 6.27 | 2.16, 2.19, 2.23, 2.30 |
| | Hyson skin | 100,000 | 30,613½ | 0.92 | 1.22 |
| | Twankay | 200,000 | 45,773 | 1.38 | 1 |
| | Soulang | 2,000 | 210 | 0.006 | 3.92 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 2,000 | no purchase | — | unknown |
| *1789* | Bohea | unknown | 819,024 | 22.16 | 0.43 |
| | Congou | unknown | 2,099,896 | 56.80 | 1, 1.06, 1.08, 1.10, 1.15, 1.17 |
| | Souchong | 72,000 or 96,000 | 227,723¾ | 6.16 | 1.65, 1.69, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 1.94, 2.16, 2.33, 3.23 |
| | Souchong (labelled as Congou) | no order | 98,530 | 2.67 | 1.33, 1.36 |
| | Pekoe | 240,000 or 320,000 | 140,710½ | 3.81 | 1.94, 2.37, 2.44, 2.51, 2.66 |
| | Songlo | 300,000 or 400,000 | 88,613½ | 2.40 | 0.72, 0.86 |
| | Hyson | 240,000 or 320,000 | 145,295 | 3.93 | 2.23, 2.30 |
| | Hyson skin | 120,000 or 160,000 | 26,942 | 0.73 | 1.15 |
| | Twankay | 120,000 or 160,000 | 44,217½ | 1.20 | 0.79, 0.93, 1 |
| | Soulang | 3,000 or 4,000 | 1,313¾ | 0.036 | 3.92, 4.67 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 3,000 or 4,000 | 4,497 | 0.121 | 2.87, 3.05 |
| *1790* | Bohea | 240,000 | 648,575 | 75.77 | 0.40 |
| | Congou | 750,000 | 133,126 | 15.55 | 0.61 |
| | Souchong | 20,000 | 30,128 | 3.52 | 0.65 |
| | Campoe | 450,000 | no purchase | – | unknown |
| | Pekoe | 80,000 | no purchase | – | unknown |
| | Songlo | 80,000 | 20,325 | 2.37 | 0.54 |
| | Twankay | 20,000 | 18,400 | 2.15 | 0.57 |
| | Hyson skin | 20,000 | 5,412 | 0.63 | 0.65 |
| | Hyson | 40,000 | no purchase | — | unknown |
| | Soulang | 1,000 | no purchase | — | unknown |
| | Gunpowder tea | 2,000 | no purchase | — | unknown |
| *1791* | Bohea | 90,000 | | | 0.54 |
| | Congou | 982,600 | 1,371,903 | 85.73 | 0.59, 0.63 |
| | Campoe* | 573,600 | | | 0.63, 0.68 |
| | Souchong | 36,800 | 59,648 | 3.73 | 0.83, 0.86, 0.90, 0.97, 2.33 |
| | Pekoe | 25,200 | 66,514 | 4.16 | 0.83, 1.80, 1.87 |
| | Songlo | 11,250 | 36,323 | 2.27 | 0.50 |
| | Twankay | 11,250 | 37,550 | 2.35 | 0.54 |
| | Hyson | 15,000 | 18,473 | 1.15 | 2.16, 2.41 |
| | Hyson skin | 8,250 | 5,630 | 0.35 | 1.26 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 2,550 | 2,555 | 0.16 | unknown |
| | Soulang | 1,500 | 1,723 | 0.10 | 3.59 |

* a type of black tea

| Year | Assortments | Volumes (pounds) home order | Canton purchase | Percentage (teas purchased) | Prices (guilders/pounds) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1792* | Bohea | unknown | 165,641 | 8.09 | 0.50 |
| | Congou | unknown | 961,794 | 47 | 1.08, 1.10, 1.13, 1.15, 1.17, 1.33, 1.51, 1.54 |
| | Congou (mixed with Bohea) | unknown | 77,862 | 3.80 | 0.61 |
| | Campoe | unknown | 406,427 | 19.86 | 0.68, 1.22 |
| | Souchong | unknown | 246,447¼ | 12.04 | 0.83, 0.90, 1.62, 1.72, 1.80, 1.87, 1.94 |
| | Pekoe | unknown | 21,924 | 1.07 | 1.94, 2.01, 2.16, 2.37, 2.51 |
| | Songlo | unknown | 40,233 | 1.97 | 0.72, 0.93 |
| | Hyson | unknown | 43,001 | 2.10 | 2.19, 2.30, 2.37 |
| | Hyson skin | unknown | 32,863 | 1.61 | 1.15 |
| | Twankay | unknown | 43,739 | 2.14 | 0.79, 1.04 |
| | Gunpowder tea | unknown | 4,932 | 0.24 | 2.69 |
| | Soulang | unknown | 1,623¾ | 0.08 | 4.31 |
| *1793* | No purchase | | | | |
| *1794* | Bohea | 159,600 | 158,598 | 5.28 | 0.43 |
| | Congou | 1,643,000 | 1,558,698 | 51.87 | 0.57, 0.65, 0.70, 0.74, 0.79, 1.01, 1.11, 1.22 |
| | Campoe | 908,200 | 863,849½ | 28.75 | 0.77, 0.81, 0.86, 1.08, 1.11, 1.19, 1.29 |
| | Souchong | 323,000 | 325,330 | 10.83 | 0.75, 0.79, 0.84, 0.86, 0.88, 0.92, 1.01, 1.15, 1.62, 1.69, 1.72, 1.80, 1.90 |
| | Pekoe | 60,000 | 14,502 | 0.48 | 0.97, 1.76, 2.51, 2.87 |
| | Songlo | 24,000 | no purchase | — | unknown |
| | Twankay | 24,000 | 7,110 | 0.24 | unknown |
| | Hyson | 40,000 | 38,736 | 1.29 | 2.16 |
| | Hyson skin | 33,000 | 32,829½ | 1.09 | 1.08 |
| | Gunpowder tea | 3,000 | 2,712 | 0.09 | 2.51 |
| | Soulang | 2,000 | 2,651 | 0.08 | 3.59 |

Sources: NA NFC 1-56, 69-95, 191-257; NA VOC 4381-4447, 4543-4547.

APPENDIX 5

# TEAS SENT FROM BATAVIA TO THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1730-1787

| Season | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1730-1731* | Amsterdam | 195,080 | 230,624.5 | * sent in late 1730 & early 1731 (it is alike in later years) |
| | | 47,843 | 60,033.1 | |
| | Zeeland | 184,518 | 219,029.2 | |
| | | 32,351 | 25,228.7 | |
| | Delft | 8,769 | 6,807.13 | |
| | | 47,191 | 56,181.3 | |
| | Rotterdam | 42,044 | 56,843.7 | |
| | | 8,612 | 6,685.10 | |
| | Hoorn | 51,159 | 66,285.4 | |
| | | 8,716 | 6,761.2 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 49,660 | 59,103.15 | |
| | | 8,613 | 6,689 | |
| *1731-1732* | Amsterdam | 168,980 | 96,271.6 | |
| | | 166,916 | 98,010 | |
| | | 107,298 | 60,209.11 | |
| | | 50,249 | 19,534.2 | |
| | Zeeland | 107,820 | 63,518.9 | |
| | | 113,316 | 11,603.18 | |
| | Delft | 49,574 | 28,573.7 | |
| | | 5,622 | 3,177.4 | |
| | | 6,102 | 2,416.4 | |
| | Rotterdam | 49,574 | 28,660.17 | |
| | | 5,622 | 3,177.4 | |
| | | 5,617 | 3,080.19 | |
| | | 6,401 | 2,534.3 | |
| | | 55,352 | 31,780.8 | |
| | Hoorn | 6,039 | 2,392.9 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 6,418 | 2,541.2 | |
| *1734-1735* | Amsterdam | 124,696 | 41,741 | |
| | | 81,013 | 32,491.8 | |
| | | 58,870 | 18,233.18 | |
| | | 133,876 | 95,093.2 | |
| | Zeeland | 90,605 | 30,070.15 | |
| | | 40,644 | 16,340.13 | |
| | | 80,557 | 66,224 | |
| | Rotterdam | 32,456 | 11,684.5 | |
| | | 19,533 | 13,866.19 | |
| | Delft | 32,554 | 11,499.6 | |
| | | 19,367 | 13,823.8 | |
| | | 32,379 | 11,414.19 | |
| | | 17,335 | 12,571.1 | |

| Season | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Enkhuizen | 32,385 | 11,415.10 | |
| | | 18,376 | 13,151.9 | |
| *1737-1738* | Amsterdam | 109,172 | 84,561.12 | |
| | | 105,473 | 98,426.2 | |
| | | 20,871 | 18,771.10 | |
| | | 142,724 | 109,824.9 | |
| | Zeeland | 22,675 | 17,544.8 | |
| | | 62,932 | 58,374.1 | |
| | | 42,901 | 33,061.17 | |
| | Delft | 42,714 | 32,913.19 | |
| | Rotterdam | 50,657 | 33,843.16 | |
| | | 47,520 | 32,920.15 | |
| | Hoorn | 50,371 | 33,182.19 | |
| | | 1,820 | 1,676.7 | |
| | | 41,840 | 32,350.2 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 50,793 | 32,972.5 | |
| | | 1,823 | 1,679.1 | |
| *1738-1739* | Amsterdam | 165,280 | 100,673 | |
| | | 154,848 | 99,958.14 | |
| | | 105,881 | 64,224.1 | |
| | | 137,706 | 83,071.7 | |
| | | 131,851 | 81,706.1 | |
| | | 134,473 | 82,072.4 | |
| | | 3,980 | 2,601.6 | |
| | | 164,916 | 106,765.1 | |
| | Zeeland | 92,477 | 55,610.19 | |
| | | 156,387 | 93,522.2 | |
| | | 97,277 | 50,995.11 | |
| | | 22,966 | 12,092.15 | |
| | Delft | 104,199 | 64,095.4 | |
| | Rotterdam | 22,623 | 11,918.9 | |
| | | 104,057 | 64,035.9 | |
| | Hoorn | 22,700 | 11,932.7 | |
| | | 103,319 | 63,573.7 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 24,013 | 12,594.2 | |
| *1739-1740* | Amsterdam | 98,142 | 39,991.5 | |
| | | 76,865 | 31,036.17 | |
| | Hoorn | 9,956 | 3,957.3 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 10,928 | 4,303.19 | |
| *1740-1741* | Amsterdam | 98,142 | 39,991.5 | |
| | | 76,865 | 31,036.17 | |
| | Hoorn | 9,956 | 3,957.3 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 10,928 | 4,303.19 | |
| *1741-1742* | Amsterdam | 214,411 | 96,490.5 | |
| | Delft | 49,075 | 22,750.15 | |
| | Rotterdam | 49,289 | 22,840.9 | |
| | Hoorn | 49,169 | 22,418.8 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 49,253 | 22,453.11 | |

| Season | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1742-1743* | Amsterdam | 9,541 | 6,188.12 | |
| | | 8,676 | 5,617.12 | |
| | | 230,589 | 143,756.7 | |
| | | 49,001 | 30,191.17 | |
| | | 323,485 | 182,034.4 | |
| | | 36,993 | 21,239.19 | |
| | Zeeland | 2,352 | 1,527.4 | |
| | Delft | 36,538 | 22,321.6 | |
| | | 12,984 | 8,378.8 | |
| | | 10,464 | 6,718.8 | |
| | Rotterdam | 44,598 | 27,556.1 | |
| | Hoorn | 11,801 | 7,616.12 | |
| | | 23,021 | 13,977.8 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 29,158 | 16,287.1 | |
| *1751-1752* | Amsterdam | 249,445 | 121,229.5 | on freight |
| | Zeeland | 304,155 | 175,106.13 | on freight |
| | Delft | 44,378 | 34,082.6 | |
| | Rotterdam | 147,531 | 101,180.19 | on freight |
| | Hoorn | 113,383 | 68,882.6 | on freight |
| | | 108,666 | 75,562.2 | on freight |
| | Enkhuizen | 258,284 | 196,733.1 | on freight |
| *1752-1753* | Amsterdam | 264,432 | 143,526.13 | on freight |
| | | 10,444 | 9,003.3 | |
| | Zeeland | 217,911 | 106,769.18 | on freight |
| | Delft | 199,740 | 139,900.4 | |
| | Rotterdam | 52,220 | 29,131.11 | |
| | Hoorn | 227,667 | 119,449.1 | on freight |
| *1753-1754* | none | | | |
| *1754-1755* | Rotterdam | 86,037 | 37,223.6 | |
| *1756-1757* | none | | | |
| *1758-1759* | Amsterdam | 18,148 | 16,486.14 | on freight |
| | | 30,262 | 26,146.8 | on freight |
| *1759-1760* | Amsterdam | 309,225 | 190,384.5 | on freight |
| | Rotterdam | 303,121 | 189,472.4 | on freight |
| *1760-1761* | none | | | |
| *1761-1762* | Amsterdam | 441,399 | 311,644.13 | on freight |
| | Zeeland | 353,248 | 239,039.14 | on freight |
| | Rotterdam | 321,235 | 226,319.3 | on freight |
| *1762-1763* | Hoorn | 212,114 | 115,962.1 | on freight |
| *1763-1764* | none | | | |
| *1764-1765* | none | | | |
| *1765-1766* | none | | | |

| Season | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1766-1767* | none | | | |
| *1768-1769* | none | | | |
| *1771-1772* | none | | | |
| *1774-1775* | none | | | |
| *1775-1776* | none | | | |
| *1776-1777* | none | | | |
| *1777-1778* | none | | | |
| *1779-1780* | none | | | |
| *1780-1781* | none | | | |
| *1781-1782* | none | | | |
| *1782-1783* | none | | | |
| *1784-1785* | none | | | |
| *1786-1787* | Amsterdam | 8,559 | 2,568.11 | on freight |
| | | 107,468 | 32,240 | on freight |

Source: NA BGB 10767-10801.

APPENDIX 6

# TEAS AUCTIONED BY THE VOC IN THE DUTCH REPUBLIC, 1729-1790

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *15 May 1732* | Amsterdam | ☆297,146+399,902 | 442,301.3+459,200.12 | ☆brought by the |
| *(for 1729-32)* | Zeeland | 193,550 | 239,363.8 | direct China ships |
| | Delft | 49,498 | 60,953.14 | |
| | Rotterdam | 39,343 | 51,052.11 | |
| | Hoorn | 53,637 | 65,446.13 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 49,411 | 63,884.10 | |
| *15 May 1733* | Amsterdam | ☆531,623+442,391 | 801,900.18+539,387.2 | ☆brought by the |
| *(for 1730-33)* | Zeeland | ☆284,254+221,535 | 448,876.8+268,662.1 | direct China ships |
| | Delft | 52,299 | 63,213.3 | |
| | Rotterdam | 50,468 | 65,235.13 | |
| | Hoorn | 55,629 | 69,505.13 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 51,804 | 67,458.10 | |
| *15 May 1734* | Amsterdam | ☆504,227+241,314 | 872,788.6+346,834 | ☆brought by the |
| *(for 1731-34)* | Zeeland | 118,259 | 169,095.1 | direct China ships |
| | Delft | 31,109 | 42,621.4 | |
| | Rotterdam | 28,789 | 43,635.11 | |
| | Hoorn | 32,530 | 39,599.4 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 32,812 | 39,097.12 | |
| *31 May 1735* | Amsterdam | ☆542,172+158,972 | 988,510.3+240,068.11 | ☆brought by the |
| *(for 1732-35)* | Zeeland | ☆549,140+82,006 | 948,440.14+125,375.7 | direct China ships |
| | Delft | 20,057 | 31,030.18 | |
| | Rotterdam | 18,710 | 31,103.2 | |
| | Hoorn | 21,194 | 33,388.18 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 18,786 | 29,321.19 | |
| *31 May 1736* | Amsterdam | ☆304,301+324,092 | 531,667+524,455.5 | ☆brought by the |
| *(for 1733-36)* | Zeeland | 190,388 | 308,733.6 | direct China ships |
| | Delft | 46,545 | 72,000.5 | |
| | Rotterdam | 42,654 | 70,937.1 | |
| | Hoorn | 43,839 | 67,380.11 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 46,375 | 69,687.10 | |
| *31 May 1737* | Amsterdam | 422,089 | 654,350.12 | |
| *(for 1734-37)* | Zeeland | 228,910 | 377,891.8 | |
| | Delft | 59,038 | 92,432.2 | |
| | Rotterdam | 56,031 | 92,075.18 | |
| | Hoorn | 55,223 | 87,358.19 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 48,558 | 76,426.1 | |
| *15 May 1738* | Amsterdam | 370,572 | 581,450.11 | *disclaimed |
| *(for 1735-38)* | Zeeland | 193,142 | 243,412.7 | |

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Delft | 49,202 | 61,971.15 | |
| | Rotterdam | *1,782+45,852 | 2,127.19+62,442.11 | |
| | Hoorn | 50,951 | 65,973.13 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 53,009 | 65,804.16 | |
| *15 May 1739* | Amsterdam | 613,255 | 942,936.12 | |
| *(for 1736-39)* | Zeeland | 411,281 | 629,325.2 | |
| | Delft | 46,473 | 67,335.3 | |
| | Rotterdam | 42,701 | 65,250.18 | |
| | Hoorn | 95,207 | 64,565.9 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 43,305 | 68,507.9 | |
| *May 1740* | Amsterdam | 896,364 | 1,010,131.6 | |
| *(for 1737-40)* | Zeeland | 415,243 | 414,791.9 | |
| | Delft | 133,864 | 152,433.1 | |
| | Rotterdam | 127,225 | 142,289 | |
| | Hoorn | 94,452 | 98,031.17 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 86,494 | 85,679.1 | |
| *15 May 1741* | Amsterdam | 578,122 | 786,798.8 | |
| *(for 1738-41)* | Zeeland | 196,524 | 263,888.3 | |
| | Delft | 20,595 | 30,095.3 | |
| | Rotterdam | 18,940 | 30,192.1 | |
| | Hoorn | 20,650 | 27,992 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 47,905 | 57,851.17 | |
| *15 May 1742* | Amsterdam | 288,337 | 430,244.15 | *volumes unknown |
| *(for 1739-42)* | Zeeland | 490,104 | 666,661.12 | for the tea samples |
| | Delft | *?+49,335 | 110.4+73,152.6 | |
| | Rotterdam | *?+46,536 | 148.2+72,792.10 | |
| | Hoorn | 52,718 | 75,904.9 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 49,966 | 70,429.4 | |
| *15 May 1743* | Amsterdam | 533,829 | 638,418.4 | *disclaimed |
| *(for 1740-43)* | Zeeland | 111,547 | 110,463.3 | |
| | Delft | 35,243 | 33,794.4 | |
| | Rotterdam | *1,239+42,060 | 1,407.5+46,336.18 | |
| | Hoorn | 9,332 | 14,680.10 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 9,257 | 14,368.9 | |
| *15 May 1744* | Amsterdam | 850,927 | 1,223,609.6 | |
| *(for 1741-44)* | Zeeland | 343,269 | 550,010.3 | |
| | Delft | 105,383 | 144,188.3 | |
| | Rotterdam | 91,000 | 136,793.16 | |
| | Hoorn | 153,155 | 220,320.1 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 97,620 | 141,272.1 | |
| *15 May 1745* | Amsterdam | ☆374,655+275,054 | 196,736.4+561,356.14 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1742-45)* | Zeeland | *204,679+464,691 | 99,567.6+906,693.8 | *at freight for 30% |
| *15 May 1746* | Amsterdam | ☆1,217,712+988,552 | 681,866.9+1,791,928.12 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1743-46)* | Zeeland | *283,847 | 117,904.2 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Delft | 174,184 | 315,405.12 | |

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rotterdam | ☆127,105+167,813 | 159,820.1+331,013.5 | |
| *May 1747* | Amsterdam | ☆925,510+579,492 | 506,439.6+987,463.15 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1744-47)* | Zeeland | *214,867+489,316 | 108,648.6+890,014.9 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Delft | ☆201,242 | 285,753.10 | |
| *31 May 1748* | Amsterdam | ☆817,579+513,431 | 406,817.8+968,766.5 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1745-48)* | Zeeland | *391,051 | 174,770.9 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Delft | ☆227,197 | 299,450.9 | °disclaimed |
| | Rotterdam | °197 | 229.8 | |
| | Hoorn | 184,108 | 327,601.5 | |
| | Enkhuizen | ☆23,317 | 10,858.4 | |
| *31 May 1749* | Amsterdam | ☆1,228,336+563,169 | 502,375.13+892,458.6 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1746-49)* | Zeeland | *370,295+225,414 | 173,211.10+398,971.2 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆253,876+158,008 | 268,601.10+254,169.17 | *at freight for 30% |
| *15 May 1750* | Amsterdam | ☆649,091+471,448 | 302,632.17+810,582.12 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1747-50)* | Zeeland | *282,491+457,459 | 113,318.6+743,584.9 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | 137 | 63.14 | *at freight for 30% |
| *15 May 1751* | Amsterdam | ☆471,025+518,674 | 176,726+831,646 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1748-51)* | Zeeland | *299,605 | 117,506.7 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | 406°+384,664 | 707.14+265,395.8 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Hoorn | ☆134,926 | 56,625.17 | °disclaimed |
| *31 May 1752* | Amsterdam | ☆529,073+546,680 | 219,555.1+794,519.6 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1749-52)* | Zeeland | *260,699+584,078 | 98,548.5+876,499.2 | for 40% |
| | Delft | ☆272,406 | 195,259.13 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Rotterdam | 330,445 | 259,567.4 | °volumes unknown |
| | Hoorn | 313,102 | 426,508.2 | |
| | Enkhuizen | °?+53,570 | 174,152.17+61,488.17 | |
| *31 May 1753* | Amsterdam | ☆233,911+485,355 | 105,344.3+776,248.9 | ☆on recognition % |
| *(for 1750-53)* | Zeeland | *346,658+34,244 | 147,071.6+55,711.4 | for 40% |
| | Delft | ☆42,367 | 28,713.4 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Hoorn | ☆207,927 | 89,931.2 | °volumes unknown |
| | Enkhuizen | °?+1494 | 106,389+1,195.10 | |
| *31 May 1754* | Zeeland | *248,982+606,873 | 96,294.8+736,490.14 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1751-54)* | Amsterdam | ☆248,390+1,026,755 | 102,298.13+1,094,324.10 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆49,911 | 34,001.1 | *at freight for 30% |
| | Hoorn | 220,291 | 89,296.9 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 429,645 | 355,780.1 | |
| *31 May 1755* | Amsterdam | ☆? | 1,588,000.2 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1752-55)* | Zeeland | 614,620 | 598,581 | *on recognition |
| | Rotterdam | *166,917+466,062 | 115,518.18+368,120.4 | for 40% |
| | Enkhuizen | 227 | 73.3 | |
| *31 May 1756* | Amsterdam | ☆? | 1,588,000.2 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1753-56)* | Zeeland | 1,058,809 | 908,681.9 | *on recognition |
| | Delft | 430,660 | 289,476.11 | for 40% |

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Rotterdam | *81,580 | 32,327.9 | |
| *31 May 1757* | Amsterdam | 1,182,082 | 1,299,464.8 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1754-57)* | Zeeland | 91,393 | 177,245.6 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆156,742 | 59,930 | |
| *31 May 1758* | Amsterdam | 655,642 | 914,997.7 | |
| *(for 1755-58)* | Zeeland | 1,208,516 | 1,393,972 | |
| | Hoorn | 475,631 | 524,125.2 | |
| *31 May 1759* | Amsterdam | 1,159,552 | 1,750,646.8 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1756-59)* | Zeeland | 3,750 | 5,831.9 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆7,108 | 4,829.16 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 537,595 | 722,152.17 | |
| *31 May 1760* | Amsterdam | ☆419,671+1,527,560 | 235,317.17+2,287,075.7 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1757-60)* | Enkhuizen | 207 | 65.7 | for 40% |
| *31 May 1761* | Amsterdam | ☆332,525+1,511,778 | 168,859.12+2,156,959.9 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1758-61)* | Zeeland | *389,140+4,990 | 153,589.8+19,701.5 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆289,770 | 118,009.4 | *at freight for 30% |
| *31 May 1762* | Amsterdam | ☆40+1,699,175 | 46+2,451,506.18 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1759-62)* | Zeeland | 1,147,228 | 1,721,642.10 | for 40% |
| *31 May 1763* | Amsterdam | ☆441,522+827,852 | 259,199.18+1,328,246.6 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1760-63)* | Zeeland | *344,717+813,820 | 186,254.7+1,321,133.7 | for 40% |
| | Rotterdam | ☆309,805 | 172,483.11 | *at freight for 30% |
| *31 May 1764* | Amsterdam | 1,777,249 | 2,483,526.3 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1761-64)* | Zeeland | 875,563 | 1,215,054.8 | *on recognition |
| | Hoorn | ☆ *? | 119,662.10 | for 50% |
| *31 May 1765* | Amsterdam | 846,881½ | 1,136,177.2 | |
| *(for 1762-65)* | Zeeland | 860,068 | 1,164,936 | |
| *31 May 1766* | Amsterdam | 2,514,303 | 3,079,853.8 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1763-66)* | Zeeland | 904,417 | 1,101,599.1 | for 50% |
| | Delft | ☆283,959+722,154 | 344,821.7+867,005.14 | |
| *31 May 1767* | Amsterdam | 1,735,801 | 2,115,765.15 | |
| *(for 1764-67)* | Zeeland | 896,272 | 1,113,634.2 | |
| | Rotterdam | 685,193 | 827,152.11 | |
| *31 May 1768* | Amsterdam | 1,690,041 | 2,015,793.7 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1765-68)* | Zeeland | 831,466 | 1,019,791 | *on recognition |
| | Hoorn | 671,499 | 764,217.7 | |
| | Enkhuizen | ☆*? | 25,950.4 | |
| *31 May 1769* | Amsterdam | 1,737,863 | 2,036,878.8 | 62 pots of confiture |
| *(for 1766-69)* | Zeeland | 902,422 | 1,084,086.2 | and (pickles), one |
| | Hoorn | 155 | 468.9 | case of tea and one |
| | Enkhuizen | 700,724 | 406,885.4 | case of wine, worth |

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | 681.4 guilders in total, for Rotterdam |
| *31 May 1770* | Amsterdam | ☆6,810+1,855,475 | 4,840.6+1,742,029.8 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1767-70)* | Zeeland | 927,537 | 978,015.8 | for 50% |
| | Delft | 669,933 | 334,574.4 | |
| *31 May 1771* | Amsterdam | 1,768,287 | 1,566,957.19 | |
| *(for 1768-71)* | Zeeland | 939,586 | 814,096.5 | |
| | Rotterdam & Delft | 656,091 | 518,112.5 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 1,144 | 836.1 | |
| *31 May 1772* | Amsterdam | ☆90,962+1,828,654 | 52,988.19+1,913,845.3 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1769-72)* | Zeeland | 958,464 | 1,020,301 | for 50% |
| | Hoorn | 687,026 | 719,043.2 | |
| *31 May 1773* | Amsterdam | ☆*?? +1,729,804 | 121,091.6+2,420,698.10 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1770-73)* | Zeeland | 839,545 | 1,178,442 | *on recognition |
| | Enkhuizen | 634,347 | 418,383.7 | for 50% |
| *31 May 1774* | Amsterdam | 1,718,797 | 1,820,274.12 | |
| *(for 1771-74)* | Zeeland | 895,426 | 943,618.16 | |
| | Delft & & Rotterdam | 438,256 | 235,053.8 | |
| *31 May 1775* | Amsterdam | ☆123,297+1,675,373 | 64,729.5+1,687,466.15 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1772-75)* | Zeeland | 929,533 | 925,126.1 | |
| | Rotterdam | 677,767 | 639,032.9 | |
| *31 May 1776* | Amsterdam | ☆26+1,718,773 | 28.8+1,512,078.16 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1773-76)* | Zeeland | 841,216 | 761,864.1 | |
| | Hoorn | 727,175 | 623,814.7 | |
| *31 May 1777* | Amsterdam | ☆33,326+1,696,974 | 21,349.17+1,604,841.17 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1774-77)* | Zeeland | 934,043 | 890,847.7 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 684,317 | 293,723.10 | |
| *31 May 1778* | Amsterdam | ☆206,125+1,714,206 | 121,925.11+1,503,009.9 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1775-78)* | Zeeland | 872,285 | 764,423.18 | |
| | Delft | 663,351 | 273,273.9 | |
| *31 May 1779* | Amsterdam | 1,699,344 | 1,996,550.19 | |
| *(for 1776-79)* | Zeeland | 829,825 | 1,015,325.15 | |
| | Rotterdam | 660,723 | 782,009.12 | |
| *31 May 1780* | Amsterdam | 821,762 | 1,120,240.11 | |
| *(for 1777-80)* | Zeeland | 806,059 | 1,170,358.3 | |
| *31 May 1781* | Amsterdam | 885,004 | 1,115,781.16 | |
| *(for 1778-81)* | Zeeland | 826,011 | 1,160,768 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 319,491 | 412,173.16 | |

| Record date | Chambers | Volumes (pounds) | Value (guilders) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1782 (for 1779-82) no sale* | | | | |
| *1783 (for 1780-83) no sale* | | | | |
| *31 May 1784* | Amsterdam | 150,311 | 295,024.9 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1781-84)* | Zeeland | 19,524 | 19,897.8 | for 50% |
| | Delft | ☆19,965+43,665 | 1,214.6+43,516.17 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 187 | 176.1 | |
| *31 May 1785* | Amsterdam | 1,258,145 | 1,278,396.18 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1782-85)* | Zeeland | 76,877 | 119,212.7 | for 50% |
| | Delft | ☆8,187 | 5,930.18 | |
| *31 May 1786* | Amsterdam | 893,509 | 971,636.3 | |
| *(for 1783-86)* | Zeeland | 847,271 | 948,626.4 | |
| | Hoorn | 889,705 | 1,096,692.2 | |
| *31 May 1787* | Amsterdam | ☆60,638+1,213,109 | 33,176+1,571,552 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1784-87)* | Zeeland | 802,198 | 1,136,020.18 | for 30% |
| *31 May 1788* | Amsterdam | ☆114,076+2,453,918 | 36,840+2,551,317.14 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1785-88)* | Zeeland | 813,954 | 830,275.4 | for 50% |
| | Delft | ☆647,709 | 360,410.6 | |
| | Enkhuizen | 692,968 | 354,073.13 | |
| *31 May 1789* | Amsterdam | 785,171 | 836,543.7 | ☆volumes unknown |
| *(for 1786-89)* | Rotterdam | 834,594 | 808,223.10 | |
| | Enkhuizen | ☆? | 1,866.15 | |
| *31 May 1790* | Amsterdam | ☆5,075+1,429,355 | 5,502.10+1,385,456.19 | ☆on recognition |
| *(for 1787-90)* | | | | for 40% |

Source: NA VOC 4592-4597.

APPENDIX 7

# PRICES OF TEAS AT THE COMPANY AUCTIONS BY THE VOC CHAMBERS, 1777-1780

(stivers/pound)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *1777* | | |
| 10 November | Hyson | 78 - 81 |
| By the Zeeland Chamber | Hyson skin | 36½ - 37 |
| | Twankay | 34 - 35¼ |
| | Songlo (½ chest) | 32½ - 34 |
| | Songlo (¼ chest) | 32¾ |
| | Pekoe | 39 - 43 |
| | Souchong | 32 - 38¾ |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 22¾ - 23½ |
| | Congou (½ chest) | 23 - 25½ |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 24¼ - 36 |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 12 - 12¾ |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 11 - 12¼ |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 11 - 13 |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 12¼ |
| | Bohea (beam chest) | 12¼ - 13¼ |
| 18 November | Hyson | 78 - 81 |
| By the Delft Chamber | Hyson skin | 36½ - 41½ |
| | Twankay | 34¾ |
| | Songlo (½ chest) | 32½ - 33¼ |
| | Pekoe (¼ chest) | 33½ - 38 |
| | Souchong | 32½ - 37¾ |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 23¼ - 23½ |
| | Congou (½ chest) | 21½ - 34¾ |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 23¾ - 29¼ |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 11 ½ - 16 |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 11¾ |
| | Bohea (beam chest) | 11¼ - 11½ |
| 2 December | Hyson | 80 - 81 |
| By the Amsterdam Chamber | Hyson skin | 38 - 46 |
| | Twankay | 32 - 35½ |
| | Songlo | 33 - 33¼ |
| | Pekoe | 34 - 58 |
| | Souchong | 32 ½ - 50 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 23¼ - 23¾ |
| | Congou (½ chest) | 21 ¼ - 25 |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 24 - 37¼ |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 11½ - 16½ |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 11 - 11¾ |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 10¼ - 12¼ |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 10¼ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 11 - 12¾ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| *1778* | | |
| 9 & 10 November | Hyson | 86½ - 89½ |
| By the Amsterdam Chamber | Hyson skin | 43½ - 51½ |
| | Twankay | 38½ - 46 |
| | Songlo | 37½ - 39½ |
| | Pekoe | 38 - 51 |
| | Souchong | 39 - 62 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 22½ - 26 |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 22½ - 43 |
| | Bohea (whole chest, best) | 16½ - 18 |
| | Bohea (whole chest, ordinary) | 16 - 16¾ |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 15½ - 15¾ |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 15¼ - 15¾ |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 15¼ - 15½ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 15½ - 16 |
| 2 December | Hyson | 90 - 90½ |
| By the Zeeland Chamber | Hyson skin | 50 - 54½ |
| | Twankay | 46 - 46½ |
| | Songlo | 40 - 43 |
| | Pekoe | 44 - 49½ |
| | Souchong | 38½ - 52 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 23 - 24 |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 25½ - 39 |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 16½ - 18 |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 18½ |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 18¼ - 18½ |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 18½ - 18¾ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 18¼ - 18½ |
| | Bohea (small chest) | 18½ - 18¾ |
| | Bohea (prop chest) | 18 - 18½ |
| | Bohea (beam chest) | 18½ - 19 |
| 9 December | Hyson | 84 - 88 |
| By the Rotterdam Chamber | Hyson skin | 47½ - 52 |
| | Twankay | 44 - 45 |
| | Songlo | 40 - 41 |
| | Pekoe | 44 - 46½ |
| | Souchong | 37 - 45½ |
| | Congou | 23¼ - 38½ |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 17¼ - 18 |
| | Bohea (whole chest, ordinary) | 16½ - 17 |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 16¾ - 17 |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 16½ - 17 |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 16¾ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 16 |
| *1779* | | |
| 1 & 2 November | Hyson | 89½ - 93½ |
| By the Amsterdam Chamber | Hyson skin | 51½ - 56½ |
| | Songlo | 49 - 49½ |
| | Pekoe | 44 - 57 |
| | Souchong | 32½ - 52 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 25¾ - 26½ |
| | Congou (1/8 & ¼ chest) | 27½ - 38 |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 21½ - 22 |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 21¾ |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 21¼ - 21½ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 21 - 21½ |
| | Bohea (beam chest) | 22 - 22¾ |
| 15 November | Hyson | 95 - 97½ |
| By the Zeeland Chamber | Hyson skin | 54 - 70 |
| | Songlo | 52½ - 53 |
| | Pekoe | 40 - 60½ |
| | Souchong (¼ chest) | 38 - 55½ |
| | Souchong (1/8 chest) | 46 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 27 - 27½ |
| | Congou (¼ chest) | 30½ - 38 |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 22¼ - 23 |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 22¼ - 22½ |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 22 - 22½ |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 21¾ - 22 |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 21¼ - 21½ |
| | Bohea (small chest) | 22 - 22½ |
| | Bohea (prop chest) | 22 - 22¼ |
| | Bohea (beam chest) | 22½ - 23 |
| *1780* | | |
| 13 & 14 November | Hyson | 86 - 92 |
| By the Amsterdam Chamber | Hyson skin | 40 - 60 |
| | Twankay | 35 - 37 |
| | Songlo | 32½ - 35½ |
| | Gunpowder tea | 108 - 145 |
| | Pekoe | 45 - 48½ |
| | Souchong | 34½ - 41 |
| | Congou (whole chest) | 27 - 28½ |
| | Congou | 30½ - 41 |
| | Bohea (whole chest) | 19¾ - 20¼ |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 19¾ - 20 |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 20 - 20½ |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 19½ - 20 |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 20½ - 21¾ |
| 27 November | Hyson | 95 - 107 |
| By the Zeeland Chamber | Hyson skin | 57½ - 71 |
| | Twankay | 35½ - 54½ |
| | Songlo | 32½ - 35½ |
| | Gunpowder tea | 108 - 125 |
| | Pekoe | 47½ - 57 |
| | Souchong | 33 - 68½ |
| | Congou (big chest) | 28½ - 29 |
| | Congou | 31 - 42 |
| | Bohea (whole chest, best)* | 21 - 22 |
| | Bohea (whole chest, ordinary)* | 18¾ - 20 |
| | Bohea (2/3 chest) | 18½ - 19 |
| | Bohea (½ chest) | 18¾ - 19 |
| | Bohea (1/3 chest) | 18 - 18¾ |
| | Bohea (¼ chest) | 19½ |
| 20 December | Hyson | 87 - 95 |
| By the Enkhuizen Chamber | Hyson skin | 47 - 48½ |
| | Twankay | 34½ - 42 |
| | Songlo | 32½ - 34 |

| | |
|---|---|
| Gunpowder tea | 114 - 133 |
| Pekoe | 45 - 48½ |
| Souchong | 35 - 57½ |
| Congou | 31 - 39 |
| Bohea | 19 - 20½ |

* In the typescript (date unknown) made of the originals the price of Bohea (whole chest, best) is given as 18¾ - 20 stivers per pound and that of Bohea (whole chest, ordinary) as 21 - 22 per pound. This goes against all reason, and accordingly, I assume that the typist made an error and that the prices should be reversed.
Source: NA Aanwinsten 541.

APPENDIX 8

# AUCTIONS OF TEAS HELD BY THE ZEELAND CHAMBER, 1758-1776

A. *The auction of teas belonging to the VOC*

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *12 April 1758* | | | |
| Pieter Bos | 2,196 | 20 - 36 | 2,662 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 308 | 33 | 510 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 59 | 38.5 | 119 |
| Jan Charles Boucheer | 1,429 | 20 - 37.5 | 1,695 |
| Jan de Vos | 1,594 | 21.5 | 1,705 |
| Jan Swart | 561 | 20.5 | 576 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 579 | 20 | 580 |
| Joost Alffes | 1,111 | 21 | 1,162 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 302 | 16 | 246 |
| *27 November 1758* | | | |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,173 | 31 - 33 | 1,868 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 563 | 33 | 927 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 591 | 34.5 | 1,017 |
| Benjamin Gavin | 715 | 28 | 998 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 708 | 28.5 | 1,006 |
| *17 November 1760* | | | |
| Hendrikus Kakelaar | 2,440 | 20.5 - 47.8 | 4,151 |
| Daniel Smit | 847 | 21.3 | 898 |
| Faken ten Hoorn | 4,930 | 18.5 - 22 | 4,948 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 3,782 | 18 - 20 | 3,605 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 2,085 | 18.8 - 20.3 | 347 |
| Jan Macquet | 2,089 | 18 - 21.8 | 2,097 |
| Jan der Moijse | 5,996 | 18.3 - 21.3 | 5,923 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 4,194 | 16 - 20 | 3,773 |
| Bomme & Engelsez. | 6,427 | 19.5 - 22.5 | 6,610 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 1,165 | 20.5 | 1,190 |
| Lambert Schoft | 889 | 18.5 | 821 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 2,546 | 18.3 - 20.8 | 4,829 |
| Aarnoud Brouwers | 2,510 | 1.5 - 20.3 | 2,480 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 4,835 | 18 - 20.3 | 4,480 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 1,154 | 20.3 | 1,154 |
| Petrus Hamer | 8,173 | 18.3 - 47.5 | 11,777 |
| Andries van der Poest | 5,494 | 15 - 18.8 | 4,616 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 5,734 | 19 - 21 | 5,665 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 6,306 | 19.5 - 20.5 | 6,314 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 877 | 19.8 | 865 |
| Ewout van Groenenberg | 5,019 | 19.3 - 20.8 | 5,001 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 862 | 20.5 | 882 |
| Johannes Rodolpheus Teuts | 1,366 | 19.3 | 1,310 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan Bekker Junior | 594 | 20.5 | 610 |
| Joan van Groenenberg | 227 | 15.8 | 184 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 18,434 | 20.5 | 16,920 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 24,829 | 20.8 | 23,432 |
| Benjamin Gavin | 26,896 | 47.5 | 28,663 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 66,711 | 49.3 | 71,007 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 61,369 | 51 | 64,060 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 33,836 | 50.5 | 33,880 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 70,153 | 50.8 | 75,844 |
| *13 April 1761* | | | |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,345 | 17.3 - 21.8 | 1,315 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 699 | 21.8 | 763 |
| Petrus Hamer | 2,336 | 16.5 - 22 | 2,149 |
| Heijman Hendriks | 352 | 22.3 | 397 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 322 | 18.8 | 307 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 1,311 | 17.3 | 1,069 |
| *9 November 1761* | | | |
| Petrus Hamer | 12,253 | 23.8 - 47.8 | 20,557 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 72,686 | 20 - 77.8 | 117,379 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 181,479 | 20.5 - 76.5 | 267,085 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 264,562 | 23.5 - 73.3 | 397,633 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 88,258 | 24.5 - 76.5 | 135,447 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 103,235 | 21.8 - 76.3 | 147,841 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 27,047 | 20.3 - 60 | 40,639 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 10,695 | 24 - 44.5 | 17,071 |
| James Turing | 50,160 | 25.3 - 51 | 66,493 |
| Paulus Hendr. Securius | 77,523 | 24.5 - 78.3 | 116,713 |
| Pieter Bos | 20,524 | 24.5 - 43 | 26,833 |
| Jan der Moijse | 3,970 | 25.5 - 38.8 | 5,779 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 7,267 | 25.5 - 43.3 | 10,111 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 16,041 | 23.8 - 48.5 | 24,145 |
| Johannes Rodolphus Teuts | 941 | 24.8 - 34 | 1,261 |
| Johan Bendleij | 18,645 | 25.3 - 47.3 | 30,631 |
| Lambert Schoft | 4,008 | 25.8 - 40.5 | 5,917 |
| Christiaan Wollaart | 1,535 | 28 | 2,137 |
| Lendert Doudeijns | 1,274 | 38.3 | 2,419 |
| Cornelis Molder | 1,245 | 38.5 | 2,383 |
| Charel Acherveld | 3,212 | 24.8 - 30 | 4,381 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 14,585 | 23.5 - 44.5 | 21,937 |
| Jeremias Petit | 5,856 | 25.5 - 38.8 | 8,533 |
| Jan de Zitter & Sons | 3,178 | 24.8 - 24.5 | 3,847 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 41,179 | 24.5 - 44.8 | 57,133 |
| Aarnoud Brouwers | 15,696 | 24.8 - 39 | 22,105 |
| Heijman Hendriks | 2,460 | 20.3 - 40.5 | 3,199 |
| Andries van Valkenburg | 2,927 | 26 - 40 | 4,705 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 11,849 | 25.5 - 43.5 | 16,771 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 3,207 | 24.3 - 26.5 | 4,045 |
| Jan de Vos | 1,593 | 29.8 | 2,353 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 3,001 | 25 - 51.5 | 4,369 |
| Bartholomeus Wijbo | 1,596 | 30 | 2,377 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 4,750 | 23.8 - 31 | 6,307 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Willem Nevejans | 406 | 42.8 | 865 |
| William Daij Junior | 523 | 22 - 42.8 | 985 |
| Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon | 1,602 | 26 | 2,071 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 18,476 | 25.5 - 43.5 | 25,783 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 4,570 | 25.5 - 38.8 | 6,619 |
| Andries van der Poest | 3,565 | 23 - 43.8 | 5,641 |
| Abraham de Smit de Jonge | 1,285 | 38.8 | 2,473 |
| Jan Macquet | 4,495 | 25.5 - 38.8 | 6,559 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 4,307 | 25.8 - 26 | 5,533 |
| Jacobus Fak | 3,300 | 25.5 - 26.5 | 4,261 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 1,995 | 25.8 - 41.8 | 2,881 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 3,175 | 25.5 - 26.8 | 4,117 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 3,245 | 25.3 - 25.8 | 4,105 |
| Jan van de Kruijsse Junior | 3,106 | 25.5 - 26 | 3,967 |
| Martinus Jasper van Beijdselaar | 1,610 | 25.5 | 2,041 |
| Jan Beukelaar | 1,504 | 26.3 | 1,963 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 947 | 25 | 1,183 |
| *19 April 1762* | | | |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 97 | 66 | 325 |
| Lambert Schoft | 260 | 36 - 47 | 571 |
| Pieter Bos | 4,809 | 24 - 44 | 6,775 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 674 | 38 | 1,279 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 177 | 37 | 331 |
| Petrus Hamer | 1,360 | 38 | 2,023 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 1,247 | 35.5 | 2,203 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 521 | 36 | 937 |
| Roeland Leenders | 753 | 24 | 901 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 772 | 24 | 925 |
| *22 November 1762* | | | |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 41,440 | 28.8 - 92 | 67,639 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 1,580 | 29.8 | 2,335 |
| James Turing | 20,283 | 29 - 92 | 32,425 |
| Daniel Smith | 2,679 | 30 - 91 | 7,555 |
| Pieter Bos | 18,397 | 29 - 84 | 29,443 |
| John Bendleij | 15,349 | 28.8 - 44.5 | 25,759 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 9,707 | 29 - 45.5 | 16,927 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 7,027 | 28.8 - 49.3 | 10,807 |
| Petrus Hamer | 4,989 | 29 - 45.5 | 9,751 |
| Silo de Cheff | 879 | 31.8 | 1,387 |
| Charel Acherveld | 1,604 | 31.5 | 2,509 |
| Jan Sierevelt | 1,561 | 29 | 2,251 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 4,644 | 29 | 6,679 |
| John Porter | 4,691 | 30 | 6,883 |
| Jacobus Borkelmans Junior | 4,380 | 30.8 | 6,505 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 4,694 | 30 | 6,889 |
| Der Moijse & Van der Woord | 17,503 | 31.8 | 25,137 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 1,495 | 30 | 2,227 |
| Andries van der Poest | 1,340 | 30.3 | 2,017 |
| Jan Macquet | 7,775 | 28.8 - 29 | 11,161 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hendrik van der Linde | 550 | 32.3 | 883 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 3,168 | 28.8 - 29 | 4,513 |
| Jacobus Fak | 1,547 | 29.8 | 2,287 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 12,411 | 29 - 30 | 18,085 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 7,149 | 32 | 10,649 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 1,504 | 29.8 | 2,227 |
| Lambert Schoft | 4,406 | 29 - 32.3 | 6,637 |
| Daniel van den Berge Wmzoon | 1,580 | 30 | 2,353 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 8,943 | 29 - 45.5 | 13,921 |
| Aarnoud Brouwer | 10,276 | 48.5 | 16,489 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 1,922 | 30 - 48.3 | 3,205 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw | 392 | 49.5 | 967 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 4,419 | 29 - 45.3 | 7,321 |
| Jeremias Petit | 5,896 | 29.5 - 45 | 9,559 |
| Jan van de Kruijsse | 4,111 | 29 - 46.3 | 8,005 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 5,760 | 49 | 9,925 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 9,611 | 49.5 | 21,133 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 14,731 | 45.3 | 22,669 |
| Pieter Clement | 34,402 | 28.8 - 45.5 | 55,345 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 35,171 | 29 - 49.3 | 58,357 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 14,717 | 29 - 46.3 | 24,715 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 826 | 69.5 | 2,851 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 2,784 | 29 - 42.8 | 4,843 |
| Johan Philip Hardij | 1,953 | 30.3 - 48.5 | 3,271 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 70,957 | 28.8 - 45.5 | 116,371 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 19,647 | 46.5 | 30,253 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 71,903 | 81 | 118,267 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 163,025 | 55.5 | 256,927 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 121,623 | 49.5 | 191,083 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 1,258 | 45.5 | 2,845 |
| Jacob de Vries | 1,492 | 29 | 2,149 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,625 | 29 | 2,341 |
| *18 April 1763* | | | |
| Jeremias Petit | 104 | 36 | 193 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 719 | 28 | 1,003 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 592 | 28 | 829 |
| Petrus Hamer | 629 | 24 - 27 | 811 |
| *8 December 1763* | | | |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 4,514 | 24 - 26.8 | 5,715 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 4,761 | 23.8 - 25 | 5,695 |
| Johan Philip Hardij | 897 | 26 | 1,165 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 3,291 | 23.8 - 26.8 | 4,117 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 4,867 | 24.5 - 25 | 5,995 |
| Cornelis den Herder | 835 | 26 | 1,081 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 3,252 | 25.8 - 27.5 | 4,311 |
| Lion van Hildeshijm | 656 | 25.8 | 841 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 422 | 25.8 | 547 |
| Jacobus Bal Davidzoon | 527 | 24 | 631 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 2,784 | 26.3 | 3,631 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hendrik van de Walle | 3,386 | 23.8 | 3,991 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 6,667 | 23.5 - 24.5 | 7,975 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 5,554 | 23 - 26.8 | 6,673 |
| Jan Macquet | 11,153 | 23.3 - 42 | 14,137 |
| Jan Sierevelt | 1,569 | 23.5 | 1,831 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 3,660 | 23.8 - 28.5 | 4,501 |
| Martinus Jasp. van Beijtselaar | 3,866 | 23.5 - 25.3 | 4,579 |
| Lambert Schoft | 1,602 | 23.3 | 1,855 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 8,169 | 23.5 - 42 | 10,981 |
| Abraham & Cornelis Tak | 10,180 | 23 - 24.3 | 11,947 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 3,127 | 23.5 | 3,649 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 19,086 | 23.5 - 42 | 25,051 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 10,327 | 23.5 - 30 | 12,643 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 13,014 | 23 - 42 | 16,855 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 1,621 | 23.5 | 1,897 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 8,377 | 23.3 - 24 | 9,799 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 15,895 | 23 - 26.3 | 19,093 |
| John Porter | 4,917 | 23.5 - 45.5 | 7,687 |
| Coppello & Carlebur | 2,675 | 25 - 50 | 4,645 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 9,003 | 23.8 - 49 | 12,019 |
| Daniel Smith | 4,289 | 23.8 - 69 | 7,027 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 6,187 | 24 - 42 | 8,659 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 13,480 | 24 - 49 | 20,113 |
| Jeremias Petit | 5,558 | 23.5 - 42 | 7,867 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 4,321 | 26.3 - 45.5 | 8,089 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 7,010 | 23.8 - 96 | 9,919 |
| Pieter Clement | 13,556 | 23.8 - 49.5 | 18,745 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 14,463 | 23.3 - 45.5 | 20,539 |
| Aarnoud Brouwer | 17,109 | 23.5 - 42 | 23,215 |
| Pieter Bos | 15,439 | 23.5 - 45 | 21,679 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 78,545 | 23 - 67.5 | 349,687 |
| James Turing | 25,756 | 23.3 - 69.5 | 33,211 |
| Maria Greeax | 9,360 | 23.5 - 49.5 | 13,867 |
| Thomas Holman | 34,350 | 23.3 - 49.5 | 49,867 |
| Petrus Hamer | 45,361 | 22 - 70 | 71,023 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 72,652 | 23 - 69.5 | 98,539 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 39,624 | 23.3 - 69.5 | 59,527 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 165,747 | 22.8 - 69.5 | 225,283 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 132,102 | 23.3 - 46 | 182,929 |
| *25 April 1764* | | | |
| Petrus Hamer | 1,485 | 23.5 | 1,735 |
| *2 October 1764* | | | |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 1,618 | 27.3 | 2,191 |
| Petrus Hamer | 36,035 | 19.8 - 61.5 | 50,395 |
| Daniel Smith | 29,183 | 15.5 - 65.5 | 43,441 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 64,758 | 18.8 - 63.5 | 87,919 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 4,590 | 21.5 - 54 | 8,995 |
| Gijstbert van Ippel | 22,820 | 21.5 - 54.5 | 30,379 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 107,422 | 18.3 - 81 | 160,261 |
| Jan van de Kruijsse | 5,466 | 21.8 - 25.8 | 6,295 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 111,563 | 9.5 - 80 | 149,131 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Thomas Holman | 33,082 | 21.5 - 54.5 | 39,931 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 53,279 | 20.5 - 54 | 70,951 |
| Jan Macquet | 13,604 | 21.5 - 51.5 | 18,391 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 8,087 | 21.5 - 47 | 9,265 |
| Aarnoud Brouwer | 11,995 | 21.8 - 52 | 15,853 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 4,358 | 21.5 - 24.3 | 4,819 |
| Pieter Bos | 22,236 | 21.8 - 76 | 30,163 |
| Bomme & Van der Veere | 10,963 | 21.8 - 54 | 24,301 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 4,187 | 21.8 - 24.3 | 4,675 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 86,688 | 20.3 - 80 | 115,657 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 1,503 | 20.3 - 21.8 | 1,627 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 107,650 | 20 - 53.5 | 144,421 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 13,654 | 21.8 - 50.5 | 18,583 |
| Jeremias Petit | 3,822 | 22.8 - 23 | 4,345 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 9,983 | 21.5 - 47 | 11,875 |
| Lambert Schoft | 4,064 | 21.8 - 27.8 | 4,951 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 11,202 | 21.5 - 40 | 12,379 |
| Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon | 3,173 | 22.5 - 23 | 3,583 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 1,601 | 21.5 | 1,711 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 13,247 | 22 - 26.3 | 15,067 |
| Hendrik van Erp | 1,560 | 22.8 | 1,765 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 1,587 | 22.3 | 1,759 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 6,236 | 21.5 - 22.3 | 6,769 |
| De Jonge & Clement | 15,066 | 21.5 - 22.8 | 16,453 |
| James Turing | 6,221 | 22 - 22.8 | 6,925 |
| John Porter | 4,590 | 21.8 - 22 | 4,975 |
| Daniel van den Berge W^m^zoon | 9,514 | 21.8 - 22.5 | 10,465 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 6,824 | 22 - 22.5 | 7,525 |
| Anthonij van Citters | 3,401 | 22.5 - 24.5 | 4,027 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 3,236 | 22 - 27 | 3,931 |
| *11 November 1765* | | | |
| Petrus Hamer | 29,567 | 18.3 - 73.5 | 38,155 |
| Daniel Smith | 5,843 | 18.8 - 55.8 | 7,351 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 49,157 | 18.5 - 73.5 | 70,759 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 121,208 | 14 - 72.5 | 147,361 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 75,901 | 16 - 72 | 89,671 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 3,151 | 18.8 | 2,935 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 135,297 | 18 - 60 | 173,833 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 4,421 | 19.3 - 54.8 | 6,481 |
| John Podd | 16,999 | 10 - 60.3 | 27,709 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 41,143 | 18 - 55.3 | 44,905 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 9,426 | 18.3 - 55.8 | 14,389 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 69,246 | 17 - 56.8 | 90,463 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 3,503 | 19 - 52.8 | 4,999 |
| Pieter Bos | 35,568 | 18.3 - 55.8 | 42,949 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 8,948 | 18 - 54.8 | 13,339 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 37,407 | 19.3 - 55.8 | 37,765 |
| Jan van de Kruijsse | 653 | 60.5 - 62 | 1,987 |
| Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. | 20,420 | 19 - 54.8 | 26,443 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 17,411 | 18.5 - 57.5 | 20,653 |
| Aarnout Brouwers | 19,821 | 18.5 - 55.3 | 24,325 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Elias de Timmerman | 21,798 | 18.8 - 52.3 | 22,651 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 19,547 | 18.8 - 52.3 | 20,143 |
| John Porter | 16,040 | 18.8 - 19.3 | 14,989 |
| Johannus Jacobus Landrij | 6,400 | 18 - 24.8 | 6,283 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 10,998 | 18.8 - 21.3 | 10,759 |
| Jeremias Petit | 7,398 | 18.8 - 55.3 | 9,619 |
| Jan Macquet | 19,095 | 18.3 - 19.8 | 17,989 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 25,613 | 18.5 - 26.5 | 27,853 |
| de Jonge & Clement | 24,201 | 18.5 - 26.5 | 23,251 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 7,437 | 18.8 - 19.5 | 7,045 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 4,077 | 18.8 - 19.5 | 3,865 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 5,397 | 18.5 - 19.8 | 5,059 |
| James Turing | 6,509 | 18.8 - 19.3 | 6,091 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 3,925 | 18.8 - 54.8 | 4,813 |
| Lambert Schoft | 3,879 | 19.5 - 26.5 | 4,297 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 2,608 | 18.8 - 54.8 | 4,207 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 3,323 | 18.8 | 3,097 |
| Cornelis Schieteratte | 2,666 | 19 - 24.8 | 2,989 |
| Abraham de Smit | 1,009 | 56 | 2,809 |
| Huijbregt Blommaart | 1,624 | 19.8 | 1,597 |
| Nicolaas de Koebert | 710 | 19.5 | 691 |
| Andries van der Poest | 1,668 | 18.8 | 1,555 |
| Johan Philip Hardij | 1,614 | 19 | 1,525 |
| Willem Nevejans | 990 | 19.3 | 949 |
| Pieter Bos | 802 | 55.8 | 2,221 |
| *3 November 1766* | | | |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 40,952 | 15.8 - 63 | 48,607 |
| Abraham de Smit | 1,383 | 58 | 3,979 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 42,464 | 17 - 79 | 68,905 |
| John Podd | 35,782 | 16.5 - 62.5 | 49,735 |
| Petrus Hamer | 30,757 | 16.3 | 42,229 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 90,357 | 15.8 - 60.5 | 100,963 |
| Jan Macquet | 7,459 | 16.8 - 62 | 8,215 |
| Gilles & Martinus Engelsz. | 21,899 | 16.8 - 61 | 30,745 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 8,626 | 17.3 - 57 | 13,015 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 67,201 | 16.8 - 60.5 | 75,565 |
| Jan Francois Herman | 2,491 | 17.5 - 18.3 | 2,203 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 98,069 | 16 - 60.5 | 142,495 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 82,690 | 16.8 - 59 | 98,107 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 66,009 | 15.5 - 62 | 16,438 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 6,417 | 38.5 - 56.5 | 16,255 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 4,946 | 17.5 - 24 | 4,897 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 28,688 | 15.8 - 55.5 | 28,297 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 4,007 | 18 - 20 | 3,763 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 16,680 | 17.5 - 58.5 | 25,057 |
| Johan David Herklots | 5,152 | 52 - 53 | 13,411 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 11,481 | 15.5 - 57.5 | 12,679 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 10,709 | 16.8 - 17.3 | 9,031 |
| Pieter Bos | 30,188 | 16.8 - 56.5 | 31,657 |
| Daniel Smith | 6,469 | 17 - 17.8 | 5,599 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 15,809 | 17.3 - 53.5 | 15,919 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Willemina Tijdgat widow A. Brouwers | 22,531 | 17 - 53.5 | 23,083 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 14,463 | 17.3 - 52.5 | 15,343 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 19,837 | 17.3 - 57.5 | 18,013 |
| de Jonge & Clement | 27,680 | 17 - 18.3 | 24,223 |
| Jeremias Petit | 4,721 | 17.3 - 18.5 | 4,219 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 8,328 | 17 - 54.5 | 11,875 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 10,462 | 16.8 - 17.8 | 8,875 |
| Nicolaas de Koebert | 959 | 18 | 865 |
| John Porter | 13,036 | 16.8 - 18.3 | 11,173 |
| Jacobus Fak | 1,869 | 17.8 | 1,651 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 10,128 | 16.5 - 18 | 8,737 |
| Lambert Schoft | 8,143 | 17.5 - 24.3 | 8,071 |
| Willem Nevejans | 946 | 17.8 | 841 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 7,564 | 17.3 - 19.8 | 6,883 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 3,484 | 18 - 18.3 | 3,133 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 968 | 18 | 871 |
| Jacob Pos J.Z. | 703 | 18.8 | 661 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 1,763 | 18.8 - 52 | 3,781 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 396 | 57 | 1,123 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 1,604 | 17.8 | 1,417 |
| *9 November 1772* | | | |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 92,235 | 5 - 90 | 135,133 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 57,259 | 22.3 - 90 | 87,439 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 85,553 | 20.5 - 90 | 107,053 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 149,466 | 20.8 - 90 | 207,445 |
| Richard Roberts | 3,427 | 22.3 - 90 | 5,065 |
| Petrus Hamer | 50,756 | 22 - 89 | 74,159 |
| Abraham de Smit & Johanes de Smit | 2,952 | 22.3 - 22.5 | 3,277 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 41,591 | 22 - 92 | 63,583 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 4,364 | 22.8 - 33.5 | 5,713 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 48,762 | 20 - 58 | 81,103 |
| Securius & Bourje | 18,041 | 21.5 - 52.5 | 28,759 |
| Anthonij Friskus | 2,377 | 22.3 - 22.8 | 2,653 |
| Jan van Maaren | 25,291 | 18 - 47 | 34,123 |
| Willem Nevejans | 919 | 30.3 | 1,387 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 37,429 | 20.5 - 52.5 | 47,371 |
| Pieter Bos | 36,976 | 21.8 - 53 | 50,347 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw & Son | 2,324 | 22.5 - 23.8 | 2,695 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 6,940 | 22.3 - 48.5 | 13,051 |
| Nicolaas de Koebert | 483 | 22.5 | 547 |
| William Nickalls | 12,179 | 20.5 - 43.5 | 14,485 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 13,964 | 22.3 - 39.5 | 17,845 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 1,468 | 22.3 | 1,627 |
| Johan David Herklots | 16,606 | 21.5 - 45.5 | 21,157 |
| Jan Muntener | 5,261 | 22.3 - 31 | 6,739 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 9,116 | 22.3 - 53 | 10,747 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 2,239 | 21 - 23 | 2,503 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 8,075 | 22.5 - 34 | 9,853 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 1,517 | 22.8 | 1,717 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 14,518 | 22.3 - 37 | 18,133 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. | 12,453 | 22.5 - 38 | 14,287 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 1,542 | 23.3 | 1,783 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 7,203 | 22 - 46.5 | 11,383 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 9,433 | 22.5 - 33.3 | 12,193 |
| Jan van de Kruijsse | 829 | 22.8 | 943 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 13,339 | 22.3 - 22.8 | 14,881 |
| Pieter de Bruijn | 11,790 | 22.3 - 23.3 | 13,285 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 4,296 | 22.3 - 22.8 | 4,831 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 12,757 | 22.3 - 23 | 14,281 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 2,900 | 22.3 - 22.8 | 3,241 |
| David van Wijk | 10,915 | 22.8 - 59 | 20,173 |
| *22 November 1773* | | | |
| Petrus Hamer | 85,373 | 14.8 - 68 | 105,841 |
| Jacobus Fak | 5,820 | 15 - 20.5 | 4,735 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 74,600 | 12.8 - 67.5 | 83,677 |
| James Turing | 3,046 | 16 | 2,419 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 135,018 | 9 - 68 | 163,753 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 28,242 | 10 - 68.5 | 28,915 |
| Johan David Herklots | 4,906 | 15 - 68.5 | 8,168 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 17,046 | 14.8 - 50 | 25,099 |
| Elias Levij Content | 2,800 | 19.3 - 21 | 2,815 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 103,923 | 15 - 56.5 | 102,775 |
| Petrus Jacobus Mathijse | 1,515 | 15.5 | 1,171 |
| Securius & Bourje | 49,234 | 15 - 36 | 46,861 |
| Anthonij Friscus | 1,707 | 15.3 - 20 | 1,471 |
| Johanes Jacobus Landrij | 10,526 | 15.5 - 43.5 | 11,383 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 94,606 | 12 - 37.8 | 82,945 |
| Joost Sanders | 1,915 | 15.3 - 30 | 1,729 |
| Jan van Maaren | 23,252 | 15 - 37.5 | 24,019 |
| Nicolaas de Koebert | 1,939 | 16 - 30.5 | 1,819 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 12,270 | 15.3 - 42.5 | 14,407 |
| Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. | 9,179 | 15.3 - 36.3 | 8,665 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 25,059 | 15 - 43 | 24,049 |
| Willem Nevejans | 2,858 | 16.3 - 19.3 | 2,503 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 6,611 | 15 - 35 | 7,483 |
| Daniel van den Berge Blok | 378 | 30.5 | 577 |
| Jeremias Petit | 3,666 | 15.5 - 32.8 | 4,189 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 3,035 | 15 - 16 | 2,335 |
| Johannes Casparus Helleman | 5,342 | 10 - 38.3 | 5,335 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 714 | 16 - 16.3 | 577 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 4,449 | 16 - 37.5 | 4,993 |
| Jan van der Woord | 4,330 | 16 - 19.8 | 3,703 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 4,609 | 16.3 - 29 | 5,191 |
| Stephannus Francois de Moulin | 855 | 15.5 - 29 | 919 |
| Jan Muntener | 1,624 | 16 - 43.5 | 2,071 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 2,289 | 16 - 30.5 | 2,365 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 13,119 | 15 - 35.3 | 14,365 |
| Pieter Bos | 32,368 | 14.8 - 34 | 33,619 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 5,235 | 15 - 19.3 | 4,255 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 5,458 | 15 - 29.3 | 5,257 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 2,729 | 15.3 - 29.5 | 2,365 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 8,760 | 15.3 - 23.3 | 7,885 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 12,450 | 15.3 - 32.3 | 11,575 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 45,423 | 10.8 - 29.5 | 39,139 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw & Son | 3,156 | 16 - 16.5 | 2,551 |
| Van de Perre & Meijners | 22,789 | 15 - 16.3 | 17,593 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 8,155 | 12.3 - 22 | 6,283 |
| Richard Roberts | 1,509 | 15 | 1,129 |
| John Podd | 1,539 | 15.3 | 1,171 |
| *28 November 1774* | | | |
| John Pilkington | 18,565 | 13.3 - 68 | 23,827 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 4,605 | 15.3 - 28 | 4,627 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 149,335 | 14.5 - 68 | 139,393 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 729 | 14.5 | 529 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 49,858 | 14.5 - 65.5 | 49,153 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 125,178 | 10 - 65.5 | 141,949 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 103,512 | 11.5 - 36 | 88,111 |
| Richard Roberts | 1,550 | 15 | 1,159 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 21,692 | 12 - 50.5 | 26,185 |
| Jacobus Fak | 3,144 | 15 | 2,341 |
| Jan van der Woord | 15,190 | 14.5 - 68 | 15,919 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 14,498 | 12.8 - 68 | 13,747 |
| Johannes Casparus Helleman | 10,465 | 12 - 37.8 | 10,753 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 16,352 | 14 - 51 | 14,473 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 7,652 | 15.3 - 28 | 8,737 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 94,163 | 14.8 - 52.8 | 101,653 |
| Johan David Herklots | 21,779 | 12 - 36 | 21,613 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 4,509 | 15 - 27.3 | 4,321 |
| Jan van Maaren | 28,753 | 11.8 - 50.5 | 32,311 |
| Securius & Bourje | 26,121 | 14.8 - 52 | 24,325 |
| Pieter de Bruijn | 6,722 | 15 - 15.3 | 5,017 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 28,178 | 14.8 - 41.5 | 25,411 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 4,492 | 15.3 | 3,403 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 12,735 | 15 - 45.8 | 13,801 |
| Pieter Bos | 24,710 | 14.8 - 69 | 26,497 |
| Joost Sanders | 3,038 | 15 | 2,263 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 20,072 | 15 - 35.3 | 18,301 |
| Jeremias Petit | 3,580 | 15.3 - 35.3 | 3,799 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 17,392 | 15 - 15.5 | 13,075 |
| Nicolaas de Koebert | 1,543 | 15 | 1,153 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 8,898 | 14.8 - 35.3 | 7,759 |
| James Turing | 1,514 | 15.3 | 1,153 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 7,308 | 14.5 - 35.3 | 7,831 |
| Ferdinand Kladt | 489 | 15.8 | 391 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 5,624 | 14 - 28 | 5,167 |
| Elias Levij Content | 1,350 | 15 | 1,009 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 6,957 | 14.8 - 15.3 | 5,185 |
| Willem Nevejans | 2,383 | 14.8 - 28 | 2,731 |
| Anthonij Friscus | 2,518 | 15.3 - 35.3 | 2,869 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan Muntener | 2,338 | 14.5 - 15.5 | 1,759 |
| Jacobus Broekhoven | 4,202 | 15 - 35.3 | 4,249 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 2,740 | 15.3 - 30 | 2,983 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,488 | 15.3 | 1,129 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,465 | 15.3 | 1,111 |
| Daniel Lijmons & Comp. | 1,482 | 15.3 | 1,129 |
| Hartog Jacob de Vries & Co. | 6,571 | 13.8 - 27.5 | 5,815 |
| Mozes Isaac Gans | 32,092 | 12.5 - 51.5 | 27,685 |
| *23 October 1775* | | | |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 19,820 | 12.5 - 70 | 16,951 |
| Pieter de Bruijn | 5,986 | 12.5 - 13 | 3,787 |
| Jacobus Aantsen | 3,388 | 12.3 - 43 | 5,413 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 2,959 | 12.8 | 1,879 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 151,796 | 7 - 69 | 132,037 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 64,473 | 12.5 - 69 | 62,065 |
| Securius & Bourje | 22,709 | 7 - 35.3 | 16,903 |
| Martinus Engelsz. | 5,826 | 12.8 - 13 | 3,721 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 155,405 | 8.3 - 69 | 152,599 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 16,307 | 8.3 - 34.5 | 11,575 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 3,085 | 13 - 14.5 | 2,107 |
| Johan David Herklots | 29,940 | 10.3 - 34.5 | 20,815 |
| James Turing | 4,322 | 12.8 | 2,737 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 3,911 | 17 - 34 | 4,603 |
| Gillis Engelsz. | 2,923 | 13 | 1,891 |
| John Pilkington | 7,963 | 12.8 - 34.5 | 6,499 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 500 | 31.5 | 787 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 99,784 | 8.3 - 38.5 | 87,103 |
| Jacobus Broekhoven | 1,468 | 12.8 | 937 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 12,285 | 12.8 - 37 | 14,989 |
| Pieter Bos | 21,374 | 12.8 - 43.3 | 23,995 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 5,639 | 17.8 - 32.8 | 6,013 |
| Jan van Maaren | 23,791 | 12.8 - 42.8 | 30,271 |
| Adriaan van den Berge | 1,511 | 13 | 979 |
| Jan van der Woord | 2,860 | 12.5 - 23.5 | 2,101 |
| Jan Muntener | 2,069 | 18.3 - 34 | 2,311 |
| Johannes Casparus Helleman | 8,008 | 12.5 - 41.8 | 6,091 |
| Christiaan & Willem Hendrik Herklots | 1,472 | 12.8 | 937 |
| Jeremias Petit | 4,346 | 13 - 39 | 4,951 |
| Abraham de Smit & Johannes de Smit | 9,170 | 12.8 - 13 | 5,857 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 5,964 | 13 - 38.8 | 5,749 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 7,956 | 12.3 - 34 | 9,241 |
| Van den Perre & Meijners | 22,577 | 7 - 44 | 20,575 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 4,313 | 13 - 38.3 | 5,875 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 18,531 | 12.8 - 38.8 | 15,109 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 12,743 | 12.8 | 8,059 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 18,194 | 8.5 - 36 | 16,969 |
| Jacobus Fak | 6,744 | 8.5 - 14.3 | 4,321 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 5,575 | 12.8 - 13.5 | 3,625 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 17,995 | 12.8 - 13.3 | 11,599 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Gregorie | 8,928 | 13 | 5,755 |
| Evert Jansz. van Bel | 498 | 35.3 | 877 |
| Johan Pagter Roelandszoon | 1,132 | 10.3 | 583 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 3,168 | 12.8 | 2,011 |
| Van de Perre & Meijners | 1,375 | 12.8 | 877 |
| Isaak Baalden | 5,795 | 13 - 37.3 | 5,683 |
| Hartog Jacob de Vries & Co. | 3,889 | 32.8 | 4,861 |
| Abraham Cohen | 749 | 8.3 | 313 |
| *25 November 1776* | | | |
| Jan Swart & Son | 73,011 | 8.5 - 74.5 | 71,383 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 190,022 | 6.8 - 74.5 | 173,707 |
| Adriaan van den Berge | 1,520 | 13 | 985 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 66,942 | 6.3 - 74.5 | 71,395 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 8,612 | 12.8 - 46.5 | 11,185 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 80,868 | 9.8 - 35.8 | 85,819 |
| Jan van Maaren | 35,218 | 12.8 - 46.5 | 39,235 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 1,019 | 36.5 - 45.3 | 1,981 |
| Securius & Bourje | 60,865 | 6.8 - 37.8 | 44,881 |
| Anthonij Friskus | 2,584 | 13.3 - 47.3 | 3,787 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 49,384 | 12.8 - 44.8 | 46,699 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 2,859 | 28.3 | 4,009 |
| Jan van der Woord | 15,921 | 7 - 35.8 | 16,003 |
| John Pilkington | 10,112 | 12.8 - 13 | 6,415 |
| Pieter Bos | 65,017 | 12 - 37.3 | 70,213 |
| Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon | 6,035 | 12.8 - 13 | 3,859 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 12,089 | 10.5 - 35.8 | 12,397 |
| Van de Perre & Meijners | 17,908 | 13 - 44.3 | 19,951 |
| Johan David Herklots | 24,651 | 8.8 - 35.8 | 22,513 |
| Willem Nevejans | 1,273 | 30.5 | 1,933 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 13,768 | 12.8 - 36.8 | 11,503 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 6,495 | 12.8 - 35.8 | 6,595 |
| Evert Jansz. van Bel | 793 | 37.3 | 1,471 |
| Jeremias Petit | 3,955 | 17.8 - 35.8 | 5,353 |
| Christiaan & Willem Hendrik Herklots | 2,870 | 12.8 - 28.8 | 2,923 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 8,023 | 10.8 - 31 | 7,627 |
| Jan Brouwer Hendrikzoon | 1,442 | 30.5 | 2,185 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 3,429 | 30.3 - 35.8 | 5,683 |
| Johannes Casparus Helleman | 5,799 | 12.8 - 13 | 3,703 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 25,534 | 12.8 - 35 | 22,825 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 6,846 | 8 - 27.8 | 6,673 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 1,282 | 13.3 | 847 |
| Boudewijn Dijserinck | 7,106 | 13 - 37.5 | 10,891 |
| Jan Pozolij | 371 | 8.5 | 163 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 14,488 | 12.8 - 30.8 | 17,503 |
| Jacobus Fak | 9,432 | 8.3 - 30.5 | 8,773 |
| Pieter Achermans | 14,814 | 12.8 - 13 | 9,475 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 2,776 | 13.3 - 30.5 | 2,917 |
| James Turing | 9,940 | 12.8 - 32.5 | 7,663 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 10,823 | 8.5 - 12.8 | 5,923 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 816 | 8.5 - 8.8 | 355 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan Bekker Junior | 31,705 | 6 - 12.8 | 14,569 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 25,626 | 8.3 - 34.5 | 19,777 |

B. *The auction of teas* op vracht

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *22 November 1762* | | | |
| Pieter Bosch | 2,878 | 26.3 - 27.3 | 3,823 |
| Jacobus Fak | 2,810 | 26.3 - 26.8 | 3,697 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 5,593 | 26 - 37 | 8,773 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 8,546 | 26.3 - 38.3 | 12,925 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 846 | 38 | 1,597 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 1,386 | 26.8 | 1,843 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 3,238 | 26.8 - 33.5 | 4,591 |
| Jan Macquet | 2,947 | 25.8 - 36.8 | 4,681 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 6,728 | 26 - 38.8 | 10,681 |
| Jeremias Petit | 895 | 27.3 | 1,213 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 1,913 | 27 - 28 | 2,635 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 3,601 | 25.8 - 35.5 | 5,215 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 5,810 | 25.8 - 27.8 | 7,693 |
| Pieter Clement | 2,935 | 27.5 | 4,009 |
| Johan Bendleij | 8,129 | 26.3 - 31.5 | 11,005 |
| Der Moijse & Van der Woord | 3,453 | 25.5 - 27 | 4,489 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 3,120 | 26.8 - 27 | 4,165 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 2,302 | 32.8 - 36.5 | 3,895 |
| Aarnoud Brouwer | 9,568 | 26.5 - 38.3 | 13,243 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 3,525 | 26.8 - 29.5 | 4,813 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 5,533 | 26.8 - 35.3 | 7,795 |
| Johan Rodolphus Teuts | 465 | 27.3 | 637 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 1,454 | 26.8 | 1,933 |
| Petrus Hamer | 11,181 | 26.5 - 46.5 | 17,539 |
| Silo de Cheff | 368 | 26.5 | 493 |
| Daniel de Smith | 1,004 | 25.8 | 1,291 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 56,197 | 25.8 - 45.3 | 83,641 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 45,697 | 25.5 - 45.8 | 71,977 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 37,962 | 25.5 - 45 | 56,095 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 39,524 | 26.5 - 38.8 | 57,865 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 60,772 | 25.8 - 46.8 | 91,441 |
| *18 April 1763* | | | |
| Jeremias Petit | 103 | 40 | 211 |
| Jan Porter | 449 | 32 | 721 |
| Pieter Bos | 78 | 32 | 133 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 823 | 27 - 31 | 1,147 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 644 | 30 | 967 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 547 | 31 | 847 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 1,693 | 27 - 31 | 2,395 |
| *8 December 1763* | | | |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 3,292 | 20.8 - 31.3 | 4,315 |
| Maria Greeax | 6,925 | 20 - 21.3 | 7,087 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 62,898 | 19.5 - 37 | 82,477 |
| John Porter | 1,487 | 21.3 | 1,573 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 37,439 | 20 - 36.3 | 51,529 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 6,689 | 20.3 - 32.8 | 8,305 |
| Hendrik Jan van Wijck | 5,733 | 17.3 - 33.8 | 8,083 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 11,093 | 16.8 - 32 | 13,075 |
| Johan Constantin Mathias | 261 | 38 | 499 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 41,777 | 19.8 - 35 | 52,849 |
| Lambert Schoft | 2,254 | 24 - 34.8 | 3,493 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 2,730 | 20.5 - 21.3 | 2,833 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 23,985 | 20 - 36.8 | 29,887 |
| Petrus Hamer | 11,546 | 19.8 - 21.3 | 11,737 |
| Pieter Bos | 4,543 | 20 - 34.8 | 5,671 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 28,751 | 20 - 36.3 | 32,761 |
| Thomas Holman | 11,345 | 20 - 21.8 | 11,593 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 1,336 | 20.3 | 1,345 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 5,140 | 20 - 33.3 | 5,863 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 2,608 | 20 - 20.3 | 2,605 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 33,846 | 19.5 - 34.5 | 40,531 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 5,455 | 21.5 - 31.5 | 7,069 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 4,258 | 30.3 - 33.3 | 6,589 |
| Aanroud Brouwer | 2,854 | 20.8 - 21.3 | 2,977 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 2,778 | 30 - 37 | 4,591 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 3,456 | 30 - 31.8 | 5,263 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 1,458 | 21.5 | 1,561 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 1,349 | 20.5 | 1,375 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 1,424 | 21.5 | 1,525 |
| Jan Macquet | 1,289 | 20.3 | 1,291 |
| James Turing | 1,317 | 20.8 | 1,363 |
| Daniel Smith | 521 | 41 | 1,063 |
| Andries van der Poest | 1,378 | 32.3 | 2,209 |
| *25 April 1764* | | | |
| Lambert Schoft | 400 | 30 | 591 |
| Pieter Bos | 1,370 | 21 - 21.5 | 1,453 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 1,985 | 19.5 - 21.5 | 2,005 |
| Petrus Hamer | 639 | 19.5 | 625 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 411 | 21 | 433 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 89 | 15.5 | 73 |
| *3 November 1766* | | | |
| John Podd | 5,532 | 11.5 - 30.5 | 4,585 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 377 | 12 | 229 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 22,156 | 12.3 - 33.5 | 27,805 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 5,578 | 12.3 - 33.5 | 4,876 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 1,390 | 12.5 | 865 |
| Petrus Hamer | 2,777 | 12.5 - 33.5 | 3,175 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 5,601 | 12.8 | 3,493 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 6,922 | 33.5 | 8,551 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 2,794 | 33 | 3,139 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 8,776 | 33.5 | 8,467 |
| Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon | 8,358 | 13 | 5,287 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 4,146 | 12.8 - 33.5 | 5,431 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *4 May 1767* | | | |
| Petrus Hamer | 330 | 32.5 | 541 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 537 | 13 | 355 |

C. *The auction of teas* van particulieren

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *27 November 1758* | | | |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 1,657 | 32.5 - 37.5 | 2,785 |
| Anthonij van Citters | 655 | 28 - 29 | 937 |
| Willem Wondergem | 155 | 20 - 30.5 | 211 |
| Aarnoud Brouwers | 917 | 30.5 - 36 | 1,591 |
| Jan de Haase | 487 | 18.5 - 26 | 535 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 1,737 | 28.5 - 50 | 3,385 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 282 | 27 - 45 | 979 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 239 | 20.5 - 28 | 277 |
| Adriaan Lourens | 148 | 27 - 27.5 | 211 |
| Jeremias Petit | 232 | 21.5 - 24.5 | 271 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 278 | 43.5 | 1,759 |
| Anthonij Leliaart | 347 | 15.5 - 27 | 331 |
| Jacob Coole | 76 | 29.5 | 121 |
| Martinus Gardijn | 90 | 27.5 | 133 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 601 | 34 | 1,003 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 67 | 24 | 85 |
| Gerrit Sleutelenberg | 105 | 17.5 | 97 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,018 | 48 | 2,263 |
| John Porter | 1,007 | 32.5 | 1,525 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | no data | no data | 811 |
| Lambert Schoft | 254 | 38 | 493 |
| James Turing | 359 | 23 | 385 |
| Jan Boudaan | 130 | 19.5 | 133 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 411 | 20 | 1,075 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 914 | 40.5 - 41 | 1,873 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw | no data | no data | 463 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 1,163 | 42.5 - 45 | 2,551 |
| Benjamin Gavin | 481 | 42.5 | 1,033 |
| Roeland Leenders | 533 | 26.5 | 715 |
| Daniel Smit | 466 | 43 | 1,009 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 1,094 | 40 | 2,197 |
| *19 November 1759* | | | |
| Jeremias Petit | 1,545 | 28.5 - 37 | 2,581 |
| Lambert Schoft | 524 | 29 | 769 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 993 | 31.5 - 33.5 | 1,621 |
| Petrus Hamer | 632 | 16.5 - 36 | 925 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 1,015 | 33 - 34.5 | 1,717 |
| Daniel Smith | 299 | 24 - 35.5 | 1,105 |
| John Porter | 130 | 17.5 | 121 |
| Elias de Timmerman | 450 | 32.5 | 739 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 1,415 | 16 - 30 | 2,215 |
| Jan de Feijter | 505 | 17.5 - 24 | 583 |
| Anthonij van Citters | 547 | 24 | 667 |
| Jonas Nathan Cohen | 465 | 26.5 | 625 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christiaan Wollaart | 204 | 29.5 | 307 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 854 | 36 | 1,255 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 806 | 25.5 | 1,015 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 542 | 26 | 685 |
| James Turing | 231 | 25 | 295 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 482 | 30.5 | 745 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 477 | 30 | 721 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 120 | 24 | 151 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 404 | 25.5 | 1,123 |
| Cornelis Zachariassen | 96 | 24.5 | 289 |
| Godart Redeker | 1,110 | 24.5 - 25 | 1,381 |
| Roeland Pagter | no data | no data | 385 |
| Roeland Leenders | 484 | 24.5 | 601 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 370 | 24.5 | 451 |
| Jacobus Helleweel | 88 | 25.5 | 121 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 211 | 25 | 271 |
| *17 November 1760* | | | |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 910 | 22 - 23.3 | 1,045 |
| Jacocb van Os | 138 | 18.5 | 133 |
| Anthonij van Citters | 959 | 28 - 29 | 1,375 |
| Abraham Verheeke | 541 | 25 | 685 |
| Pieter Bos | 983 | 15.5 36.5 | 1,459 |
| Petrus Hamer | 1,004 | 17 - 20.8 | 967 |
| Benjamin Gavin | 3,756 | 13.3 - 23.5 | 3,577 |
| Alexander Israel | 202 | 11.8 | 127 |
| Maria Uijtterschout | 73 | 16 | 67 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 491 | 38.5 | 955 |
| Hendrik Lambertus de Vos | 216 | 18 | 199 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 1,185 | 17.8 - 24.8 | 1,243 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,435 | 22.5 - 36 | 2,089 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 259 | 15.8 | 205 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 238 | 16.5 | 205 |
| Willem Grauwert | 460 | 22.3 | 517 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 433 | 20.3 | 451 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 1,010 | 28.5 | 1,249 |
| Lambert Schoft | 512 | 23.5 | 607 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 192 | 20.3 | 199 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 2,244 | 27 | 2,701 |
| Aarnoud Brouwers | 913 | 24.8 | 961 |
| Jeremias Petit | 442 | 18 | 403 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 73 | 16.8 | 67 |
| Abraham de Smit de Jonge | 238 | 21.3 | 259 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 993 | 36.5 | 1,675 |
| Roeland Leenders | 459 | 23.3 | 541 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 406 | 14.3 | 295 |
| Jan Noordhoek | 475 | 22.3 | 535 |
| Hendrikus Kakelaar | 547 | 36.8 | 1,015 |
| *9 November 1761* | | | |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 596 | 33.3 | 997 |
| Johan Bendleij | 537 | 36 | 973 |
| Lambert Schoft | 1,572 | 25.8 - 34 | 2,353 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jan der Moijse | 275 | 33 | 463 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw | 678 | 22.5 - 24.3 | 793 |
| Willem Nevejans | 493 | 24.5 | 613 |
| Petrus Hamer | 857 | 23 - 23.5 | 1,003 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 401 | 23.8 | 481 |
| Abraham Verheeke | 659 | 22.3 - 25.3 | 817 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 536 | 36 | 973 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 55 | 22 | 67 |
| Samuel Le Cocq | 548 | 35.5 | 979 |
| the widow Maartens & Son | 1,490 | 28.5 - 40 | 2,941 |
| Andries Nebbens | 422 | 25.3 | 541 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 831 | 40.3 - 40.5 | 1,687 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,130 | 39.5 - 41 | 2,281 |
| Jan de Haase | 497 | 40 - 42 | 1,027 |
| Leenderd Doudeijns | 497 | 32 | 805 |
| *22 November 1762* | | | |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 1,971 | 26.8 - 40 | 3,253 |
| John Porter | 1,095 | 27 - 33.8 | 1,669 |
| Bomme & Engelsz. | 743 | 34.5 | 1,291 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 4,302 | 33.3 - 38.5 | 7,627 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 531 | 36 | 961 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 483 | 39.3 | 955 |
| Pieter de Swarte | 421 | 42.3 | 895 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 270 | 36.3 | 499 |
| der Moijse & Van der Woord | 325 | 25.3 - 25.8 | 421 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 577 | 27.8 | 811 |
| Jan Macquet | 227 | no data | 505 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 2,025 | 38 - 40.5 | 4,015 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 444 | 36.8 | 823 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 4,474 | 26.3 - 40 | 8,185 |
| Jacobus Bal | 701 | 26.8 - 30 | 1,027 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 513 | 38.3 | 991 |
| Anthonij van Citters | 1,556 | 39 - 39.8 | 3,085 |
| Jeremias Petit | 553 | 26.8 - 38 | 1,003 |
| Petrus Hamer | 610 | 26.3 - 35.3 | 1,027 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 490 | 36.8 | 907 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 478 | 34.8 | 841 |
| Jan Sierevelt | 395 | 27 - 33.3 | 631 |
| Bomme & Voutje | 646 | 26.5 - 44 | 1,273 |
| Silo de Cheff | 107 | 26.5 | 151 |
| Daniel van den Berge W^m^zoon | 502 | 38 | 961 |
| Heijman & Hertog Hendriks | 185 | 26.8 | 253 |
| *8 December 1763* | | | |
| Lion van Hildeshijm | 803 | 20.8 - 35.3 | 1,099 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 939 | 21.3 - 33.5 | 1,333 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 2,830 | 20.3 - 37.5 | 4,579 |
| Pieter Adriaansen | 517 | 21 - 23.3 | 565 |
| Heijman & Hertog Hendriks | 909 | 21.8 - 33.3 | 1,303 |
| Silo de Cheff | 1,010 | 20.3 - 35.8 | 1,423 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 1,967 | 34.5 - 36 | 3,439 |
| Jeremias Petit | 2,119 | 34.5 - 38 | 3,847 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,542 | 34.3 - 38 | 2,785 |
| John Porter | 668 | 34.3 | 1,705 |
| Petrus Hamer | 885 | 23.8 - 34.8 | 1,297 |
| Thomas Holman | 937 | 34 - 35.5 | 1,639 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 2,589 | 33 - 37 | 4,549 |
| Jeremias van Nederveen | 1,828 | 35.3 - 36.5 | 3,265 |
| Dirk de Visser | 141 | 29 | 211 |
| Johan Philip Hardij | 285 | 33 - 34.8 | 493 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 967 | 32.8 - 34.3 | 1,627 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 73 | 33 | 127 |
| Willem de Bruijn Leendertzoon | 522 | 35.3 | 925 |
| Abraham de Smit | 1,406 | 35 - 38.5 | 2,551 |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 1,037 | 36 - 38.3 | 1,933 |
| Cornelis de Gruijter | 167 | 25.3 | 217 |
| Benjamin van Heulen | 223 | 34.8 | 397 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 532 | 35.8 | 961 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 475 | 36.8 | 883 |
| Pieter Bos | 252 | 35.8 | 637 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 540 | 36.8 | 1,003 |
| Hendrik Jan van Wijck | 1,859 | 35.3 - 36 | 3,325 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,040 | 34.8 - 35 | 1,825 |
| *2 October 1764* | | | |
| Jeremias Petit | 618 | 45.3 | 1,405 |
| Daniel Smith | 649 | 43 | 1,405 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,160 | 43.8 - 44 | 2,557 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 585 | 43.3 | 1,273 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 649 | 43 | 1,396 |
| Bomme & Van der Veere | 530 | 44.3 | 1,183 |
| Pieter Bos | 524 | 44.8 | 1,183 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 584 | 45 | 1,321 |
| *19 November 1764* | | | |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 1,165 | 16.5 - 36.5 | 1,483 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 550 | 37.8 | 1,045 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 2,903 | 20.3 - 43 | 5,353 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 1,458 | 38.5 - 40 | 2,893 |
| Jeremias Petit | 505 | 39.5 | 1,003 |
| Petrus Hamer | 2,379 | 14.3 - 37.5 | 2,461 |
| Roeland Leenderts | 167 | 22.3 | 193 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 1,279 | 38 - 43.8 | 3,001 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 2,637 | 17.3 - 44.8 | 5,233 |
| Hendrik van de Walle | 1,404 | 41.3 - 45.5 | 3,019 |
| Roeland Pagter | 453 | 28.5 | 655 |
| Thomas Holman | 501 | 43 | 1,085 |
| Pieter Bos | 1,085 | 32.5 - 41.3 | 2,125 |
| Cornelis van der Veere | 993 | 37.3 - 39.5 | 1,915 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 588 | 35.8 | 1,057 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 230 | 41 | 481 |
| Jacobus Pols | 917 | 39.5 - 41.5 | 1,867 |
| Pieter van der Elst | 396 | 17.3 - 17.8 | 355 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| *11 November 1765* | | | |
| Cornelis Perduijn | 1,032 | 37 | 2,071 |
| Bomme & Van der Veere | 3,420 | 36 - 47.3 | 7,213 |
| Jacobus Bal David & Son | 92 | 18 | 91 |
| Elias Levij Content | 72 | 12.3 - 17 | 61 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 1,325 | 10.5 - 45 | 1,615 |
| Willemsen & Steurbroek | 168 | 13 | 115 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 1,263 | 8 - 45.5 | 1,771 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 822 | 17.3 - 48.3 | 1,819 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 1,089 | 45.3 - 45.5 | 2,479 |
| Der Moijse & Van der Woord | 1,060 | 8 - 11.8 | 499 |
| John Porter | 952 | 41.8 - 44.5 | 2,059 |
| Pieter Bos | 250 | 13 - 15.5 | 181 |
| Jeremias Petit | 656 | 45.3 - 58 | 1,651 |
| Lambert Schoft | 152 | 12.3 | 103 |
| Daniel Smith | 206 | 23.8 - 24 | 253 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 449 | 45.5 | 1,027 |
| *3 November 1766* | | | |
| Lion van Hildescheijm | 167 | 8 - 31 | 217 |
| Paulus Hendrik Securius | 2,157 | 7.8 - 46.5 | 3,649 |
| John Porter | 1,546 | 31 - 45 | 3,277 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 1,686 | 8.5 - 46.5 | 3,445 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 1,885 | 8.8 - 45 | 3,451 |
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 1,350 | 8.3 - 44.5 | 2,377 |
| Daniel Smith | 221 | 8 - 10 | 103 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 466 | 46 | 1,081 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 488 | 43.5 | 1,069 |
| Francois Gaaswijk | 193 | 44.5 | 439 |
| Willemina Tijdgat widow A. Brouwers | 706 | 42.5 | 1,501 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 226 | 8.5 | 97 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 230 | 43.5 | 505 |
| Jeremias Petit | 431 | 46 | 997 |
| Cornelis Dijserinck | 1,167 | 46 | 2,695 |
| *9 November 1772* | | | |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 1,187 | 30.5 - 66 | 2,215 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 512 | 29.5 | 763 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 967 | 28.8 - 30.8 | 1,447 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 2,611 | 27 - 30.5 | 3,721 |
| Securius & Bourje | 1,265 | 19.8 - 35.3 | 1,717 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 1,360 | 27.3 - 34.3 | 2,293 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 2,097 | 31 - 35.3 | 3,529 |
| Jan Muntener | 658 | 26.8 - 27.3 | 901 |
| Petrus Hamer | 692 | 28.3 - 34.5 | 1,069 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 1,018 | 27.3 - 33.3 | 1,561 |
| Gillis & Martinus Engelsz. | 449 | 19.5 | 445 |
| Jacobus Fak | 2,017 | 20 - 27.8 | 2,629 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 503 | 36.5 | 925 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 563 | 34.8 | 985 |
| the widow Daniel Smith | 510 | 36 | 925 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boursse de Superville & Smith | 775 | 25 - 84 | 1,801 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 989 | 35.3 - 35.8 | 1,765 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 479 | 35 | 847 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 1,531 | 32.5 - 37 | 2,665 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 420 | 19 | 409 |
| *22 November 1773* | | | |
| Pieter Bos | 977 | 19.3 - 20 | 967 |
| Johannes Jacobus Landrij | 1,048 | 18.5 - 30.5 | 1,321 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 202 | 19.3 | 199 |
| Petrus Hamer | 5,052 | 10.5 - 30.3 | 6,673 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 2,211 | 24 - 28 | 2,851 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 500 | 19 | 481 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 4,011 | 13.8 - 32 | 4,381 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 837 | 24 - 34.5 | 1,219 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 182 | 30.5 | 383 |
| Ferdinand Kladt | 213 | 22 | 241 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 3,078 | 27.8 - 34.3 | 4,693 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 932 | 24.5 - 25.5 | 1,177 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 932 | 29 - 29.3 | 1,363 |
| Jan Muntener | 483 | 20.8 | 511 |
| Securius & Bourje | 920 | 29 - 32.8 | 1,335 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 890 | 22.3 - 31.8 | 1,207 |
| Joachim Rutger Liens | 431 | 18.3 | 403 |
| Willem Nevejans | 501 | 25.5 | 649 |
| Jacobus Mareeuw & Son | 498 | 30.5 | 769 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 445 | 29 | 655 |
| Johan David Herklots | 456 | 24.3 | 559 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 255 | 30.5 | 397 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 252 | 28.5 | 367 |
| Jan van Maaren | 481 | 22.5 | 547 |
| Dirk de Visser | 467 | 26 | 613 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 480 | 30.5 | 739 |
| *28 November 1774* | | | |
| Securius & Bourje | 738 | 35.5 - 38.5 | 1,387 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 1,239 | 24 - 36.8 | 1,927 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 955 | 17.5 - 34.5 | 1,279 |
| Jan Willeboorts | 629 | 18 - 23.5 | 691 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 4,280 | 7.5 - 35.3 | 4,399 |
| Jacobus Broekhoven | 1,478 | 20.5 - 34.3 | 1,993 |
| Jan Muntener | 878 | 18.3 - 21.8 | 865 |
| Casparus Ribaut & Son | 1,951 | 18.5 - 33 | 2,593 |
| John Pilkington | 1,905 | 34.3 - 35.8 | 3,349 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 474 | 36.3 | 865 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 1,548 | 33.5 - 35.3 | 2,689 |
| Elias Levij Content | 272 | 22 | 307 |
| Pieter Bos | 428 | 22.5 | 487 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 450 | 18 | 415 |
| de Haze Bomme van Citters & Catteau | 423 | 18.5 | 397 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hendrik van der Linde | 245 | 36.5 | 457 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 524 | 34.8 | 919 |
| Jan van Maaren | 514 | 33.8 | 877 |
| Pieter Jacob van Engelsdorp | 592 | 34.3 | 1,021 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 237 | 36.5 | 439 |
| Nathan Jonas Cohen | no data | 40.5 | 415 |
| *22 October 1775* | | | |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 3,997 | 13.8 - 38.3 | 5,269 |
| Stephanus Francois de Moulin | 197 | 23 | 235 |
| Johannes Henricus Schuttel | 194 | 22 | 223 |
| Securius & Bourje | 990 | 36 - 37.8 | 1,831 |
| Gerrit de Jong | 1,037 | 34.5 - 35.5 | 1,819 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 539 | 34.3 | 931 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 952 | 34.5 | 1,651 |
| Pieter Bos | 999 | 33.8 - 36 | 1,723 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 1,614 | 32.8 - 34 | 2,707 |
| Jacobus Broekhoven | 544 | 33.3 | 913 |
| Van de Perre & Meijners | 582 | 35.3 | 1,033 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 438 | 32.5 | 721 |
| Jan van Maaren | 473 | 34.3 | 817 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 467 | 33.8 | 793 |
| Joost Sanders | 269 | 35.3 | 481 |
| Fredrik Papegaaij | 470 | 33 | 781 |
| Mathijs Gotreke | 241 | 36.5 | 445 |
| Jan Bekker Junior | 488 | 33.3 | 817 |
| Jan Pozolij | 200 | 17 | 175 |
| *25 November 1776* | | | |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 9,438 | 22.8 - 30 | 12,721 |
| Cornelis Willemsen | 2,386 | 23.3 - 30 | 3,325 |
| Thomas Holman & John Holman | 3,634 | 8.8 - 71.5 | 5,305 |
| Jan Swart & Son | 1,125 | 26.5 - 72.3 | 2,665 |
| Jacobus Aartsen | 962 | 26.8 - 29.3 | 1,351 |
| Jan Muntener | 446 | 25.3 - 38.3 | 721 |
| Pieter Kakenberg | 1,395 | 25.3 - 29.5 | 1,945 |
| Isaak de Wijze | 1,115 | 31.5 - 32.8 | 1,795 |
| Gijsbert van Ippel | 1,153 | 28 - 30.3 | 1,693 |
| Van de Perre & Meijners | 1,606 | 24.3 - 31.3 | 2,299 |
| Securius & Bourje | 589 | 10.3 - 26 | 487 |
| Heijman Hendriks & Hartog Hendriks | 889 | 25 - 27.5 | 1,171 |
| de Timmerman & de Jonge | 899 | 26.5 - 30 | 1,273 |
| Pieter Jacob van Engelsdorp | 477 | 27.5 | 661 |
| Pieter Bos | 517 | 28.3 | 739 |
| Anthonij Friskus | 201 | 24.3 | 253 |
| Hendrik van der Linde | 402 | 27.5 | 559 |
| Johannes van Deijnsen | 521 | 26 | 685 |
| Leendert Doudeijns | 498 | 31.8 | 799 |
| Willem Nevejans | 466 | 31.3 | 733 |
| Jacobus Johannes Steurbroek | 544 | 27.5 | 757 |
| Jan Bommene | 487 | 29.5 | 727 |

| Tea buyers | Volumes (pounds) | Prices (stivers/pound) | Value (guilders) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Johannes Hendricus Schuttel | 457 | 23.8 | 553 |
| Petrus Johannes Nortier | 234 | 24.8 | 295 |
| Jan van Maaren | 110 | 30.3 | 175 |
| Daniel van den Berge Blok | 221 | 32 | 361 |
| Jacob Bouvin | 487 | 30 | 739 |
| Boudaan & Van den Bosch | 460 | 28 | 649 |

Source: NA VOC 13377.

APPENDIX 9

# SELLING PRICES OF BOHEA AND SOUCHONG ON THE AMSTERDAM COMMODITY EXCHANGE, 1732-1795

(guilders/pound)

| Year | Bohea | Souchong | Year | Bohea | Souchong |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *1732* | 1.33 | unknown | *1764* | 1.21 | 3.41 |
| *1733* | 1.44 | unknown | *1765* | 1.21 | 3.95 |
| *1734* | 1.55 | unknown | *1766* | 1.06 | 3.94 |
| *1735* | 1.59 | unknown | *1767* | 1.01 | 3.96 |
| *1736* | 1.60 | unknown | *1768* | 1.04 | 3.57 |
| *1737* | 1.30 | unknown | *1769* | 1.04 | 3.50 |
| *1738* | 1.12 | unknown | *1770* | 0.92 | 3.38 |
| *1739* | 1.03 | unknown | *1771* | 1.07 | 3.15 |
| *1740* | 1.00 | unknown | *1772* | 1.11 | 3.35 |
| *1741* | 1.09 | unknown | *1773* | 1.00 | 3.30 |
| *1742* | 0.94 | unknown | *1774* | 0.90 | 3.14 |
| *1743* | 0.90 | unknown | *1775* | 0.83 | 2.99 |
| *1744* | 1.13 | unknown | *1776* | 0.89 | 2.83 |
| *1745* | 1.05 | unknown | *1777* | 0.75 | 2.31 |
| *1746* | 1.52 | unknown | *1778* | 0.82 | 2.12 |
| *1747* | 1.40 | unknown | *1779* | 0.99 | 2.20 |
| *1748* | 1.23 | unknown | *1780* | 1.09 | 2.15 |
| *1749* | unknown | unknown | *1781* | 1.31 | 2.63 |
| *1750* | 0.97 | unknown | *1782* | 1.58 | 2.98 |
| *1751* | 0.9 | unknown | *1783* | 1.18 | 2.60 |
| *1752* | 0.81 | unknown | *1784* | 0.77 | 2.31 |
| *1753* | 0.89 | unknown | *1785* | 0.76 | 2.46 |
| *1754* | 0.67 | unknown | *1786* | 0.68 | 2.75 |
| *1755* | 0.92 | unknown | *1787* | 0.70 | 2.95 |
| *1756* | 0.77 | unknown | *1788* | 0.62 | 2.39 |
| *1757* | 0.98 | unknown | *1789* | 0.54 | 2.15 |
| *1758* | 1.00 | 3.1 | *1790* | 0.54 | 2.12 |
| *1759* | unknown | unknown | *1791* | 0.51 | 2.12 |
| *1760* | 1.05 | 3.25 | *1792* | 0.53 | 1.88 |
| *1761* | 1.18 | 3.05 | *1793* | 0.51 | 1.88 |
| *1762* | 1.30 | 3.05 | *1794* | 0.49 | 1.97 |
| *1763* | 1.32 | 3.15 | *1795* | 0.56 | 2.13 |

Source: N.W. Posthumus, *Nederlandsche prijsgeschiedenis*, dl. I, 189-194.

APPENDIX 10

# SELLING PRICES OF TEAS BY SEVERAL TEA-DEALERS IN AMSTERDAM, 1776-1795

(guilders/pound)

A. *Selling prices by J. Voute & Sons*

| Sales date | Bohea | Congou | Souchong | Pekoe | Songlo | Twankay | Hyson skin | Hyson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 Sept. 1777 | 13 - 16 | 28 - 36 | 34 - 56 | 40 - 56 | 33 - 34 | 35 - 36 | 36 - 40 | 80 - 85 |
| 9 Feb. 1778 | 13.5 - 16 | 28 - 36 | 35 - 50 | 46 - 60 | 34 - 36 | 36 - 38 | 42 - 46 | 82 - 90 |
| 9 Mar. 1778 | 14 - 16 | 28 - 36 | 35 - 50 | 46 - 60 | 34 - 36 | 36 - 38 | 42 - 46 | 82 - 90 |
| 29 Jun. 1778 | 16 - 17 | 28 - 36 | 35 - 50 | 46 - 60 | 36 - 37 | 38 - 42 | 40 - 50 | 82 - 86 |
| 13 Jul. 1778 | 16 - 17 | 28 - 36 | 35 - 50 | 46 - 60 | 36 - 37 | 38 - 42 | 40 - 50 | 82 - 86 |
| 7 Sept. 1778 | 16 - 17 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 45 - 60 | 37 - 39 | 38 - 42 | 40 - 50 | 82 - 90 |
| 29 Mar. 1779 | 19 - 20 | 28 - 46 | 36 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 45 - 48 | 49 - 50 | 50 - 54 | 85 - 95 |
| 9 Aug. 1779 | 19.5 - 20 | 28 - 46 | 32 - 60 | 34 - 56 | 46 - 50 | 50 - 56 | 58 - 60 | 92 - 96 |
| 13 Dec. 1779 | 22 - 23 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 52 - 60 | 78 - 102 |
| 3 Jan. 1780 | 22 - 23 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 52 - 60 | 78 - 100 |
| 17 Jan. 1780 | 22 - 23 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 52 - 60 | 78 - 100 |
| 23 Jan. 1780 | 22 - 23 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 52 - 60 | 78 - 100 |
| 31 Jan. 1780 | 22 - 23 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 52 - 60 | 78 - 100 |
| 24 Mar. 1780 | 22 - 22.5 | 28 - 45 | 34 - 60 | 48 - 60 | 50 - 52 | 54 - 56 | 54 - 60 | 80 - 100 |
| 11 Sept. 1780 | 21 - 21.5 | 30 - 40 | 34 - 60 | 42 - 60 | 42 - 45 | 44 - 46 | 48 - 56 | 70 - 95 |
| 5 Mar. 1781 | 22 - 24 | 36 - 50 | 38 - 60 | 48 - 56 | 36 - 38 | 38 - 44 | 50 - 60 | 80 - 105 |
| 25 Feb. 1788 | 13 - 16 | 32 - 46 | 42 - 65 | unknown | 28 - 32 | 34 - 40 | 42 - 56 | 75 - 100 |
| 26 May 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 2 Jun. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 9 Jun. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 30 Jun. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 11 Aug. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 1 Sept. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 8 Sept. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 78 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 28 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 3 Nov. 1788 | 11 - 13 | 26 - 42 | 34 - 52 | 80 - 85 | 26 - 30 | 27 - 31 | 38 - 40 | 50 - 65 |
| 2 Mar. 1795 | 9 - 11 | 20 - 24 | 32 - 48 | 36 - 60 | 14 - 24 | 16 - 25 | 24 - 32 | 36 - 52 |
| 9 Mar. 1795 | 9 - 11 | 20 - 24 | 32 - 48 | 36 - 60 | 14 - 24 | 16 - 25 | 24 - 32 | 36 - 52 |
| 4 May 1795 | 9 - 11 | 22 - 44 | 34 - 52 | 38 - 60 | 17 - 24 | 18 - 26 | 24 - 33 | 38 - 52 |

B. *Selling prices by D.J. van Wijk*

| Sales date | Bohea | Congou | Souchong | Pekoe | Songlo | Twankay | Hyson skin | Hyson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14 Apr. 1788 | 10 - 14 | 26 - 48 | 45 - 65 | 66 - 100 | 28 - 32 | 34 - 36 | 38 - 44 | 70 - 110 |
| 5 May 1788 | 10 - 14 | 27 - 48 | 38 - 60 | 65 - 90 | 28 - 30 | 30 - 34 | 38 - 45 | 75 - 95 |
| 19 May 1788 | 9.5 - 14 | 27.5 - 46 | 37 - 60 | 66 - 95 | 30 - 36 | 31 - 37 | 35 - 45 | 68 - 95 |
| 26 May 1788 | 8.5 - 14 | 27 - 46 | 40 - 60 | 60 - 90 | 24 - 34 | 31 - 37 | 38 - 45 | 58 - 90 |
| 1 Jun. 1788 | 8.5 - 14 | 26 - 46 | 40 - 60 | 68 - 90 | 26 - 34 | 31 - 37 | 36 - 45 | 58 - 96 |
| 9 Jun. 1788 | 9 - 13 | 26 - 47 | 40 - 60 | 70 - 95 | 24 - 35 | 32 - 37 | 35 - 46 | 55 - 90 |
| 16 Jun. 1788 | 11.75 - 14 | 27 - 47 | 45 - 70 | 73 - 95 | 28 - 36 | 34 - 38 | 37 - 46 | 60 - 95 |

C. *Selling prices by G. Hentzen*

| Sales date | Bohea | Congou | Souchong | Pekoe | Songlo | Hyson skin | Hyson |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13 May 1776 | 15 - 24 | 36 - 56 | 38 - 70 | 36 - 60 | 28 - 34 | 38 - 46 | 74 - 110 |
| 28 Mar. 1795 | 10 - 13 | 24 - 50 | 24 - 60 | 40 - 70 | 16 - 22 | 24 - 32 | 40 - 140 |
| 27 Apr. 1795 | 10 - 13 | 24 - 50 | 24 - 50 | 36 - 60 | 18 - 34 | 24 - 34 | 40 - 140 |
| 11 May 1795 | 10 - 13 | 24 - 50 | 24 - 50 | 36 - 60 | 18 - 24 | 24 - 34 | 40 - 140 |
| 28 May 1795 | 10 - 13 | 25 - 50 | 26 - 50 | 36 - 60 | 18 - 24 | 24 - 34 | 40 - 140 |
| 15 Jun. 1795 | 10 - 13 | 28 - 56 | 28 - 56 | 36 - 60 | 20 - 26 | 26 - 36 | 40 - 140 |
| 29 Jun. 1795 | 10 - 13 | 28 - 56 | 28 - 56 | 36 - 60 | 20 - 26 | 26 - 36 | 40 - 140 |
| 28 Sept. 1795 | 12 - 16 | 33 - 56 | 38 - 56 | 44 - 60 | 24 - 30 | 30 - 40 | 40 - 150 |
| 19 Oct. 1795 | 12 - 16 | 33 - 56 | 38 - 56 | 44 - 60 | 24 - 30 | 30 - 40 | 40 - 150 |
| 16 Nov. 1795 | 12 - 17 | 33 - 56 | 38 - 56 | 44 - 60 | 24 - 30 | 30 - 40 | 40 - 150 |
| 30 Nov. 1795 | 13 - 15 | 30 - 50 | 38 - 48 | 40 - 60 | 23 - 28 | 28 - 36 | 60 |
| 14 Dec. 1795 | 13 - 15 | 30 - 50 | 38 - 48 | 40 - 60 | 23 - 28 | 28 - 36 | 60 |

Source: GAA, Bibliotheek, N 19.23.022, “Coffee and Tea”.

APPENDIX 11

# AVERAGE WAGES: WESTERN AND EASTERN NETHERLANDS, 1725-1790

(stivers per day, summer wages)

| Year | Master | | Journeyman | | Unskilled | | Hod-carrier | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | W.N. | E.N. | W.N. | E.N. | W.N. | E.N. | W.N. | E.N. |
| *1725* | 27.16 | 19.5 | 24.12 | 18.4 | 18 | 12.25 | 18.8 | unknown |
| *1730* | 27.48 | 19.5 | 24.29 | 18.4 | 19.25 | 12.25 | 18.8 | unknown |
| *1735* | 28.34 | 20 | 25.41 | 18.4 | 19.13 | 12.25 | 18.8 | unknown |
| *1740* | 28.13 | 20 | 24.87 | 18.4 | 17.33 | 12.25 | 18.6 | unknown |
| *1745* | 27.75 | 20 | 24.33 | 18.8 | 17.33 | 12.25 | 18.6 | unknown |
| *1750* | 28.35 | 20 | 24.7 | 18.8 | 18 | 12.88 | 18.6 | unknown |
| *1755* | 28 | 20 | 24.93 | 18.8 | 17.33 | 12.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1760* | 28 | 20 | 25.08 | 18.8 | 17.33 | 12.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1765* | 28.25 | 20 | 24.3 | 18.4 | 18 | 12.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1770* | 28.38 | 20 | 24.3 | 18.8 | 17.33 | 11.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1775* | 28.5 | 20 | 24.9 | 18.8 | 17.33 | 11.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1780* | unknown | 20 | unknown | 18.8 | unknown | 11.88 | unknown | unknown |
| *1785* | 28.7 | 20 | 24.55 | 18.8 | 17.2 | 11.88 | 19.2 | unknown |
| *1790* | 28.6 | 20 | 25.23 | 18.4 | 17.2 | 12.75 | 19.2 | unknown |

Source: J. de Vries and A.M. van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 610-613.

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